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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of youth activism in Egypt as key social actors during 
the latter years of Mubarak’s presidency (from 2000) and leading into the tumultuous events 
of the Revolution in January 2011.  
The assessment draws on social movement theory to provide an analytical framework, 
specifically the political process model. It first offers an analytical narrative of the political 
structures which have developed within Egypt in the modern era and which have provided the 
structural context within which such movements have emerged and developed, notably cycles 
of contentious politics. The narrative identifies the impact of early Nasserist hegemony, the 
subsequent embedding of corporatist structures for socio-political organisation, and the 
inhibiting effects these had on the development of autonomous social movements until the 
contemporary period. Youth and Student movements remained key political actors during 
specific historical periods but even these were severely constrained after 1979. This provides 
the structural scene setting for our in-depth study of contemporary youth activism.  
In attempting to explain the contemporary  re-emergence of youth activism during the January 
Revolution, the thesis proceeds to examine the political opportunities which were presented to 
social movements in general, and youth activism specifically, during the era of Mubarak’s 
rule, and with an emphasis on the period from 2000-2010. Developments in Egypt are 
analysed through the ordering devices offered by SMT, including the progressive rupturing of 
the state-society relationship, the high level of grievances among the population, the level of 
institutional access, and divisions among the ruling elite. The thesis adds an additional 
category – the role played by transnational and external factors – which emerged as an 
important influence in the preceding narrative of Egyptian political development but which 
have traditionally been neglected by SMT.  
The thesis further uses the analytical tools of SMT to examine two particular forms of youth 
mobilisation; the student movements and the April 6
th
 movement. Successive chapters 
examine the strategic choices, organisation, framings and mobilisation strategies of these 
movements, drawing heavily on intensive semi- and un-structured interviewing and data 
collection, both in person and through the formats and devices of the social movements 
themselves (such as Facebook, Twitter and movement websites).  
The thesis demonstrates that these youth activism are better understood as New Social 
Movements (NSM) rather than conventional social movements. They have developed through 
horizontal networking rather than vertical and hierarchical organisations. They have drawn 
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substantially on the political opportunities offered by transnational and external factors. In 
both these aspects, they have made good use of new informational and communications 
technologies, specifically the Internet, which create communicative linkages but do not offer a 
clear route to the next stage of formal political organisation (explaining in part the limitations 
of these movements). Finally, they demonstrate the importance of generational politics in 
Egypt, the grievances of which lie at the core of the rupture between state and society. 
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 Introduction   
Egyptian politics in the modern era (since 1952) have been marked by cycles of mobilization 
and reform. However, these have become a great deal more intensive over the last decade 
which has been marked by a recurrence of long waves of social and political protest. The 
period between 2000 and 2010 was the most astonishing,  witnessing inspiring waves of 
mobilization – the most profound seen since the 1967 war as various generations and social 
forces joined hands to bring about  the historical change of 25
th
 January 2011. Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime faced an ultimately overwhelming challenge from the convergence of 
counter-hegemonic forces, social movements and new activism which launched a long 
campaign and framing process to delegitimize the regime and its policies. Over the period, the 
regime lost its hegemony over society and suffered from the lack of support of its own 
previously loyal networks and social bases which became less willing to defend the old 
regime. Youth, labour, students, new political parties and Islamists united to challenge the 
regime and security forces before and during the revolution. All these agents of change acted 
together in harmony to organize and coordinate the protest and mobilization under different 
umbrellas and coalitions. 
Aims of the thesis and research questions: 
This thesis seeks to shed light on one part of this story of agency; the rise and role of the 
youth activism which were so prominent in the January 2011 Revolution. It takes as its 
starting point the analytical frame which is offered by Social Movement Theory (hereafter 
SMT). It tells a story of agency in times of both constraints and opportunities in Egypt, 
explaining the recurrent waves of social and political mobilization in the form of protest 
movements, specifically the youth activism. The specificity of the Egyptian context is 
developed through combining the tools of SMT with the theoretical insights gained from 
academic literature about the state and society in Egypt, together  providing  an elaboration of 
the  political opportunities structure in Egypt both before and subsequent from 2000-2010.  
The three basic empirical questions are thus: (1) What conditions shaped the mobilization of 
youth activism which has taken place in Egypt during the period of study? (2) What can the 
application of SMT tell us about youth movements; do they indeed conform to the formats of 
social movements and how are they different from conventional social movements in Egypt; 
Finally, (3) what does the study of contemporary youth activism in Egypt – their 
organisations, mobilizing strategies, and framing - tell us about the wider realm of Egyptian 
politics and state-society relations? 
11 
 
The recent years have witnessed a proliferation of youth activism in Egyptian politics, 
although this has frequently been manifested outside of the established formal political 
structures and traditional political parties. In this regard the youth activism in this thesis refers 
to those “young people engaging in a practice that emphasizes direct vigorous action, 
especially in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue” (Giles, 2008, p.11). 
The youth activism engaged in the contentious politics in Egypt includes various categories, 
particularly independent youth networks, “student movements” and “youth chapters” of 
political parties and social forces. The research focuses on the ways the youth activism of 
what we may call the Millennium generation engaged in contentious politics through a fully-
fledged youth movements. The April 6th Youth Movement, Al Ghad and Youth for Change 
etc., all represent broad swathes of youths who perceive their interests to be unrepresented by 
existing political structures and their needs to be unrecognized and unmet.  
It is worth noting that the number of approaches to the study of youth activism already exist 
drawing on theories and methods in sociology (such as generational studies), cross-cultural or 
historical analysis. The most widespread approach, and therefore the one adopted here – is the 
use of Social Movement Theory. The theoretical point of departure for this theoretical 
position is that the entry of youth activism into the public arena can be seen as a process of 
social mobilization. 
Chapter One elaborates on the main concepts, categories and arguments of Social Movement 
Theory. It identifies the role of social movements in contentious politics, as opposed to party 
or lobby politics. It examines the various approaches which have developed within the 
broader range of Social Movement Theory, ultimately acknowledging the Political Process 
Model (PPM) as the most useful for the purposes of this study. The PPM offers the research 
three clear dimensions of social movements which can be studied: the (responses to) political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes and culture. A further dimension 
which is suggested for study is the impact of external and transnational factors. How these 
dimensions interact (referred to in the thesis as the reciprocal relationship) determines the two 
stages of first the emergence, and second the development and outcomes, of social 
movements. Key to this process is the role and strategies of the state and how it responds to 
social forces such as social movements. The chapter acknowledges the deficiencies of the 
approach, specifically the weakness or lack of consensus over definitions, and more 
immediately the appropriateness of the approach for non-Western contexts with different 
historical and cultural contexts. 
 
Chapter Two therefore addresses how the approach will be applied in the context of Egypt, 
setting out the methodology of the thesis. In order to acknowledge the specificity of Egypt, 
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the study builds upon close examination of the historical evolution of political structures, the 
state-society and state-social movement relationships until the contemporary period (Chapter 
Three). The thesis is subsequently structured to identify the political opportunities which 
emerged in the period of study (2000-2010), and the responses within social and youth 
activism (the reciprocal relationship) (Chapters Four and Five). The methodology then 
requires moving from the macro to the micro level. In order to assess the organisation, 
mobilisation strategies and framing process of youth activism, the thesis zooms in to study 
two specific formats of youth activism, student movements and the April 6
th
 Movement 
(Chapters Six and Seven). The methodology for these studies is devised to allow the youth to 
speak for themselves through the communications methods which they favour and which 
shape the activism itself. The researcher extensively engaged with youth activists through not 
just face-to-face interviews, but also through Internet-base chat rooms, Facebook and other 
forms of web-based communication. How this was done will be elaborated on in Chapter 
Two. 
 
Chapter Three sets out the evolution of the state-society relationship in Egypt in the modern 
era in order to provide the political structural context in which social movements in general 
and youth activism in particular emerged and developed, and with what outcomes. The 
chapter shows that youth activism responded to varying political opportunities (and 
alternatively periods of political closure) resulting in cycles of contestation between 
themselves and the regime. Youth activism came in waves, the scale and intensity of which 
depended upon the particular political opportunities of the moment. If the early years after the 
July 1952 Revolution featured lively youth activism (coming out of the contestation 
surrounding the end of the monarchy), the consolidation of the Nasserist regime in the late 
1950s and 1960s saw the regime containing youth activism within its own corporatist and 
hegemonic structures. The next major wave of activism came with the defeat of 1967, 
continuing through until the period of Sadat’s rule although at this point the activists were less 
divided by ideology, and more united in their nationalist outlook (indicating the importance of 
transnational and external factors). During Sadat’s rule, the ideological hegemony of Nasser 
diminished; leading social movements to fragment once more over ideological lines 
(principally Islamist, Leftist, Nasserist and Liberal) while the political opportunities were 
reduced by Sadat’s growing authoritarianism. Mubarak’s rule suggested initially a 
continuation of these limited political opportunities resulting in stagnant and polarised youth 
activism in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Chapter Four identifies the period from 2000 to 2010 as one of expanding political 
opportunities, using indicators of political opportunity drawn from the Political Process 
Model and which the researcher demonstrates are particularly appropriate to the Egyptian 
context. The chapter demonstrates that during this period not only was the state-society 
ruptured by growing social and economic grievances, but the state itself was weakened by its 
loss of hegemony, internal divisions, the internal contradictions of the competitive 
authoritarian political model which had developed and the impact of external and 
transnational factors (such as a Palestinian Intifada, the War in Iraq and American democracy 
promotion in the region). The environmental opportunities rendered the established regime 
vulnerable to change by identifying and deepening cracks and fissures in the regime, 
particularly through the interaction between pressure from the bottom and the survival 
strategy at the top. 
 
Chapter Five examines how social movements responded to these opportunities, notably in 
the longest wave of political mobilisation and protest since 1967. It argues that conventional 
corporatist youth arrangements were unable to capture or express this mobilisation and those 
consequently new formats for activism outside of organised structures began to emerge. 
This chapter highlights the various cycles of mobilization 2000/2010, which contributed to 
the emergence and development of various kinds of social and youth activism. And then it 
explores more specifically the formal structures and official corporatist arrangements which 
the regime tightly controlled through various mechanisms. 
 
Chapter Six shows how this was particularly the case within student activism. Using data 
drawn from interviews, websites and internet-based communications with activists, the 
chapter demonstrates how the regime-control of campus-based student union activism, and 
the reluctance of traditional political party student wings to challenge this directly, led 
students to mobilise outside the structures of established youth activism. This wave of student 
activism was less ideologically divided, creating new forms of cooperation like the Free 
Student Union.  
Chapter Seven uses similarly rich youth voices to examine the mobilisation of youth into the 
April 6
th
 movement, its organisation, strategies and framing processes. Indeed, April 6 
developed a more stable structure and collective identity and strategic choices compared with 
other youth networks such as Youth for Change but still needed to be articulated in more 
complex and specific terms and concepts.  
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The close examination of these two formats for new youth activism leads to Chapter Eight, in 
which the researcher elaborates on the cross-ideological nature of the new activism, the 
common strategies of non-violent direct protest rather than electoral participation or 
engagement in the conventional political arena, and the shared reliance on new forms of 
internet based communication to communicate with and mobilise participants. Despite 
enormous success in mobilising large numbers of youth to engage in the wave of protest 
activism, the political structures which formed the context of contentious politics necessitated 
that they ultimately had to create more formal organisations with whom other socio-political 
actors could engage. However, as they sought to develop these more formal organisational 
structures, they were rapidly weakened and fragmented, often losing the flexibility and 
fluidity which had given them such appeal in the first place. As movements formalised, they 
lost their ability to reflect the aspirations of the younger generation. Substituting vertical 
forms of organisation for the horizontal and more inclusive networks of the protests led to a 
loss of dynamism and a loss of the focus on a single shared goal which had enervated them 
towards the January Revolution.  
 
In conclusion, the thesis argues that the youth activism of contemporary Egypt is best 
understood as New Social Movements rather than conventional social movements. They are 
particularly characterised by their use of, indeed reliance on, social media formats which 
shape their mobilization, organisation and framing processes. While this sustains horizontal 
networks, it translates poorly into formal vertically-structured organisations and has begun to 
diminish the power of this latest wave of activism, although new forms of social mobilization 
may yet emerge since Egyptian politics remain highly contentious.  
The second feature of these New Social Movements is the way they reflect the generational 
dynamic in Egyptian politics. What has variously been called the Millennium or Digital 
Native Generation, which has been excluded and failed by the politics of successive Egyptian 
regimes, has found a voice in these movements which is unlikely to disappear. 
In this regard, Social Movement Theory is seen to provide the researcher with the relevant 
concepts and tools to explain the emergence and development of the new youth activism in 
Egypt. Political opportunity, mobilizing structures, framing processes and New Social 
Movements prove to be useful concepts for exploring and explaining the emergence and 
development of youth activism in a different context from the normal Western context in 
which it is used. It is also useful in illustrating and understanding the larger state-society 
relationship in Egypt.  
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The thesis argues, in sum, that the youth activism which developed in Egypt during the period 
2000-2010, and which featured so prominently in the January 2011 Revolution, are New 
Social Movements which represent, or derive from, a rupture in state-society relations which 
has developed over a more prolonged period of contentious politics, but was invigorated by 
specific political opportunities arising after 2000. 
Issues of researcher objectivity are discussed in the methodology chapter later in the thesis. 
However, it should be recognised that the youth activism being studied here were leading the 
extraordinary events of 2011 which culminated in the toppling of the Mubarak Regime. The 
researcher, being Egyptian, was not immune to the momentousness of events, which offered 
him alternately visions of being unable to return home, threats to the security of livelihood of 
his family and friends, his studentship being put in jeopardy, and then the joys and excitement 
of freedom and change. He was not just a researcher of this phenomenon – he was a part of it. 
While every effort has been made to maintain academic objectivity, he recognises that at 
times the research takes implicit positions but with the ambition always that this does not 
affect the academic judgement.  
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Chapter One: 
Theoretical Framework: Social Movements Theory 
1.1 Introduction 
The perspectives developed by Social Movement Theory (SMT) particularly the political 
process model, are valuable in illuminating the intrinsic aspects and characteristics of youth 
activism and explaining their prominence in specific contexts and periods. This study treats 
youth activism as agents of change and adopts the standard of a social movement 
questionnaire to provoke questions about young activism in Egypt. As youth activism is 
treated as a kind of social movement, the theory offers various explanations of the conditions 
under which youth mobilization emerges and develops. In this regard the political process 
model (PPM) assumes that movements emerge as a function of some combination of 
opportunities, resources and framing, however, the way in which these variables are defined 
differs from case to case and from one context to another. None can be generalized to explain 
all cases.  
The purpose of this chapter is to reassess certain parts of SMT and particularly the political 
process model in order to provide and construct analytical frames to be used for the study of 
Egyptian youth activism.  Our starting point in studying youth activism reflects the underlying 
assumption of the PPM. But the study considers the other theories and approaches since the 
scholars categorize four main perspectives in the analysis of social movements: collective 
behaviour, new social movements, resource mobilization and political process model. 
This chapter addresses the main questions and basic definitions of the main concepts of SMT 
such as PO, MS and FP, and then illustrates the importance of transitional and external factors 
in the emergence and development of social movements.  It also explores some efforts to 
utilize SMT in a Middle East and Egyptian context and discusses the limitations of the 
applying of theory to non-western contexts which are often characterized by political control 
and limited means for communicative action. 
1.2 Defining Social Movements in the Contentious Politics 
There are plenty of definitions of social movements, which reflect the essence of the concept 
and distinguish it from other concepts. Tarrow (1994, p. 4), for example, produced a rather 
abstract definition describing them as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and 
social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities”. 
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Zirakzadeh’s definition (2006, p. 5) focused on the aim and level of change as “a group of 
people who endeavour to build a radically new social order, involving political activity by 
non-elite people from a broad range of social backgrounds employing a mix of socially 
disruptive tactics and legal tactics”. 
What is common between different definitions is that SMs call for change in certain aspects 
of societal order and their interaction with other actors, in order to achieve this goal, with 
some sort of opponent or authority that they feel is unjust (Tarrow, 1988). This, plus certain 
other interesting features, can be found in the definition provided by Della Porta and Diani 
(2006, p. 20) stating that social movements are a distinct social process consisting of the 
mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective action are involved in conflicting 
relations with clearly identified opponents, are linked by dense informal networks and, 
finally, are characterized by a distinctive collective identity.  
In this regard contentious collective action serves as the basis of social movements because it 
is the main and often the only recourse that most ordinary people possess to demonstrate their 
claims against better-equipped opponents or powerful states. This means that the role of 
ordinary people in contentious politics is the most remarkable element to distinguish social 
movements from other civil society groups, market relations, lobbying, or representative 
politics. Indeed they bring ordinary people into confrontation with opponents, elites, or 
authorities (Tarrow, 2011, p. 8). Another distinctive aspect of social movements is their 
sustainability, which means that isolated incidents of contention, for instance, a riot or a mob, 
do not represent a social movement, because the participants in these forms of contention 
typically have no more than temporary solidarity and cannot sustain their challenges against 
opponents. It is not a movement unless it is "sustained." However, mobs, riots, and 
spontaneous assemblies may be an indication that movements are in the process of formation 
rather than movements themselves (Tarrow, 2011, p. 11). 
These definitions are useful in studying youth activism and social protest groups as actors 
which have been involved in contentious politics in Egypt. They are inclusive and allow for 
exploring a variety of groups, using different methods to achieve their goals. These wide 
definitions and perspectives also make it possible to observe interesting variations in the 
mobilization processes of different groups.  
It is noteworthy that there are various theoretical explanations of social movements. These 
theories could be seen as the building blocks of the sociology of social movement because 
they represent socially constructed images/perceptions of reality, which trigger off collective 
action (Sociology of Social Movements, p.1310). As noted by Della Porta and Diani (1999) 
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these theories are rather fluctuant as in many cases concepts and ideas overlap and change 
over time. Scholars categorize four main perspectives in the analysis of social movements: 
collective behaviour, new social movements, resource mobilization and political process. This 
chapter discusses and reassesses the political process model in order to provide and construct 
analytical frames to be used for the study of Egyptian youth activism.   
1.3 The Political Process Model 
The political process model stressed the crucial importance of expanding political 
opportunities as the ultimate spur to collective action (McAdam et al, 1996, Bayat, 2005, p. 
892). It shares with resource mobilization theory a rational view of action, but pays more 
systematic attention to the political and institutional environment (Della Porta, Donatella and 
Mario Diani, 2006), p. 16). 
Our starting point in studying youth activism reflects the underlying assumption of the 
political process model. It is widely agreed that the political process model (PPM) is currently 
the ‘hegemonic paradigm among social movement scholars’1. It “dominates the field of social 
movement research by powerfully shaping its conceptual landscape, theoretical discourse, and 
research agenda”. Its domination of the field makes Goodwin and Jasper declare that it “may 
be criticized, but it cannot be ignored” (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999 p. 28). 
The political process model emphasizes the importance of three broad sets of factors in 
analyzing the emergence and development of social movements. This approach considers 
social movements as a combination of a movement’s organizational strength, providing the 
means for taking action; their shared cognitions, which presents the ideological motivation 
that inspires people to collective action, group identity and group action; and, finally, political 
opportunities, highlighting the political context within which groups can engage in 
contentious politics (McAdam, et al, 1996, p. 2 ; Davenport,2005). 
PPM proponents claim that although social movements usually conceive of themselves as 
being outside of, and opposed to, institutions, acting collectively inserts them into a complex 
policy network and thus within reach of the state. That is, movements develop in response to 
                                                     
1 The political process approach was introduced by McAdam as a result of his tracing of the development of the 
American civil rights movement (1982) although, as McAdam mentioned (1982: 36), he took the term from an 
article by Rule and Tilly (1975: 28) , See McAdam, Doug, (1999) Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930–1970. Second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago. Most social movement researchers have 
since then followed in McAdam’s footprints. 
19 
 
an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger socio-political 
environment they seek to change (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 17). 
Political Opportunities 
Political opportunity is a concept that deals with the complex environments that the 
movements face. As Tarrow (2011, p. 6) pointed out, “contentious politics emerges in 
response to changes in political opportunities and constraints” which “create the most 
important incentives for triggering new phases of contention” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 12). 
However, the broader set of political constraints and opportunities is unique to the national 
context in which they are embedded (McAdams et al, 1996, p. 3). 
Tarrow identified a number of types of political opportunities and was followed in doing so 
by other authors (like McAdam 1996 p. 10, Goodwin, 1999, p. 32, Bedford, 2009, pp. 35, 36, 
Donatella and Diani, 2006, p. 17). These types include
2
:  
1- The  degree of openness or closure of formal political access; 
2- The degree of stability or instability of political alignments;  
3- The availability and strategic posture of potential alliance partners and political 
conflict within and among elites; 
4- The state’s capacity and propensity for repression. 
The main emphasis in the model has been on highlighting the various opportunities opening 
up to social movements. Collective action is structured by the available political 
opportunities. The activists can be expected to be encouraged by “relaxation in social control, 
the granting of electoral access, cleavages in previously stable governing alliances and the 
routine electoral transfer of institutional power from one group of incumbents to another who 
interpret the transfer of power as granting them new elite allies” (McAdams et al, 1996, pp. 
10, 11). 
Plenty of researchers focused on two particular dimensions of opportunity structure that are 
considered most relevant. Firstly, “the formal aspects of the institutionalized political system 
that involves institution and legislation that enable or prevent movement mobilization”. 
Secondly, “the informal identifying attitudes of, and practices pursued, by the political 
establishment in regards to opposition” (Bedford, 2009, p. 35; Esman, 1994). 
                                                     
2 Chapter 4 will discuss in details these concepts and indicators that explain the political opportunities in the 
Egyptian context. 
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There are many critical points of view to classify these four dimensions and the concept of 
political opportunity in general. First of all one could note that a number of recent studies 
suggest additional dimensions to the political opportunity concept (Donatella & Diani, 2006, 
p. 17). Several authors do not restrict themselves to this "consensual" list; they added other 
political opportunity variables. Goodwin & Jasper (1999, p. 32) argued that the four variables 
cannot by themselves “explain the rise of social movements nor could any other specification 
of political opportunity”. They concluded that political opportunities cannot be well defined 
because they suffered the fate that ‘resource’ often did within the resource mobilization 
model: “virtually anything that, in retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement 
mobilize or attain its goals becomes labelled a political opportunity” (Goodwin & Jasper 1999 
p. 36). They emphasised that “there may be no such thing as objective political opportunities 
before or beneath interpretation or at least none that matter; they are all interpreted through 
cultural filters” (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p, 33). 
On the other hand, Tarrow (2011, p. 12) responded to such criticism by confirming that 
“objective opportunities” do not “automatically trigger episodes of contentious politics or 
social movements, regardless of what people think or feel”.  He added that “individuals need 
to perceive political opportunities and to be emotionally engaged by their claims if they are to 
be induced to participate on possibly risky and certainly costly collective actions; and they 
need to perceive constraints if they are to hesitate to take such action”.   
It is also worth noting that even though the definitions of these dimensions may or may not 
cover a political context ranging from facilitative to repressive towards social movements, the 
studies of political activism in “partial democracies feature an inopportune political 
environment which, from the outset, hardly offers any openings for social movement 
mobilization”3. As suggested by Wickham, rather than relating political environment to 
improving political opportunities, “authoritarian empirical contexts call for a greater focus on 
how institutions and legislation shape and restrict movement mobilization” (Rosefsky-
Wickham, 2002, p. 13). The concept still faces some ambiguity in the definition and ability to 
interpret all aspects of political and social structure and environment that face the movements. 
“As a result of the difficulties relating to the narrow political opportunity thesis, political 
process theorists added social/organizational and cultural factors to the latter's political ones” 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p. 41). 
                                                     
3 See for example Foweraker (1995); chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Bayes, Jane H and Nayereh Tohidi (ed.) (2001) 
Globalization, Gender and Religion. The Politics of Women’s Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts. New York: 
Palgrave or Singerman (2004). 
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It is worth noting that the collective behaviour perspective, as one strand of Structural Theory, 
concentrated on strain as the root cause of social movements and on the individual and social 
psychological reasons for contention (McAdam et al, 1996). Consequently, social movements 
were considered a product or at least a manifestation of the social structure (Sociology of 
Social Movements, p.1309). But critically, however, Wiktorowicz (2004, p. 9) states; 
“Structural strain and discontent may be necessary, but they are not a sufficient causal 
explanation”. 
In the Egyptian context, the four types of political opportunities produced by Tarrow are far 
from enough to provide the comprehensive explanations for the emergence of ‘social’ youth 
activism. Notwithstanding that a specific kind of social structure has a specific kind of social 
movement, it is important to revise the Middle East political literature to discuss and analyze 
the political opportunities according to the different approaches and theories about the state-
society relationship. In addition to this, the following chapters will test and apply some of the 
assumptions and arguments of the structural approach about grievances and relative 
deprivation in the Egyptian context.  
Mobilizing Structures 
Political process theorists emphasise the importance of mobilizing structures. If the political 
contexts shape the prospects for collective action and the forms movements take, their 
influence is not independent of the various kinds of mobilizing structures through which 
groups seek to organize. In this regard mobilizing structures means “collective vehicles, 
informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in the collective 
action” (McAdam et al, 1996, p.3)  As McAdam illustrates, “these vehicles include the micro-
level groups, organizations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building 
blocks of social movements”. In other words, this factor refers to “the level of organization 
within the aggravated population” or “degree of organizational readiness” within the 
community in question McAdam (1999 p. 40). This concept focuses on the means available 
for a group to turn their efforts into an organized campaign of social protest and the effects of 
organization on the movements’ capacity for contention. Tarrow (1994); McAdam (1999). 
Bedford (2009, p. 27) identified certain factors which are crucial to social movement 
mobilization: members, networks, social relationships, leaders and  free spaces.  
It is worth noting that resource-mobilization theory focuses on the critical role of resources 
and formal organization in the rise of movements. This approach defines social movements as 
conscious actors making rational choices. Donatella and Diani (2006, p. 15) emphasized the 
organization and the effectiveness with which movements use the resources to obtain their 
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goals (McAdam et al, 1996). The emergence of social movements cannot be explained simply 
by the existence of tension and structural conflict, as structural theory confirms, but it is 
important to explore the conditions which enable discontent to be transformed into 
mobilization. The capacity for mobilization depends on the material resources (work, money, 
concrete benefits and services) and/or non-material resources (authority, moral engagement, 
faith and friendship) available to the group (Donatella and Diani (2006) p. 15). Consequently, 
social movements arise when people who are aggrieved or discontented are capable of 
mobilizing resources sufficiently to take action toward addressing their problems (Sociology 
of Social Movements, 1311). 
Framing Process: 
Frames and framing processes in the study of collective action have come to be regarded, 
alongside mobilizing structures and political opportunities, as “a central dynamic in 
understanding the character and course of social movements” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 
611). The shared meanings and definitions that people have to bring to their situation can be 
considered as a mediator between opportunity, organization, and action. They need to feel 
both aggrieved and optimistic to act collectively, and it is highly unlikely that they will 
mobilize even when afforded the opportunity if these perceptions are missing or not 
considered as sufficient to motivate them (McAdam et al, 1996, p. 5). In this regard Tarrow 
(2011, p. 12)  argues that “objective” opportunities do not automatically trigger episodes of 
contentious politics or social movements, regardless of what people think or feel. Individuals 
need to perceive political opportunities and to be emotionally engaged by their claims if they 
are to be induced to participate on possibly risky and certainly costly collective actions; and 
they need to perceive constraints if they are to hesitate to take such action.  
According to the political process model, framing refers to "the conscious, strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996b, p 6).  
In other words, McAdam (1999, p. 40) believes that the framing process represents the “level 
of insurgent consciousness” or the “collective assessment of the prospects for successful 
insurgency”. The cultural factor deals with the moral visions, cognitive understandings, and 
emotions that exist prior to a movement but which are also transformed by it (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 1999, p. 29). Bedford (2009, p. 31) identifies two major parts of this process: the 
formation of a collective identity for the movement’s participants and the employment of 
certain frames in order to facilitate this formation.  
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The sustainability of collective action is generated from cultural and meaningful factors which 
occur in social solidarity, common purposes and collective identities. Tarrow (2011, p. 12) 
pointed out that, “People do not risk their skin or sacrifice their time to engage in contentious 
politics unless they have good reason to do so”. It takes a common purpose to motivate people 
to run the risk and pay the costs of involvement in contentious politics. The most common 
denominator of social movements is “interest”, but interest is no more than a seemingly 
objective category imposed by the observer. It is a participant’s recognition of their common 
interests that translates the potential for a movement into action (Tarrow, 2011, p. 11). 
Notwithstanding this, individuals are often slow to appreciate that opportunities exist or that 
constraints have collapsed. The leaders, entrepreneurs and founders of the movement play 
major roles in defining the opportunities and creating or stimulating consensus in the 
movements (Tarrow, 2011, pp. 11, 12).  
It is worth noting that leaders and entrepreneurs can create a social movement only when they 
tap into and expand deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. This is almost certainly why 
nationalism and ethnicity or religion has been more reliable bases of the organization of 
movements in the past than the categorical imperative of social class (Anderson 1990; C. 
Smith ed. 1996). In this regard, Tarrow (2011, p. 11) noted that some scholars take the 
criterion of common consciousness to an extreme. Rudolf Heberle, for example, thought a 
movement had to have a well worked-out ideology. But others, such as Melucci(1998), think 
that movements purposefully “construct” collective identities through constant negotiation. 
The social movement research can elaborate on the relationship between cultural change and 
structure because movements arise out of what is culturally given, but at the same time they 
are a fundamental source of cultural change. Melucci (1995, p. 31) confirmed that the 
relationship between collective involvement and personal engagement is the key to trying to 
understand how a group is formed. He argued that “the movements are viewed as processes of 
identity formation and as social actors struggling to define history: both the subjective 
motives for action and the ideology of the group are significant”. In the literature it is often 
indicated that social movements start out of what is culturally given, finding its position in the 
political landscape by utilizing pre-existent rhetoric and symbols. 
The movement consciously utilizes culture to recruit members and realize its goals. Social 
movement theory seems to carry a fairly instrumental view of culture, assuming that social 
movements are not only shaped by culture, but also contribute to shape and reshape the 
culture themselves. Culture is, according to this point of view, seen as a set of instruments. 
Social actors, relying on these cultural instruments, make sense of their own life experiences 
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by adopting symbols, values, meanings, icons, and beliefs and moulding them to fit the 
movement’s objectives Porta & Diani (1999). 
External and Transnational Factors 
One could acknowledge the possible importance of transnational actors and the international 
context in which the movements operate. However, Bedoford ( 2009, p. 38) argues that this 
factor is neither a part of the political process model nor commonly found in social movement 
literature in general. (Maney, 2001, pp. 1, 2) confirms that, “by and large, theories of social 
movements have neglected the role of both transnational structures and external actors in 
contributing to domestic political conflict”. The impact of international governmental 
organizations on domestic protest has received less attention (Maney, 2001, p. 28). While 
more frequently acknowledging, on an ad hoc basis, the importance of international factors, 
those working in the political process tradition, until recently, did not devote significant 
attention to the impact of international factors on their primary subject matter and structures 
of political opportunity (Maney, 2001, pp. 2, 3). 
Considering that much previous research focuses on the countries’ strategic geographical 
location specially Egypt, it could be expected that external influence has played a certain role 
in shaping the internal continuous politics and mobilization (Bedoford, 2009, p. 38). 
Systematic comparison across cases and regions reveals that direct contact with international 
feminism played a critical role to the mobilization of social movements like women and youth 
in democratic transitions (Baldez ,  p. 255).   
Some scholars offered an approach that linked the political process-based framework with 
external factors. Maney (2001, p. 5) argues that the political process models are constructed 
with the assumption that external and internal processes, institutions, and actors contribute, 
separately and in interactive combination, to the origins, trajectories, and outcomes of 
domestic protest. In the political process model, the international institutions and the direct 
interventions of external actors spark protest by altering both the vulnerability and receptivity 
of elites to challenges from those excluded from the polity and the likely costs and benefits of 
extra-institutional collective action. The same transnational factors could shape structures of 
political opportunity (Maney, 2001, p. 31). 
It could be argued that PO (opportunities and constraints) are more homogeneous at the 
national level (one centre of power) while at the international level they are heterogeneous. 
And when internal opportunities are closed, social movements seek and benefit from 
international alliances and institutions to create opportunities and generate new resources. It is 
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worth noting that the outstanding trend in Middle East scholars proclaims the interaction 
between external and internal determinants as, “key to any prospect for democratization in 
Egypt: (a) freedom and strengthening of civil society and (b) international pressures and 
incentives, especially from the United States as the hegemonic power in the region” 
(Brownlee, 2002; Brumberg, 2002; Langohr, 2004). It is also noteworthy the growing 
international connection between authoritarian regimes which has arguably increased their 
durability and adaptive capacity to face the political protests.  
In this regard the transnational structures and external factors can be argued to have had 
profound implications for the political opportunities and constraints in the Egyptian context 
that need to be fully understood and explained. This study acknowledge  different kinds of 
extrinsic influence that will be identified in the following chapters such as direct involvement, 
particularly USA foreign policy, globalization and the diffusion of ideas and international 
civil society activism, and the regional conflicts in the Middle East. 
There are other certain parts of SMT that should be discussed in order to provide and 
construct the analytical frames to be used for the study of youth activism: 
First: The new social movements perspective highlights the role of the distinctive material 
and ideological contradictions in post-material society in helping to mobilize new political 
constituencies around either non-material or previously private issues. This approach focuses 
on the movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, which were considered 
representative of a new type of contention set on ideological changes in society rather than 
political power (McAdam et al, 1996). This approach makes a clear analytical distinction 
between the so-called old social movements that existed in industrial society (pre-1950 for 
instance) and the new social movements, which exist in the contemporary post-industrial 
society. The process named alternatively ‘new modernity’, or ‘post modernity’ led to the 
emergence of the development of the New Social Movements (NSM).  
Following Roxborough’s claim that to each form of economic development, a particular form 
of politics and form of state apparatus would correspond, for capitalist industrialization, the 
nation-state becomes the political apparatus; the argument of Roxborough could be extended 
by saying that to every political system a form of collective action and social movement 
corresponds(Tür Kavli, 2003, p. 20).
 Up until the 1970s, the components of “modernity”, 
industrial capitalism, nation-state, and class identity continued to dominate western societies. 
Then changes in political economy and a decline in class identity occurred.
 
If class 
movements were associated with modernity, the New Social Movements (NSMs) are 
associated with post-modernity (Ibid, pp. 23, 31).  
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The common characteristics of these new movements could be divided into four general 
areas: goal orientation, forms, participants, and values (D'Anieri, 1990, 446) 
Regarding goal orientation, there are two primary strands. Firstly: seeking state action, or 
establishing alternative, non-institutional means of reaching their goals. Secondly: the 
interests of a particular group or class, or promoting goals that will benefit all members of 
society (Ibid, 449). In relating to form, NSMs have had a non-hierarchical and participatory 
nature of movements, as well as consensual and decentralized decision-making. Thirdly, new 
social movement theorists assert that participation in new social movements is not based on 
class cleavages. Fourthly, NSMs focus on "life-chance" concerns. The theorists suggest that 
recent movements are not driven by traditional materialist values such as higher wages, safer 
working conditions, and voting rights, but instead are motivated by qualitative values.   
The weakness of this approach could be its failure to establish the precise origin of social 
movements in different societies. The sociology of the social movements encyclopaedia 
highlights that “Habermas’s contention that new conflicts arise in the areas of cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization, while insightful, loses sight of the fact that 
the Euro-American nations do not represent the entire globe and that even where conflicts 
arise over the political system, such a conflict may equally be driven by the struggle for the 
control of material or economic resources of society” (Sociology of Social Movements, 
p.1309). 
Second: The political process model has a great importance in social movements study 
because it provides two functions. Firstly; it takes into account that social movements emerge 
not just when political opportunities are expanding, but also when would-be "insurgents have 
available to them 'mobilizing structures' of sufficient strength to get the movement off the 
ground" and "feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting 
collectively, they can redress the problem" (McAdam et al., 1996b, pp. 5, 13). Secondly; the 
model explains “how and why movements decline or disappear, political opportunities shrink, 
mobilizing structures weaken or disintegrate, or cultural frames come to delegitimize or 
discourage protest” (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p. 42). 
Third: The social movement involves different types of interactions with other actors 
particularly the state and political parties to achieve its goals. Other actors develop 
perceptions about the organization’s goals and if they represent a threat to their interests or 
opportunities. “Thus the mix of opposition and support enjoyed by a given SMO is 
conditioned by the perception of threat and opportunity embodied in the group goals” 
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(McAdam et al., 1996, p. 15). Bedford, (2009, p. 44) refers to two main factors influencing 
state-movement interaction:  
1- The degree of threat a movement is believed to pose to the state. 
2- The state’s strategies towards this threat. 
1.4 Theoretical Criticism 
Criticism of the PPM has come from two groups of authors; one of them is the sympathetic 
critics of PPM like Jasper (1990) and Goodwin (1999), and the other is the pioneers and 
founders of the model like Tilly himself. The first group of critics admits that they do not 
offer another or better model than the political process model, “but rather a more expansive 
set of concepts and distinctions”. The political process theorists themselves such as McAdam 
and Tilly pointed out most of the crucial critical remarks in their works, “however, these 
criticisms have not had a radical impact on PPM” (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p. 29). The 
criticism can be summarized by the inability to reach a minimum consensus about the 
definitions of the basic concepts and the causal capability of the model and its universality. It 
is worth focusing on these points:  
First, political process theorists have been unable to reach a minimum consensus about the 
definitions of the basic concepts, most notably that of political opportunity structures, leading 
at best to conceptual confusion (Giugni, 2005, p. 402). Consequently, the PPM could be 
applied in diverse settings because of its imprecision which hindered the testing and 
refinement of theoretical propositions. It sometimes seems as if there were as many political 
process approaches as theorists  (Goodwin & Jasper, p. 28). Goodwin and Jasper assume that 
PPM is “tautological, trivial, inadequate, or just plain wrong”  (Goodwin & Jasper, p. 29, 
Giugni, 2005, p. 402). However, they think that PPM “provides a helpful albeit limited set of 
‘sensitizing concepts’ for social movement research” (Goodwin & Jasper, p. 28). 
Goodwin & Jasper, (1999, p. 46) argue that the notion of cultural framings, political 
opportunities and mobilizing structures are overly broad, subsuming a variety of factors that 
are potentially contradictory in their effects and that need to be carefully disaggregated, 
including collective identities, grievances, goals, repertoires of contention, and the sense of 
efficacy or empowerment (Goodwin, James M. Jasper, p. 46). 
Second, the causal capability of the model: A lot of criticisms have been raised about the 
causal capability of the model. Many authors criticize the search for “invariant models of 
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social movements” (Giugni, 2005, p. 402). Such an invariant and trans-historical theory is 
simply not possible and should, therefore, not be the goal of research (see Tilly, 1994, 1995). 
Goodwin and Jasper criticize the implicitly frequent promises of the political process theorists 
to provide, “a causally adequate universal theory or model of social movements” (Goodwin, 
Jasper, p. 28).  
Tilly, (2004, p. x) declared that the theorists did not think that there is, “no sufficiently 
coherent body of theory concerning how social movements exist”.  The explanations – that 
involve specification - of how and why the three factors - mobilizing structures, framing 
process and political opportunities – “behave and interact as they do. At least for the moment, 
no available theory provides general specifications of how and why” (Tilly, 2004, p. x). 
There are no plausible regularities and generalizations or causal models that can interpret and 
account for sorts of PO, MS and FP (Tilly, 2004, p. xi). For example, how and why does the 
governmental repression diminish or accelerate mobilization? 
Third; structural and non-structural factors: The model undergoes a strong bias in favour of 
metaphors of structure (Goodwin, Jasper, p. 28). The theorists tend to emphasize "structural" 
factors (i.e., factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the control of movement 
actors) more than non-structural factors which are often analyzed as though they were 
structural factors (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p. 29). 
Although the original term "political opportunity structure" (POS) has generally given way to 
apparently more fluid concepts such as "process" and "opportunities," these are still usually 
interpreted in unnecessarily structural ways. A number of factors have been added to political 
opportunities in recognition of the influence of non-structural variables but without being 
accurately theorized as non-structural. These include strategy, agency and culture (Goodwin 
& Jasper, 1999, p. 29). Process theorists tend to wash the meaning and fluidity out of strategy, 
agency, and culture so that they will look more like structures. According to Gugni, the 
dominant paradigm “has at worst overlooked the role of strategy, agency, and culture, or at 
best defined these concepts so that they look more like structures” (Giugni, p. 402). 
The two main categories that process theorists have added to political opportunities are 
"mobilizing structures”, which contain much that is not structural, and "framing”, which is 
their effort to include culture, but actually leaves out most of culture (Goodwin, Jasper, p. 29). 
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Fourth: the focus on the leaders, their discourse in analyzing the movements and neglecting 
the members. One should go beyond mere discourse, language and symbols, especially those 
of the leadership, taking both multiple discourses (Bayat, 2005,: p. 892). 
1.5  Limitations of Applying of Social Movement Theory to the Middle 
East 
It is widely acknowledged that the focus of the study of social movements has been on 
Western Europe or North America, as this is where a majority of social movement researchers 
originate from. SMT has not been extensively applied beyond the Western context. Indeed, 
the effort to apply the theory in non-western contexts raises a number of questions and 
criticism that could be summarized in three key issues particularly: the western democracy 
bias, neglecting specific aspects of social movements such as the silent resistance and the 
uncritical application of the model of social movements theory in the Middle East. 
First of all one could note that, until recently, “only a minority of empirical research in this 
field of study has been conducted in contexts that do not possess fully developed plurality of 
parties, unions and alliance structures ensuring citizens’ access to the political system”4. The 
social movements - like the new social movements - are “rooted in particular genealogies, in 
the highly differentiated and politically open societies, where social movements often develop 
into highly structured and largely homogeneous entities - possibilities that are limited in the 
non-Western world” (Bayat, 2009, p. 4). Tilly pointed out the historical specificity of “social 
movements” which emerged and developed in Western Europe and North America after 
1750. In this historical experience, what came to be known as “social movements” combined 
three elements: an organized and sustained claim making on target authorities; a repertoire of 
performances; and public representations of the cause’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and 
commitment (Tilly, 2004, p.7). Deployed separately, these elements would not make “social 
movements”, but some different political actions (Bayat, 2009, p. 4).   
                                                     
4 Different authors discussed this issue such as Bayat, Asef. (2009). Life as Politics: How Ordinary 
People Change the Middle East. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Cf.  Wolff, Kristin (1998), 'New 
New Orientialism: Political Islam and Social Movement Theory', in A.S. Moussalli (ed.), Islamic 
Fundamentalism: Myths & Realities (Reading: Ithaca), 41-73. Or in a different context (Latin America) 
but raising many of the same issues: Foweraker, Joe (1995), 'Theories of Social Movements', in 
Foweraker, Theorizing social movements (Boulder: Pluto Press), 24-35. 
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Kurzman (2004) argues that this has contributed to giving certain features of social movement 
theory a “core democracy bias”. It is worth noting that the increase in social movement 
activities in non-democratic or democratizing countries during the last decades has, moreover, 
led to concerns about the viability of generalizations from findings and conclusions in this 
field. The theory and its assumption should be adapted to be appropriate for the study of 
social movements and mobilization in a political environment that, despite certain progress, 
still cannot be said to possess fully developed democratic societal norms and values. Given 
that the dominant social movement theories draw on western experience, the research on 
social movement in the Middle East should take into consideration the limitations of the 
prevailing social movement theories - those grounded in the technologically advanced and 
politically open societies – “to account for the complexities of socio-political activism in 
contemporary Muslim societies, which are often characterised by political control and limited 
means for communicative action” (Bayat, 2005, p. 891). A key question here is to explore 
what extent using SMT can help us to “understand the process of solidarity building or the 
collective identity, in politically closed and technologically limited settings?”(Bayat, 2009,  p. 
4). To deal with this shortcoming, the thesis adopts a wide definition of the structure of 
political opportunities to include new elements that explain the process of the creating such 
collective identities and borrows some concepts from the field Middle East studies such as 
hegemony and competitive authoritarianism...etc which provide an opportune context for 
social movements
5
.  
Secondly, the social movements theory used to be neglected in the Middle East literature and 
research or applied partially, without critically questioning the main assumption and 
propositions when applying it in the Middle East context. Bayat (2009, p. 3) argues that there 
is a tendency to exclude the study of the Middle East from the prevailing social science 
perspectives. The social sciences did not pay attention and delayed in studying such 
phenomena until the appearance of Islamic movements in the 1970s. Even Middle East 
studies in the West did not pay attention, but were too late to apply the theories of social 
movements to study Islamic and political movements. 
In recent years, a number of new scholars have attempted to use the social movements theory 
in the Egyptian context such as Abdel Rahman (2009), in her contribution about Kefaya and 
El Mahdi (2009) and her study about the labour movement, but they were still partial studies 
and did not engage in discussion about the main concepts and propositions of the theory.    
                                                     
5 For further discussion see the methodology chapter and chap. 8 
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Bayat criticized a growing trend in recent years among “local” scholars in the Middle East 
who often tend uncritically to deploy conventional models and concepts to the social realities 
of their societies, without acknowledging sufficiently that these models hold different 
historical genealogies, and may thus offer little help to explain the intricate texture and 
dynamics of change and resistance in this part of the world, for instance, considering “slums” 
(Bayat, 2009, p. 4). Roy warns against the kind of comparison that takes “one of the elements 
of comparison as ‘norm’ while never questioning the “original configuration” (Roy, 1994, pp. 
8-9). 
It is noteworthy that some sociologists such as Ibrahim (1980) have used some of the 
concepts and processes of social movements to explore the Islamic activism but not in a 
systemic way or from a comprehensive social movements perspective which hindered the 
scholarship from progressing.  Over recent years, a handful of scholars and research have 
attempted to bring Islamic activism into the realm of social movement theory (Wiktorowicz, 
2004;Meijer, 2005 Bayat, 2005).   However, these scholars tend largely to “borrow” from, 
rather than critically and productively engage with and thus contribute to, social movement 
theories (Bayat, 2009, p. 4).  It is important to take into account this dilemma relating to the 
dichotomy that appeared in the literature about Middle East politics in general and 
particularly Islamic movements. “The literature based on Western experiences has still not 
completely grasped the logic and reality of Middle East social movements” (Schmidt, 2004, 
pp. 401, 402). Kurzman interprets this as a result of, “the eyes of the subjects and the 
researcher don’t line up” in the literature about Islamic movements (Kurzman, 2004, p. 207). 
Thirdly; as every social and political structure has a form of collective action and social 
movements correspond, the social movement theory is biased not only toward some kinds of 
movements that should be studied, but also in the activities observed and explained in those 
movements, for example there is neglect of counter-cultural movements and practices 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999, p. 35).  The collective action in the Middle East subsumes different 
types of activities and protestations like the silent resistance and bypassing of authority, day-
to-day forms of resistance or evading practices of power. There is a tendency to minimize or 
obscure the political meanings of those movements (Beinin & Vairel, 2009). In other words, 
more research is need to explore certain aspects and unconventional forms of agency and 
activism that have emerged in Egypt and the Middle East that do not get adequate attention, 
because they do not fit into the political process model and its conceptual imaginations. In this 
regard the thesis addresses questions such as the pre-existing phase of social movements and 
how the ordinary young activists engaged with contentious politics. It also discusses how the 
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protest and social movements are inclined to work through the networks and not through 
hierarchical organization as a result of regime repression and internal disputes. 
  
1.6  Theoretical Summary: The Social Movements in the Egyptian 
Context  
It is widely agreed that the focus of the study of social movements was on Western Europe or 
North America, as this is where a majority of social movement researchers originate from. 
This chapter briefly discussed some efforts to utilize the theory in a different context and 
analyse a number of questions about its democratic bias, Middle East’s silent resistance and 
Islamic movements. It points out some limitations of the prevailing social movement theories 
to account for the complexities of socio-political activism in contemporary Egypt which was 
often characterized by political control and limited means for communicative action. For 
example, the concept of political opportunity in the Middle East certainly seems different 
from that in Western countries, however, as much as the focus on liberal (Western) 
democracies and authoritarian (Arab) regimes is helpful when one is trying to understand 
social activism in its diversity (Schmidt 2004, p. 402). 
Therefore, another aim of this thesis is to elaborate on the conditions surrounding movement 
mobilization in non-democratic contexts. This aim will be approached through the theoretical 
problem which this thesis addresses: under what conditions may movement mobilization in 
non-democratic contexts occur? 
The study about youth activism and social movements in Egypt should take into account the 
following concepts and processes and elaborate them to be more relevant and helpful in 
explaining the prominence of youth activism: 
1- The classification of the four dimensions of the concept of political opportunity has 
been discussed and developed to be appropriate for political context ranging from 
facilitative to repressive.  
2- The possible importance of the international context and transnational factors in 
which the movements operate in the Middle East and Egypt. 
33 
 
3- In addition to that the study will discuss the dilemma of culture and framing process 
which reflected the effort to include culture in the political process model, however, 
it roughly leaves out most of culture. 
4- The study also tested the validity of new social movement approach in Egypt 
according to the four major characteristics which theorists argue are uniquely 
characteristic of contemporary social movements; goal orientation, forms, 
participants, and values. 
In conclusion, it is important to adapt and improve the social movement analysis through:  
rejecting invariant modelling, beware of conceptual stretching, recognize the diverse ways 
that culture and agency, including emotions and strategizing, shape collective action. It is also 
important to realize the limitation of utilizing the theory in different contexts. 
34 
 
 
Chapter Two:  
Methodology and Methods 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis will demonstrate that approaches and concepts developed in the realm of social 
movement theory can nonetheless be valuable in illuminating the intrinsic aspects and 
characteristics of social and youth activism in Egypt. It introduces fresh perspectives to 
observe, a novel vocabulary to speak, and new analytical tools to make sense of specific 
realities. A fruitful approach would demand an analytical innovation which raises a number of 
theoretical and methodological questions as to how to look at the notions of agency and 
change.   
Our starting point in studying youth activism reflects the underlying assumption of the 
political process model. In this regard, social movements theory is utilized in two ways; the 
instrumental use to explain the Egyptian case and the critical use and discussion with the 
theory propositions. The theory provides a theoretical framework, but it also makes sets of 
assumptions that might not help to explain the prominence of youth activism and social 
movements without integrating an understanding of the specificities of the Middle East. For 
this reason the thesis will explore theoretical approaches to understanding the political 
structures of the Middle East, including an appreciation of the region’s history, international 
relations and transnational factors. This comprehensive approach yields useful frameworks 
for analysing the structure of political opportunities and its impact on youth activism and 
political protest in Egypt. For this reason Chapter Three specifically reviews Egyptian 
political history through the lens of existing research literatures, ultimately drawing upon 
theories of hegemonic ideology and corporatism to explain how and why the political 
structures which formed the environment for the emergence of social movements in Egypt 
emerged. This will offer a distinct analytical framework for the following analysis of the 
political opportunity structures that governed the emergence and development of social 
movements in Egypt, and then more specifically youth activism, which forms the basis of 
Chapters Four and Five.  
Having used the SMT concept of political opportunity to project a narrative of the emergence 
and development of social movements in general, and youth movement in particular, it is 
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necessary to explore in detail the features of these youth activism through the categories 
offered by SMT, and specifically the political process model. This is done empirically 
through deep study of two key youth activism; the students’ movement (Chapter Six) and the 
April 6
th
 movement (Chapter Seven). 
2.2. Defining youth and youth activism in Egyptian context: 
Youth can be either be understood as a demographic (biological age and % of population) or 
as a social construction (a stage of life, a set of expectations, and an understanding of social 
roles, etc).  
The thesis provides demographic statistics about the youth bulge in Egypt but its main aim is 
to focus on youth activism which is not only about biological age or demographics but about 
stalled transition, political exclusion and generational effects. This demographic ‘youth bulge’ 
brings with it specific political and economic challenges for regimes (Murphy, 2012, p.5). 
Consequently it is the current generation, the youth, who find themselves excluded and 
marginalized, socially, economically and politically. Their transition to adulthood is, as it 
were, ‘stalled’. Dhillon &Yousef (2009)  
In this regard, the total number of young people represents a large amount of population 
which increasing every year. The following two tables provide a data over time to highlight 
the percentages of youth within the Egyptian population. It is noteworthy that the definitions 
of youth and children in youth policies in Egypt overlap due to the type and the set up of 
ministries and agencies responsible for youth such as: Education, Higher Education, Youth 
and Sports. According to NDP youth policy paper, young people are between the ages of 18 
and 35 years old. However, it also mentions those who are between 6 and 18 years old. On the 
other hand, a document issued form the Supreme Council for Youth and Sport in May 1996 
considered youth as being from 6-30 years old. The NCY differentiates between two groups: 
the age group from 6-18 years old (teenagers and children) and from 18- 30 years old (Youth) 
(Gharbouch, 2006, p. 921). 
In its youth policy paper, the National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party, defines 
youth as the age group from 18 – 35 years old. This long period of time is due to the fact that 
large sectors of young people between 18 and 35 in Egypt usually face the same problems and 
challenges, such as unemployment, poor education, low health awareness and limited access 
to training, educational, volunteering and job opportunities. (Tohami, 2009, p.10) 
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The population statistics collected by the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and 
Statistics (Algehaz Almarkazy Letta’bi’a Ela’mahh Wa El-ehssa’a)  illustrate that in 
demographic terms, the number of people aged between 15 -35 reached 30.4 million out of 80 
million in 2011 according to CAPMAS. They represent more than  37.8 % of the total 
population
6
. 
Table (1): Estimated Midyear Population by Age Groups (2011) in thousands
7
 
Total 80 410 
Less than 5 years 8 535 
-5 8 452 
-10 8 535 
-15 9 437 
-20 8 695 
-25 7 057 
-30 5 255 
-35 5 141 
-40 4 516 
-45 4 055 
                                                     
6 Some observers raise questions about the credibility of the statistics, given how CAPMAS routinely 
undercounts those who live in the ashwaiyyat for example. See Sabry, Sarah, (2009) Poverty Lines in 
Greater; Cairo Underestimating and misrepresenting poverty. http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10572IIED.pdf 
7 http://www.capmas.gov.eg/pdf/Electronic%20Static%20Book_eng/population/untitled1/pop.aspx 
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-50 3 377 
-55 2 499 
-60 1 880 
-65 1 317 
-70 872 
+75 817 
 
Table (2): Estimated Midyear Population by Age Groups (2002-2005-2008-2011) in 
thousands and percentage: 
 
Year/age 2002 2005 2008 2011 
15-30 20844 
31.3% 
22165 
31.3% 
23566 
31.3% 
25189 
31.3% 
15-35 25169 
37.8% 
26764 
37.8% 
28456 
37.8% 
30414 
37.8% 
Total 66531 70748 75299 80410 
 
These demographic statistics show that Egypt is going through a period in which the total 
number of youth is significantly high, a so-called “youth bulge” (Dhillon & Yousef, 2007, 
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p3). This demographic transition represents both an opportunity and a challenge
8
. It is 
obvious that not all members of youth activism are in the age category of 18-29. A number of 
people who are younger or older than that age consider themselves young, or join youth 
movements.  
Youth activism in the Egyptian context: 
The term has been variously defined. For instance, Wikipedia defines youth activism as when 
youth voices “engaged in community organizing for social change”9. It also refers to young 
people engaging in a practice that emphasizes direct vigorous action, especially in support of 
or opposition to one side of a controversial issue (Giles, 2008, p.11). 
This definition is particularly relevant to the aims of the thesis discussion. Youth activism 
therefore takes place, when young people are involved in planning, researching, teaching, 
evaluating, decision-making, social working, advocating and leading actions on 
environmental issues, social justice, human rights campaigns, supporting or opposing issues 
like abortion, anti-racism, anti-homophobia, anti-homosexual, war or ethnic cleansing, etc, all 
with particular reference to bringing about a social change. Students, it has been observed by 
many researchers, are often at the forefront of youth activism especially through student 
unionism (Kayode, 2011, p.3). 
The thesis has adopted a definition of youth activism that refers to the youth engagement in 
the contentious politics in Egypt. It includes various categories, particularly independent 
youth networks, “student movements” and “youth chapters” of political parties and social 
forces. (However, as will become clearer through the course of the text), these youth activism 
cannot ultimately conceptually be separated from the reclaiming of youthfulness and the 
particularity of a specific generation (Bayat, 2009, p. 18). Nonetheless, as a working 
definition this is inclusive of the wide variety of movements and networks of youth activism, 
including both new and conventional social movements (such as the Muslim Brothers’ young 
wing and political parties). This perspective makes it possible to observe interesting variations 
in the mobilization processes of different movements.  It is also worth noting at this point that 
the evolution of student movements cannot be entirely separated from that of youth activism 
more generally because the constraints on the former have forced much student activity into 
broader youth activist groups and away from the campuses. 
                                                     
8 For further discussion about the socio-economic conditions and grievances among youth see chap. (4)  
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youth_activism 
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Excluding and controlling youthfulness is likely to trigger youth activism which can take 
different aspects and ways. The research focuses on the ways the youth activism of what we 
may term the Millennium generation (those who are young during the start of the new 
century) engaged in contentious politics through a fully-fledged youth movement.  
The recent years have witnessed a proliferation of youth activism in national politics, 
although this has frequently been manifested outside of the established formal political 
structures and long-established political parties (Murphy, 2012, p.11). Youth movements 
articulate interests of people which has less things to do with biological age.  The April 6th 
Youth Movement and Youth for Change in Egypt, all represent broad swathes of youths who 
perceive their interests to be unrepresented by existing political structures and their needs to 
be unrecognized and unmet (Assad & Barsoum, 2007).  
For Roel Meijer (2000), the Arab street is the location in which ‘alternative lifestyles and 
modes of thought and action falling outside the family and the state’ are played out. With the 
diminishing functionality of the family and the failures of the state to live up to its promises 
of provision, the street has assumed a new significance for Arab youth. It has become a spatial 
home for broad coalition social movements in which ideological affiliation is secondary (or 
even irrelevant) relative to membership of this politically, economically and increasingly 
socially excluded generation (Murphy, 2012, p.11) Evidence suggests that 15–25 year olds, 
often termed late adolescents or early adults, are more engaged with the new technologies 
than any other age group and 
For as much as the demographic statistics are significant, the percentage of youth activists is 
not representing the majority among youth. It is noteworthy that young people who interested 
in political activism considered a minority among the younger generation, although they have 
a great influence on the political and social structure. For example, the majority of blogs and 
accounts on Facebook are not mainly political, but personal pages which touch on politics to 
varying degrees (Elting, et. al., 2009, p. 10). The Egypt Human Development Report (2010, 
P. 106) showed that political participation was a concern for just 7% of youth. Although they 
represent a minority in this term, youth activism comprised the largest structural cluster that 
mobilized and engaged in continuous politics during the different cycles of mobilization. It is 
obvious that this minority of activists used to have an incredible effect on the public sphere 
and represent a big challenge to the hegemonic discourse of the regime either during Mubarak 
era or after the revolution.   
The political opportunity structure triggered different cycles of political and social activism 
since 2000 as large segments of the younger generation from both middle and lower classes 
40 
 
found that “there was no reason why political participation should be further postponed, for 
example, no developmental projects (economic or political) for which democracy should be 
sacrificed” (Rutherford, 2008).  
2.3 Critical Reading and Applying of the Theory 
The research seeks to explain certain aspects and unconventional forms of agency and 
activism that have emerged in Egypt and the Middle East but which did not get sufficient 
attention until the Arab Spring, because they did not easily fit into the political process model 
and its conceptual imagination on the one hand and the conventional approaches of political 
sciences that focus on institutions and ruling elites on the other hand. The thesis is seeking to 
help in the developing of new practices and approaches in the discipline and field of politics 
and Middle East literature. 
The social sciences did not pay attention to explore and explain the emergence of political and 
social movements in the Middle East and, until recently, the scholars delayed in exploring and 
explaining their roles from the perspective of social movements.  
Many of the local scholars pursued partial studies and did not engage in discussion about the 
main concepts and propositions of the theory. The thesis avoids the ideological reading and 
vision of the theory which tend to focus on a number of social movements which reflect the 
same ideology of the researcher, such as labour movements when studied by leftist scholars. 
A proper literature and theory is needed to understand and analyze the phenomenon emerged 
in the Egyptian socio-political context which is completely different.  In this regard, El-
Shorbagy (2010, p. 115) argued that “Kefaya has been misunderstood widely in the West, as 
well as among the Egyptian elite, due to the adoption of Western social science rankings”. El-
Shorbagy also emphasized that “The literature about Kefaya was a selective ideological vision 
which described Kefaya as a secular leftist movement reflected the revival of the left in 
Egypt; while other writers amplified its strength and its popularity”.  
It is true that Kefaya was characterized by a number of characteristics highlighted by the 
literature of the new social movements according to Adel Rahaman(2009), however, it was 
not a society-oriented movements that focus on values and identity issues, nor was it centered 
around a single issue; both being important features of the new social movements. The 
approach of the new social movements remains valid to analyze many of the features of 
Kefaya as a protest movement composed of loose networks and small groups of activists, 
horizontal structure and cooperation across ideological lines.  
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It could be argued that the dilemma is not linked to the perspective of social movements itself 
but in the reductionist vision and ideological lens that limited it to particular networks and 
frames while ignoring other parts of the whole picture or considering it irrelevant. When the 
lens is not wide enough to include the most significant aspects of the phenomena, it will yield 
to wrong interpretations. In this regard the theory and approaches connected to the social 
movements produce a wide range of concepts and approaches that could be applied as a 
whole or in specific cases. It is a challenge for individual researchers to digest and apply the 
whole theories and apply them in different specific areas which means that there is a need for 
accumulation in the field and teamwork efforts. 
It is worth noting that the thesis tends to avoid the dilemma of uncritical deployment of the 
conventional models and concepts to the social movements without acknowledging 
sufficiently that these models hold different historical genealogies, and need to be improved 
to offer explanations to the dynamics of change and resistance in this part of the world. 
The thesis’s contribution could be is to apply SMT and to test the political process model in 
the Egyptian context from a comprehensive approach which includes the proper theoretical 
propositions relevant to a non-Western context and the empirical fieldwork to prove the 
argument and provide accurate evidences. The empirical research has been conducted in 
contexts that do not possess fully developed plurality of parties, unions and alliance structures 
ensuring citizens access to the political system. 
Therefore, another aim of this thesis is to elaborate on the conditions surrounding movement 
mobilization in competitive authoritarian regimes. This aim will be approached through the 
theoretical problem which this thesis addresses: under what conditions may movement 
mobilization in such competitive authoritarian contexts occur? 
The viability of generalizations from the findings and conclusions could be extended to other 
social movements in Egypt or in the Middle East. The suggested frame for defining the 
political opportunity and new social movements and networks, cultural framing and new 
media impact could be extended to other contexts in the Middle East. They could account for 
the complexities of socio-political activism in contemporary Muslim societies. 
The study about youth activism and social movements in Egypt should take into account the 
following concepts and processes and elaborate them to be more relevant and helpful in 
explaining the prominence of youth activism.  
Political opportunity 
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The concept of political opportunity in the Middle East certainly seems different from that in 
Western countries. However, as much as the focus on liberal (Western) democracies and 
authoritarian (Arab) regimes is helpful when one is trying to understand social activism in its 
diversity, Tarrow (1988, 1994, 2011), identifies a number of types of political opportunities, 
including: 1) institutional access, 2) unstable political alignments, 3) divided elites, and 4) the 
presence of support groups and allies. Additional opportunities can be added to this list, 
notably diminished repression by an authoritarian state.  
The classification of the four dimensions of the concept of political opportunity has been 
discussed and developed to be appropriate for political context ranging from facilitative to 
repressive. In the Egyptian context, these types of political opportunities are far from enough 
to give the comprehensive explanations for the emergence of social and youth activism. 
Notwithstanding that a specific kind of economic and social structure has a specific kind of 
social movement, it is important to revise the Middle East political literature to discuss and 
analyze the political opportunities according to the different approaches and theories about the 
state-society relationship. In addition to this, the following chapters will test and apply some 
of the assumptions and arguments of the structural approach about grievances and relative 
deprivation in the Egyptian context.  The high levels of grievances among citizens generate 
tension and intense protest that could create political opportunities like that which triggered 
the intense social and labour protests in Egypt in 2007-2010 when networks of activists found 
recourse in street politics.  
Consequently, the study will place stress on some indicators of political opportunities that are 
considered most relevant to the emergence of new agents of change and political networks. 
There are plenty of approaches and theories that need to be tested and these can be 
summarized into five sets of factors that seem most relevant to the Egyptian context from 
2000-2011: 
1- The rupture in state-society relationships 
2- Socio-economic conditions and high levels of grievance: pressure from the bottom 
3- Institutional access and ruling elite strategies  
4- Division among the ruling elite and patronage  networks 
5- External and transnational factors 
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The transnational structures and external factors and actors used to have deeper implications 
on the political opportunities and constraints in the Egyptian context than the social 
movement theory used to stress. This means that the possible importance of the international 
context and transnational factors in which the movements operate need to be fully understood 
and explained. The study will focus on different kinds of extrinsic influence that will be 
identified in the following chapters such as direct involvement, particularly US foreign policy, 
globalization and diffusion of ideas and international civil society activism, and the regional 
conflicts in the Middle East 
Framing and culture  
The study discusses the dilemma of culture and the framing process which reflected the 
efforts to include culture in the political process model. The thesis highlights certain aspects 
of cultural opportunities, hegemony and counter-hegemonic blocks to explain the prominence 
of political activism, in addition to the process of constructing collective identity and social 
solidarity generated from the public and sub-culture and ideologies in the society.  However, a 
further discussion about different components of culture, ideology, collective identity is 
worthy of future research.  
In the conclusion, a study about youth activism and social movements in Egypt should take 
into account the following concepts and processes: 
The classification of the four dimensions of the concept of political opportunity.  
The importance of the international context and transnational factors 
The dilemma of culture and framing process  
The validity of new social movement approach 
2.4 Methods and Techniques 
To achieve the aims of the thesis and prove its arguments, fieldwork was very important to 
address the questions which emerged from the theoretical framework. The official data or 
statistics gives the general picture and map about youth conditions but would not be much 
help in knowing the details about the perception, frames and networks of the youth activism 
and its internal mechanisms. This research engages specifically in an empirical method which 
combines active observation and semi-structured interviewing of youth activists themselves. 
These methods, which give voice to the agents themselves, illuminate the concealed and 
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unknown parts of the phenomena which have been neglected by top-down elite-level studies. 
Close engagement with activists themselves allows new viewpoints from within the 
movements to emerge and be discovered, and is particularly important in unveiling the 
cultural attitudes and framings of the youth. 
The researcher used a number of different techniques to collect the required data to address 
the questions posed in the thesis. 
Active observation  via new social media 
Active observation is a kind of participant observation research method for data collection 
typically done in qualitative research projects and which includes 
direct observation, participation in the life of the group and collective discussions. As the 
thesis will demonstrate, the Egyptian youth activists have used new social media extensively 
and (in generational terms uniquely) to debate and discuss controversial issues, to support or 
oppose policies and actions both in internal and external arenas, to connect with other youth 
activism at home and abroad, and to develop and disseminate counter-hegemonic discourses. 
How better to access the youth than to speak to them through their own medium, to be a part 
of the movements themselves in terms of joining their internal conversations. It should be 
noted that, as an Egyptian who likes to think of himself as still ‘young’, this kind of 
participation is also a part of the researcher himself, and he of it. This has benefits in terms of 
the researcher’s ability to interpret or translate the meaning of conversation, but equally the 
researcher must acknowledge the subjectivity that comes with active participation and being a 
part of the phenomenon that he is studying. While familiarity with context meant that the 
researcher might, for example, know which conversations or “chat rooms” were more 
significant than others, on the other hand his own ideological or political preferences could 
shape his relationship to prominent bloggers or party websites.  
This participant observation included active observation of  a large number of activists’ web 
pages and profiles on Facebook and Twitter,  focusing on their posts, comments, videos and 
links they use to share, to explore and analyze their views and ideas, in addition to the groups 
they established and taking notes about their attitudes and engagements.   
Most of the activists speak and write Arabic which is the mother tongue for them and for the 
researcher who became a virtual friend with hundreds of activists on Facebook and began to 
interact and observe their behaviour, discussions and debates. During the days of the 
revolution, the researcher acted as an activist himself, (thus becoming participant – or 
‘researcher-activist’) and engaged in the online activities as a participant and not only a 
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researcher. The researcher used the snowball technique by adding a number of famous 
activists whom he knew personally, then by including mutual friends’ feature on Facebook, 
thus more and more activists became friends of the researcher. This enabled the researcher to 
carry out the online interviews for the thesis in the later stages in order to collect the data for 
the research. Of course, the very term ‘friend’ implies a subjective relationship, although the 
nature on on-line ‘friends’ is somewhat more transitory and superficial (or non-committed) 
than normal friendship. The researcher was conscious of the ethical dimensions of this, of the 
trust which such a relationship implied but did not make explicit, and thus afforded 
anonymity in the thesis where necessary to protect on-line discussants.  
This kind of methodology was combined between what amounted to a novel on-line form of 
focus groups and observation techniques. When an activist wrote a note or posted his ideas 
various feedbacks and comments began to emerge, some of them supporting or rejecting, 
depending on the political views and different ideologies and networks that worked together 
or were involved in clashes. This enabled the researcher to examine and test the assumptions 
through observing the online behaviour and debates about different subjects and rectify the 
false information that might emerge from interviews. For example the researcher observed a 
long discussion on Facebook between Asmaa Mahfouz and other activists who accused April 
6 of getting a foreign funding or another conversation about the activists who travelled to 
America to attend a Freedom House course and Ahmed Maher. 
Second: Semi-structured interviews 
In this regard the field work was conducted in three phases. The first phase, at the beginning 
of 2008, included interviews with some activists representing a sample of student and youth 
activism. It was part of a fieldwork project to explore the youth policy and student movements 
in Egypt. The semi-structured interviews with student activists in Egyptian universities aimed 
to comprehend and analyze the structure of the student movements and formal or informal 
networks. The collected information was about the financial and human resources, 
membership, leadership and collective identity which helped the researcher to respond to the 
questions raised by the social movement theory. The samples have been chosen by the 
snowball techniques and covered most of the student networks in Egypt from different 
universities. It included Al-Ghad, Revolutionary Socialist, Kefaya and Muslim Brothers 
student wing, in addition to a number of independent activists who were active in the formal 
student unions.  
The second phase was conducted in September and October 2010 and the sample included 
activists representing the new activism that had emerged such as the ElBaradei campaign and 
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the Facebook activism.  These interviews were mostly exploratory to identify the new 
phenomenon. The researcher used the snowball techniques and active observation for 
Facebook to choose the activists. The observation showed some activists who used to have 
influence and their pages reflected their leadership skills. Contacts were made and phone 
numbers obtained before returning to Egypt to conduct the fieldwork. The interviews were 
carried out either in activist’s workplace or in popular cafes. At this stage the police 
repression was high before the rigged parliamentary election in 2010 but the activists were 
resisting and keen to build their organization using the social media and by benefiting from 
the social protest wave and the return of ElBaradei. At this stage focus was on the ElBaradei 
campaign, independent and social media activists and Muslim Brother Activists.  
The third phase included interviews carried out through Skype and Facebook ‘chatting’ in 
January and February 2012. The sample included both old and new networks of activists that 
had emerged after the revolution and aimed to fill the gaps and respond to the main questions 
of the thesis. Unlike normal semi-structured interviews, these could often take place through 
discussion over a prolonged period of time and would progressively lose their structure and 
follow their own course. The benefits were obvious – a relationship of mutual trust would 
develop, the interviewee might become more willing to express difficult positions, and 
subjects could be returned to for clarification. 
During this stage focus was on the perception, culture and new opportunities that emerged 
during and after the revolution, seeking answers to the questions that the SMT raised about 
the recognition of the political opportunities and the framing process they followed in 
addition to the reasons behind the splits and divisions among young activists and their weak 
performances in the election. 
The use of interviews through Facebook and the choice of the samples came after the 
researcher engaged with activists on Facebook to support the Egyptian revolution from abroad 
as part of the roles played by Egyptian Diasporas around the world particularly in Europe and 
the United States. This engagement created a kind of sympathy and mutual trust between the 
researcher and activists and, in later stages, some activists sought to recruit the researcher into 
their new movements and parties. The researcher spent time engaging with the activists on 
Facebook in their discussions and debates commenting on their ideas from an academic 
viewpoint.  The researcher at all times retained integrity in his own responses, did not pretend 
political sympathies, or suggest untrue positions. He also, at all times made it clear that he 
was simultaneously a researcher and that the discussions would be used in his thesis. This 
never generated a negative response.   
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In this regard, there was no time limit for carrying out the interviews as both the researcher 
and activists were always there and could return back to the thread on Facebook to revise the 
responses and verify the answers and generate new questions.  
One striking issue from the participant/active observation and the interview process, in many 
stages, was to see how the activists developed their views over time and moved from their 
original positions and movements to engage with new networks and construct new positions. 
Here, the contentious politics was vivid and changeable and the ideas were modified and 
developed, including the building of new connections and networks and constructing of new 
identities. The trajectory of young activists could be traced to see how the consciousness and 
connections developed over time aiming to reach a point of equilibrium and stability.   
Sample selection 
The initial selection of a sample of young activists was based on the experience of the 
researcher and his networks as he had prior personal knowledge of many activists through 
various researches that had been previously conducted
10
. As a researcher in the National 
Center for Sociological and Criminological Research in Cairo, we keep on preparing 
fieldwork research that included different aspects and categories of young people in Egypt. 
Interviews were conducted with a sample of 50 activists representing a wide variety of 
networks and groups. The interviews with the activists should take into account the 
representation of the most prominent orientations and movements. In this regard, the snowball 
technique was useful in knowing and getting contacts with more activists. 
The sample included activists from these movements and networks: 
 April 6 youth activism  
 Muslim Brotherhood young wing 
 Altyyar Party 
 Kefaya activists  
 Democratic Front Party 
 Al-Ghad 
                                                     
10 Two empirical studies have been conducted by the researcher before and during his Ph. D;  a published study 
about “Youth Policy in Egypt”, 2009and “the Generational Mobility in Egypt”, 2009.  
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 Al-Amal (Labour) Party 
 ElBaradei campaign 
 Facebook activists: anonymous activists who hide their identity.  
 Socialists movement 
 Copts activists 
 Civil society and non-governmental organizations:  
 Researchers and experts who have experience in working with youth 
The field work helped the researcher to address the questions that emerged from the 
theoretical frameworks and illuminate the unknown sides of the phenomena such as the 
personal motivation for engagement in contentious politics, the social and political 
experience of the leaders and members and specific reasons behind the splits and 
divisions in the networks. The thesis is focusing on the kind of continuity and changes in 
these movements and networks which were born from the womb of existing groups or 
networks and the role of the generational gap in this process.  
As the political opportunity is not something objective, the active observation and interviews 
with leaders and members illustrates how and why they recognize any event or series of 
incidents to be a chance or opportunity for mobilization and protest. Interviews with 
leadership and ordinary members could point out the perceptions and shared definitions of the 
situation. The leadership and entrepreneurs play a big role in defining the opportunities and 
creating consensus in the movements. “Objective” opportunities do not automatically trigger 
episodes of contentious politics or social movements, regardless of what activists may think 
or feel. The empirical work is carried out to explore individual perceptions and emotions 
about the political opportunities and constraints to explain their engagement in the continuous 
politics which is risky and certainly can be costly actions. It was also helpful in discovering 
that some historical events create new networks and groups while other events did not help in 
developing such networks and groups. For example, April 6 2008 Strike created new 
movement such as April 6while Kefaya began to decline after the 2005 election.  
The fieldwork presented several arguments and conclusions that could help in understanding 
the process of building solidarity and the collective identities of the social movements and 
political actors. The interviews and comparisons between the sources could give a clear vision 
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about the real power and resources available to these networks and movements apart from 
propaganda and media images. 
Themes 
There were main elements and big themes prepared before the semi-structured interviews, 
with a flexibility for discussion with the respondents to show points of interest and political 
expertise and socialization. This flexibility was very important to shed light and open serious 
dialogue about new issues that had not been clear in the basic scenario of the interview. In this 
regard, the discussion and open questions contributed to the development of themes proposed 
for discussion. These elements and responses could be converted into a quantitative study in 
the future through the design of a form of questionnaire to be distributed for wider 
representatives of the activism society.   
Interviews aimed to get answers about: culture, framing, perceptions of the political 
opportunities and the networks and the internal mechanisms such as the level of centrality, 
membership and internal democracy. The interviews also sought to explore the various 
activisms’ recognition of their common interests and their definition of political opportunities 
and constraints and the bases for cooperation across ideological divisions. 
The active observation and interviews were important in exploring the framing process these 
movements pursue and why they move from focusing on external issues like Palestine and 
Iraq to internal issues. They also sought to explore the cultural grounds upon which they built 
their opposition to the regime (internal culture or external); what were the political and 
cultural problems that led to the splits in these movements and why they cannot continue for a 
long time and the political pragmatism and the lack of ideological grounds which make it easy 
for activists to move from movement to another. 
The open questions 
 The perception and the awareness of the existence of a political opportunity. 
   The development of organizational and logistics capacity of the youth 
activism. Drafting revolutionary intellectual and cultural frames against the regime. 
 Constructing the collective identity of groups.  
 Class and social affiliations of the activists. 
 Reasons for the decline of youth activism 
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 Funding problems and divisions. 
 Relationship with other actors in the political game. 
Limitation 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the techniques of using Facebook and Skype 
in the interviewing of activists. Some interviews carried out through chatting and dialogue on 
Facebook and Skype could fulfil the aims of fieldwork while others, through the use of video 
calls, allowed the opportunity to observe the body language, facial emotions and noting the 
conditions of the place. However, due to the nature and aims of this research, which focuses 
on the ideas, perceptions, knowledge and experience of respondents, this method was 
adequate and conducive to the objective of the research, in addition to reducing the extra 
costs. This, of course, is different from anthropological studies and case studies that require 
the kind of cohabitation and description of the surrounding environment. 
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Chapter Three: 
 The State Society Relationship and the Cycles of Rise and Decline of 
Youth Movement: 1952-2000 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Egyptian political history is marked by the prominence of youth and political activism 
when the political arrangements and institutions organizing the state society relationship 
failed or proved to be inefficient. Over the last six decades, several historical events which 
coincided with a politically opportune context witnessed the dramatic emergence and spread 
of youth activism and other social movements. This chapter attempts to set out a narrative of 
the political history and state-society relations to compose a synthesis explaining and 
analysing the conditions in which the youth activism emerged and developed resulting from 
the social changes and the political arrangements which organized state society relations in 
Egypt between 1952 and 2000. In other words, this chapter focuses on a post-independence 
Egyptian political history to work out the rules that governed the emergence of the youth 
activism in these five decades in order to develop an analytical framework to explain the 
similar experience that emerged and developed from 2000 to 2010.    
In other words, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a narrative of Egypt modern history 
which identifies the political opportunities which enabled youth activism to emerge or 
decline. In each historical stage, explanations are offered about how social movements might 
then be contextualised within a study of post-independence Egyptian political history, linking 
the process and concepts raised from the social movement theory to show how the Egyptian 
context complements or accommodates them. For example, the political process model gives 
great attention to the political opportunity structure that leads to the emergence of social 
movements. It is important to examine its assumption in the Egyptian context to understand 
and analyze the factors that worked together to lead to the emergence and development of the 
youth activism.  This chapter discusses the elements of the political opportunities and 
institutional context, in which the social movements emerge such as a less repressive climate, 
splits within the ruling elite, or the presence of influential allies or supporters (Tarrow 1989).  
It is noteworthy that the literature about Middle East offers several theoretical approaches and 
concepts to achieve this goal and this chapter attempts to mark them out as social pact, 
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corporatism, hegemonic state and competitive authoritarianism. It has to be clear that these 
propositions developed over different stages.  In post-independence political life: social pacts, 
corporatism and hegemony theories belong to the era of populist post-independence regimes. 
Competitive authoritarianism relates to a more recent phase marked by political reforms, the 
end of single-partyism, and a corresponding bid to broaden the political base of the regime in 
an era of neo-liberal economic reforms which undermine the old social pacts.  
3.2 Youth Activism and Power Struggle in Egypt 1952-1954  
Youth, particularly university students were an important player in Egyptian politics during 
the liberal period (1919-1952). Youth mobilization emerged and developed against the 
backdrop of British colonialism and in support of constitutional rule and became a mainstay 
of Egyptian public life. The students in universities became integrated part of the political 
movements of the time such as Al Wafd party, the Muslim Brothers, Young Egypt and the 
Communist Movement. Youth activism during that period was often an extension of the 
political forces outside the universities. The youth activism and other civil society 
organizations were very active and vibrant during the liberal era in the 1940s. However, they 
were parts of the political and ideological movements and parties that sought for 
independence and political change.  
All these groups and networks accumulated their efforts with the Free Officers to produce the 
1952 upheaval. As a result an immediate replacement in the political ruling elite took place 
between 1952-1954 but the youth activism continued to flourish because of the less repressive 
climate and splits within the new ruling elite. As soon as conflicts within the Revolutionary 
Command Council and the Free Officers escalated (Springborg, 1974, 65), youth activism 
became gradually part of the power struggle that took place in Egypt and ended up in 1954 
with the beginning of the Nasser era.   
The revolution of 1952 inherited a political system in which the universities played an 
important role both in the national movement and in the struggle for power. However, to 
consolidate its power at the outset, the military regime had to win over a politically active 
student body which, in common with other political groups, had become accustomed to the 
liberal framework of political activity and found it difficult to come to terms with the rule of 
the armed forces. Students and workers were seen as a potential source of political 
disturbance (Abdulla, 2009, p. 119). The confrontation with universities, both teachers and 
students, resulted directly from the conflict between the liberal intelligentsia and the 
autocratic tendencies of the military rulers (Abdulla, 2009, p. 120). 
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The domination of the young Free Officers in Egypt after 1954 did not only exclude the old 
ruling political elite which linked to the Palace and traditional political parties, but also 
isolated the younger generations and activists of the other ideological political factions who 
supported the revolution. Thus, if the generation of the free officers reflected the aspirations 
of new generations in post-independent Egypt, in fact it excluded other generational units 
represented by the various political and social movements. It is interesting to consider that 
members of the Revolutionary Command Council, who left the council early - voluntarily or 
involuntarily - were of those who had distinguished themselves as members of Islamist or 
Leftist trends, which no doubt explains the political arrangement formulated by Nasser 
(Lachin, 1992, p. 69). 
3.3 Youth Activism in the Nasserist Era: the Hegemonic State  
The end of the liberal experiments that Egyptian society had engaged in briefly before and 
immediately after 1952 and new regime emerging led to the decline of independent youth 
activism. The Nasser era was marked by the emergence and rapid consolidation of the 
corporatist arrangements which successfully included the social and economic forces through 
a single party system that incorporated the main interests in society and helped the state to 
allocate the resources in a way that gained the support of social classes and forces especially 
workers and peasants as well as the middle class. A populist social pact organized the state 
and society relations in ways that decreased any social protest. The regime gained more 
power and legitimacy as the bureaucracy expanded to include millions of Egyptians, and the 
military establishment enjoyed a high profile in society. Nasser’s charismatic personality 
jointly with the Pan-Arab ideology provided a strong base for state hegemony over the society 
and decreased the appeal of counter hegemonic ideologies like that of the Muslim Brothers 
and the Communists.  
The following section discusses the structure and features of the Nasser regime using 
hegemony, social pacts and corporatism, patron-client networks theories belonged to the era 
of the populist post-independence state which was marked by the decline of the autonomy of 
youth activism.  
First: ideological hegemony of the state 
The state, according the hegemony approach, “rules and manages social and political actors in 
the society not through coercive means but through the expansion of social forces consent and 
the common beliefs and values system” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 159). Hegemony exists as “a 
consensus concerning the ‘naturalness’ of existing relations of power, backed by the coercion 
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of the state apparatus (the police, courts, etc.)”. This consensus is diffused through the 
institutions of civil society, for example, voluntary associations, the education system and the 
media (Gramsci, 1971, pp 12, 161, Pratt, 2004, p.  318). Using Gramscian concepts, it could 
be argued that Nasser became hegemonic in two ways: ‘leading’ and ‘dominating’. Nasser led 
the regime and the social forces which were its allies, and dominated those which were its 
enemies (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 55-57, n. 5; Ayubi, 2001, p. 6). It could be further argued that 
the Nasser regime consolidated itself by incorporating support through a combination of 
nationalism (anti-imperialism) in foreign policy, curbing the weak agrarian capitalist 
oligarchy through nationalizations and land reform, and a populist social contract 
(Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 2). 
It is worth noting that the Gramscian concept of hegemony is “broader than the Weberian 
concept of legitimacy because it does not confine itself to the processes according to which 
political structures are accepted by the system’s agents, but delves as well into the area of 
cultural and ideological consent, and emphasizes the role of state as educator” (Ayubi, 2001, 
p. 7). In this regard the regime constructed a synthesis of ideas and principles which 
concentrated on social justice, socialism, Arab nationalism, the resistance of the Western 
colonization and Israel. This ideology also emphasized the corrupt nature of a monarchial 
regime before the revolution, and the party system and parties. In addition to this, the people 
expressed their emotional attachment to Nasser and his charismatic personality (Tohami. 
2009, p 85). The regime overcame the counter-hegemonic groups and discourse which 
became weak and did not manage to compete with the regime ideology.  
It is worth noting that consent may also be secured “through material realities, such as, the 
creation of certain political institutions, state provision of services and cultural rituals” 
(Eagleton, 1991, p. 112). However, the ‘ideological’ and the material aspects of the 
hegemonic state “cannot be separated but, rather, constitute two sides of the same coin, the 
one reinforcing the other” (Eagleton, 1991; p. 114 & Ayubi, 2001, p. 8). In the Egyptian 
context, the new populist regime gave the state an expansionist socio-economic role to get 
this consent. An explicit or implicit “social pact” was forged, under the terms of which “the 
state was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy the basic needs of its citizens, 
consolidate political independence, and achieve other national aspirations e.g., Arab unity, the 
liberation of Palestine”. In return, citizens were to forgo, at least for a while, the quest for 
democracy and participation. In this regard “Pan-Arab nationalist and socialist ideologies 
were used to popularize this social contract and to generate political mobilization in support 
of the ruling regimes. The majority of citizens accepted or acquiesced” (Ibrahim, 
Liberalization and Democratization, p. 36). 
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Second: Corporatist state/structure of ASU which integrated interests including youth 
The hegemonic regime consolidated a “distinctive model for the organisation of mass 
politics” which could be called the corporatist regime. The regime organized and established 
its formal institutions and incorporated the interests on the basis of corporatism. Ehteshami & 
Murphy, (1996, p. 755) argued that in this corporatist regime, “A generals/civilian technocrats 
alliance defends the control of the authoritarian bureaucratic regime, while a corporatist 
political structure provides the channels for mobilisation through which it can operate” 11. 
Ayubi discriminated between two ideal types of corporatism which range between a more 
‘organic’, solidaristic and communicatarian strand at one end of the spectrum, and an interest-
based and populist/mobilisational strand at the other end (Ayubi, 2001, p. 3). It could be 
called the authoritarian strand of corporatism (Ayubi, 2001, p. 19). In such ‘corporative-state’ 
arrangements, the state is “compelled to play a driving role in the social development” in the 
absence of earlier democratic traditions (Busi-Gluckmann, 1980, p. 284ff)
 12
. Heydemann 
considered that the emergence of that “centralized, hierarchical, and tightly regulated 
corporatist structures of interest representation” was one of the significant indications of the 
rise of the national populist social pacts during the 1950s and 1960s (Heydemann, 2007, p. 
32).  
In the corporatist regime, a single party became the intermediary between state and interest 
groups as in this corporatist model, interests are negotiated and incorporated into the state's 
decision-making processes (Ehteshami & Murphy, p. 754). Indeed, one-party rule became the 
dominant pattern of governance worldwide assuming that it played the major role in the 
processes of nation building and national integration (see Apter 1955 and 1965, pp. 179-222; 
Coleman & Rosberg 1964; Huntington 1968; Moore 1962; Schachter 1961; Wallerstein 1960; 
Zolberg 1963 and 1966). 
                                                     
11 Corporatism, according to Perlmutter, is a type of political domination by a coalition of politicians, technocrats, 
military men and bureaucrats, with the military as the ultimate arbiter and source of elite recruitment, in which 
different more or less organized and more or less autonomous social groups are linked to the state and its 
bureaucracy via patrimonial-clientelistic structures of control (Perlmutter 1981, 38 and 117). Corporate regimes 
(the military is still the most powerful group, but rule is exercised by a coalition of the military and bureaucrats) 
(Perlmutter 1981, 129).  11  The balance between technocratic and military roles changed over time and between 
different stages. (O’Donnell 1973, 30-31)  11 . Kevin Koehler and Jana Warkotsch, Putting Institutions into 
Perspective: Two Waves of Authoritarianism, Studies and the Arab Spring, 1122, pp 6,7 
12 Ayubi illustrated that, “This stems from the fact that in these societies neither ‘philosophical individualism’ nor 
social classes have developed well enough to allow for the emergence of politics as we see it in Western capitalist 
societies”. Ayubi, 1995 , p. 3 
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The corporatist structures provided the blueprint for relations between the state and a wide 
range of other collective interest groups, including peasants, labour, students, women, and 
various associations (Heydemann, (2007) p. 32). 
Apart from the state apparatus, Nasser’s vision was against any political or ideological 
organizations, against the idea of the organization itself. The face of this new system of 
popular organizations was not conducted on the basis of the difference in the content of 
politics and ideology adopted by each organization, but was fundamentally about the notion 
of being party or organization itself (Al-Shalg, 1992, p 80). In this single-party system, the 
Arab Socialist Union (ASU), which was supposed to be the popular political organization, 
shifted over time to an administrative technocratic body more than a political party (Al-Shalg, 
1992, pp 105,106). 
The key attribute of the Socialist Union was its expansion to include the entire electorate, 
where the values of democratic competition and respect for the other opinion were rejected. 
Indeed, the plurality of opinions even within a single political organization was not 
permissible either, and the widespread belief among that leadership was that political 
participation was equivalent to mobilizing of the masses behind the national goals and 
policies 
 
(Abou-Zeid, 1996, pp. 70, 71). Nasser regime acted as a kind of national-populist 
social pact to, “incorporate interests, absorb oppositions, co-opt competitors, build flexible 
coalitions, articulate cross-cutting and seemingly inconsistent policies, reconstitute privileged 
social networks, restructure property rights, and accommodate the emergence of new 
institutions” (Heydemann, 2007, p. 35).  
The regime offered to do away with the parliamentary system in return for providing a 
number of social achievements which the previous system had notably failed to produce. 
While the promises of social change appealed to large sectors of the intelligentsia, the 
accompanying political restrictions provoked their vivid animosity. As some authors such as 
Awad put it “any people thought they could have a republic and agrarian reform and at the 
same time keep the classical forms of liberal democracy” (Abdalla, 2009, p. 120). In this 
regard, The University was one of the three platforms (the other two being the lawyers’ and 
journalists’ syndicates) from which the intelligentsia could voice its opposition to the military 
regime (Abdalla, 2009, p. 120). 
Third: Stunting of an embryonic civil society 
The populist social contract had, among other things, a detrimental impact, not only on 
traditional political parties, but also on other organizations of civil society. The latter were 
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either prohibited or severely restricted by an arsenal of laws and decrees or were annexed 
outright to the single party in power (Ibrahim, 1995, p. 36). 
The boundaries between the state and civil society have long been blurred and the two 
‘spheres’ are much more interrelated than are currently depicted. For example, civil society 
actors, such as trade unions and business organizations, have long been involved in state 
policymaking in many countries through corporatist arrangements (Schmitter, 1979; Pratt, 
2004, p. 317). Law 32/1964 organized civil associations into a strict, monopolistic hierarchy, 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) at the apex of the pyramid (Ibid, p. 321). The 
Explanatory Memorandum of Law 32/1964 identified the ideological intentions of the Law as 
being an instrument of state-directed modernization (Ibid, p. 322). 
In other words, under populist rule, civil society organizations lost all or much of their 
autonomy. As a result, many of these organizations withered away due to aging membership 
and the disinterest of younger generations. Some became merely paper organizations, and 
only a very few adapted to the new populist formula and managed to remain active within the 
existing political constraints (Ibrahim, 1995, p. 36). 
Fourth: Patron-client and informal networks 
The regime developed clientelism and patron-client relations to ensure the coherence and 
loyalty of the elite and social forces. The corporative regime and its national-populist social 
pact “not only can be defined by formal institutional arrangements but also by closely related 
informal modes of governance and resource allocation” (Heydemann, 2007, p. 22).The 
informal networks within and across formal institutions and public sectors were not only 
dominated by members of the single party (ASU) but also included senior officers, 
bureaucrats, union elites, and senior officials in other semi-public associations (Heydemann, 
2007, p. 33). The formal political and administrative institutions “provided fertile breeding 
grounds for patron-client relationships” (Springborg, 1974, pp. 86-88). 
Springborg deepened our understanding of the informality and networks that the regime 
effectively worked through. The concept of political clientelism has been used to refer to “the 
glue that held the political system together for long time” (Ibid, p. 87).  Springborg illustrated 
that the informal organizations included Family, Dufaa “graduating class” and Shilla “close 
friends”. This means that small group of people work together to obtain individual goals (Ibid, 
p. 104). 
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In this model the formal organizations worked as vehicles through which personal 
connections were established (Ibid, p. 104). In addition to this, the civil or nongovernmental 
associations’ leaders were considered brokers between the sources of patronage (ruler, 
ministers or ministerial secretaries) and their organization’s membership, and were evaluated 
by their followers largely in terms of the amount of patronage they funnel down into the 
organization (Ibid, p. 86). 
The main characteristics of the informality arrangements could be summarised as follows:  
First, access to these networks typically was controlled by the political elites who dominated 
formal institutions. Second, both informal networks and formal institutions depend on and 
contribute to the survival of the system of rule that produces them. Third, the proliferation of 
informal modes of governance and resource allocation contributes significantly to the 
adaptive capacity of regimes by expanding the opportunity set so that incumbents can exploit 
themselves in power. The availability of new resources might come from internal mechanisms 
like the nationalisation of private and foreign projects or through external financial or material 
support (Heydemann, 2007, p. 34).  
The formal and informal networks such families and dufaas “graduating class” serve main 
two functions for the regime; first as communication centres and, second, as centres for the 
recruitment process. It is personal connections and loyalties that open the channels of upward 
mobility (Springborg, op.cit, pp. 104, 105). 
Collective action and youth activism 
The literature about collective action and youth activism and student unions shows that they 
have long been involved in state policymaking through corporatist arrangements in Egypt. 
Most youth unions and organizations were integrated into the state structure or the ruling 
party, resulting in the arrangement where ASU and the formal student unions (Etihad E-
Talaba) would represent them.  These authoritarian corporatist institutional forms became the 
only available form for collecting and organizing interests (Heydemann, 2007, p. 30). Indeed, 
the corporatism reflects Waterbury’s (1993) sense of having been delivered by elites rather 
than fought for by their members. This model diffused potential grievances against, and 
challenges to, the regime. When interest groups attempted to protest or express their 
grievances outside of this system, “the regime would claim that they challenged the national 
consensus and interest and so could legitimately be suppressed” (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996 
p. 755). In the context of post-independence Egypt there was a hegemonic consensus around 
the subordination of civil society to ‘national interests’ (Pratt, 2004, p. 319). The authoritarian 
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vision which dominated the political culture suspected that autonomous civil society or youth 
activism could be a threat that should be “suppressed before the colonialists could exploit it 
for their own purposes and the autonomous individual seemed to resemble an enemy that 
should be subjugated” (Al-Arawi, 1983, pp. 29-36, 107, Ayubi, 2001, p. 24). In other words 
the hegemonic regime ideology has led to “demobilization of the populace, or at best selective 
and controlled mobilization of certain pro-government segments of the population” (Bayat, 
2000, p. 2). All civil associations, syndicates and youth centres were part from the corporatist 
arrangements. The political activism was highly restricted and oppressed, and youth 
mobilization was restricted to state sponsored organizations such as the Youth Organization 
(Munazzemet Al-Shabab) and the Youth Vanguard which were parts of the ruling party 
(ASU)  (Eissa Mohamed, 2008, pp. 33-34).  
The formal Student Unions (Etihad E-Talaba) emerged as entities belonging to ASU after the 
formation of the General Federation of Arab Republic of students in 1960. However, the 
University Guards oversaw the activities of students and the approval of the security services 
became a prerequisite for candidates in student elections (NCSCR, 1983,p. 158). It is true that 
large segments of the young people in the 1960s joined ASU and its Youth Organizations, for 
being in power, not for revolution. However, the regime excluded the political parties from 
practicing any contribution to the political socialization of the youth (Al-Shobky, 2002, p. 
84). Counter-hegemonic movements could not emerge or challenge these arrangements and 
remained outside the public sphere.  
Thus the implication of the 1954 confrontation between the regime and youth activism 
marked the 1950s and 1960s which represent a long period of hibernation for the student 
movements. Zakariay, a famous author, criticized the youth apathy in 1960s by saying “the 
young men on whom the future of the country depends are bossed with an opium called 
football” (Zakariay, 1966, p. 42 quoted from Abdalla, 2009, p. 123). The demobilization and 
demoralization of what had been an autonomous political movement was engineered through 
a combination of coercion and socialization. The scholar Amos Permutter went so far to say, 
“The problem of Egypt is not a crisis of political participation. The problem is “the 
suspension of politics as an autonomous goal” (Abdalla, 2009, pp. 124, 138).  
In sum the youth activism during this period were marked by three characteristics:   
First: a lack of tolerable ideological diversity with only regime organizations having 
permission to exist.  
Second:  a loss or absence of structural/organizational autonomy. 
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Third: a weak and inability to mobilize except trough informal and formal networks tied to 
the regime. 
However, the collective action and youth engagement took different forms to adapt to the 
hegemonic regime and its corporatist arrangements. A number of scholars have noted that 
even these highly controlled forms of corporatism created their own possibilities for agency, 
bargaining, and negotiation by the groups that they sought to contain (Bianchi 1989; Goldberg 
1992; Posunsey 1997, Heydemann, 2007, p. 32). It is worth noting that the regime 
unintentionally created social forces which represented what could become fertile soil for a 
new wave of political activism like, large groups of educated youth as well as working and 
middle classes that would later confront the state (Bayat, 2000, p. 2). 
The 1967 Defeat and the revitalization of social movements 
These arrangements were strongly shaken after the defeat of 1967 and the failure of the state’s 
developmental projects. Most segments of society such as the intelligentsia and young 
generation lost their trust and confidence in the governing elite. They realized that they were 
mistaken to think the state and its leadership were qualified to protect the society and defend 
the national security. Consequently the hegemonic power of the state diminished and 
important groups of young people began to challenge the ruling elite through demonstrations 
and strikes. The corporatist arrangements faced a strong challenge due to the fact that the 
protest actions basically came from the Youth Organization (Munazzemet Al-Shabab) which 
was a part of the ruling party (ASU). The students, those oft-invoked ‘Sons of the 
Revolution’, turned out to be its prodigal sons.  They discovered that their own hoped-for 
share in political power could not be realized without direct confrontation with the regime 
(Abdalla, 2009, p. 212). 
The younger generation began to seek different solutions and this led to the flourishing of 
diverse ideological and religious movements. Indeed, university students and workers were 
the first to mobilize against the Nasserist regime in the wake of the 1967 defeat. They staged 
demonstrations in 1968 calling for the strict penalization of those responsible for the 1967 
defeat, and for the restoration of political rights and freedoms. The Nasser regime responded 
by issuing harsher sentences against some military officers, and by promising limited political 
liberalization within the ranks of the ruling party (Eissa, 2008, 33-34). There were not student 
unions in the sense of trade unions before 1952, but there was a political current that was 
active. In 1960 the General Federation of Students was formed, and student unions emerged 
as entities belonging to the ASU Youth Organization. In the wake of the massive student 
demonstrations in September 1968, the regime modified the student regulations to allow the 
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formation of a political action committee as one of the four core committees of the formal 
student unions (NCSCR, 1983, p. 158). 
The political role of the young people who grew up in the era of Nasser and the revolution 
changed in the wake of the defeat of 1967, when the rebellion of large segments of this 
generation emerged. It is astonishing that this generation was brought up in the organizations 
of corporatism, but at the same time they rebelled and sharply criticized the leadership of the 
regime (Al-Shobky, 2002, p. 84). 
The events of 1967 were distinctive and showed the failure of the populist social contract and 
the anti-imperialistic ideology seeding the erosion of state hegemony and creating disputes 
among the ruling elite particularly between the president, Nasser, and the General Leader of 
the Army, Abdel Hakiem Amer about who should bear the responsibility about the defeat 
which ended with the suspicious death of the latter. This lack of coherence in the ruling elite 
provided the youth and protest movement with the context for a new opportunity to emerge.  
The regime attempted to temporarily cope with this wave of protest when Nasser declared the 
30
th
 March Statement which called for more responsibility and democracy. The regime 
realized that there was an urgent need to respond to the crisis through some changes in the 
way of political governing. Consequently, the Statement of March 30
th
 1968 pointed out the 
shortcomings in the performance of ASU which been attributed to the appointment as a way 
to choose the leaders of ASU, thus the regime endorsed the elections. It also stressed the need 
to transform society to be more open society and to offer an opportunity for expressing other 
opinions (Abou Zied, 1996, p. 72-75). However, a new phenomenon began to emerge that 
reflected the apathy among some members of this generation. After the 1967 defeat, 
discontent increased among the intellectual elite, and there was a growing trend for migration 
of the educated and intellectuals, and the period 1968-70 had highest rates of emigration 
which were concentrated in the age group of 20-40 years (Isaac, 2002, p. 71). 
The most significant implications of the 1967 events were that they sowed the seeds for the 
development in the longer term of ideological possibilities in Egypt and the Arab political 
arena. According to Dessouki (1973), the Arab intellectuals who explained al-Nakba (the 
defeat) in terms of historical and long-term factors, who saw the wider significance and who 
made sincere attempts at self-analysis and self-criticism, could be classified into three groups: 
1- Representatives of the secular liberal response who stressed the importance of 
education, science, technology, planning and secularization.  
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2- Representatives of the Islamist response who advocated a return to Islam as the only 
solution. 
3- Representatives of the revolutionary socialist response who advocated the complete 
modernization of society along revolutionary lines.  
Most observers of the Egyptian scene agree that the rise of these religious movements dates 
back to the aftermath of the Arab defeat of 1967(Ibrahim, 1980, p. 425). 
3.4 The Sadat Era: Survival Strategies and the Prominence of Youth 
Ideological Oriented Activism 
The regime crisis after the 1967 war, followed by Nasser’s death in 1970, created a growing 
awareness among the elite and intellectuals that the old populist social pact and hegemonic 
ideology were not able to continue and there was a need to create a new model stressing 
political and economic openness as the March Statement in 1968 had illustrated. The laws 
issued in 1971-1972 came to allow the participation of those who had been politically isolated 
under Nasser  (Abou Zied, 1996, pp. 72, 75). The expansionist role of the state had reached its 
peak in the 1950s and 1960s. After that, the course of socio-political events internally, 
regionally, and internationally forced the state to retreat from several socio-economic 
functions (Ibrahim, 1995, p. 37). This led to the emergence of a new form of social pact that 
organized mass politics in Egypt which some authors thought “might give way to more 
participatory democratic forms of rule” (Heydemann, 2007, p. 21). 
Liberalising the state from the top 
The beginning on the path of transition to democratic rule in the late sixties and the first half 
of the seventies occurred as a kind of crisis management to diffuse the pressure coming from 
society and social forces especially students and workers who called for more political and 
civil liberties as well as other groups such as intellectuals and judges. The economic 
liberalization, associated with political openness in the seventies, connected with the 
convergence with the United States (Abou Zied, 1996, p. 76).  An alternative foreign policy 
emerged which shifted the anti-imperialistic approach and alliance with the USSR toward a 
new alliance with the west and the USA. 
Ehteshami & Murphy (1996, p. 764) argued that the democratisation came as “a strategy of 
survival from the top” as the president and his elite sought to renew the political legitimacy. 
Sadat searched for other alternatives and embarked on a different articulation of the relation 
between state and society to compensate for his lack of charismatic and revolutionary 
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legitimacy - at least in the early years of his rule - compared with Nasser who had dominated 
the state and society. The fiscal crises after the war also shaped the social pact between the 
state and citizens. Sadat attempted to compensate for the lack of hegemonic bases through a 
democratic legitimacy using both traditional and religious legitimacy.   
After the achievements in the 1973 war, Sadat renewed his legitimacy as a confident 
champion leader and decided to rearrange the political and economic system. The economic 
opening policies “Infitah” of 1974 was accompanied by an apparent political opening. At first 
the single party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), simply evolved into three permitted 
factions; centre, left and right, which were later allowed to operate as distinct political parties 
in 1977 (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, p. 761). This led to a kind of loose form of corporatism 
which allowed for pluralism and different social forces to compete together in elections. 
Egypt formally resumed its second democratization process in 1976, after a quarter of a 
century of corporatism and populist state ideology under Nasser (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 381).  
However, several counter forces impeded the process, including the inertia of the 
authoritarian legacy (1952-1976) and the continued restrictive law of associations (Law 32 of 
1964), which stunted the flourishing of Egyptian civil society (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 381). 
The loose corporatist arrangements 
The state was forced to assert its autonomy from the party in order to ensure the liberalization 
strategy and reducing resistance from within. However this created a dilemma for the 
corporatist arrangements: “The state could not afford simply to ditch the ruling party, not only 
because it represented the ideological source of regime legitimacy, but also because it 
provided the route for co-opting society through its position as intermediary between state and 
corporate groups” (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, p. 760). In addition to this, “the level of 
fusion between personnel in the party and state further complicated matters because the head 
of state was usually the party leader as well” (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, p. 760). The 
authoritarian legacy ingrained in the executive branch of the government and the practice of 
election rigging in favour of the ruling party spread; the latter has bequeathed the political 
parties weak cadres and an impotent political infrastructure (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 381). 
The labour and trade unions that benefited from the corporatist system were against the 
dissolution of the ASU the only body which could have stood in the way of Sadat's economic 
liberalisation measures. Actually Sadat, having destroyed the party as a centre of power, now 
established the power of the centre. He demolished the ASU to establish the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) which was led by his loyal supporters and got rid of his enemies. 
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Sadat, followed by Mubarak, decided to gather two important positions together to become 
the head of the state and head of the NDP which became the dominant  party in the political 
system until the 25
th
 January revolution.  
In fact Sadat’s survival strategy did not weaken the presidential position or the hegemonic 
party as the centre of power. Ehteshami & Murphy (1996, p. 761) emphasized that this 
transformation did not “mean the dismantlement of corporatism, merely the decapitation of 
the corporatist organisations to prevent vested interests from interfering with his economic 
policy”. During the Sadat era a new balance in the corporatist arrangements between military 
and bureaucracy was representing a decrease in the military character of the Egyptian elite 
(Abdalla, 1988, p. 214). This created a relatively more civilian ruling elite, especially in the 
cabinet and at provincial levels. 
Sadat established a new type of political contestation where some parties play the role of real 
opposition and others of loyal opposition. The content of political action remained the same 
and did not differ from the foundations of what was ruled by the political process in the 
period of Nasser. Sadat created a loose form of corporatism shaped by “restricted pluralism to 
serve a particular function in his project which attempted to be applied in Egypt” (Nafaa, 
1988, p.47). In this restricted pluralism, a certain number of parties were legalized while the 
formation of others was rejected, in addition to measures restricting the participation of 
radical groups, either directly or indirectly 
 
(Abou-Zeid, 1996, pp. 70-75). The liberalization 
was thus aiming ultimately towards liberalization in the economic arena rather than heading 
towards the democratization of the political arena. 
The regime felt threats coming from the Left which began to exercise its role as a real 
opposition party, refusing to remain part from the façade democratic structure, and succeeded 
in attracting many members of the Nasserists, Nationalists and Marxists groups. The regime 
responded by narrowing the channels of political participation not only against political 
parties, but also civil society and student movements. It should be noted that Sadat used both 
force and legislations to eliminate or to weaken the Left, but these options ironically 
contributed to the strengthening of the Islamic movements at the expense of other political 
forces, in spite of the continuation of the ban on the formation of Islamist political parties 
(Abou-Zeid, 1996, pp. 78-82). 
Collective action and political opportunities: 
The Sadat era was marked by a number of elements that led to a new prominence of youth 
activism. They include the power struggle after Nasser, liberalization and the privatization 
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process which created tension within the regime, the high level of grievances and the fiscal 
crises. 
First; The power struggle and lack of coherence in the ruling elite:   
Clientelism and patron-client relations ensured the coherence and loyalty of the elites and 
social forces. The golden age of the interests of informal networks had been in the fifties and 
sixties. With the beginning of pluralism and economic openness, political resources 
multiplied and it became essential that the alliances be reinforced on the basis of common 
economic interests and harmony of political visions (El-Sayed, 1991). After Nasser’s death 
different factions either declared loyalty to new leader or rejected him on ideological and 
interest grounds. Some of the main formal and informal networks within the regime defied 
Sadat as the legitimate president. Sadat was Nasser's vice president and the second in 
command according to the succession rules, but he lacked much of Nasser's charisma and 
therefore seemed less qualified as a president (Rashed,2012).  
The powerbrokers within the ASU forced Sadat to accept limits on his own presidential 
authority in return for accepting him as president in 1970. The most important of these was a 
stipulation that he rule collectively, which meant that he would have to secure the agreement 
of the ASU’s Supreme Executive Committee and the Central Committee on all major policy 
initiatives (Cook , 2012). By May 1971, however, Sadat had cultivated enough support, 
especially among the military and police officers, to oust these power centres and prominent 
figures
13
 by what has been called the “Rectification Revolution”. The confrontation weakened 
the ruling elite cohesion, but these forces failed to challenge to the official president. They 
broke down due to lack of legal cover for rebellion, however, this confrontation encouraged 
the emergence of protest movements in the streets opposing Sadat’s policies particularly the 
student movement in 1971-1972. 
Second: Liberalization and the privatization process created tension in the regime 
networks 
The move from Nationalist populism and a state-led economic development strategy to 
economic liberalization during 1970s deepened the lack of coherence in the ruling elite. It is 
worth noting that the change in the strategy of the regime to pursue economic liberalization 
and the privatization process created tension in the regime networks. Some of them were 
                                                     
13These prominent figures include: General Sharawi Guma, the interior minister; Sami Sharaf, the minister of 
state for presidential affairs; Ali Sabri, the head of the ASU; and General Mohamed Fawzi, the minister of war.  
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excluded and new networks would benefit. Thus for both the functional reason of economic 
necessity, and because the liberalizing elements of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie needed to 
cement their alliance with their commercial counterparts, as Ehteshami & Murphy (1996, p. 
760) pointed out, “political liberalising -and what amounts to power-sharing came onto the 
agenda”. Such a process created new alliances between networks in the regime bureaucracy 
and business. “This would be fiercely resisted by those elements of the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie who believed that power-sharing represented power-loss and who were more 
interested in preserving their existing privileges than risking all for accumulatory possibilities. 
The most threatened group of all in this situation are the core elements of the single party who 
recognise that multiplicity of parties means the loss of their own monopoly on power. 
(Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, p. 760). 
Thirdly: Grievances in the society and among younger generations 
The advent of liberalization and marketization unleashed important socio-economic changes, 
(Bayat, 2000, p. 2), and increased grievances in the society and among younger generations 
that began to challenge the regime. In the absence of a well developed civil society, and 
without established channels for the diffusion of these explosions of popular angst, the regime 
was faced with political chaos, instability and a threat to itself. For the sake of self-
preservation, and to resist pressures to alter the economic policies, it used the means available 
to it, the security forces, to re-impose its authority (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, p. 764). The 
regime security apparatus launched attacks in “efforts to crush the opposition which has 
emerged with political liberalization or social forces unleashed by the economic crisis and the 
policies of economic liberalization which have been undertaken to remedy it” (Ehteshami & 
Murphy, 1996, p. 763). 
Youth activism and political activism in the Sadat era 
These conditions and the relative openness led to the emergence of social movements and 
ideological trends. And the youth activism expanded in the universities in the 1970s.  The 
civil society associations obtained the required formal licence to work due to the fiscal crisis 
which shacked the social pact and a new class of businessmen emerged while the labour class 
began to complain and protest especially after the price rises in January 1977 which led to a 
spontaneous explosion and violence in city streets but the Leftists and  younger generation of 
Nasserists took the opportunity to participate and gain revenge over Sadat who got rid of 
Nasser’s elite and heritage. After the Camp David agreement Sadat lost the rest of his 
hegemonic power, while the Iranian revolution pushed the Islamist’s younger generations to 
become more violent and ambitious to capture the state.   
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For the student of social movements, these two conditions: deterioration of the social pact and 
the creation of new political opportunities triggered activism and protest (Bayat, 2000, p. 3). 
The main features of the youth activism in the 1970s could be identified as follow: 
- They were dominated by the ideological divisions compared to 1967 wave of protest. 
- The growing organizational capacities and skills. 
- They involved in confrontation with the state which represent strategic mistake 
justifying the regime coercive repression  
- The youth movement particularly the Left lost momentum by the end of this decade.  
The study identifies three waves of youth activism during the 1970s:  
The first wave of student activism: 
This wave of activism was sparked off by the President's speech in which he excused his 
failure to keep his promise to make 1971 a decisive year (Abdalla, 2009, p. 178).  The youth 
activism during 1971-72 became more active, criticizing the delay in liberating the occupied 
land. In 1972-1973, Leftist students gained momentum and formed a number of independent 
clubs and associations on university campuses and staged a series of demonstrations to press 
the Sadat regime to wage war to reclaim Sinai Peninsula 
 
(Eissa Mohamed, 2008, pp.34-36).  
These protestations represented the glory days of the leftist and nationalists student 
movements, when demonstrations of thousands occupied the Tahrir Square in Cairo. Students 
were “ostensibly urging the then Sadat to go to war with Israel to wrest back occupied Arab 
land, but after the 1973 war the protests continued, focusing more on Egypt's lack of 
democracy and economic hardship” (Schemm, 2002). 
In the universities, the growing waves of political activism were beginning to develop into a 
fully-fledged movement. Students published a multitude of 'Wall magazines' on the buildings, 
organized numerous student clubs and held frequent conferences. The formation of a variety 
of clubs provided students with a platform for collective activities and dicussions. Where 
some were primarily social and cultural gatherings, usually called Ossar 'studnet clubs' and 
supervised by a member of the teaching staff, others were overtly political and did not ask for 
formal approval (Abdalla,  2009, p. 176). 
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The most prominent political group was the Club of the Supporters of the Palestinian 
Revolution (SSPR) in Cairo University's Faculty of Engineering. In addtion student activism 
through the public meetings, youth activism started to take a unique form called the 'Student 
Conference'. An earlier indication of students' growing interests in political affairs was the 
attempt by a number of leftist candidates to politicize the usually non-political contest for 
Studnet Union seats (Abdalla, 2009, p. 177). The students chose actively to challenge the 
regime through these embryonic opposition movements which gradually dominated the 
student activism (Abdalla, 2009, p. 213). 
The criticism of the regime focused on three distinct issues which Abdalla (2009, pp. 189-
190) identified as: The Israeli occupation of Egyptian and other Arab land, the question of 
democracy, and the socio-economic demands. The most radical issue was the demand that the 
highest income should not exceed a multiple of ten times the lowest income. It represented the 
socialist ideology which spread among the student movement during this period. 
Fearing the growing student radicalization in 1971, the regime made some concessions 
including the abolition of administration to oversee the activities of student unions and the 
university police guards (NCSCR, 1983, p. 158). 
The second wave: The 1977 confrontations 
During 1977, however, Egypt witnessed three major events that had collective political 
implications. The first was the occurrence in January of massive food riots, which were 
blamed on leftist elements and communist organizations and which were followed by a 
multitude of repressive measures against all kinds of political opposition - right, centre, and 
left (Ibrahim, 1980, p 424). The Leftist students were active participants in the January 1977 
bread riots which were the largest that Egypt had seen since the dissolution of the monarchy 
and the establishing of the republic in 1952 (Eissa Mohamed, 2008, pp. 34-36). 
The second event was a bloody confrontation in July 1977 between the regime and the 
members of a militant Islamist group labelled in the mass media as the Repentance and Holy 
Flight group (RHF). While the third event was President Sadat's historical decision to travel to 
Israel in search of peace (Ibrahim, 1980, p 424).  
The three events were, in a curious way, intertwined. The riots reflected the mounting 
frustrations of the lower classes and lower-middle classes vis-a-vis the negative pay-off of 
Sadat's socio-economic policies. The bloody confrontation in July between a religious group 
and the government reflected the growing despair of the most volatile element of the 
69 
 
population – the youth of the lower-middle and working classes - who sought salvation in 
Islamist militancy. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was motivated as much by these mounting 
internal problems as by a genuine desire for peace (Ibid, 424). 
The deterioration of the leftist ideology as a main force in attracting the young people 
To counteract activism by leftist and Nasserist students, the Sadat regime had actively 
encouraged the emergence of Islamist student movements on university campuses during the 
second-half of the 2791s. By the end of the 1970s, the Islamists had successfully marginalized 
leftist student groups and had succeeded in dominating formal student unions in most of the 
principal Egyptian universities through election (Eissa Mohamed, 2008, pp. 34-36). Having 
been challenged by a popular uprising earlier in 1977 that was officially blamed on leftists 
and Al-Tagma’a party, the regime was in an embarrassing position in blaming the Islamists. 
Indeed, the regime made a reconciliatory gesture toward these Islamist from 1970 to 1973 to 
counterbalance what perceived as a Nasserist-leftist opposition (Ibrahim, 1980, 425). 
Salimi (1999, p. 32) suggested various reasons that led to such deteriorations such as internal 
ideological and organizational conflicts and divisions and political battles and confrontations 
between the left and Islamist groups which impacted on the status of youth organizations in 
political parties, universities and high schools. 
The leftist and youth organizations in this stage of the seventies were affected by 
psychological conditions of the Marxist and Pan-Arab ideology which served as a reference to 
some of the trends based on youth. The setback of the student revolt in France had negative 
repercussions, which was also caused by the fall of the French student movement which was 
led by Trotskyite groups and involved in the political battles that were governed by actors 
beyond the aims of the student. For example, the use of the trade union movement and 
organizations of the French left-wing student groups in the confrontation with the French 
government at the time. On the Arab level, the 1967 defeat had a psychological impact and 
ideological negativity on Left student movements (Salimi, 1999, p. 32). The long term impact 
of 1967 defeat weakened the socialist Nasserist ideology and revived competition between the 
Islamist and liberal ideologies in the universities and society. As stated before the left 
involved in a bitter confrontations with other movements backed by the Sadat regime in 
1970s.  
At the time when it occurred that youth activism associated with the left parties, in the case of 
the disintegration and divisions, the formal political institutions represented in the Parliament, 
local groups and parties newly established showed a greater capacity to absorb the energy of 
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the young and their use in political, economic and social contexts, but these dynamics did not 
maintain continuity and sustainability. This led to led to the disintegration of number of youth 
organizations and a subsequent declining role (Salimi, 1999, p. 32). 
Third wave: confrontation with Islamist resurgence 
The rising tide of Islamist resurgence was further evidenced by the landslide victories of 
Islamist groups in the students unions from 1975 to 1979 - a fact that prompted the 
government to dissolve these unions by presidential decree in the summer of 1979 ( Ibrahim, 
1980, p 425). 
In 1979, the government clipped the students activism by passing a new university bill which 
forbade political activity by students - effectively confining student demonstrations to the 
campuses. Battles between students and police were no longer fought in the main streets of 
the capital, but at the university gates usually far away from the rest of the population 
(Schemm, 2002). The bill came after the intensification of tension between Sadat and the 
student movement, as evidenced in his meeting with the well-known  leaders of student 
unions in 1977 particularly Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh from the MB and the Nasserist  
Hamdeen Sabahi. However, after Sadat’s visit to Israel, and the subsequent signing of the 
Camp David accord and the peace treaty with Israel, Islamist student groups began to join 
their leftist counterparts in criticizing Sadat’s foreign policy orientations. As opposition to the 
Sadat regime began to increase, the regime passed a new bill regulating student activities. The 
1979 bill continued to be in force during Mubarak’s reign, and allowed the university 
administration to interfere directly in student elections by excluding candidates. It also re-
established the special security unit known as the University Guard which was given the 
authority to operate inside university campuses to ensure their ‘security’. The 1979 bill also 
prohibited political parties from operating inside university campuses
14
. 
3.5 Mubarak Era (1982-2000): Stagnant Polarized Youth Activism 
Mubarak took charge of Egypt following the assassination of Sadat in 1981 and his regime 
survived over three decades in the face of regional and international challenges and 
democratic waves worldwide until the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011.  Mubarak’s 
regime in his first decade (1980s) pursued similar political and economic strategies to those of 
Sadat focusing on liberalization of the economy and limited political openness but without 
great success. Mubarak’s foreign policy witnessed a continuation of the strong ties with the 
                                                     
14 For further discussion about 1979 bill and other regulation, see the student movement chapter. 
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West in addition to the restoration of Egypt-Arab relations. Civil society began to revive and 
establish itself as counter-hegemonic forces such as the Islamists and Leftists penetrated 
syndicates, trade unions, NGOs and human rights movements which would represent a 
challenge to the regime in later stages. 
The context in the 1980s provided appropriate opportunity for civil society organizations to 
develop marginally under the “twin poles of Islamist activism and secular intellectualism” 
(Abdel Rahman, 2004, p. 56). However, other “organizations outside these vaguely tolerated 
groups were largely marginalized or disallowed” (Paul Rowe, 2009, p. 111). Mubarak’s 
regime sought to control and dominate the civil society associations and over time it tried to 
“re-adjust its control in response to changing conditions at the global and local level” 
(Zubaida, 1992). These conditions encouraged civil society organizations to press for greater 
liberalization to balance the state's failure to meet the citizens’ socio-economic needs and, 
later, for its reluctance to respond to their quest for political participation  (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 
378). These associations emerged to fill the vacuum created by the absence of the state 
because of the new liberalism (2000, p. 17). The regime made some concessions in response 
to the society’s demands for democratization but did not fully respond to these demands in the 
1980s. Its response to the mounting discontent was promises of economic and political reform 
(Ibrahim, 1998, pp. 42, 43). 
The relatively liberal corporatist arrangements in the 1980s allowed for Islamists and secular 
movements to compete with representatives of the state through elections of parliament, 
syndicates, student unions, social and sports clubs. However, the regime realized the threat 
coming from these elections and their impact on the corporatist institutions particularly the 
NDP and its youth branches in universities and syndicates. The regime representative became 
incapable of competing with the growing social forces in free elections. These movements 
generated significant challenges to the regime and the bureaucracy. However the regime still 
controlled the legal and political keys to stop the whole process and decided in later stages to 
freeze all these political activities and elections either by law or by force. It is noteworthy that 
restrictive Law of Associations stunted the flourishing of civil society. Along with a host of 
socio-economic problems bedevilling the Egyptian society at large and the middle class in 
particular, a potent opposition force to the regime has been Islamic activism (Ibrahim, 1988, 
pp. 632-657; Ibrahim, 1998, p. 381).
 
 
The retreat and De-liberalization 1990-2000 
The process of de-liberalization marked the Egyptian politics in the 1990s as a result of the 
bloody confrontation with increasingly militant Islamists groups and the social protests 
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against the economic reforms programme. The regime was faced with the growing threat of 
both Muslim Brothers winning the professional syndicates elections and the increasing 
influence of secular groups in civil society organizations. In such circumstances, the regime 
developed into something that might, at best, be called competitive authoritarianism, rather 
than a fully-fledged liberal democratic regime
15
. Egypt has experienced a substantial degree 
of political deliberalization which defies the notion of a blocked transition to democracy. The 
high level of mounting collective action and civil society activities represented a real 
challenge to the loose corporatist arrangements. The regime was forced either to progress in 
liberalization and democratization or in retreat to repression and authoritarianism and 
ultimately the regime’s response was repression. As a result, a growing body of literature 
argued that “liberal assumptions about the democratizing effects of civil society are erroneous 
because they have failed to take into consideration the state’s ability to limit civil society 
activities” (Kleinberg and Clark, 2000, 78).  
The sluggish performance of the state vis-a-vis the demands of the society led many 
marginalised young people of lower and middle class to espouse Islamic militancy as a mode 
of protest against the alienation and discontent. During the 1990s, “there were three-way races 
to maintain or seize power among autocratic regimes, Islamic activists, and civil society 
organizations” (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 378). 
The state lost its ideological ‘mission’ without any hegemonic ideology such that of 
Nasserists’ hegemonic state ideology in the 1950s and 1960s. The Egyptian army 
participation in the international coalition against Iraq in the 1990s to liberate Kuwait led to a 
dramatic deterioration of the basis of legitimacy built on “nationalist foreign policy” 
(Hinnebusch, 2012, p. 2). The regime seemed to be enjoyed neither electoral nor traditional 
legitimacy in the eyes of counter-hegemonic movements. This was reflected in increasingly 
frequent violent confrontations between the regime and one or more of the major socio-
economic formations. 
Restrictions of liberties in Egypt in the 1990s have been viewed largely as the effects of the 
conflict between the regime and armed Islamist groups (Kienle, 1998, p. 221). As the 
confrontations with the militants escalated in 1992-94, the government sought the support of 
civil society organizations. As soon as it regained the upper hand over the militants, it turned 
its back on the secular organizations of civil society and in 1995-97 began to arrest the 
                                                     
15 Concepts such as ‘illiberal democracy’ (Zakaria 1997), ‘defective democracy’ (Merkel 2004), or ‘delegative 
democracy’ (O’Donnell 1994), all have one 
fundamental point in common in that they serve to highlight a specific regime’ democratic deficits by adding a 
negative adjective that signals in which area the respective regime fails to reach democratic standards 
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Muslim Brothers activists. With the domestic situation well under government control in 1994 
and 1995, it fell back into the same authoritarian practices, rigging elections (ICER, 1995), 
arresting members of the Muslim Brother prominent figures, and alienating many aspects of 
civil society. After the boycott of most opposition parties to the 1990 elections, “the 1995 
election turned out to be the worst since the first elections, in 1866” according to Ibrahim who 
observed the election as sociologist and director of Ibn Khaldoun Centre (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 
381). 
Repressive amendments to the penal code and to legislation governing professional syndicates 
and trade unions as well as unprecedented electoral fraud were only some of the indicators. 
Though related to the conflict between the regime and armed Islamist groups, the erosion of 
political participation and liberties also reflects other factors, including attempts to contain 
opposition to economic liberalization under the current reform programme (Kienle, 1998). 
In 1993, legislation was passed that gave the regime greater powers to invalidate elections in 
the professional syndicates (Kienle, 1998 p. 220). The election of officials had simply been 
replaced by appointments in the state bodies such as syndicates councils, university faculty 
deans who used to be elected and Umdas (village chiefs) were no longer elected but appointed 
(Ibid, p. 228). 
The opportunities for formal representation and participation through elections have been 
restricted rather than simply stopped from expanding. One of the better-known examples was 
that of the parliamentary elections of 1995 (Ibrahim, 1998, Kienle, 1998). Management from 
above of the general elections in 1990 and 1995 was certainly aimed at excluding the 
opposition from parliamentary representation (Kienle, 1998, p. 234). 
The confrontations on the state–society level expanded to NGOs and civil society 
organizations. While the confrontation between the regime and Islamists, “secular political 
activists, human rights workers, and voters had all been increasingly targeted by the end of 
the 1990s”. This trend could be viewed as “an indication of the increasing insecurity of an 
authoritarian regime determined to maintain its monopoly on power” (Kassem, 2004; Paul 
Rowe, p. 112). Norton (1995, p. 12) emphasised that, “active associational life, civil society 
was undermined by a deficit in political toleration and constricted by arbitrary government 
regulation”. 
Pratt (2004) argued that both subsequent laws of civil society organization: Law 153 in 1999 
and Law 84 in 2002 were very similar to the Law 32 in 1964 belonging to Nasserist era and, 
therefore, represented “a continuation rather than a departure from the hegemonic consensus”.  
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The 1964 law organized civil associations into a strict, monopolistic hierarchy, with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) at the apex of the pyramid (Pratt, 2004, p. 321). “The 
organization of civil associations into compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, which were controlled by the state, approximates to 
the typical model of corporatism, as defined by Philippe Schmitter” (1979, p. 13). The 
ideological aim of such regulations was to subordinate the civil associations to be “an 
instrument of state-directed modernization” (Pratt, 2004, pp. 32, 322). 
The NGOs protestation against the 1999 law constituted “probably one of the most intensive 
moments of civil society mobilization and activism in Egypt”. The NGO-led campaign 
against restrictions was significant because it brought together NGOs working on human 
rights with those working in less politically-sensitive areas of social welfare and 
development” ( Pratt, 2004, p. 324). 
On the other hand, there were hopeful features in Egypt in the late 1990s, mainly improved 
economic performance and a flourishing media, consisting of more private newspapers and 
satellite cable TV, which the government could not censor or control (Ibrahim, 1998, p. 382).  
Socio-economic grievances and social protest 
The government began to implement the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
policies to adjust the economy in 1991 (Bayat, 2000, p. 2). Thus economic crisis and reform 
were determining factors for political deliberalization and social protest (Kienle, 1998, p. 
234). Privatization and public sector reform were a major concern of trade unions. The 
implement of the reform programme to adjust the economy had negative sides that led the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1993 to warn of the 
deteriorating social conditions in Egypt (1993:2) (Bayat, 2000, p. 2). Thus the regime sought 
to control the trade unions through 1995 amendment of their law consolidating the NDP 
majority (Kienle, 1998, pp. 234, 235). Ballot rigging of trade unions and syndicates elections 
spread to install loyal leadership connecting with the ruling party. These developments were 
significant enough for the regime to anticipate discontent and protests from those most 
threatened or affected by them. The "bread riots of 1976" had not yet been forgotten (Kienle, 
1998, p. 233). The advent of these policies unleashed important socio-economic changes. 
Reported strikes rose from eight in 1990, to 26 in 1991, to 28 in 1992, and to 63 in 1993. In a 
major strike at Kafr al-Dawwar in September 1994, three people were shot dead by the police 
and many others were injured (Kienle, 1998, 233).  A human rights organization reported 70 
strikes in large companies in Egypt during 1998 (Bayat, 2000, p. 8). One of the outstanding 
collective actions in this decade was “the farmers’ protests across isolated villages in 1998 but 
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this failed to modify a new policy that ended farmers’ land tenure” (Bayat, 2000, p. 6). In the 
absence of opportunities and free activities, the political activism was forced either to exit the 
political scene at least temporarily or to go underground (Bayat, 2009, p. 10). However, 
militant Islamists in the 1990s resorted to subversive revolutionism largely because open and 
legal political work was limited (Bayat, 2009, p. 11), but they failed and could not defeat the 
state apparatus. 
Mubarak regime and youth activism 
In spite of the severe restrictions imposed by the 1979 Mill on student activism, the Mubarak 
regime pursued a relatively tolerant attitude towards non-violent student activism. Since the 
mid-seventies the influence of Islamic movements was growing rapidly and they took control 
of the student unions in the universities. The state responded by attempting to curb religious 
movements and the imposition of state control over unions. In the 1980s, the MB became the 
strongest force on the Egyptian campus, whereas usually the Brotherhood had been more 
interested in spreading its influence by providing social services and encouraging a specific 
way of life among students and not focusing in stirring up protests on the street. They were 
able to mobilize more students to create a bigger demonstration just inside universities, but 
they would not clash with police (Schemm, 2002). It is worth noting that the political activism 
during the tended to focus primarily on cultural and foreign policy issues rather than on 
domestic issues. Islamist students attempted to uphold a strict moral code on university 
campuses and to implement gender segregation and to ban musical and artistic activities that 
were seen as un-Islamic (Tohami, 2009, 70). 
The regime succeeded in isolating and silencing the radical youth activism and effectively 
prevented the student movements from connections with society and labour movement. The 
youth activism was stagnant, excluded, organizationally weak. Large segments of young 
activists initiated a framing process that would divert attention from the state toward society 
or social values and ignore the political change as happened with Amr Khaled and Salafi for 
example, but this did not prevent the regime corruption which reached unprecedented levels. 
During the nineties the influence of political and ideological trends gradually deteriorated 
within the universities. Also most of official student unions came under the full control of the 
regime and universities’ administrations which supported only NDP students who respect the 
rules drawn up by the regime. 
Formal student unions and their activities came under the control of students who were 
backed by the State.  These developments happened when the regime adopted a more 
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aggressive strategy towards the Muslim Brothers and other Islamist groups and the 
restrictions on student activism stipulated in the 1979 bill were actively enforced. 
During the 1990s, Islamists and other opposition students were barred from contesting student 
union elections and students loyal to the regime were placed by the university administration 
at the head of student unions. Moreover, during the 1990s, the NDP began to establish a 
number of clubs on university campuses in the hope of winning back the support of university 
students. Furthermore, the University Guard became a more visible presence on university 
campuses and students from the Islamist and also from the non-Islamist opposition were 
frequently monitored and harassed. As a result of these restrictions, which were parts of a 
more general crackdown on the Egyptian opposition, “youth mobilization was highly 
circumscribed during most of the 1990s” (Shehata, 2008, p. 4). The strict restrictions imposed 
by the regime on student activism, coupled with tight restrictions on the activities of political 
parties and movements significantly weakened the links between university students on the 
one hand, and political parties and labour movements, on the other. Moreover most parties 
and movements, including the MB, experienced internal divisions partly “as a result of the 
continued domination of an aging leadership and the marginalization of younger activists with 
more moderate ideas” (Shehata, 2008, p. 6). 
3.6 Conclusion 
Social change and political transformations in Egypt have created a political opportunity 
structure that triggered specific waves of contentuous politics in different occasions leading to 
the emergence and development of youth activism. The prominence of youth activism and the 
adaptive capacity of the regime marked the different stages of Egyptian political history from 
the post-independence regime until the 25
th
 Jan. 2011 Revolution. 
This chapter has identified the political opportunities at each stage and the collective action of 
youth activism. The structural, organizational, ideational elements have been linked together 
to explain not only the emergence of youth activism but also the adaptive capacity of the 
regime that enabled it to continue in the face of demands or to make some reforms to absorb 
the pressure from youth and social movements. The successive regimes re-adjusted their 
control in response to changing conditions at the global and local level to reach a new 
equilibrium which did not last for long due to the emergence of another wave of youth and 
social protests. 
The Nasser era was marked by consolidation of the corporatist arrangements which 
successfully included the social and economic forces through a single party system. A 
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populist social pact organized the state and society relations in ways that decreased any social 
protest. Nasser’s charismatic personality jointly with the Pan-Arab ideology provided a strong 
base for state hegemony over the society and decreased the appeal of counter hegemonic 
ideologies like that of the Muslim Brothers and the Communists.  However, the collective 
action and youth engagement took different forms to adapt to the hegemonic regime and its 
corporatist arrangements which unintentionally created social forces and fertile soil for a 
coming wave of political activism like, large groups of educated youth as well as working and 
middle classes that would later confront the state after the 1967 defeat. The younger 
generation began to seek different solutions and this led to the flourishing of diverse 
ideological and religious movements.  
The process of integration and interaction featured the framing dynamics of youth activism 
when the regime hegemonic ideology became ineffective particularly after the 1967 defeat 
and absence of a charismatic leader.  Youth activism flourished and mobilized for a general 
national cause, however in the following stages, the ideological forces took the momentum 
and the polarization between Islamists and Leftist escalated in the universities until the Sadat 
crackdown in 1979. The socialist movements attempted to delegitimize the regime policies 
toward Israel and the west, while the Islamists pursued framing processes condemning the 
regime for not applying Islamic principles. At later stages, political activism adopted a 
democratic discourse criticizing authoritarianism and repression.   
The relatively liberal corporatist arrangements in the 1980s allowed for Islamist, Nasserist 
and Leftist activism to become active in universities and to compete with representatives of 
the NDP in the elections of the formal student unions.  However, Mubarak’s regime realized 
the threat coming from these elections and their impact on the corporatist institutions, 
particularly the NDP and its youth branches in universities and syndicates. In the 1990s the 
regime imposed strong restrictions on youth activism which weakened the links between 
students and political parties. The University Guard played a major role in the campuses and 
activists were frequently monitored and harassed.  
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Chapter Four: 
 Expanding Political Opportunities in Egypt 2000-2010 
4.1 Introduction 
The Egyptian political arena was marked by political opportunities and constraints and a high 
level of grievances that shaped the prominence of the youth activism which became some of 
the significant agents for change. The social movements and youth activism mounted up in 
the years which preceded the 25
th
 of January Revolution and led to the fall of the president 
Hosni Mubarak.  It is worth noting that the revolution did not emerge from nothing, or take 
place in a social or political vacuum, but reflected the accumulation of long-term events 
which occurred as a result if the prevailing social structures and systems of power. Moreover, 
this generation of youth activism has experienced a particular context that changed their 
awareness and mobilized them in specific ways to represent such a great challenge to the 
ruling elite. 
The political process model and social movement theory, in addition to the literature about the 
Middle East, provides an appropriate  explanation for the political opportunities structure in 
Egypt from 2000-2011.  The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed significant 
social and historical changes such as not only the shrinking role of the state as a result of the 
collapse of the old social pact and the erosion of the regime legitimacy, but also the profound 
effects of globalization accompanying new social and digital media which promoted new 
counter-hegemonic and democratic discourses. This evolving of socio-economic context has 
presented a distinctive opportunity for youth activism to emerge and become the main agent 
for change. The loose corporatist structures and the statist order were undermined by 
prolonged economic and social crises which weakened key institutions of state control, 
particularly the public sector, the subsidy system, political parties and student unions.  
These internal developments led to a dramatic change in the structure of political 
opportunities which were further exposed through the regional political challenges as a result 
of escalating tension and conflicts in the Middle East. As the dramatic increase in political 
opportunities materialized, so too did recurrent waves of social and political actions such as 
youth activism, workers, peasants protests and Islamist groups. In fact, the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century witnessed one of the longest waves of social and political 
activism as these transformations created opportunities for competing movements and 
ideologies to emerge and grow into meaningful alternatives to the declining regime. 
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This chapter explores the causes and structures of opportunities that explain the emergence of 
social and youth activism in the Egyptian context during that period. The theoretical 
framework established that the indicators of political opportunity are state-society ruptures, 
elite splits, high levels of grievances and external factors, and so this chapter will now assess 
how evident each of these were during the time period under examination. 
4.2 The Indicators of Political Opportunity in the Egyptian Context  
Political opportunity is concept that deals with the complex environments in which 
movements grow and operate. It represents the broader set of political constraints and 
opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded (Goodwin, 1999, p. 
27; McAdam, 1996, p. 3). The political process model asserts that political opportunities 
present themselves when elites become vulnerable or receptive to movements by groups 
excluded from the polity. Such “challenger” movements usually make demands for the 
redistribution of social rewards and increased institutional access (Maney, 2001, p. 13). The 
dilemma in the Egyptian context was how youth and political movements could prepare for 
such opportunities when the authoritarian regimes exhibited a great intolerance toward 
organized activism? Indeed this requires a political opportunity in itself when the political 
authorities and the mechanisms of control are undermined by transnational or internal 
transformations (Bayat, 2009, p. 9). 
The PPM identifies the sources of political opportunity as follows:  medium-levels of and/or 
increased institutional access, unstable political alignments, divided elites, influential allies 
and support groups and diminished repression by authoritarian states. 
It is worth noting that the political process indicators are not sufficient to give a 
comprehensive explanation for emergence of social and youth activism in the Egyptian 
context without revising the Middle East political literature that offered various approaches 
and models about the state-society relationship. On the other hand, it is important to apply the 
assumption of the structure approach about grievances and relative deprivation because the 
high level of grievances among citizens generated tension and social protest that created 
political opportunities like those  triggered by social and labour protests in 2007-2010 when 
“networks of activists found recourse in street politics, expressing grievances in public spaces 
and engaging in contentious politics to challenge the regime” (Bayat, 2009, p. 11). 
This chapter is going to focus on the political opportunities that are considered most relevant 
to the emergence of new agents of change and youth networks. They could be summarized in 
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five broad master variables relevant to the Egyptian context (2000-2011) which could explain 
the uprising as follows: 
6- The rupture in state-society relationships 
7- Socio-economic conditions and high levels of grievance: pressure from the bottom 
8- Institutional access and ruling elite strategies  
9- Division among the ruling elite and patronage  networks 
10- External and transnational factors 
4.3 Rupture and Alienation between State and Society  
The rupture between state and society extensively deepened as the ideological and hegemonic 
state mission of the Nasser and Sadat eras was dramatically undermined by Mubarak’s 
foreign and internal policies. Authoritarian corporatist arrangements turned into façade 
structures that sought to serve the incumbent regime and its allies. The social forces and 
movements abandoned them as a result of their corruption and lack of representativeness. In 
this regard Hinnebusch (2012, p.3) argues that opportunity structures for protest emerged as 
result of change in the relative power balance between state and society. This changed 
balance can be traced to the Mubarak regime’s lack of hegemony and legitimacy, the façade 
democratic and corporatist arrangements, the collapse of the social pact and the difficulties of 
upgrading the competitive authoritarianism.  
Mubarak regime’s lack of hegemony and legitimacy: 
The hegemonic state of the Nasser era dramatically deteriorated until it lost the remainder of 
its legitimacy while the counter hegemonic groups gradually penetrated the society and the 
public sphere and their discourse became appealing to the majority of social forces in the 
society.  
The Egyptian state under Mubarak’s regime became less representative of the large segment 
of social forces and did not reflect their demands and express their ideology in its foreign and 
internal policies. This paved the way for the ideological and political movements like Islamist 
and nationalist to demoralize the regime hegemony and legitimacy. The rupture between state 
and society deepened the vulnerability of Mubarak’s regime. The social and political protest 
under the umbrella of the new social movement gradually undermined the bases of the 
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legitimacy and abilities of Mubarak’s regime. By the end of the Mubarak era the social and 
political transformation undermined the hegemonic state ideology and turned it into a security 
and police state under the hegemony and dominations of police and intelligences while social 
and media networks began to uncover the police brutality. 
The weakness of the hegemonic block and lack of ideology compared with the Nasser era 
prompted a kind of authoritarian corporatist arrangement that attempted to seek a democratic 
legitimacy without great success and when the legitimacy has been challenged by counter 
hegemonic political and social movements the state resorted to the coercive tool.  The 
Egyptian state particularly under the Mubarak regime exhibited elements of strength in terms 
of repression capacities. However a closer comprehensive look reveals that it is a relatively 
“weak” or “soft” state, lacking certain basic capabilities to penetrate, not to mention 
dominate, society (Migdal, 1988; Springborg, 1982; Waterbury, 1983). Ayubi (2001) 
illustrated many signs of the weakness such as lacking certain abilities to collect taxes or 
building a ‘hegemonic’ power block or an ideology that provides a strong basis for legitimacy 
that would help to decrease the coercive and ‘corporative’ level and foster the moral and 
intellectual sphere of the state. Actually other writers argue that this kind of state attribute 
with “high degrees of nondemocratic legitimacy” created through “symbol politics, elaborate 
patronage systems and control of the rules of the political and economic games, are all 
instrumental in keeping incumbent elites in power” (Bill and Springborg 1994; Richards and 
Waterbury 1996, Schlumberger, 2007). 
Understanding these limitations and the requirements of building a postcolonial “modern” 
state, different Egyptian regimes have combined the use of coercion with some sort of 
legitimacy of performance and elements of state-corporatism in a matrix of “flexible 
authoritarianism” to consolidate their ruling pact (El Mahdi, 2009, p. 1021). However, the 
absence of social compacts and an increasingly narrow social base, quoting Joel Midgal 
(1988), make the regime inherently weak (Schlumberger, 2007, p. 11). 
The Egyptian state under Mubarak’s rule could be considered a soft type of the Nasser’s 
corporatist state that corresponded to the Gramscian categories of ‘gendarme-state’ and 
‘corporative-state’ (Busi-Gluckmann, 1980: 284ff)16. This kind of regimes is “obsessed with 
power and strength, and it may indeed be strong in terms of its body”. This state reduced its 
                                                     
16The state in terms of its ‘law and order’ functions and the state in terms of its economic interests and functions. 
(cf. wrong) By contrast, Gramsci’s concept of the ‘integral state’ or the ‘state in its totality’is not confined to the 
government but includes certain aspects of the civil society and is based on hegemony and leadership. The concept 
of the ‘integral state’ is thus often linked to the ‘ethical state’ or the state as educator-through the schools and the 
courts (Busi-Gluckmann, 1980; Ayubi, 2001, p. 7) 
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mission, function and roles under Mubarak to a loose and weak model of corporatism in 
which the violence was in reality an indication of its weakness and fragility. Indeed the 
repressive and coercive apparatus may be powerful but the state as whole is weak “because it 
lacks rationality and because it lacks the necessary moral, ideological and educational 
supports” (Al-‘Aeawi, 1981, 146-58; Ayubi, 2001, p. 23). 
In this regard Mubarak’s regime suffered from a lack of hegemony over the society and lack 
of legitimacy when compared with Nasser and Sadat. Enjoying neither electoral nor 
traditional legitimacy, Hinnebusch (2012 p.2) argued that “legitimacy in the populist 
authoritarian regimes was contingent on a nationalist foreign policy and delivery of jobs and 
welfare”. However, in more recent years, the neoliberal policies like privatization and 
encouraging foreign investment led to the abandonment of the populist social contract. In 
addition, efforts “to achieve integration into the world capitalist economy has led to the 
abandonment of the anti-imperialism”. It is worth noting that Mubarak’s regime did not enjoy 
any kind of the revolutionary legitimacy compared with Nasser or Sadat who were the heroes 
of 1952 movement. The crisis of the democratic legitimacy worsened and came under 
tremendous suspicion because of rigging of the parliamentary elections which increased in the 
mid-nineties until the 2010 parliamentary election which preceded the revolution and was one 
of its main triggers. The regime was forced to face the growing influence of the counter-
hegemonic forces as both Islamists and secular represented a threat to the regime legitimacy 
on religious and nationalist bases or on its dependency on the US and Israel which would be 
further discussed by focusing on the second Palestine Uprising and the Iraqi war in 2003
17
. 
The dramatic change in the structure of political opportunity was further exposed through the 
regional political challenges as a result of escalating tension and conflicts in the Middle East 
since 2000, particularly the Palestine Intifada, September 11 aggressions and the war against 
Iraq which reflected the impact of the external opportunities in the emergence and 
development of social movements. The International Crisis Group report (2003, p.7) 
confirmed that these regional and international developments sparked general “debates 
regarding the regime’s ability to uphold national interests”. The youth activism arose from the 
protest movements and demonstrations in October 2000 and April 2002 and March 2003 as 
the mood of young people became more militant.  The counter- hegemonic movements 
launched political and ideological campaigns to demoralize the regime and its policies and 
security apparatus which had grown increasingly demoralized. The regime came under 
growing pressure and criticism because “what was seen as a weak or compliance role in the 
region during the second Intifada and during the American invasion of Iraq” (El-Mahdi, 2009, 
                                                     
17 For more details see chapter five 
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p. 1022). In this regard, number of Leftist and Islamist activists criticized the regime policy 
after the Iraqi war. They claimed that the regime was “friend with the US” that “occupied 
another Arab country... being their servant in the region”. Moreover, “The American invasion 
of Iraq would not have been possible without Mubarak’s help” (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1023).  
The “weak fierce state”, echoes Ayubi (2001, p. 23) faced huge challenges coming from the 
growing counter hegemonic networks and youth activism, as well as the lack of ability of the 
regime to manage the pressure coming from social, political and ideological movements 
especially after they began to develop cooperation across ideological divides.  The regime’s 
adaptive capacity (Heydemann, 2007, p. 26) to accommodate external and internal pressures 
and to respond to the grievances from these counter-hegemonic forces dramatically 
deteriorated. Similar examples took place during the Sadat era when the youth activism as 
part of the counter-hegemonic and ideological trends challenged the president’s policies over 
ideological and cultural issues because of his approach to the peace process with Israel and 
the West.  The social movements that emerged in the Egyptian context after 2000 included a 
counter-hegemonic movements which, borrowing Eagleton term (1991, p. 114), did “not only 
focused on the grievances and material issues in confrontation with the regime but they also 
contested the whole arena of “culture”, defined in its broadest sense” (Ayubi, 2001, p. 8). It is 
worth noting that Gramsci was interested in the trenches in which social forces would 
establish their “war of position” (Gramsci, 1971: 229–38). In this regard for Gramsci “civil 
society is not only the sphere through which hegemony is diffused, but also the terrain upon 
which resistance to hegemony, or counter-hegemonic projects, can be formulated” ( Pratt, 
2004, p.  318)18. In the following sections and chapters, the study is going to illustrate that 
between 2000-2011 liberals, Islamists, young activism and political movements like Kefaya 
launched a framing process constructing a counter-hegemonic discourse to demoralise and 
delegitimize the regime. The social movements and social media helped to overturn the 
hegemony of the regime and triggered the established regime becoming vulnerable to change. 
The loose corrupted corporatist arrangements and façade structure 
 From a theoretical perspective the corporatist state provides official channels for pursuing 
grievances and mediation between state and society, and strong links between the state and 
powerful societal groups reducing the potential for social movements (Zapata 1977, Eckstein 
1989). In the last years of Mubarak’s reign, the corporatist arrangements served as a 
                                                     
18 Gramsci never used the term ‘counter-hegemony’. This term is generally used to describe the creation of an 
alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil society in preparation for a ‘war of position’. For a development of the 
concept of ‘counter-hegemony’, see Boggs (1984). 
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democratic façade to cover the alliance between military and bureaucracy bodies which 
dominated the regime without electoral authority to govern the population. The regime 
became vulnerable to challenges from those either not represented officially or not 
represented to their satisfaction.  It could be argued that the weak intermediary organizations 
such as political parties, trade and student unions and civil associations under the authoritarian 
regime prompted sectors of society to express their views outside of the state institutions 
(Fawzy, 2010, p. 29).  
Table (3): The façade democratic structure and controlling the opposition parties (1981-
2010) 
19
 
The legal statues  The way of 
establishment 
The date of 
establishing  
Party No 
Active Party Affairs 
Committee  
1976 Al-Tajamu party 
 
1 
Divided and 
marginal 
Party Affairs 
Committee  
1976 Al-Ahrar 2 
The ruling party 
(78-2010) 
Party Affairs 
Committee  
1978 NDP 3 
Suspended but 
active  
Party Affairs 
Committee  
1978 Al-Amal 4 
Active Party Affairs 
Committee  
1978 Al-Wafd 5 
Marginal Court verdict  1983 Al-Ummah 6 
Divided and 
Marginal 
Court verdict  1990 Maser Al-
Fattah 
7 
                                                     
19  The data is collected from different sources such as (Shukr, 2002 pp. 18-19, Soliman, 2005, Wikipedia and 
news papers) 
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Marginal Court verdict  1990 The Green 8 
Marginal Court verdict  1990 Democratic 
union 
9 
Marginal Court verdict  1992 Egypt Arab 
Socialist Party  
10 
Marginal Court verdict  1992 Democratic 
people 
11 
Active Court verdict  1992 Arab 
Nasserist 
12 
Marginal Court verdict  1993 Social Justice 13 
Marginal Court verdict  1995 Social 
Integration 
14 
Marginal Party Affairs 
Committee  
2000 National 
consensus  
15 
Marginal Court verdict  2001 Maser 2000 16 
Marginal Court verdict  2002 New 
Generation 
17 
Marginal Court verdict  2002 Maser youth 18 
Divided but 
Active 
Party Affairs 
Committee  
2004 Al-Ghad 19 
Active 
 
Party Affairs 
Committee  
2007 The 
Democratic 
Front 
20 
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Active Rejected  1996 Al Karamah  
 
21 
Active Rejected 1996 Al-Wasat 22 
 
The corporative state, in terms of its economic interests and functions, suffered from high 
levels of corruption and the violation of law from the ruling elite. It turned into what Galal 
Amin (2011) called the “soft state” which was produced to explain the reasons behind the 25th 
January revolution. The “soft state” theory developed by Gunnar Myrdal is one that is 
unwilling to perform its main functions – namely preserving law and order - leaving 
mediocrity and lawlessness to prevail. “In such a state there is no respect for the law, and 
breaking legal codes is the cultural norm which connected with the deterioration of the 
education and health systems, among other symptoms of the so-called soft state under 
Mubarak” (Amin 2011, pp 7, 8). 
The state transformed from the populist corporatist state to an authoritarian corporatist state in 
the 1990s which was marked by loose corrupted form of corporatist arrangements. The 
authoritarian corporatist arrangements turned into façade structures that sought to serve the 
incumbent regime while social forces and new activism denied their corruption and lack of 
representativeness as most of their leaders were either directly appointed or positioned 
through the rigging of elections as used to be the case in the formal student unions and trade 
unions.  
Consequently, the ineffective state apparatus did not succeed in delivering the required 
services to the citizens and lost the capability to achieve their functions. Thus, the society and 
social forces began to create and develop their own agencies and institutions to fill the gap 
through establishing various kinds of organizations which could be called “parallel structures” 
either for lobbying and political purposes, such as the independent trade and free student 
unions (see chapter 6), or for delivering health and educational services like private tutoring 
or for a more informal economy. In later stages these parallel structures established alliances 
among social forces that had high levels of grievances through cooperation and networking.  
For example, the formal trade unions which remained in the grip of corporatism attempted to 
defend workers’ rights and their traditional social contract (Bayat, 2009, p. 9). But, as a result 
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of their corruption and non-elected leadership they failed to protect workers in the face of the 
neoliberal policies and the growing business class. Where trade unions have failed to serve 
the interests of the majority of the working poor, workers have often resorted to illegal strikes 
or mass street protests. Indeed, this was apparent in the 2006, 2007, and March–April 2008 
spate of mass workers’ strikes in Egypt’s public and private sectors (Joel Benin, 2012, Bayat, 
2009(. The workers established the first independent union which the Ministry of Manpower 
and Migration unexpectedly decided to recognize in April 2009. It was the first trade union 
independent of the regime in over half a century. Independent unions of health-care 
technicians and teachers were also founded before the end of 2010 (Beinin, 2012, p. 5). 
Moreover, the professional middle classes (teachers, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, and 
doctors) deployed their fairly independent syndicates both to defend their professional 
interests and to carry out political activities since traditional party politics remained, in 
general, corrupted and ineffective. Thus, it was not uncommon to find a number of 
“professional syndicates to serve nationalist or Islamist politics - a phenomenon quite distinct 
from the conventional trade unions which remained engaged chiefly with economic and social 
concerns” (Bayat, 2009, p. 8). 
The failure of corporatist arrangements triggered new political opportunities for activists 
because the political discourse of the regime was forced to announce the acceptance and 
existence of such vehicles and allowed the demonstrations and protests seeking social and 
private demands for specific groups as long as they did not include political claims or directly 
threaten the regime. It was clear that the ruling elite would agree to pay the required cost in 
many cases to satisfy such groups and stop the growing protests. The aim of this strategy was 
to prolong the regime survival which came under the threat of ongoing and increasing social 
and economic and cultural unrest and grievances. This discourse and rhetoric about political 
openness promoted the formation of new youth and social movements and the subsequent 
restrictive security policies in dealing with activists did not prevent the mobilization but just 
slowed it down. 
The collapse of the social pact: 
The social pact, as a mechanism to organize the state-society relationship and arrange mass 
politics
 
in Egypt, dramatically deteriorated. The regime was no longer able to honour the 
terms of the old social contract or forged a new participatory social contract for the fear of 
being toppled from power (Ibrahim, 1995, pp. 41, 42). However, Heydemann, (2007, p. 21) 
and Rutherford (2008) expected that the erosion of the old social pact would make the 
democratic bargain feasible.   
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In the post-independence period, the regime attempted to mobilize civil associations, workers, 
peasants and middle-class professionals as a ‘popular’ coalition of working people in support 
of national development (Richards & Waterbury, 1991, p. 27). The trade unions, professional 
associations, peasant associations and other groups were incorporated into the state through 
corporatist arrangements. The regime also extended socio-economic benefits (such as, 
universal healthcare and education, guaranteed employment, subsidized food and rent 
controls) to all citizens (Bianchi, 1989; Ayubi, 2001).  
This corporatist model and statist order created during the Nasser era could not survive 
because of economic crises, economic restructuring, and integration into the global economy 
which weakened key institutions of state control, particularly the public sector and the subsidy 
system. They have also eroded the ideology that legitimates the regime (Rutherford, 2008). 
With the vigorous implementation of neoliberal policies since 2004 - which the Mubarak 
regime was very slow and cautious in implementing during the early 1990s - including 
depreciation of the Egyptian currency, the resultant price hike, and speeding up of 
privatization schemes, a large section of the middle class and popular sectors were further 
marginalized.  The regime’s attempts to withdraw certain benefits, such as oil and bread 
subsidies, were faced by fierce public opposition, demonstrating society’s belief in the 
legitimacy of the post- independence hegemonic consensus. For example, from 1991 
onwards, public sector workers have struck against privatization and tenant farmers have 
staged protests against the removal of land rent ceilings in 1998 (Pratt, 2004, p.323, 324). 
These policies triggered a new wave of political and social activism as young people became 
more vulnerable to economic shocks and volatility because of the erosion of the old social 
contract that once guaranteed employment and social protection for whole citizens (Dhillon & 
Yousef, 2007, p.2). Past generations had benefited from this state-led social contract, which 
provided public sector employment and protected workers. But the current generation faced a 
two-fold challenge: “State institutions are no longer able to meet their expectations for 
employment and social protection, and private sector jobs remain an elusive reality” (Dhillon 
& Yousef, 2007, pp.7.8). This led to a change in the “political opportunity structure” as large 
segments of the younger generation from both middle and lower classes found that “there was 
no reason why political participation should be further postponed, for example, no 
developmental projects (economic or political) for which democracy should be sacrificed” 
(Rutherford, 2008).  
It is worth noting that the advent of new social media and advances in telecommunication 
exposed young people to international norms. This exposure raised the expectations for 
89 
 
consumption and living standards and created a new sense of exclusion. Young people 
became at the heart of a process of political change and emerged as agents of change (Dhillon 
& Yousef, 2007, pp. 7.8). This situation created opportunities for competing ideologies and 
institutions to emerge and develop in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
Rutherford (2008) stressed the importance of two categories of ideologies and groups; a 
liberal conception of law within the judiciary and an Islamic conception of governance within 
the Muslim Brother in addition to the reformist trend among the business community and the 
ruling party. He considered that the two categories’ approaches to constitutional order had 
grown into meaningful alternatives to the declining statism of the regime. “These two 
alternatives share important features; their agendas converge around a core set of reforms that 
embody the key features of classical liberalism, including constraints on state power, 
strengthening the rule of law, and protecting some basic rights”.  
4.4  The Socio-Economic Crisis and High Level of Grievances Among 
Youth  
The failure of the corporatist structure and the collapse of the social pact associated with the 
socio-economic crisis raised the grievances and the sense of relative deprivation to 
unprecedented levels. Grievances generate tension and intensify the social protest that created 
political opportunities like those that triggered the intense social and labour protests in Egypt 
2007-2010. Hinnebusch (2012, p. 3) argued that “where grievances are high and the 
opportunity structure shifts to society, mass mobilization can be rapid and effective”. He 
emphasised that the opposite is also right: “Where grievances are low and the opportunity 
structure is low, because the state-society balance favours the regime, there should be no 
uprising”.  
The social protest was the main response from social forces to the grievances and relative 
deprivation. The socio-economic situation triggered street politics and motivated ordinary 
young people to express grievances in public spaces and engage in civic campaigns, or resort 
to what Bayat (2009, p. 11) called “social non-movements” that interlock activism with the 
practice of everyday life.   
The middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a new wave of social and 
political movements because the “situation has created opportunities for competing ideologies 
and institutions to emerge” Rutherford (2008). The neoliberal policies, such as accelerating 
the privatization programme, pursued by the Egyptian regime since the formation of the 
Government of Ahmed Nazif in 2004 have  resulted  most of the social disorder slides and 
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affected social classes in recent years, which resulted in a tidal wave of protest movements 
and demonstrations during the period from 2007 to 2010. 
It was obvious that the regime was no longer able to honour the terms of the populist state 
social contract or to forge a new democratic social contract. The economic liberalization 
policies failed to “redistribute economic power significantly and to replace state hegemony 
with an economic polyarchy more prone to competition and more favourable to political 
conflict and pluralism” (Kienle, 1998, p. 236).  
Table (4): The socio-economic indicators 2010 
20
 
Population (millions) 81.5 
GNI per capita, PPP (current USD)  5,470 
GDP (current USD) (billions)  162.3 
GDP composition by sector  
 
 
Agriculture-3 
Industry- 28 
Services- 69 
GDP growth rate (%)  7.2 
% below poverty line (%)  16.7 
Inflation (%)  18.3 
GINI index  32.1 
Adult literacy rate (%) 66.4 
                                                     
20  World Bank. (2010). Retrieved from World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
http://epri.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/15-Egypt.pdf 
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Overseas development aid per capita (current 
USD)  
17 
Net official development assistance 2005 
(USD millions) 
993.6 
Remittances as % of GDP  6 
2009 Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranking  
123/182 
 
Evidence suggests that the implementation of Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
since the 1990s has caused large changes in social policies; “with adverse impacts on the 
foundation of human development, in the areas of health, education, housing, and the supply 
of adequate food”. Market-oriented policies “have drastically undermined the principle of 
equity, that is, equal access to life-chances” (Bayat, 2009, p.37). Nazif’s mandate in 2004 was 
to accelerate the neoliberal transformation of the economy and the sell-off of the public 
sector. These policies were promoted by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
who enthusiastically praised Egypt’s efforts at economic “reform” and repeatedly designated 
it a top-ten “most improved reform”21. However the state bureaucracy and corruption 
hindered economic performance and discouraged investment. Predominance of market-
oriented policies and the mingling  between power and wealth promoted the sense among 
Egyptians that this relationship between money and politics has  severely hurt the concepts of 
public interest and public good and spread patterns of consumer culture as well as the 
excessive use of money in political life and elections (Fawzy, 2010, p. 29). 
These policies have had a huge impact on the Egyptian people, particularly the youth, and 
motivated the various waves of social and political protest. The statistic shows that the total 
number of young people represents a large amount of population which increasing every year. 
Egypt is going through a period in which the number of youth population is increasing 
                                                     
21 World Bank, Most Improved Business Reformers in DB 2008 &World Bank, 2009; Most Improved Business 
Reformers in DB 2009. 
D.C.: World Bank, 2010; “Most Improved Business Reformers in DB 2010,” Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2011. 
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significantly, a so-called “youth bulge” (Tohami, 2009, Dhillon & Yousef, 2007, p. 3). The 
previous tables in chapter two provided a data over time highlighting the percentages of youth 
within the Egyptian population.    
The demographic transition represents both an opportunity and a challenge. Once this youth 
population reaches working age, its ratio to the older and younger non-working populations 
will shrink, potentially constituting a “demographic gift.” Until then, these youths will put 
enormous pressures on the educational system and the labour and housing markets (Assaad & 
Barroom, 2007, p. 8). This is the challenge of youth inclusion, defined as “the provision of 
opportunities that enable youth to fully participate in normally prescribed roles and 
activities”. These include receiving quality education, decent employment, affordable housing 
and the power to shape their communities (Dhillon & Yousef, 2007, p. 1). 
The dangerous situation of exclusion can be measured in numbers. The cost of youth 
unemployment, early school leaving, adolescent pregnancy, and youth migration is 
significantly high. The total cost of youth exclusion can reach a staggering 17.4% of GDP in 
Egypt. The cost of youth exclusion in Egypt is as high as the total value-added of Egypt’s 
agricultural sector, close to 17% of GDP (Chaaban, 2008, p. 18). 
Education in Egypt has witnessed big improvements as school enrolment has remarkably 
increased. Illiteracy among youth has also fallen significantly. There has been a dramatic 
expansion in the education system. More children go to school and more children stay in 
school for longer periods. According to the World Bank (2006a), the net enrolment rate in 
primary education increased from 83.7% in 1985 to 98.3% in 2003. Gross enrolment rates in 
secondary school were 61.4 % in 1985 and rose to 87.1% and higher education enrolment 
from 18.1% to 32.6% in the same period. While the figures show rapid growth in school 
enrolment at all education levels and near-universal enrolment in primary schooling, there are 
still those who are excluded (Assaad & Barsoum, 2000, p. 10). While educational enrolment 
has increased dramatically in recent years, the quality of education has not improved. Early 
school drop-out and non-enrolment persists for certain groups in certain parts of the country, 
particularly for girls in rural Upper Egypt. Some factors hinder good education such as 
overcrowding in classes, teaching by rote, private lessons, and the wide gap between 
education and job market requirements. Households try to compensate for the limitations of 
public education through private tutoring (UNDP, 2006, p. 28). These figures highlights that 
the social and political cost of deterioration in the educational system and unemployment.  
They have had a significant impact on society and mobilization because of the high levels of 
grievances. Consequently, new patterns of social crimes emerged as well as political problems 
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such as alienation and lack of participation through the formal structure which associated with 
the erupt of protest against the regime and its policies. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) report on the economic trends in the 
Mediterranean region for the year 2002, suggests that the unemployment rate in Egypt 
amounted to 10.8% in 1995. The number of unemployed males and females accounts for 
95.5% of the new entrants in the labour market (UNDP, 2006, p. 49). Between the late 1970s 
and early 2000s, the number of new entrants to the labour market more than doubled, to about 
850,000. Currently, they constitute the greatest percentage of the unemployed. The 
unemployment rate declined from 11.7% in 1998 to 8.3% in 2006. The total number of 
unemployed youth in Egypt in 2006 was about 1.6 million. Eighty-three percent of the 
unemployed were in the age group of 15-29 and 47% were between the ages of 20-24. 
Although declining, the unemployment rate among those aged 15-29 is still much higher than 
the overall rate. Youth with a secondary education or above made up 95% of youth 
unemployment in 2006, up from 87% in 1998 (Assaad & Barsoum, 2007, p.19). 
Unemployment rates at the end of the 1990s were highest for those with a technical secondary 
education, followed by post-secondary institute graduates, then by university graduates. This 
pattern changed by 2006, with university graduates having the highest unemployment rates 
among young men and post-secondary institute graduates having the highest rates among 
young women. In fact, university graduates are the only educational group whose 
unemployment rates increased since 1998 (Assaad & Barsoum, 2007, p.19). 
The governmental figures about the decline in unemployment were marred by the growth in 
what the World Bank terms to be “bad jobs.” These are essentially low-paid jobs that provide 
little in terms of social insurance, stability, and potential for advancement (Ibid, p. 20, 21). 
The high unemployment rates of young people led to multiple negative consequences, both 
for the young people themselves and their society. Statistics showed that unemployment 
represents a suitable environment for committing crimes, for example, 44% of thieves were 
unemployed (Galbi: 2006, p. 637). Poverty is increasing in Egypt in recent years, and the 
brunt of this poverty is mostly borne by youth. Poverty affects rural zones, especially young 
farmers. Poverty in urban areas is largely attributed to deprivation and economic deterioration 
in rural areas, as people are consistently moving from there to urban areas (UNDP: 2006, 
p.27). As a result, high desire for emigration is emerging due to widespread feelings of 
frustration with both economic and social conditions. According to the 2002 Arab Human 
Development Report, 51% of Arab youth and 45% of younger adolescents expressed a desire 
to emigrate, clearly indicating dissatisfaction with current conditions and with future 
prospects especially in rural areas (UNDP: 2006, pp. 30, 31). 
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The following tables offer various economic and social indications associated with the 
exclusion and grievances that contributed to different cycles of mobilization among youth. 
The GDP per capita, Gini coefficient, wages of poor households in 2003/2004 reflect the 
socio-economic problems. The neoliberal policies since the formation of the Government of 
Ahmed Nazif in 2004 have resulted most of the social disorder slides and affected social 
classes, which resulted in a tidal wave of protest movements and demonstrations during this 
period. 
Table (5): The status of income distribution, poverty, and social investment in 2005
22
 
 
The neoliberal policies and the shrinking role of state have had significant results in the 
development of a two-tier system of social provisions where high-quality private but 
expensive social services (in schooling, hospitals, food supply, air quality, entertainment, 
living environment)  stand against the deteriorating state provisions. The expanded NGO 
sector in the region partially fills the vacuum of the shrunken involvement of the state in 
offering social services to the needy. Yet not only do NGOs fragment their beneficiaries, they 
may also reinforce communal cleavages. For unlike the state, which dispenses welfare 
                                                     
22 Egypt Human Development Report 2005, UNDP, p.207 
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provisions to all citizens irrespective of their communal affiliations, NGOs can function on 
ethnic lines, extending services to a particular community while excluding others (Bayat, 
2009, p.37). 
Table (6): The global integrity report: Egypt (2008) 
23
 
 
                                                     
23 World Bank (2009)  Egypt Governance Brief 2008, p. 7  
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4.5  Institutional Access and the Ruling Elite Strategies  
The Political Process Model asserts that political opportunities emerge when the ruling elite 
become vulnerable or receptive to movements by groups excluded from the polity. Such 
challenger movements usually make demands for the redistribution of social rewards and 
increased institutional access. They are more likely to seek the overthrow of the regime and 
could deploy protest and violence. It is worth noting that here are different kinds of 
relationship between inclusion/exclusion and mobilisation. It could be argued that the more 
inclusive, democratic political systems minimize exclusion while the more exclusive, 
authoritarian regimes that deny political rights, raise the costs of visible, large-scale 
mobilization (Maney, 2001, p. 13). The Egyptian regime as kind of competitive authoritarian 
regimes with high level of political exclusion led to the emergence of large-scale mobilization 
such as social and youth activism outside the official corporatist arrangements such as student 
unions and political parties.  The mixture of openness and closure make such regimes 
particularly susceptible to challenges from those either not represented officially or not 
represented to their satisfaction. The following pages discuss the nature of the Egyptian 
regime, the institutional access, and the level of repression which provided political 
opportunities for counter-hegemonic power and social movement to emerge and spread. 
Institutional access and opportunity for changes: 
The Egyptian regime since the 1990s could be classified as kind of “competitive 
authoritarianism”24. Levitsky and Way (2002, p. 52) identified the ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ as a hybrid political regime that “combined democratic rules with 
authoritarian governance”. In this model “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as 
the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority”. However, incumbent 
regimes “violate those rules so often and to such an extent” that “the regime fails to meet 
conventional minimum standards for democracy.”  
Due to the persistence of meaningful democratic institutions in the competitive authoritarian 
regimes, arenas of contestation exist through which opposition forces may periodically 
challenge occasionally autocratic incumbents. Four such arenas are of particular importance: 
1) the electoral arena; 2) the legislature; 3) the judiciary; and 4) the media (Levitsky and Way, 
p. 54). For example; the media are often a central point of contention in competitive 
                                                     
24  Scholars began to develop new classificatory tools to deal with the allegedly novel (or hybrid) nature of a 
number of post-third wave regimes, ranging from so called ‘adjective democracies’ to ‘hybrid regimes’ and ‘new 
authoritarianisms’ (see Collier & Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002 and 2010; Schedler 2002 
and 2006). 
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authoritarian regimes.  Independent media outlets often play a critical watchdog role by 
investigating and exposing government malfeasance (Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, p. 57).  
In relating to the electoral arena, the executive branch of the government continued to practice 
election rigging in favour of the ruling party (NDP); and the legal regulations and security  
constrained has bequeathed the political parties weak cadres and an impotent political 
infrastructure (Ibrahim, 1998, p 381). This “electoral authoritarian regime” using Andreas 
Schedler’s (2002) characterization, is a regime “in which opposition parties lose elections”. 
The democratic rules were violated systematically in Mubarak’s regime which without, 
however, completely eliminating formal political competition. This violation of democratic 
rules could be noticed in the Party Affairs Committee and Court decisions which rejected the 
establishing of a number of active political forces for long time such as Al Karamah and Al-
Wasat (see table 2). The formal rules were violated to such an extent as to prohibit effective 
contestation for power through official channels (Kevin Koehler and Jana Warkotsch, 2011, 
p.15). In addition the formal institutions were manipulated to serve the informality and 
interest networks within the regime.   
This model created growing contradictions in the regime during the last decade of Mubarak’s 
rule. It might be seen as a classic example of stable authoritarianism, where the regime 
controlled much of the media, dominated political life, and suppressed its opponents with a 
vast array of legal and extra-legal tools. It also carefully monitored and manipulated civil 
society groups and political parties. On the other side, Egyptian political sphere included 
several features that suggested a democratic picture particularly during the phases of political 
mobility in 2005-2006 and 2010-2011 mobility. The independent judges’ movement was 
vibrant through the assertive Judges’ Association (the Judges’ Club) that openly confronted 
the executive and lobbied for legal and political reform (Rutherford, 2008). There were also 
large and well-organized Islamist organizations particularly the Muslim Brother as well as 
other youth networks and social movements such as Kefaya. 
The prominence of these social movements revived the inherent tension in the regime. The 
coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods aimed at keeping incumbents in 
power created an inherent source of instability. The presence of elections, legislatures, courts, 
and an independent media created periodic opportunities for challenges by opposition forces. 
Such challenges created a serious dilemma for autocratic incumbents. On the one hand, 
repressing them is costly, largely because the challenges tend to be both formally legal and 
widely perceived (domestically and internationally) as legitimate. On the other hand, 
incumbents could lose power if they let democratic challenges run their course. 
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Periods of serious democratic contestation thus bring out the contradictions inherent in 
competitive authoritarianism, forcing autocratic incumbents to choose between egregiously 
violating democratic rules, at the cost of international isolation and domestic conflict, and 
allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost of possible defeat (Levitsky & Way, p. 59).  
Structure of contestations: 
Lust-Okar (2007, p. 39) showed how the regime learned to rule by selectively including and 
excluding political and social forces from participation in “semi-competitive” or 
“authoritarian”  elections . She focused on “the fundamental distinction that lies in the extent 
to which opposition groups are given equal opportunity to participate in the formal political 
sphere, or structure of contestation”. The regime created institutions that either include or 
exclude opposition groups. “In contrast to Sadat’s strategy to exclude the left, Mubarak 
created divided structures of contestation as he granted moderate secular opponents greater 
political space than they had under Sadat, drawing them closer to the regime”. Islamists 
parties remained banned. Although they were sometimes permitted to run on the ballots of 
secularist parties, and indeed to win seats, they were formally excluded (Lust-Okar, 2007, p. 
40). 
The regime strategy was furthermore to enable a passable opposition presence in the 
parliament. In order to reach this objective the NDP needed a complicit counterpart within the 
opposition prepared to play the role of sparring partner to the NDP's heavyweight 
parliamentary presence (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). The regime’s broader strategic concern was 
to avoid reforms that would impose a democratic set of rules of the game. Heydemann (2007, 
p. 28) showed that in recent decades “pressure to impose singular and transparent rules of the 
game has originated largely with two groups of actors: Islamists and democrats which 
represent a symmetrical threat to regimes”. The strategic options available to these groups of 
opposition were to participate in elections and/or to pursue protest campaigns even as both 
were singled out as targets of extensive regime violence.  
The regime faced election difficulties when it granted greater subsystem autonomy by 
allowing formal organizations such as syndicates, trade and student unions more freedom in 
selecting leaders. This freedom resulted not from a basic change in the character of those 
organizations but from the regime decisions from the top (Springborg, 1974 , p. 86.( when the 
opposition particularly the Islamists penetrated the syndicates, student unions and youth clubs 
through election , the regime decided to stop it.  
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The elections have been conducted in ways that ensure large parliamentary majorities for the 
ruling party (NDP). Thus, the opportunities for formal representation and participation 
through elections had been restricted or simply stopped from expanding (Kienle, 1998, p. 220; 
Ibrahim, 1998, p. 381). For example the parliamentary election in 1995 turned out to be the 
worst since the first elections in 1866 (ICER, 1995: pp. 179-222). However, new 
opportunities for reform through election emerged in the 2000 and 2005 elections following 
the Supreme Constitutional Court’s verdict to confer full supervision of election onto judges. 
This verdict made the electoral fraud either hard or easy to be uncovered and reveal. This led 
to an increase in the number of opposition groups in parliament to contribute 100 members in 
2005. However, the context associated with this election and the rigging vote generated a 
tension between the state and judges which led to a wave of political protestation in spring of 
2006 (Shehata; 2008, p. 5).  
 
Table (7): The parliamentary representation of political parties (1979-2010) 
25 
Election/ 
Party 
2797 1984 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
NDP 337 371 384 348 829 371 330 811 
MB - 4 31 - 2 29 44 - 
Al-Wafd - 01 30 - 6 9 0 6 
                                                     
25 The data is collected by the researcher from different sources such  as ( Shukr,  2002 p. 27, Soliman 2005) 
and Wikipedia and Newspapers) 
http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA
_%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9
%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A_2010 
 
 
100 
 
Al-Amal 13 - 16 - - - - - 
Al- Tajamu 
party 
’a 
 - - 0 0 6 2 0 
Al-Ahrar 3 - 8  2 2 - - 
The Nasserist - - - - 2 1 - - 
Al-Ghad - - - - - - 2 2 
Independent 
and marginal 
parties 
2 - 0 00 23 12 27 91 
Total 366 884 884 888 888 888 888 018 
 
Table (8): The dominant position of NDP in the elections
26
 
1- People’s Assembly Elections 
2010 420 seats (not including 53 NDP-affiliated independents) 
2005 311 seats (including 166 “independents” who joined the NDP after the election) 
2000 388 seats (including 218 “independents”) 
1995 417 seats (including 99 “independents”) 
                                                     
26 http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/national-democratic-party 
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1- People’s Assembly Elections 
1990 386 seats 
1987 339 
1984 394 
1979 347 
2- Shura Council Elections27 
2010 80 seats (out of 88 seats available) 
2007 
84 seats (out of 88 seats available, including 3 seats won by NDP-affiliated 
independents 
2004 
70 seats (out of 88 seats available, with 
  
 
NDP-affiliated independents winning another 17) 
2001 74 seats (out of 88 seats available) 
1981 
140 seats (all elective seats, the president 
  
 
appointed the remaining 70 members) 
                                                     
27 http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/national-democratic-party 
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3- Local Elections 
2008 95 percent of roughly 52,000 council seats 
2002 97 percent of council seats 
 
Table (9): The low turnout in election and the exclusion of ordinary people (Apathy)
28
 
Year of election/ 
turnout 
1984 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Population (millions)  47 50 53 59 65 71 81 82 
Numbers that have the 
legal right to vote 
(millions) 
28 29 31 34 38 41 49 50.4 
Registered numbers 
(millions) 
13 14 16 20 27 32 41 50 
Turnout (millions)  5.4 7.8 7.5 10 7.4 8.1 5-25 32 
Turnout (% of the 
registered) 
 
43  54 46 50 27.5 25.3 5-25
29
 
 
60 
Turnout  (% of who 19.8 26.6 24 30.8 19.7 19.6 5-25 60 
                                                     
28 The data is collected by the researcher from different sources such  as ( Shukr,  2002 p. 27, Soliman 2005, p. 
159, Wikipedia and Newspapers)  
29 Contested percentages 25% according to the  Government and  5% according to opposition and between 15-
20% according to observers 
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have the right to vote)  
  
These tables highlight the fluctuation of opposition figures in election comparing with the 
NDP that dominated the parliament by not less than a majority of two thirds. The election of 
2005 featured a significant decline of both NDP and opposition parties comparing with MB’s 
rise as they succeeded to get a historical percentage reached to 20% of seats. On the other 
hand the representation of the traditional political parties particularly Al Wafd which 
considered the main opposition party since 1980s has sharply declined to become a marginal 
party in the parliament with only 6 seats in 2005 comparing with 50 seats in 1985. This means 
the official political structure was not able to absorb the movements and ordinary people 
desire to participate particularly when the regime decide to design the 2010 parliament 
election by excluding the main political movements such as youth movements and MBs.  The 
following table shoe the low turnout in the elections because of the exclusion of most 
ordinary people and the lack of trust in the political structure. 
 
Table (10): Turnout between urban and rural regions
30:
  
Region Percentage of turnout in 
Localities’ Elections31 
Percentage of turnout in 
Parliamentary Elections 
Urban Governorates 10.2 17.3 
Lower Egypt 50.9 25.8 
Upper Egypt 41.7 25.4 
Frontier Governorates 30.4 31 
Egypt 42.4 24.1 
                                                     
30 Egypt Human Development Report 2005, UNDP, p. 230 
31 Some could argue that these formal figures were not accurate as the local elections were comprehensively  
rigged  
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The elections, even rigged ones, continue to be sensitive issues for the regime. The revolution 
on 25
th
 January 2011 was to large extent prompted by the results of the 2010 parliamentary 
election which extensively undermined the regime rhetoric about democratic legitimacy. The 
new activism managed to uncover and document the violations, fraud and rigging in this 
election using the digital and social media to spread and publish. Election polls were marred 
by massive fraud and there was no illusion that other parties would pose a significant threat to 
the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP was widely expected to engineer a 
strong reduction in the Muslim Brotherhood's presence, while allowing the share of other 
opposition groups to rise in order to provide, at least, a fig-leaf of pluralist politics in Egypt. 
But in the end, the NDP won 420 seats (81.1%), and NDP 'independents' won 53 seats 
(10.2%) for an NDP total of 91.3%. This election put on display the techniques of political 
control of so-called façade democracies to strip democratic institutions of any significance. 
The uncovering of such practices undermined the notion that 'liberalised autocracies' have 
some sort of democratic elements behind their façades (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). The 
parliamentary elections of November 28th and December 5th 2010 witnessed an intensive use 
of the social networking technologies which became the heart of the media battle coinciding 
with the election campaign. Given state control of state media and the self-censorship 
practiced by private newspapers and satellite channels, these networks emerged as the most 
prominent developments in the election. They became a real alternative that allowed the 
investment of time and effort to produce great achievements without considerable financial 
cost in areas of both publicity and observation. El Barqy, a former activist from MB youth 
wing, emphasized that “there were preparations to launch a wide protests such those which 
followed the Iranian elections in 2009 but the MB leadership hesitated to become involved in 
such confrontation with the regime at this time” (El Barqy, Interview, 2012).  
The regime strategy and upgrading authoritarianism   
The regime attempted to utilize the dynamics of the political mobility in order to make the 
most of the contradictions and disputes among political and social forces. There is no doubt 
that such polices were useful in attempting to give a democratic shape to the competitive 
authoritarian regime to matters related to ensuring an acceptable degree of political legitimacy 
and avoid external pressure and provide a positive image about Egypt which depends heavily  
on tourism, remittances and foreign assistance. 
The regime allowed some degree of freedom of action for some political and social forces as 
part of its efforts to remain in power. The regime demonstrated a quality that was described 
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by Heydemann (2007, p. 26) as “bounded adaptiveness” which means “a capacity for 
adjustment and accommodation that is produced by the interaction of formal and informal 
modes of conflict resolution, bargaining, and coalition management”. This adaptive capacity 
refutes the assumption that authoritarian regimes are highly resistant to change. In this model, 
rulers have to get into a rich opportunity array of alternative strategies for securing their 
interests (Heydemann, 2007, p. 28) 
 The regime works efficiently through two mechanisms of consolidated formal and informal 
modes of governance; firstly, the formal institutions that are available play a significant role 
in resolving what Wintrobe (1998) described as “the dictator’s dilemma” which means “the 
inability of an authoritarian leader to make minimally credible commitments and to be held 
minimally accountable for them”. (Heydemann, 2007, pp. 26, 27). The structure of the 
Egyptian state system showed that the executive branch was headed by the President Hosni 
Mubarak (1981-2011), and the last head of the government, Ahmed Nazif, (2004-2011).  The 
cabinet, with the prime minister at its apex, was also appointed by the president; an additional 
feature of an even higher degree of centralization of political power. In accordance with the 
constitution, the president was the centre of power
32
. The Parliament has the power to 
legislate and to nominate the president, and other branches of government, which were 
responsible to the assembly. But, in practice, it had never actually exercised such 
constitutional checks on the executive. It is important to note the prime minister and his 
cabinet could be considered scapegoats and responsible for the regime’s failure or lack of 
achievements and were easy to be sacked or replaced by the regime as happened during the 
25
th
 January when  Mubarak fired Nazif to ease the pressure of the protestations.  
Secondly, the informal modes permit leaders selectively to operate outside formal institutional 
arenas: “to make side payments, to bypass formal commitments, and to manage access to 
informal economic and political networks as a way to reward supporters and sanction 
opponents” (Heydemann, 2007, p. 27).  The formal institutions such as the ruling party and 
parliament and non-governmental organizations such as trade and student unions, professional 
associations and opposition parties occupy an important position that cannot be completely 
disregarded in this model (Heydemann, 2007, p. 27). Authoritarian persistence cannot be 
explained by coercion alone and indeed, the logic of authoritarian rule is to include some 
social forces in order to exclude others (Hinnebusch, 2012, p.3). Mubarak’s family sought to 
upgrade the authoritarian regime since 2004 by diminishing the role of the old guard and 
                                                     
32 http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:Uy9sBCBHxucJ:www.country-studies.com /egypt/ government-and-
politics.htm 
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empowering his son Gamal and his inner circle. The regime used privatization as a source of 
patronage to build new bases of support to substitute for the old populist coalition (Kienle, 
1999; Hinnebusch, 2012, p.3).  
Hinnebusch (2012) argued that such strategies of change and the upgrading of 
authoritarianism could be identified as the seeds of the uprising, “even though it framed them 
in terms of their positive contribution to authoritarian upgrading. The underlying deep change 
was a movement from an originally populist form of authoritarianism to “post-populist” or 
neo-liberal versions” 33 . The seeds of rebellion are to be found in this transition. The 
neoliberal policies adopted by this strategy weakened the corporatist arrangements and 
networks dominated by the ruling party (NDP) which sought to disempower and demobilize 
rather than mobilize workers, peasants and youth (Hinnebusch, 2012, p.3). This version of 
authoritarianism generated high levels of mass grievances. On the other hand the 
“authoritarian upgrading, although meant to contain and compensate for these negative side 
effects, also had their own negative side effects. They had cumulative costs, which, indeed, 
contained the identifiable seeds of the uprising” (Hinnebusch, 2012, p.3). 
The level of repression:  
Declines in the repressive capacities of previously highly repressive states provide a window 
of opportunity for movements to mobilize broadly and openly with a lower risk of beatings, 
incarceration, torture, and/or death; and, in the case of revolutions, a better chance of seizing 
power. Political process theorists usually envision an inverted ‘U-shaped’ relationship 
between regime repressiveness and political conflict. Fluctuating and sweeping repressive 
measures can also alienate broad segments of the population, triggering rebellion (Jenkins & 
Schock 1992, p. 43). Consequently, the competitive authoritarianism does not rely solely on 
the coercive power of the state but it needs to create an effective balance between repression 
and co-optation. There are a broad collection of instruments available for the regime which 
“quite apart from a coercive capacity that is simply too blunt an instrument to account, on its 
own, for the resilience of authoritarian rule” (Heydemann, 2007, p.27).   Some could argue 
that the Egyptian regime’s capacity to launch a comprehensive war against the Muslim 
Brothers was limited because it was not that kind of totalitarian regime or stark 
authoritarianism such as the Saddam Hussein regime for example. 
                                                     
33 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Liberalization without Democratization in ‘Post-populist’ Authoritarian States: 
Evidence from Syria and Egypt,” in Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis and Manuel Hassassian, Citizenship and the State 
in the Middle East, 2000); Martha Pripstein-Posusney Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions and 
Economic Restructuring, 1979); Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Emma Murphy, “The Transformation of the 
Corporatist State in the Middle East,” Third World Quarterly 17, 4], 1996); 
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In addition to this, there were stages that were marked by a diminishing in repressive 
capacities due to political reasons. The regime turned a blind eye on mobilizations in specific 
period such the first wave of Palestinian uprising demonstrations and the compromise strategy 
with social protest wave. During the 2000-2002 demonstrations, the regime turned a blind eye 
to the support for Palestine in order to use it as a tool against western support for Israel and to 
renew the Egyptian formula of a moderate nationalist role in the region. The regime tolerated 
the protests as long as they could be contained and managed. The external pressure in 2004 
and 2005 created another cycle of tolerance and diminished the repression. The stage between 
2007- 2010 was marked by police relaxation in the face of social protest while continuing to 
exert pressure on Muslim Brothers. It is noteworthy that the security forces did not oppress 
these demonstration as long as they avoid sharply condemning the regime. The student 
activism for example benefited from the regulations that prevented the police forces from 
invading the university campuses. Compromises and negotiations took place to emphasise the 
limits and red lines imposed by the police on demonstrations such as preventing 
demonstrations from crossing the campuses to streets.  It could be said that the repression 
succeeded when the regime directed pressure against one group in attempting to isolate it 
from the spectrum of political activism like the left in the 1970s, militant Islamists in the 
1990s and the Muslim Brothers from 2005-2011. However the repression failed if the 
opposition groups worked together across ideological divides particularly Islamist and Leftist 
groups and because of their ability to use the social media to reveal the scandals of torture 
There is a third possible dynamic when increasing repression triggered further protests and 
fuelled mobilisation, for example the police measures in April 6 2008 enabled young activists 
to get more support and sympathy from media and society which led to the formation April 6 
youth movement.  
Activists gained the right to protest through supporting the Palestine and Iraqi causes and 
during the political mobility in 2005. But the period 2005-2010 witnessed different levels and 
stages of repression, depending upon the regime’s objectives and threats. Since 2006, 
repression focused selectively on prominent and influential activists particularly from the 
Muslim Brothers and the activists since the abortion of demonstrations to support judges in 
2006 and the military trial for MB leaders, while authorities have tolerated the emergence of 
non political-oriented actions. In general, the regime has expressed little tolerance toward 
sustained collective dissent. Amnesty International report (2007, p. 51) cited police violence 
against peaceful protestors calling for political reform, the arrest of hundreds of Muslim 
Brotherhood members, and the detention, without trial, of thousands of others suspected of 
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supporting banned Islamic groups. Torture and ill-treatment in detention continued to be 
systematic. 
With the return of ElBaradei and the launching of Khalid Saeed Facebook page in 2010, 
security forces were obliged to ease their grip on political protests taking place under the 
ElBaradei umbrella with efforts to defuse protests before they happened. The role of social 
media on YouTube and Facebook, which revealed several actions of torture and brutal 
scandals, alerted the regime and security forces to be more cautious and avoid such scandals. 
The police atrocities and corruption have been well-documented in human rights reports and 
new media outlets which in return created a limitation on the coercive capacity of the regime. 
The regime faced the paradox of exerting high levels of police atrocities to keep its stability 
and the ability of social media to uncover these atrocities and show them to the international 
community.  Transnational and internal organizations focusing upon human rights played an 
increasingly important role in constraining regime repression of political and social 
movements (Sikkink 1993, p. 75). The new activism networks relatively shielded participants 
and members from retribution by the states whose policies they challenged by “manipulating 
intersecting dependencies, tapping into the increased salience of human rights norms, and 
utilizing the international media to generate negative publicity for states engaged in human 
rights violations” (Coy 1997, Pagnucco 1997, Maney, 2001, p. 21).  
4.6 Divisions among the Ruling Elite and Patronage Networks  
Shifting alignments and political competition among elites triggers opportunities for political 
access and the emergence of social movements. Jenkins (1983, p.547) argued that, “If the 
polity is closely divided, members have lost their normal coalition partners, or members find 
themselves in jeopardy for want of resources, the normally risky strategy of supporting the 
entry of a movement is more likely to be adopted”.  
The patron-client relationship and the adaptability and flexibility of the clientelism guaranteed 
a high level of Egyptian regime resiliency and durability during periods of stability. 
Springborg explained how the political clientelism became “the glue that held the political 
system together for a long time” (Springborg, 1974, P. 87). The clientelism could be 
considered an integrative, stabilizing force on the periphery of the regime instead of the 
absence of a clear hegemonic or ideological block. These established personal ties have been 
“as, or more, powerful in contributing to policy outcomes than organizations with formal, 
legal existence” (Springborg, 1994, P. 104). El-Sayed (1991, pp. 379) confirmed that “the 
golden age of the interests of informal networks was in the 1950s and 1960s”. The ruling 
elites were established on a military-civilian coalition and various key officials started to run 
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private businesses using their special access to information and power (Adly, 2012, p.3.).  
Similar patterns of patronage networks were established with the beginning of pluralism and 
economic openness since the 1970s and the following decades but on the basis of common 
economic interests and harmony of political visions (El-Sayed, 1991). Waterbury (1992) 
emphasized the beginning of the transformation of Nasser's state "bourgeoisie" into a business 
since the first partial liberalization that took place under Sadat in the mid-1970s. Skafianakis 
(2004) coined the concept of “networks of privilege” to explain the cronyism and corruption 
networks during the Mubarak era. The corruption and cronyism connected with “the abuse of 
state power in issuing laws, decrees and regulations that would allocate public assets or 
ensure favoured market positions to a politically selected few” (Adly, 2012, p. 2-3). In this 
regard the “ruling elites used pressures for privatization from international financial 
institutions to appropriate public sector assets for themselves, to enrich presidential families 
and ministers and private investors allied with them in “networks of privilege” (Heydemann,  
2004). The cronyism takes four forms (Adly, 2012, pp.2-3): The Sultan’s inner circles 
(Mubarak ruling family networks), Mamluk fiefdoms (state apparatuses particularly military, 
intelligence and the ministry of interior, claim certain economic sectors), oligarchs 
(businessmen make their way from economics to politics by occupying executive and 
parliamentary positions) and junior partners (partnership of businessmen with key officials 
and their family members). 
During the stages of political and economic transformations, tension and conflicts of interest 
emerged in the regime networks, bureaucracy and ruling elite. Some were excluded, others 
benefited. The concept of power sharing came onto the agenda (Ehteshami & Murphy, 1996, 
p. 760, Waterbury, 1992). The privatization and liberalisation of the economy, to some degree 
away from direct interference by the state, has often transferred assets, or the control thereof, 
to actors and groups close to the state. This process is likely to produce not only winners but 
losers as well. These losers realize that they would be “excluded from the political game and 
removed from existing corporatist arrangements” (Kienle, 1998, p. 236).  
In this regard the divided elites and the destabilization of political coalitions as a result of 
conflicts among elites during times of political and economic crisis make certain elites more 
willing to support challenger movements (Piven & Cloward 1977, p. 23). Even if such 
support is not forthcoming, a lack of unity translates into a less coordinated and resource-
laden opposition to insurgents (Skocpol, 1979, Maney, 2001, p. 19). 
It is worth noting that the conflict among ruling elites over resources and policies heightened 
in a number of occasions in Egyptian history (Brownlee, 2002, p. 6). The lack of coherence 
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among elite groups emerged in the regime because the patron-client model is connected to 
what Springborg identified the regime dilemma of “the organizational vacuum”. The political 
clientage failed in certain events and crises to provide sufficient cohesion within the elite 
(Springborg, 1974, p. 87). While rulers such Mubarak may appreciate their relative freedom 
of action, “the organizational vacuum over which they preside actually sets real and narrow 
limits on their governing scope”. In other words, “the Egyptian rulers can be authoritarian but, 
in the absence of means of organizing mass behaviour on a permanent rather than a temporary 
basis, they are incapable of establishing either totalitarian government or government based 
on  a system of checks and balances between institutions” (Ibid, p. 86). Moreover, clientelism 
does not provide a sufficient organizational basis for a leader to enforce unity of purpose 
within the elite, nor for him to reach down effectively into the population to extract or 
distribute resources (Ibid, p. 106). 
These clientalist networks provide the foundations of an authoritarian regime, not a 
totalitarian one, allowing the opportunity for the emergence of social movements. The clash 
between the informal and formal networks might have a great impact on the coherence of the 
ruling elite and provide an appropriate context for the emergence or developing of social 
movements. Heydemann (2007, p. 28) illustrated that the  possibility of the ruler to exploit 
multiple sets of rules could be undermined when the formal institutions and practices are 
discarded entirely in favour of informal, selective, and arbitrary modes of governance. The 
next table shows that standards of transparency and good governance were very weak in 
Egypt comparing with other Middle East and North Africa countries. 
Table (11): The corruption perceptions index and international transparency (2008)
34
  
                             Egypt and MENA compared 
County 
Rank 
Regional 
Country Rank  
Country/Territory  CPI Score 2008  
28 1 Qatar 6.5 
35 2 
United Arab 
Emirates 5.9 
                                                     
34 World Bank, 2008, Egypt Governance Brief, June 2009, p. 6  
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41 3 Oman 5.5 
43 4 Bahrain 5.4 
47 5 Jordan 5.1 
62 6 Tunisia 4.4 
65 7 Kuwait 4.3 
80 8 Morocco 3.5 
80 8 Saudi Arabia 3.5 
92 10 Algeria 3.2 
102 11 Djibouti 3 
102 11 Lebanon 3 
115 13 Egypt 2.8 
126 14 Libya 2.6 
141 15 Iran 2.3 
141 15 Yemen 2.3 
147 17 Syria 2.1 
178 18 Iraq 1.3 
Average     3.705555556 
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Egypt fell in the 20
th
 lowest percentile bracket on WBI’s 2008 World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) and compares unfavourably within MENA and with other countries with similar 
income levels. The 2008 Freedom House report ranks the country as “not free.”  Government 
accountability has been rated low and witnessed a modest decline over the last year according 
to WGI.  The 2008 Global Integrity report notes that no mechanism or appeals process exists 
in Egypt for citizens who are denied access to basic information.  The 2008 World Bank 
CPIA index rated Egypt below the region’s average in the area of transparency and 
accountability. With regard to corruption, WGI shows an overall deterioration in the country’s 
anti-corruption efforts over the last decade and the 2008 Transparency International’s CPI 
index ranks Egypt below the regional average. The same pattern also stands out with respect 
to the country’s regulatory and bureaucratic quality35. 
In this regard, the last years of Mubarak’s regime were marked by factional and interest 
conflicts among the ruling elite, which lost its coherence and harmony and became an old-
age, corruption-riddled elite. The regime manoeuvres to upgrade after 2004 heightened the 
tension between the former old guard which gradually excluded by Mubarak’s son Gamal and 
his inner circle of businessmen constituencies. The regime denoted the tactical techniques by 
which regimes tried to manage this transition without destabilizing their rule. Heydemann and 
Kniele illustrated how a regime such as the Mubarak’s “used privatization as a source of 
patronage to build new bases of support substituting for the old populist coalition and elites” 
(Kniele, 1998, p. 199; Hinnebusch, 2012, p.3).  
The replacement of the old guard with Gamal Mubarak’s figures deepened the conflicts while 
keeping the same dilemma within the ruling elite. The change of prominent figures among the 
ruling elite did not mean that reform in the autocratic regime was taking place as the 
newcomers to the political arena preserved the same rules and practices. The neoliberal 
policies of the Nazif government (2004-2011) provided the space for the expansion and 
sophistication of the growing new networks of businessmen which became involved in 
disputes over policies and resources with the old networks. Under Nazif's government, “many 
businessmen were brought into the cabinet and joined the economic team while others joined 
the NDP-dominated parliament: a classical revolving-door situation” (Adly, 2012, pp. 3.4).  
Indeed with the advent of the neoliberal phase in Egypt, and the subsequent rise of Gamal 
Mubarak into the apex of the NDP and the political spectrum, a new taxonomy of political 
                                                     
35 World Bank, 2008, Egypt Governance Brief,  June 2009, p. 1  
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elite was in the making. The ascendance of the business community into the higher levels of 
the Egyptian polity was, in effect, a reflection of a set of social and economic changes that the 
country went through in the aftermath of the Open Door policy adopted by Sadat in the mid- 
1970s. “About one decade after economic liberalization, the first echelon of businessmen 
started to appear in politics during the mid-1980s. One decade later, with the beginning of 
privatization, they increasingly interfered in formal politics. Generally speaking, they 
substituted those personalities in parliament that came from the public sector” (Kavli, 2003, 
p.6).    
These changes and such processes created new alliances and tensions between different 
networks of bureaucracy, business and military. It is worth noting that privatization and the 
distribution of wealth creates divisions within the state and among the ruling elites. The 
austerity policies also created tension as some officials might have concerns that these 
programmes “erode national sovereignty, lower state revenues and capacities, worsen living 
standards, produce recession, and lead to economic and political instability” (Maney, 2001, 
pp. 19,20). The policies of the new guard around Gamal Mubarak were fiercely resisted by 
those elements of the bureaucracy and military who considered it as power-loss and who were 
more interested in preserving their existing privileges (Adly, 2012, pp.3, 4). The business 
tycoon Ahmed Ezz, the prominent figure in Gamal’s inner circle and Organizational Secretary 
of NDP, owned the Steel Rebar's Company (Al-Dekheila) which dominated 70% of the 
market (Shawqi, 2001, p.45). Opponents accused the government of helping Ezz overtake the 
Alexandria Iron and Steel Company. Ezz was also accused of using his influential role in the 
ruling party to become the main shareholder and board chairman of Al-Dekheila Company. 
Thus he monopolized the iron and steel market in Egypt. A number of MPs raised concerns 
that Ezz would improperly manipulate the Anti-Trust and Competition Protection 
Commission (ACPC). They accused Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif's government of being in 
cahoots with the business community, and the only way to ensure ACPC's independence was 
for it to be affiliated to the Central Auditing Agency (Essam El-din, 2007). 
These clashes among the ruling elite were also part of political successions arrangement 
preparing for Mubarak’s departure from office. Since the rise of Gamal Mubarak and the 
formation of the “Policy Committee” which dominated the NDP, much has been said about 
the crises that recurrently characterized the regime internal networks. Observers and activists 
noted the implicit and hidden tension over issues and policies among the ruling elite e.g. 
disagreement between old and new guards, the doubt about the military establishment 
position regarding the political succession and the conflicts to control the resources emerged 
on various occasions revolution such as the Agrium projects (Tohami, 2010), the nuclear 
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reactor project in Eduba’a and the conflict between two prominent figures in the NDP, 
Ahmed Ezz and Hesham Mustafa. Such a crisis developed into a fully-fledged rift, which 
could be beyond repair until the revolution. There was a mix of closed institutions infused Wit 
over lapping loyalties on one hand and growing military control that had tried to replace 
Mubarak and his party’s men since 25th January on the other (El Sirgany, 2012). 
The power struggle and internal contest between the 'old guard' and Gamal Mubarak's new 
generation of businessmen-politicians forced the NDP to field two sets of candidates in the 
2010 election which reflects the kind of loose corporatist arrangements.  In fact, in some 
places, the NDP even fielded one or two additional 'independent' candidates, for a total of 
over 800 candidates in 508 constituencies. The run-off competitions often saw competing 
NDP candidates jostle for election, with many of the same dirty tactics being turned on their 
party colleagues (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). The internal dispute in the NDP posed a serious 
obstacle to the NDP's objective of a enabling a passable opposition presence in parliament. 
After NDP won of over 90% of available seats, the other parties decided to boycott the 
elections and withdrew their candidates. In any case, these deep splits demonstrate not only 
the temptation of collaborating with the regime, particularly for businessmen-politicians, and 
the frailty of the regime's pluralistic 'cover', but also the deep rift between party leaderships 
and their members (Ibid). Indeed, this election was significant because the experiment in 
electoral engineering sponsored by the new guard (Gamal’s men, particularly Ezz) failed to 
provide the regime with a façade of democratic legitimacy, failed to resolve internal 
factionalism and impose party discipline, and the withdrawal of most parties after the first 
round of voting suggests that this time most opposition parties – though not necessarily their 
MPs –  refused the regime's offer to act as mere sparring partners (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). 
Another outstanding aspect of these conflicts was between the military leadership and Gamal 
Mubarak’s Policies Committee around the issue of economic policies and privatization. The 
Army and retired generals hold administrative posts, and many sectors now feature more 
officials with direct links to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). A number of 
senior officers were appointed as governors of  provinces, managers of  towns, or heads of  
city councils, or heads of factories or companies owned by the state or the military
 
(El 
Sirgany, 2012; Abul-Magd, 2012). The conflicts of interest emerged and created a rivalry 
between SCAF and some of the top NDP leaders over privatization policies and political 
succession which played an important role in explaining the SCAF position during the 
revolution which asserted it as the “primary political force” (El Sirgany,2012). 
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4.7  Transnational and External Opportunities 
The outstanding trend in the literature review about the Middle East proclaims the interaction 
between external and internal determinants as “key to any prospect for democratization in 
Egypt: (a) freedom and strengthening of civil society and, (b) international pressures and 
incentives, especially from the United States as the hegemonic power in the region” 
(Brownlee, 2002; Brumberg, 2002; Langohr, 2004). It could be argued that social movements 
have revitalized in the last decade due to this interaction between internal, regional, and 
international factors. In this regard, when internal opportunities are closed, SMs might seek to 
benefit from international alliances and institutions to create opportunities and generate new 
resources.  
On the other hand, the leverage of external and transnational factors were not addresses as an 
independent   factors in the social movement theory compared with PO, MS and FP. Maney 
(2001) argued that “by and large, theories of social movements have neglected the role of 
both transnational structures and external actors in contributing to domestic political conflict” 
(Maney, 2001, pp.1, 2). He showed that, “While more frequently acknowledging, on an ad 
hoc basis, the importance of international factors, those working in the political process 
tradition, until recently, did not devote significant attention to the impact of international 
factors on their primary subject matter - structures of political opportunity” (Maney, 2001, pp 
2, 3).  
It could be argued that the political process model is “constructed with the assumption that 
external and internal processes, institutions, and actors contribute, separately and in 
interactive combination, to the origins, trajectories, and outcomes of domestic protest” 
(Maney, 2001, p. 5). It could also be argued that opportunities and constraints are more 
homogeneous in the national level (one centre of power) while on the international level; they 
are heterogeneous, which lead to differential mobilizing of networks both at national level and 
international levels. 
This section is going to address the issue of external and transnational opportunities and 
constraints which emerged from 2000-2010 by focusing on three main factors: the impact of 
globalization and internet-based communication, USA foreign policy, and regional conflicts 
in Middle East 
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The Impact of Globalization and Internet-based Communications: 
The global economic change, developments in media and communications technologies, and 
the growth of transnational networks contributed to reshaping the opportunities and 
constraints facing social movements and regimes. Some forms of authoritarianism, such as 
totalitarianism and bureaucratic authoritarianism, have become more difficult to sustain. 
Although several new (or partially new) nondemocratic regime types took on greater 
importance in the 1990s, including competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, p. 63), 
globalization and new media contributed to the democratization in Middle East countries. In 
this regard the new transnational types of political, economic, social and cultural actors and 
processes resulting from globalization led to a global redistribution of power (Pratt, 2004, 
314). Henry and Springporg argued that the way globalization impacts on political regimes in 
the Middle East depends on the regime type which range between three major types 
:praetorian republics, monarchies, and, lastly, democracies of varying degrees of 
institutionalized competitiveness.  They classified
36
 the Egyptian regime under Mubarak as a 
praetorian republic ruled by “bullies” as there were some elements of both civil society and 
rational-legal legitimacy, which in turn reduce, but do not altogether eliminate, the 
importance of violence and coercion in political life. The structural power of capital, although 
negligible in praetorian republics governed by bullies, is noticeably greater than in bunker 
states, where security of property is insufficient to permit capital accumulation. Consequently 
the “bully” responses to economic globalization are less brutal than those of the bunker states. 
The limited capacities of the “bully” states, however and the structural weakness of capital 
within them have severely constrained their efforts to globalize (Henry, Springborg, 2010, p. 
63). 
In addition to this, globalization strengthens “national/regional/political or other identities by 
bringing people together across time and space” (Yamani, 2001). The process of globalization 
has facilitated intercultural exchanges which enable new combinations of identities to be 
created, resulting in a hybrid culture (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995). In some cases, these new 
identities can become a resource for the creation of transnational social movements or a 
movement for ‘globalization-from-below’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Falk, 1999; Al-Ali, 
2001; Pratt, 2004, pp. 315, 316). The blurring of hegemonic national cultures that represent 
the national community as homogeneous, may empower previously suppressed or ignored 
social groups, based on class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or other identities (Held 
and McGrew, 2000; Al-Ali, 2001;  Pratt, 2004, 315, 316). 
                                                     
36 They considered that Egypt, Tunisia, and prospective Palestine comprise the “bully” states of the MENA, while 
Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen are the bunker states. 
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In this regard, state autonomy is challenged from below by NGOs and other non-state actors. 
NGOs for example, “have been encouraged into this role by the increasing amount of aid 
channelled to them by Northern donors over the last decade.” (Fowler, 1992; Pratt, 2004). The 
interdependence relationship between the Egyptian NGO campaign for democratization and 
transnational NGOs emerged as the former not only mobilized local support, but it also had 
the backing of international human rights, NGOs and many foreign governments and donors 
(Pratt, 2004, p. 330). 
The growing international civil society contributes to the creating of the opportunity for the 
emergence and extension of social movements. It is widely agreed that the role of 
transnational social movements and civil society organizations gradually expanded and surged 
with the globalization and the Iraqi war in 2003. Various groups from civil society and NGOs 
from different ideological trends have strong ties with the civil society in the western 
countries. Abdel Rahman (2009, p. 40) argued that “the success of the worldwide anti-war 
movement has given support to the nascent Egyptian movement whose members are closely 
linked with this global umbrella”. In response to this challenge the regime advocated 
executive supervision of fund-raising abroad and attempted to delegitimize transnational 
linkages by representing ‘foreign funding’ as a threat to the nation (Pratt, 2004, pp. 326, 327). 
In addition to this, globalization plays a role in democratization through the extension of new 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), which provide activists with new ways 
to challenge the authorities (Ibid, pp. 315, 316). 
The internet-based communications helped social movements to establish “counter-public 
spheres” (derived from Habermas’s ‘public spheres’), whereby this technology provides 
protesting and marginalized groups with a new and inexpensive means to establish a sphere of 
media discourse that accompanies their forms of organization and protest (Downey and 
Fenton, 2003, pp. 185-202). These groups and individuals developed the use of such 
technology to become significant channels for voices, minority viewpoints, and political 
mobilization, and challenge the elite control of public sphere and mass communication. The 
online media, under a variety of regimes, has significantly contributed to expanding the scope 
of freedom of expression and to breaking official organizations’ monopoly of channels of 
communication (UNDP, 2010, p. 114). Increasingly, these developments comprise an 
emerging networked public sphere, in which the power of elites to control the public agenda 
and bracket the range of allowable opinions is seriously challenged (Etling, et al., 2009, p.7).  
The benefits of media convergence, bringing together print, video and broadcast in 
cyberspace, best explain how sub-state groups can circumvent their marginalization in 
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mainstream media outlets. Ajemian argues that intersecting and complementing existing 
transnational media would allow for dissident groups and their sympathizers to tap into the 
mainstream. In addition to this, online media best demonstrate how media convergence 
empowers individuals to shape media counter-public spheres (Ajemian, 2008). Morozov 
(2009) discussed the change of the meaning of activism; he argued that “anyone can be one of 
the activists joining a Facebook group, posting to a blog, or setting up a Twitter account 
would count as activism”.  
Despite the historical control over the media, through many entities such as the Egyptian 
Supreme Press Council, which has been enhanced by the renewal of the state emergency law, 
the economic and political reform plans and the modernizing process since the mid-nineties, 
convinced the regime to consider the availability of information and knowledge one of its 
priorities, programmes that provide labour market information and employment services 
began emerging on the internet especially on the websites of the National Council for Youth 
and the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (Tohami, 2009, p. 23). 
These developments led to a revolution in the use of the internet and new social networking 
technologies and created a new dilemma for the authorities that were able to effectively move 
against the traditional media while finding it difficult to silence the increasing numbers of 
elusive protest voices playing out on new technologies which spread around the country. For 
example, the circulation for newspapers and magazines is just one million a day. But there are 
60 million cell phones that can send a SMS. To the government this can be a dangerous issue 
that needs to be under control (Flieshman and Hassan, 2010). The infrastructure of digital 
networks is beyond the reach of the state. The government can easily cut power off to 
television stations or restrict the supply of newsprint, but cannot easily control digital 
networks when the servers that host political conversations are located overseas, and the 
internet service providers and mobile phone operators are privately held businesses (Howard, 
2010). These days regimes cannot ban ideas and political debates; they just drive them on to 
the internet (O'Donnell, 2010). 
It is worth noting that the youth are the main group who use internet-based technologies. 
Indeed, the growing numbers of educated young people looking for new chances has become 
the age group benefiting the most from these transformations. They constitute the largest 
number of current internet users and have developed channels for alternative means of 
engagement. According to population estimates prepared by the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS, 2008) the youth population between 15-35 years old is 
about 23 million out of  the total population of 76 million in 2006 (30%). And the youth 
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represent the biggest category using the internet as a source of information because it is one of 
the cheapest and fastest tools at hand. 
The youth culture enjoys a visible presence and certain acknowledgement from society and 
media that was unseen in the 1980s or 1990s.  Egyptian youth activists in recent years found 
new independent sites for their activism in the emerging blogosphere and Facebook which 
became platforms of political and cultural expression for some, as well as a mode of social 
and political networking, campaigning and organization for others.  Blogging remained a 
platform for cultural expression and networking (Tohami, 2009, pp. 12-13). 
The statistics about internet-based technologies usage illustrate that the number of internet 
users in Egypt is estimated at about 13 million to date, according to available statistics. That 
is, almost two out of eight citizens go to the internet for information, business and personal 
usage. This is an increase of almost threefold compared to 2005 - and for many, ‘logging in’ 
has become a daily practice. It means, for example, that the number of daily Internet users in 
Egypt is much higher than that of newspaper readers. These figures are expected to rise to 
cover more than 50% of Egypt’s population in the next ten years (EHDR, 2010, p. 114). 
The number of computer users among the youth was over six million, of which 57% were 
male and 43% female; (CAPMAS, 2008). More than 80% of Internet café clients in Egypt 
were young people (IDSC, 2006, Internet Mania).  
The number of Facebook users sharply rises every day and reached more than 4 million of the 
residents in Egypt in October 2010. This number represents around one third of Internet users 
in Egypt and will continue to increase in future years. Facebook occupied the second most 
visited website after Google, and Egypt came number eighteen between the countries that use 
Facebook. Consequently, the protesting youth found it to be the best arena to publish and 
mobilize through composing groups or through personal profiles (Shorouk, 2010). 
We should take into account how young people deal with these new technologies as a new 
avenue to achieve their goals and dreams and how this reflects on the public sphere or 
otherwise. The World Development Report (World Bank, 2006) shows a higher prevalence of 
computer use in Egypt. The young people have access to the Internet through cyber cafes that 
are in Cairo and other urban centres. But technology use among youth is limited to chatting, 
downloading songs, and access to religious sites (Assaad & Barsoum, 2007, p. 15; Tohami. 
2009, p. 13). 
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For as much as these developments are significant and worth noting, the percentage of active 
youth is not representative of the majority. It is striking that the youth who are interested in 
political and cultural activities is considered a minority among the younger generation and the 
number who are practising as members of social movements is small, although they have a 
great influence on political and social issues (Elting, et. al., 2009, p. 10).  In relating the 
political and cultural impacts, it is obvious that this minority of activists has an incredible 
effect on the public sphere and represent a big challenge to the hegemonic discourse of the 
regime.  
Online activists and bloggers, as well as participators in ‘Facebook’ and ‘YouTube’ were 
behind the political action in Egypt. The UN Human Development Report confirmed that “the 
extent of success of the so-called ‘electronic democracy’ rests largely on young people” 
(UNDP, 2010, p.113). The importance of the Internet lies in the fact that it may be the only 
online means available for measuring youth’s political participation. And it has become a tool 
with huge weight in calling for any activity, as the events of 6th April 2008 demonstrated 
(UNDP, 2010, p. 114). 
The American Policy and the democratization process : 
Several authors writing on Middle East politics argue that the political opportunity that helped 
the emergence of social movements fundamentally originated from external pressure. The 
supporters of this trend concentrate on the authoritarian nature of the regime and its unity 
while the opposition is weak and divided, so the international context plays the decisive role 
in the emergence of the new movements. Abdelrahaman (2009, p.40) argued that the external 
pressure, “such as that applied by the USA, on Mubarak’s regime has certainly played a major 
role in creating new openings for domestic social forces which have seized the opportunity for 
action” (Abdelrahman, 2009, p. 40). Indeed this view was widely accepted in research about 
the transition to democracy in Egypt. For example, Brownlee (2002, p. 6) confirmed that 
“unless domestic and - perhaps more importantly - international actors compel the Egyptian 
president to cede power to other branches of government and to allow civil society 
organizations to operate independently, the outlook for organized political contestation in 
Egypt will only continue to dim”.  
The United States’ policy underwent a significant change after the attacks of September 11, 
2001 subsequently aiming to bring about the issue of democratization in the Arab world as 
one of the priorities of the region.  It is widely agreed that prior to September 11, U.S. policy 
makers assumed that stable and friendly authoritarian regimes in the Arab world were the best 
guarantee of American security and economic interests (Tawfiq Ibrahim, 2003, p.7). The 
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relationship between the US and Egypt is based on strategic interests, in particular, oil, Israel, 
the Soviet Union (until 1991), radical Islamic movements and the eagerness to maintain the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and (to extend the peace to other Arab countries). 
American economic and military assistance to Egypt had extended to approximately $62 
billion over the previous thirty-one years by the end of 2006. Consequently, a common 
understanding developed as democratization was a subordinate to the strategic concerns that 
shape the US-Egyptian relationship. Democratization took a back seat to core strategic 
concerns (Rutherford, 2008). In the wake of the September 2001 attacks, the American 
political elite concluded that “terrorism by radical Islamists was partially a result of the 
repression and economic stagnation of Arab dictatorships” (Rutherford, 2008). The Europeans 
adopted a similar conviction, though less effusive and preferred more diplomatic tools to 
create democratic change in the Middle East. The international context, after 11 September, 
made the issue of democratization in the Middle East one of the priorities in the region. In 
other words, democratization became not only an extra goal but also a strategic objective in 
itself. “True, it is only one objective among many. But it now carries significant weight 
among policy makers in the United States and Europe. Major Western governments now 
argue with increasing conviction that the absence of democracy in the region has a direct 
impact on regional and global security” (Rutherford, 2008).  
However, the rise of contentious politics in Egypt vehemently defied those predictions. When 
in come to the reality, the policy of democratization witnessed a lot of complications and 
contradictions that made some scholars conclude that what really happened was, 
“strengthening authoritarian rule through Democracy Promotion” Durac & Cavatorta, (2009). 
They discussed the Bush administration hesitation and unease over supporting democracy in 
Egypt.  US officials were worrying about how to react “because political transformation in 
Egypt presented a policy puzzle with no simple solution”. On the one hand, Mubarak’s 
regime was profoundly unpopular but “the opposition was thin on democrats and liberals and 
heavy on leftists, Nasserists, and Islamists, all deeply opposed to the United States, and 
divided along fault lines” Durac & Cavatorta, (2009, p. 15). There was great doubt that they 
could remove the regime and that external pressure alone could lead to any result without a 
strong movement on the ground. The paradox of democratization policy appeared when the 
interests of the United States contradicted with the requirement of democratization similar to 
what happened after the Egyptian and Palestine elections in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The 
Muslim brothers and Hamas increased their influence in the political system and parliament 
through the democratic tools which became a pretext for the regime to launch a repression 
campaign against the Islamists and the prodemocracy movement. The Bush administration 
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turned a blind eye because the U.S. still needed the regime mostly for strategic reasons 
relating to the situation in Palestine, Iraq and the War on Terror. El-Mahdi (2009, p. 1019) 
argued that, “Although the United States was ready to pay lip service to democratic transition 
in the region, it could not risk exerting real pressure to destabilize one of its biggest allies in 
the region”.  Some activists criticized what they considered as, “immorality of the American 
position which ignored the repression in 2006-2009” after encouraging political and social 
movements to challenge the regime then left them to their fate.
 
The young activists became more radical and sought to get support from the American 
administration. Some of the radical activists like Ahmed Salah, who claimed to represent 
April 6 youth movement and a former member of Kefaya, attempted to convince the 
American officials with their goal to “replace the current regime with a parliamentary 
democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections”. However, the American embassy analysts 
in Cairo assessed it as an “unrealistic goal” without a “roadmap of concrete steps”. They also 
mentioned that, “Most opposition parties and independent NGOs work toward achieving 
tangible, incremental reform within the current political context, even if they may be 
pessimistic about their chances of success”. They add that, “such an approach places him 
outside this mainstream of opposition politicians and activists (Scobey, 2008). This illustrated 
that the American diplomats’ assessment did not welcome such radical change and preferred 
the reformist approach which lost its credibility and effectiveness.  The Americans focused on 
helping and cooperating with the weak opposition parties and NGOs which worked under the 
existing constraints imposed by the regime. The dilemma increased because whatever 
strategies Western governments use to facilitate democratization such as strengthening civil 
society “have been half-hearted in their scope or misplaced in their intent, since their apparent 
effect in their current guise has been to simply reinforce the Egyptian regime” (Teti & 
Gervasio, 2011).  Meanwhile the governmental media waged a propaganda war against the 
opposition leaders and groups like Ayman Nour and Sa’ad Edien Ibrahiem and accused them 
of being agents for the west who received foreign financial and political support. The activists 
themselves criticized Western policy towards reform in the Arab World which ElBaradei 
described as, “It has not been based on dialogue, understanding, supporting civil society and 
empowering people, but rather it's been based on supporting authoritarian systems as long as 
the oil keeps pumping” (Shenker, 2010). 
Most worryingly for Egyptian activists during their campaign against the regime was what 
they considered as the West's muted reactions to the corrupt rigged elections and repression, 
one prominent activist said that they “expect little support from Western governments for 
their own democratic dreams”. After the rigged parliament election in 2010, there were plenty 
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of “disappointing statements” put out by various Western governments such as the U.S. State 
Department. “The EU only managed a strongly-worded statement by the head of its 
Parliament while Council and Commission have thus far felt unable to produce even 
tokenistic condemnation” (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). The dilemma continued and appeared on 
different occasions particularly with ElBaradei’s ambitious to compete in the presidential 
election. His return to Egypt in February 2010 raised questions about the role of Washington 
in the political reform in Egypt. While some observers have argued that, “ElBaradei’s return 
has produced a situation in which Washington can play a positive role in advancing the cause 
of reform”, others were cautious for different reasons, first because such a role may imply a 
statement that, “the Egyptian public cannot help itself and has no agency, interests, or politics 
of its own, thereby requiring Washington to intervene”. Secondly, “Egypt’s close relationship 
with the United States has become a critical and negative factor in Egyptian politics. The 
opposition has used these ties to delegitimize the regime, while the government has engaged 
in its own displays of anti-Americanism to insulate itself from such charges” (Cook, 2010).  
The regional effect and the erosion of legitimacy 
The external factors are not related just to US policy but also to regional conflicts like the 
Arab- Israeli conflict and the Iraqi wars in addition to transitional ideologies and movements 
like pan-Arab and Islamist.  In this regard the defeat of Arab regimes at the hands of Israel in 
1967 and successive reversals, culminating in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, led to the 
discrediting of the populist social contract and the steady erosion of the legitimacy of 
successive regimes. Clinging to power, many populist regimes escalated their oppression; 
others engaged in external adventures, while some did both. Some engaged in the token or 
substantial revision of their systems of governance (Ibrahim, 1995, p. 36). The Palestine and 
Iraq issues since 2000 not only paved the way for street protests but also challenged the 
legitimacy of the regime. It could be argued that the legitimacy of the Egyptian regime used 
to be tested in its regional and Arab policy as well as its ability to protect the national 
security. 
These regional conflicts, particularly in Palestine and Iraq, contributed to the decreasing of 
the legitimacy of Arab regimes and led to the emergence of radical social movements that 
challenged the independent and anti-imperialistic bases of legitimacy. In this regard the 
regional political developments in the Middle East since 2000 played an important role in the 
strengthening the youth activism. The second Intifada in Palestine in 2000 and the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 were critical moments that pushed the activists to demonstrate and 
mobilize. The absence of an influential pro - Arab role was a critical blow to the nationalist 
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dimension of the regime’s legitimacy (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1022). Angry protests were directed 
by Islamists and Nasserist against the West and Israel, and less against their own repressive 
regime to commit to a democratic order (Bayat, 2009, p. 2). A big shift took place since 2003 
and during the Gaza 2008-2009 crisis where the demonstrations were connected between 
protests against Israel and Mubarak at the same time. 
A larger shift in Egyptian policy occurred in the late Mubarak era when looking for ways to 
make himself useful to Washington in confrontation with Iran, besides tangling with Hamas, 
participating in renditions of terrorist suspects, and being the occasional facilitator for talks 
between Israelis and Palestinians 
 
(Cook, July 19, 2012). It is worth noting that Mubarak’s 
regime used to get foreign resources that contributed significantly to its adaptive capacity 
(Heydemann, 2007, p. 34). The American aid began to the Sadat regime after the peace 
agreement in 1979 and continued throughout the whole era of the Mubarak regime with both 
western and Arab support for the Mubarak regime particularly after the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990 and confrontation with terrorist groups. These foreign resources continued in 
the period from 2000-2010 however they were not enough to face the new social and 
economic challenges and grievances.  
These policies promoted the counter hegemonic movement effort to delegitimize the regime 
where a significant aspect of legitimacy was contingent on a nationalist foreign policy. 
Hinnebusch (2012, p.2) stressed that enjoying neither electoral nor traditional legitimacy, 
legitimacy in these populist authoritarian regimes was contingent on a nationalist foreign 
policy and delivery of jobs and welfare.  However to achieve integration into the world 
capitalist economy, the regime abandoned anti-imperialism. The main sources of aid/rent 
were in the West, which required forfeiting nationalist legitimacy by foreign policy alignment 
westward and peace with Israel (Hinnebusch, 2012, p.2). 
Another case in point was the roles played by the Arab satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera in 
creating similar identities and challenges to the regimes as well as pan-Arab movements and 
ideas that have mutual influence and impact in the Arab public sphere such as the birth of the 
Arab Human Rights Organization and similar civil formations (Ibrahim, 1995, p. 56). The 
Jasmine Tunisian revolution had a great impact on the Egyptians as the successful ousting of 
autocratic president Zien El Abidien Ben Ali struck a chord with many young, angry Arab 
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populations ready to protest. And in return the Egyptian one has a similar impact on other 
Arab revolutions
37
. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the structure of opportunities that were considered most relevant to 
the emergence of new agents of change and protest networks among young Egyptians. It has 
discussed the different aspects of the political opportunities associated with the consequent 
waves of youth and political activism since 2000 until it reached its peak in the 25th 
revolution. It concluded that the structures of opportunities emerged as a result of the rupture 
in state-society relationships which could be traced to the regime’s lack of hegemony and 
legitimacy, the façade of corporatist arrangements and the collapse of the social pact, in 
addition to the high level of grievances as a result of the deterioration in the socio-economic 
conditions and the impact of the neoliberal policies which triggered an unprecedented wave of 
social protest particularly from 2007-2010. 
Moreover, the Egyptian regime as a kind of competitive authoritarianism created growing 
contradictions and the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods created an 
inherent source of instability. The presence of elections, legislatures, courts, and an 
independent media created periodic opportunities for challenges by opposition forces. The 
regime also faced the paradox of exerting high levels of police atrocities to keep its stability 
and the ability of social media to uncover these atrocities and show them to the international 
community. In addition to this, the latter years of Mubarak’s regime were marked by faction 
and conflicts of interest among the ruling elite, which lost its coherence and harmony and the 
failure to resolve internal factionalism and impose party discipline exposed the vulnerability 
of the regime in the face of strong pressure from society. 
This was further exposed through transitional factors and the regional political developments 
in the Middle East which played major roles in creating new opportunities other than the 
social movement theory proposed. This change in the political opportunity structure agitated 
Egyptians against the regime and provided a suitable environment for youth activism to 
emerge and develop. The Palestine and Iraqi issues since 2000 not only paved the way for 
street protestation for political reasons but also challenged the legitimacy of the regime. In 
later stages the American support for democratic policies decreased the repressive capacity of 
                                                     
37 For more details see, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/01/arab-world-how-tunisia-
revolution-changed-politics-of-egypt-and-region-.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/egypt-tunisia-
arab-revolution_n_816695.html 
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the regime to oppress the political mobility in 2004-2006 and paved the way for the 
emergence of new movements and networks like Kefaya, Al Ghad and Youth for Change. 
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Chapter Five: 
 Chronological Developments and Formal Structure of Corporatist 
Arrangements in the Universities 2000-2010 
5.1  Introduction 
The outbreak of the Intifada in Sep/Oct. 2000 was a turning point for the Egyptian youth 
activism. It was the spark that announced the beginning of a new round of activity after a 
period of calm and apathy. The impacts of the Palestinian Intifada and Iraqi war mobilizations 
resulted in turning youth activism against the regime, criticizing its failure and the absence of 
effectiveness. The youth activism began to shift towards internal issues and launched various 
initiatives since 2004. The high levels of grievances became more visible and intense after 
2007 and the strains triggered more waves of social protest which was encompassed in the 6
th
 
of April 2008 strike. The accumulation of these experiences over the years was added to the 
new opportunities connected with the preparation for the parliamentary elections in 2010.  
This mobilization represented a qualitatively and quantitatively different stage from other 
waves of protest since the 1970s.  The participation of millions of young ordinary people in 
universities and schools reflected a new awareness and engaged the younger generation with 
continuous politics against the main strategy of the regime to exclude the majority of young 
people from politics. 
On the other hand, the formal structure governing the student activities was marked by 
significant constraints. The official corporatist arrangements such as student unions and youth 
centres were suffering from a crisis of credibility and efficacy as serious doubts about their 
legitimacy and representativeness of the youth emerged and increased. The independent 
student movements had experienced a severe security pressure from the mid-1990s which was 
marked by the waves of terrorism and violence in which students represented a significant 
element. Conflicts have also raged between the students of the Muslim Brothers and students 
of the National Democratic Party which was backed by the security forces which ended up 
with expulsion of opposition candidates from election, failure to hold the elections or the 
appointment of the representatives of students unions by university administrations. 
Notwithstanding this, the universities experienced unprecedented levels of mobilization and 
violence as demonstrations erupted every year following the rigging of elections while the 
streets around the universities began to resemble like semi-military barracks. 
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The purpose of this chapter is first to highlight the various cycles of mobilization 2000/2010, 
which reflected the emergence and development of various kinds of social and youth 
activism. Second, it aims to explain more specifically the formal students’ structures and 
official corporatist arrangements which the regime tightly controlled through various 
mechanisms.  
5.2 Chronological Developments of Social and Youth activism 2000-
2010:  The Cycles of Mobilization  
The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by various cycles of protestations and 
demonstrations connected with internal and external issues. This new wave of contentious 
politics contributed to, and reflected, the emergence and development of various kinds of 
social movements. The regime adopted a tolerant approach toward the popular feelings to 
support the Palestinian and Iraqi causes. However, the protests generated more complicated 
responses, crossed the red lines imposed by the regime and triggered a new wave of 
continuous politics in Egypt. 
In later stages, the social movements emerged and developed in an opportune context as a 
result of the American pressure for democracy after September 11
th
 aggression and relaxation 
of repression before the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, exemplified the rise of 
political movements like Kefaya. The period between 2007 and2009 was distinguished by the 
eruption of economic and social protest as a result of the neoliberal policies and corruption, 
while 2010-2011 featured the return of political struggle and the preparation for the election 
which was connected with the return of ElBaradei and the large rigging of the 2010 election 
which paved the way for the 25
th
 revolution. 
The Resurgence of Youth Mobilization 2000-2002:  
During the period 2000-2002, young people participated in various kinds of activities and 
demonstrations in support of the second Palestinian Intifada which had been triggered by the 
visit of the Israeli prime minister to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem on 28 September 2000. 
Large numbers of students and youth participated in demonstrations and joined the Egyptian 
Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI), which was created 
by a number of the middle-age generation from different ideological backgrounds.  
The demonstrations were originally organized by EPCSPI and comprised of various NGO 
activists and representatives of the different political forces and opposition political parties 
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(Schemm, 2002). The activists from the Seventies generation
38
 formed the EPCSPI and with 
strong participation from the younger generations, launched various demonstrations in Tahrir 
Square in downtown Cairo for  the first time since the 1970s, and organized a boycott 
campaign of American and Israeli goods, and collected donations and sent aid caravans to the 
Occupied Territories. In this regard, the Egyptian government’s approach toward the EPCSPI 
and activists moved from cooperation to tension. They received cooperation from the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry to coordinate with the Palestinian embassy, but there were sometimes 
security attacks on participants in demonstrations. EPCSPI’s aim was to expand the shelter 
available for legal movements in front of any activity of a political nature in Egypt (Agati, 
2010, p. 100). The state media was not against the committee or its demonstrations; indeed it 
was relatively sympathetic. The situation became more complicated as the regime not only 
allowed the state media to cover the activities of the EPCSPI, but also promoted its activities 
abroad. On the other hand, the security forces tightened their grip on demonstrations (Agati, 
p. 100). The regime’s security bodies were always concerned about any kind of popular 
gathering. Demonstrations have been forbidden under emergency laws in force since 1981. 
However, the regime’s strategic aims during these events were more complicated. Firstly, the 
regime sought to use the internal protests in order to support the Palestinian leadership and 
exert pressure on the United States and Israel to make more concessions in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Secondly, the regime sought to renew its internal legitimacy and the Egyptian 
regional role which had dramatically declined in earlier decades.  
It is worth noting that there were two rounds of protestations; the first round was in 2000 and 
the second in 2002. The outbreak of the Intifada in October 2000 was the spark that initially 
announced the beginning of a new round of activity. Hundreds of thousands of university and 
school students demonstrated across the country took to the streets clashing with security 
forces during attempts to reach the Israeli embassy that was located in a street close to Cairo 
University.  However, a rapid decline in protests occurred until September 2001. Then 
EPCSPI organized the first demonstration in Tahrir against America and Israel. It took place 
on September 10
th
, 2001, a day before the 11
th
 of September (Abdalla, 2003, p.21). Khalil 
(2003) considered it a new birth of the demonstrations held in the capital’s main square, 
marking the beginning of a rise within the movement.  
                                                     
38 The middle-age political generation represents an extension and continuitycontiguity of the students’ movement 
generation that emerged in the seventies decade of the last century. In the nineties, and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, this generation re-emerged strongly in the opposition political elite, now their ages are 
between 35-50 years. This generation always attracted the attention because of its role in the students’s movement 
and the political skills and capabilities that it has. For more details see (Tohami, 2009) 
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With this second wave of Palestine Intifada, which began after the Israeli re-occupation of 
West Bank cities in March and April 2002, Egyptian youth activism continued to gain 
momentum. This was marked by another wave of demonstrations that were stronger and more 
serious lasting for more than two weeks on a daily basis. The demonstrations of April 1
st
 were 
angrier than the previous wave in October 2000, as the university students merged with 
preparatory and secondary school pupils, all together involved in a violent fight with the 
security forces. This was followed by massive arrests and detentions. Some observers 
estimated that tens of thousands of young people demonstrated in hundreds of gathering in 
separate locations across the country during this period. The largest of these demonstrations 
was the massive one in front of Cairo University, and included tens of thousands of 
demonstrators (Khalil, 2003, p.3 & Abdalla, 2003, p .21 & Tohami, 2009, p. 180).  The 
security forces attacked the students of Alexandria University on April 9, which resulted in 
the death of student Mohammed Al Sakka and injured hundreds (Schemm, 2002). These 
demonstrations were the largest that Egypt had seen since the bread riots of 1977, and the 
students’ protest cycle was the longest in Egyptian student activity since the Gulf War in 
1990-1991, and possibly before that (Shehata; 2008, p. 4,5). 
The spirit of struggle and militancy among students and young people was intensive and 
deeper than most of the protests that had taken place during the rule of President Mubarak. It 
is important to take into account that while the protests began against the Israeli invasion of 
the West Bank, they soon turned to criticism of the Egyptian regime as well, and the absence 
of the Arab armies on the front, and featured slogans such as "O Mubarak, you coward, you 
American agent,” "I've been an activist for years," said one student, "and I've never seen them 
attack Mubarak so directly" (Schemm, 2002). The militancy represented a qualitatively 
different stage from other waves of protest since the 1970s, especially when the protestors' 
slogans started to criticize the regime itself. The state security apparatus changed their tactics 
toward the protest from turning a blind eye to the use of strong and harsh tactics when they 
became out of control and went beyond the red line (Schemm, 2002). In 2002, when protests 
spread around the country and spontaneous student demonstrations suddenly erupted, the 
security forces responded violently suppressing demonstrations, because the regime realized 
that the protestations exceeded the red lines that been allowed at the time, and a new phase of 
predominantly repressive control began (Agati, 2010, p. 101). After the confrontations in 
Alexandria and Cairo, this round of protests subsided but the militancy and anger remained as 
the students were waiting for another opportunity to organize and network. "The objective 
conditions for another outburst are there, but you never know when the spark will come," said 
an activist. These protests forced the government to announce it would downgrade 
131 
 
government-to-government relations with Israel (though not diplomatic ties) and also halted 
Egypt Air flights to Tel Aviv. These gestures came in response to the street protests 
(Schemm, 2002). 
The spontaneous anti-war demonstrations 2003 
The most significant incident that took place after the attack of Iraq was the occupation of 
Tahrir Square on 20
th
 of March 2003 for the first time since the student movement had done 
so in 1971-1972. It was a symbolic occupation which represented a dream for all activists 
from different ideologies for a long time. Notwithstanding this, the security forces succeeded 
in ending the demonstration on the same day after 12 hours of occupation. It was an inspiring 
event that the 25
th
 January activists repeated in a more organized way, continuing controlling 
the square for two weeks until the toppling of Mubarak.   
Despite the significant decline in the events and demonstrations relating to the Palestine 
uprising, the invasion of Iraq showed the vitality and spirit once again of the youth 
movement, after the spontaneous demonstrations that started against the war in 19-20 March, 
2003 which confirmed the entry of new players on the scene: young ordinary people not 
belonging to any political organization but thirsting for an effective political voice. 
Several demonstrations were organized in solidarity with Iraq and Palestine in the beginning 
of 2003 until March 2003 during the preparation for the war against Iraq. The beginning was 
the demonstration in front of the Embassy of Qatar in Cairo in protest at Qatar’s reception of 
the central headquarters of the American forces in the Gulf. This was followed by the 
demonstrations of January 18
th
 and February 15
th
 at Sayeda Zeinab Square; in Cairo, in 
alliance with the International Solidarity Movement against the War on Iraq, and in solidarity 
with the Palestinian Intifada. In addition to this, a demonstration was organized at the Cairo 
International Book Fair on January 31
st
, as well as two demonstrations in front of Cairo 
University on February 22
nd
 and March 15
th
. These demonstrations included all political 
forces and popular committees. They were besieged by massive numbers of the central 
security forces so as to prevent them from interacting with the public. The participants in the 
demonstrations insisted on continuing the movement in order to achieve concrete objectives. 
First, was considered these demonstrations as the beginnings of a movement aimed at 
gradually reclaiming the people's right to demonstrating. Second, was the awareness that these 
besieged demonstrations and the small numbers of participants with the inability to break 
through the security cordons surrounding them could turn into a spark interacting with the 
people's anger and fury against the regimes (Khalil, 2003, p. 7). 
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The protests reached a peak on 20th and 21st March when, for the first time since 1977, 
thousands of protestors unaffiliated to any organized political movement attempted to protest 
in Tahrir Square. They broke through security cordons and filled the square and repeatedly 
tried to march on the nearby American and British embassies. They occupied Tahrir Square 
from Thursday noon till midnight 39. A poster of Mubarak was torn down, and slogans 
expressing hostility to him were shouted (International Crisis Group, 2003, p. 6). While the 
demonstrations managed to occupy Tahrir Square on March 20
th
, the demonstrations of 
March 21
st
 marched all over the streets of Cairo; thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to 
protest. But the government subsequently refused to allow similar protests to be staged 
without prior security permit (Hamdi Al Husseini, 2003). Other demonstrations took place in 
Al-Azhar and Cairo Stadium with the participation of many political powers such as the NDP, 
Nasserists, leftists and Islamists, although the Muslim Brothers were the main organizers. 
A new tradition emerged; represented in the weekly Friday demonstration at Al-Azhar 
mosque in Cairo, witnessing the constant attempts of the people to walk from the mosque into 
the streets. Al-Azhar demonstrations gathered demonstrators from the youth and middle-age 
generation from the Islamic groups like Labour party and Moslem brothers, and the Nasserists 
(Islamonline.net, April 13, 2002). 
It is worth noting that most demonstrations not only blamed the American and Israeli policies, 
but also slammed the government for allowing the spread of corruption, some of them 
chanted, "Down with Mubarak, and ‘No’ for grooming his son to leadership," (Abdel Halim, 
2003). In addition to this, plenty of anti-war demonstrations were coordinated by young 
people through the new medium of cyberspace. Email and mobile phone text messages 
circulated the previous day instructing protestors to converge on the square as soon as the first 
bomb hit Baghdad. A protest organiser said, “We can’t claim to have brought more than 3,000 
people to the square that day, the rest was spontaneous. But together we showed that we can 
break the fear and confront the government” (International Crisis Group, 2003. p. 6).  
Internal political mobility sparks political and youth activism ( 2004-2006) 
This new wave of continuous politics created new opportunities for competing ideologies and 
political movements to flourish and attract large groups of young ordinary people. The 
American pressure for democracy and relaxation of the regime repression before the 2005 
                                                     
39 Estimates of the number of protestors ranged from 10,000 to 20,000, to what organisers claimed were 40,000 
people. See Paul Schemm, “Egypt struggles to control antiwar protests”, Middle East Report Online, 31 March 
2003. Other observers raise the number to 100,000 demonstrators, see; close the spaces between lines for 
consistency  Mustafa Abdel Halim, Egyptians Protest Israeli Aggressions, Arab Weakness, slamOnline.net, 
September 28 2003 
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presidential and parliamentary election associated with the rising of political movements like 
Kefaya and Al-Ghad.  By 2004 Egypt politics included not only veteran activists who had 
developed their mobilizing structures during the previous cycle of protestation and initiated 
the new pro-democracy protest movement but also a large part of the intelligentsia and 
middle-class professionals who have been classically tied to the state. Figures like ex-Prime 
Minister Aziz Seddki, ex-Minister Yehia El-Gamal, and a number of columnists in state-
owned newspapers became associated with these movements (El-Mahdi, 2009).  
Rutherford (2008) suggested that various significant political actors, specifically, the Muslim 
Brothers, the judiciary, and the business sector, could work in parallel, if not exactly together, 
to influence the Egyptian politics. The opportune context triggered social and political 
movements amid ideas such as “a liberal conception of law within the judiciary and an 
Islamic conception of governance within the Muslim Brotherhood”.  The middle-age 
generation of Muslim brothers cooperated with other activists from various ideological 
backgrounds and developed a new democratic view toward other political forces which was 
clear in the electoral programme of the group in the 2000 election (Ouda & et al, 2001). 
Rutherford expected that “these new approaches to constitutional order have grown into 
meaningful alternatives to the declining statism of the regime”. He also added that there were 
other social and political groups which supported this set of reforms, particularly parts of the 
business community and the reformist wing of the ruling party. The hope for reform was 
reinforced by the emergence of Kefaya, Al Ghad and the reasonable gains of the opposition in 
the election. In this regard, Mubarak had opened the political sphere a little bit, so 88 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood had been elected in the parliament. Ayman Nour, a 
Middle Age politician and the leader of Al Ghad party, was running, and had actually gained 
reasonable support, against Mubarak in the first presidential election in Egyptian history in 
2005 (Radsch, 2011).  
These transformations sparked demonstrations calling for political reform. They continued 
between 2005 and 2006 and emphasized the new shift in both issues and mobilizing structure. 
The new agenda of the youth movement featured a shift from the priorities of the previous 
phase that had tended to focus on regional causes to domestic and internal grievances. The 
activism began to shift towards internal issues from 2004 and the activism launched many 
initiatives and platforms to absorb this new wave of protest. The new opportunities allowed 
for the emergence of new young leaders and stimulated the process of mobilization and 
recruitment of young ordinary people. In this regard, the young activists who participated in 
the existing mobilizing structures played an important role in the growing movement calling 
for political and constitutional reforms even though they had not yet constructed their 
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independent networks. They engaged in continuous politics through the existing organizations 
and networks that had been established by the older and seventies generations. 
 Thousands of the young ordinary people joined movements such as Kefaya and the Al Ghad 
party. Maher and Qutub emphasized (Maher, interview, 21/1/2008 & Qutub, interview, 
7/10/2010)  that the formation of Al Ghad Students Union was during this period; just before 
the elections for parliament in November 2005 and featuring a huge number of young 
ordinary people who were not mobilized before. As national attention shifted towards issues 
of political and constitutional reform, the Kefaya movement became a vocal protest actor 
during 2004-2006 to call for comprehensive political and constitutional reforms. In this regard 
Youth for Change, which was considered the youth wing of Kefaya, became exceptionally 
active during the presidential elections (Maher, interview, 21/1/2008).  
These protests, though small, attracted a great deal of national and international attention 
because they broke with many of the taboos that had characterized public life in Egypt for 
decades. The protestors staged popular demonstrations in public areas without official 
permission thereby challenging a long-standing ban on popular demonstrations outside 
university campuses. In addition to this, they raised slogans that directly attacked the 
president and the security establishment, also challenging a long-standing taboo against 
directly criticizing these ‘sovereign’ institutions. The protestors used new forms of protest 
such as candle-light vigils which helped attract attention. The role of youth was also visible 
during the demonstrations that accompanied the judges’ protests in the spring of 2006. Judges 
who had exposed instances of election fraud during the 1110 parliamentary election were 
referred to a disciplinary committee by the High Council of the Judiciary. In response, the 
Judges Club of Egypt held a sit-in, and various parties and movements staged demonstrations 
in solidarity with the judges’ sit-in. Youth from movements such as Kefaya and the Muslim 
Brotherhood were highly visible during these protests. The regime reacted strongly to such 
activism, and hundreds of activists from the Brotherhood and Kefaya were arrested and 
detained for several months (Shehata; 2008, p. 5). Following the 2005 elections and the end of 
the wave of political reform protests, the regime began to tighten its grip on power and 
resorted to methods of coercion. The political movements lost the momentum and the 
presence of political issues associated with the parliament, parties and reforms and the 
judiciary system judges retreated from the political discourse.  Some activists expressed their 
disappointment which forced large groups in the different networks and affiliations to quit 
and withdraw as a result of the growing repression and the U.S. retreat from supporting the 
democratic cause (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). 
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The regime cracked down on this wave of political reform movement and launched a backlash 
against Kefaya and MB and jailed Ayman Nour (Radsch, 2011). This coincided with the 
decline in the United States policy of democratization in Egypt and the Middle East after the 
victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in 2006 and the achievement of the Brotherhood 
in the 2005 Egyptian elections. The U.S. policy witnessed a shift to focus on the formal and 
informal support to the civil society association rather than directly putting pressure on the 
regime. The U.S. administration's policy tended to focus on the spread of the liberal principles 
and encouraging the youth associations. 
Social protest phase and the revival of youth activism 2007-2009 
The high level of grievances became more visible and intense and the structural strains 
triggered a new wave of social protests which were encompassed by the revival of youth 
activism as a response to the social protest wave and failure of political mobility led by the 
1970s generation. In this respect the economic and social crises which deepened in 2007-2008 
triggered a yet another wave of political unrest and protestations.  
After the repression of the political movements in 2006-2007, the Egyptian context was 
marked by an eruption in the economic and social protests as a result of the neoliberal policies 
and corruption. Egyptian workers played an important part in bringing down the regime of 
Hosni Mubarak. They not only had a substantial presence in the mass demonstrations in 
Egypt but also played a major role in delegitimizing the regime in the eyes of many Egyptian 
and popularizing a culture of protest long before the mass demonstrations that led to the 
ousting of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 (Beinin, 2012 p. 3). Although they received far 
less attention than middle-class pro-democracy movements like Kefaya, workers were by far 
the largest component of the burgeoning culture of protest of the 2000s that undermined the 
legitimacy of the Mubarak regime (Beinin, 2012, p. 5). 
As stated before, the mandate of “the government of businessmen” led by Nazif was to 
accelerate the neoliberal transformation of the economy and the sell-off of the public sector. 
The predominance of market oriented policies and the relationship between power and 
wealth, in addition to high levels of grievance, stimulated this wave of protestation, especially 
after the citizens began to realize that this new relationship between money and politics 
damaged the notion of public interest and spread patterns of consumer culture, and led to the 
excessive use of money in political life (Fawzy, 2010, p, 29(. 
The statistics showed that the highest estimate of the total number of labour protests from 
1988 to 1993 is 162 - an average of 27 per year. Then from 1998 to 2003 the annual average 
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for collective actions rose to 118. But in 2004 there were 265 collective actions; over 70% 
occurred after the Nazif government took office in July. The movement was initially centred 
in the textile industry, which had been targeted for privatization, but by 2007 it encompassed 
virtually every industry, public services, transport, civil servants, and professionals (Beinin, 
2012, p. 4, 5). In 2006, 2007, and March-April 2008 there was a spate of mass workers’ 
strikes in Egypt’s public and private sectors. 
Integrating social and political activism: the  April 6 strike 
This wave did not focus on political reform but raised the demands of workers, employees, 
peasants and students. The lack of effective welfare policies and the failure of the subsidy 
system created growing anger among people. Protests increased because of the crises of 
bread, clean water and gas shortages. Some of what could be called non-political protestations 
managed to achieve important concessions from the regime for the interest of its members 
such as the tax collectors and El-Mahala labour protest movement in addition to the protest 
against the establishment of the Agrium petrochemical project in 2008. The regime showed a 
flexible and tolerant policy in dealing with such protests and sought deals through negotiation 
and compromise, fearing a public explosion which would be difficult to control or oppress 
without paying a high cost. It is worth noting that until 2011 only a small minority of workers 
advanced democratization as a strategic objective. Striking or protesting workers commonly 
sought to factional interests rather than openly contest the regime’s power. The regime drew a 
red line at linking local grievances and national policy and temporarily succeeded in 
maintaining this position (Beinin, 2012, p. 6). 
Indeed, the  positive response of the government to these protest actions and the relative 
success of this strategy tempted many groups of young activism to call for a general strike on 
the 6
th
 April 2008, which was the real beginning and foundation of April 6 Youth Movement.  
The April 2008 spate of mass workers’ strikes in, particular among the textile workers of El-
Mahalla al-Kubra, was described as the most effectively organized activism in the nation’s 
history since World War II (Beinin & Hossam el-Hamalawy, 2007; Bayat, 2009, p. 9). The 
striking thing about this strike was the cooperation among workers and youth activists which 
led to its success. Among the most prominent elements of the political opportunity this time 
was the availability of new media and modern communication technologies such as blogs, 
Facebook and Twitter along with multiple news websites which allowed the activists to post 
their comments about news and events on websites like Masrawy, the Seventh Day and Islam-
Online. The activists began to use these methods to preach large-scale strikes for the 6th of 
April. They formed the 6th of April group on Facebook shortly before the events.  
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Indeed, there was not any particular group or movement adopting this call for a strike; the 
matter was an initiative of the labour movement in the city of El-Mahalla Al-Kubra in Delta 
Egypt. This call for a strike became a key issue in the public sphere and grabbed the activists’ 
attention to support it in spite of the absence of any political organization to coordinate or 
organize this strike. Compared with 25 January 2011, we should take into account that the 
labour movement was encouraged and supported by political and youth activists who 
perceived the protest as an opportunity to challenge the regime while the call for 25
th 
January 
came as an initiative from youth activists on Facebook. 
The prominence of youth activism and political protest 2010-2011: 
The regime repression against the political groups and movements such as the Muslim 
brothers, Kefaya and the independent judges made it very difficult to identify an actual 
pathway to political reform as the regime seemed to be impervious to change. Mubarak had 
proven adaptable to both internal and external pressures, not brittle and vulnerable to political 
challenges. However, new developments emerged with the potential to affect Egypt’s political 
trajectory dramatically; some of them connecting to the preparation for parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2010-2011, with others relating to the growing influence of social 
media and youth activism.  
There were plenty of prominent events that enabled activists to gain momentum in 2010, the 
most important of which were the return of Mohammed ElBaradei and the launching of 
Khalid Saeed’s Facebook page in addition to the rigged parliamentary election. They created 
a new wave of contentious politics and increased the political awareness of younger 
generations which engaged in politics seeking for change. One prominent activist (Moataz 
Adel, Interview, 3/2/ 2012) confirmed that this was a new beginning of coordination and 
cooperation between the old and new networks. They joined hands and coordinated their 
activities in the real world, even though this new type of coordination and leadership began to 
emerge through Facebook particularly via the Khalid Saeed page. 
ElBaradei Presidential Campaign that was formed after his return to Egypt in February 2010 
got a lot of support from thousands of young ordinary people and political groups which 
cooperated under the umbrella of a new cross-ideological body called the National 
Association For Change, “which along with his tantalizing public statements, only amplified 
the ElBaradei phenomenon” (Cook, March 26, 2010). By late February, Egyptian bloggers 
and journalists were reporting that one thousand people were joining ElBaradei’s Facebook 
page every ten minutes (Cook, March 26, 2010). 
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Media coverage contributed to ElBaradei’s apparent popularity and to the anticipation over 
his next moves. In a sign of his evident prestige, street art celebrating ElBaradei began to 
appear in Cairo. To be sure, the number of “friends” on a Facebook page is a crude 
measurement of actual or potential power in Egypt’s highly circumscribed political 
environment (Cook, March 26, 2010).  
ElBaradei Presidential Campaign reached out to a new segment of young ordinary people 
who either joined the new networks or the existing ones, like April 6 youth movement, which 
supported the campaign even though it was keen to keep its independent organization and 
original identity. A similar trend took place with members of the new political parties like the 
Democratic Front Party that joined ElBaradei's campaign without leaving the party. Indeed 
these major events created a new wave of activism and did not diminish the old networks. 
However, the new wave and its new networks gained the momentum and media attention. 
Adel argued that “events created a new atmosphere that attracted the marginalized young 
people to the political arena, while the professional and older activists continued in their 
networks” (Moataz Adel, Interview, 3/2/ 2012). 
After the fraud and rigging of the parliamentary elections in November 2010, it became clear 
that there was no hope for political reform through election strategies. The young activists 
increased the level of cooperation among themselves, blending internet activism with the 
more important strategy of drawing scared and complacent people into the streets. April 6 
Movement set up branches and staged quick-hit acts of street protest such as spray-painting 
"The regime is over" on city walls. Copycat movements began and in the early weeks of 
2011, the rebellion was born. April 6, along with other groups, were in the forefront of the 
uprising (Fleishman, 2011).  
The youth activists and Facebook pages picked January 25, 2011, the “Police Day”, as their 
new date for protest. Shawky, a prominent activist from April 6, stressed that “the Tunisian 
revolution stimulated their energy and created a militant sense and new hope for change 
among the younger generation” (Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012).  Beside the public calls and 
activities, there were secret meetings for the preparation to avoid the security pressure. 
Shawky refers to a big shift in their methods of protest during their meetings as they decided 
to begin a sudden march in a new tactic instead of announcing the place of the demonstration 
on Facebook. They realized the importance of keeping the place secret till the last minute and 
on the 25
th
 all groups gathered in a specific place then moved to the secret site of 
demonstration to take the police security by surprise. Maher confirmed that the activists 
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sought to “overcome the methods that the state security services always use to pre-empt 
demonstrations and protests” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012) 
5.3 The Formal Structures and Corporatist Arrangements 
 One can legitimately ask; where were the formal or official youth unions during the period of 
intensive protest? Why were they unable to capture and express the grievances of youth? One 
can legitimately argue that the inefficiency of the formal student organizations, legally 
established during the Nasser era, and their failure to meet the demands of young people 
triggered the longest wave of student mobilization from 2000-2010. It has become obvious 
that the corporatist structures were not able to include or integrate students into the political 
regime. In such a context, the youth activists began to establish their own organizations and 
networks outside the pre-existing political structures either of the ruling party (NPD) or 
opposition parties. The dilemma of student representation deepened because of the 
competition between the student unions officially recognized by the state and the student 
activism networks such as the Free Student Union and other student clubs that did not enjoy 
any legal recognition. There is no doubt that this dilemma cannot be understood and analyzed 
without examining the crisis of student unions and the poor representation of the students. 
They ended up unable to carry out their functions, became decorative structures, and ceased to 
be expressive and clear about the needs of students and their aspirations.  
As stated before, the research sets out more specifically the structures of formal student and 
youth organizations under Nasser and how they evolved under Sadat. 1967 was a turning 
point when youth and students took advantage of the opportunity presented by the war and 
political mobility in the 1970s to be more active. This led to greater Leftist and Muslim 
Brothers influence in the universities which led in turn to the 1979 clampdown. Thereafter the 
formal students’ organizations were tightly controlled through a number of mechanisms: 
a) Infiltration by the National Democratic Party and rigging of elections to assure their 
dominance. 
b) Subordination to university authorities 
c) Legal constraints on their establishments and what they may or may not be allowed to 
do 
d) The establishment of university guards 
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The student institutional arrangements: Historical background 
There was a complicated relationship between the student movement and official student 
unions in modern Egypt. This relationship used to have different shapes; the official student 
unions were supposed to reflect and contain the student movement, otherwise clashes and 
disputes would emerge around the issue of representation and legitimacy. When both sides 
failed to build a kind of cooperation and mutual recognition, the student movements were 
obliged to use informal channels and networks which were considered illegal by the regime 
and formal unions. 
In democratic regimes, the student unions and clubs aimed to increase and develop the 
political participation and improve the socialization process. The educational systems in 
democratic frameworks expand the scope of a wide range of activities and accept the 
composing of all types of student organizations and clubs as long as they respect the code of 
conduct. Moreover, elections and performances are characterized by transparency, fair and 
free voting and the open exchange of ideas and criticism. This process gradually develops to 
become a model for the initial formation of positive participation among young people (Al-
Khamisi, 1988, p. 668).    
In the Egyptian context it is worth noting that the student movement has always been at the 
forefront of the pro-democracy movement within the universities and was always linked to 
the issue of democracy in the country as a whole (Abdullah, 1991, p. 13). In specific periods, 
such as the mid-seventies, there were vibrant and energetic Leftist, Nasserist, Islamist student 
movements which, through free elections, were represented in the official students unions and 
the Republic Student Union which comprised of five members elected from the 
representatives of student unions of all universities (Al-Khamisi, 1988, p. 668).  In fact, the 
historical experience suggests that the emergence and development of the student movement 
became most prominent at the national level in two cases: First, when the cause of 
independence and the national feelings became the central issue in political life to be the 
subject of a strong national consensus like the period before independence in the 1940s and 
after the 1967 defeat, in the second case, when the political parties were absent or weak, then 
the student movements became the national political groups that reflected the hopes and goals 
not only for students but for the whole of society (Abdullah, 1991, 14). The Egyptian 
experience also showed that when the student movements, as a social movement, got involved 
in contentious politics, they used to take an opposition position toward the regime and 
interacted with, and were influenced by political forces outside the universities. Depending on 
the strength of the student movement and the different wings inside, the regime devised its 
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own strategy ranging from containment, manipulation, repression and exclusion (NCSCR, 
1983, pp. 153-154). In other words, the effectiveness of student activism was associated with 
the social and political context; the more an atmosphere of freedom increased, the livelier 
were the student activities and initiatives.  It is worth noting that low level of student activism 
may exist during period of repression such as the 1990s it but did not get momentum unless 
new opportunities emerge such as the Palestine uprising in 2000. Moreover, the Egyptian 
youth movement has always represented one of the main sources of the formation and the 
recruitment of the political elite, along with their interest in raising the political awareness 
among students by focusing on the call for participation and democracy, without ignoring 
their role in providing services which benefit all students.  Not only did the role of unions and 
student movements contribute to the process of political socialization and participation but 
also they were essential institution for the formation and the recruitment of political elites and 
the making of political leaders. These prominent roles under the colonial rule prompted 
Walter Laqueur (1956) to state that, “history does not know that the community students play 
in a leading role, as happened in Egypt”. Indeed, students have been among the most 
politically mobilized groups in Egyptian politics for much of the 20
th
 century and into the 21
st
. 
This can be demonstrated by a brief examination of the political role of youth activism. 
The legal frameworks and regulations (1979 bill) constraints and restrictions:  
The legacy of Nasser’s corporatist and hegemonic state continued to influence and govern the 
legal frameworks and student unions for a long time. The General Federation of Arab 
Republic of Students emerged in 1960 as an entity connecting to the Union of Socialist Youth 
Organizations and became the only formal student union in Egypt. However, in the wake of 
the massive student demonstrations in September 1968, the regime allowed in a more open 
regulation the formation of the “Political Committee” as one of the four core committees in 
the formal student unions
40
. In 1971 under continuing of student pressure, the regime 
abolished the system which allowed university administrations oversight of the activities of 
student unions, and established the “University Guards”. The approval of the security services 
was a prerequisite for candidates in student elections (NCSCR, 1983, p. 158). The 1979 
regulations came after the intensification of tension between Sadat and the student movements 
as the Leftist and Islamist activists won the student election and controlled the formal student 
unions. The leaders of student unions in 1977 - such as Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh and 
                                                     
40 Four committees were: Cultural, Social, Scouts, Sports committees 
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Hamdeen Sabahi
41
- challenged the president in some public meetings and criticized his 
internal policies. Thus the regime issued a bill on June 19
th
 1979, Decree No. 265 which 
cancelled the previous bill No. 235 of 1976. This bill contained the regulations for the Law of 
the Organization of Universities entitled "student unions" and its main articles empowered the 
state role played by administration and security services over the student unions as follows: 
- Banning of political organizations: It stated that "No creation of organizations or 
formations of organizations on the social, political, ideological bases in the 
universities”. 
- Abolishing the “Political Committee” of the student unions. 
- Imposing restrictions on the conditions for nomination: Article 34 stated that "The 
person who stands for the nomination to the membership of the union’s committees 
and boards must achieve certain conditions such as to enjoy good reputation and 
moral character, not have previously been given a custodial sentence for freedom, and 
not been dropped or suspended by student unions or committees". These restrictions 
gave legal justifications for the write-off and expulsion of any candidate from the 
competition in elections. 
- Imposing penalties in article 39 on the member of the union who violates the rules 
governing student unions or prejudices to the union's reputation or harms the interests 
or loses terms of ethics and good reputation, including cessation of membership of the 
union for a maximum of two months".  
It is worth noting that some of the words were stretched to justify punishment and then 
expulsion. The 1979 bill continued to be in force during the whole Mubarak reign, allowing 
the university administration and security services to intervene directly or indirectly in student 
elections by vetting candidates, creating the special security unit known as the “University 
Guard” and prohibiting political parties from operating inside university campuses (Eissa 
Mohamed, 2008, p. 37). 
The governmental bodies responsible for youth and students: 
The whole institutions in the field of youth and students witnessed dramatic changes and 
fluctuations over time. In 1999 the Supreme Council for Youth and Sports (El-Maglis El-Alla 
                                                     
41 Both have become after more than thirty years  prominent candidates for the first presidential election after 
toppling Mubarak in 2012 
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Le-Shabab Wa Riada), which was established in 1979, was demolished when the Ministry of 
Youth was established. The latter was dissolved in 2005 when two national councils were 
established: one for youth and the other for sport. Due to the failures of, and instability in, the 
youth policy, in December 2005, the Ministry of Youth and Sport was abolished and the 
National Council for Youth was established (ESIS, Year Book 2006).  
Furthermore, there was instability in laws and bills; Mosa’ad Ewies, a former official in the 
youth sector told the researcher that, “every minister changes the former bill and creates a 
new one; the same minister may change the bill many times” (Ewies, Interview, 2/10/2010). 
For example, there were more than ten modifications in the bill of youth centres in less than 
ten years. It was obvious that there were many authorities and actors responsible for devising 
and implementing youth policy, but the more important ones were the following: the National 
Council for Youth (Almaglis Alqaumy Leshabab) and the National Council for Sports 
(Almaglis Alqaumy Le-Riada) (ElSheikh, Interview, 8/4 2008).  
On the other hand, some contradictions took place between these bodies particularly between 
NCY and the Ministry of Higher Education as youth in universities represents 25% of the 18-
24 year-old age group. Both bodies have cross-sectional policies and provided similar 
services that include social and sport activities. The formal student organizations in 
universities consist of “Student Unions” and “Societies” (El Ossar) which could be seen as 
youth clubs. While the student union should be elected, the societies (El Ossar) need to be 
formed by the students themselves and registered in the official records after taking the 
administration’s permission. Further political education for students used to be launched by 
the Leaders Preparation Institute (LPI) (Ma’ahad Edaad El-Qada) in Helwan which is 
affiliated to the Higher Education Ministry (Shura Council, 2000, pp. 98-100). 
The National Democratic Party (NDP) and Students activities 
The relative autonomy of official student unions rapidly deteriorated because of the restraints 
imposed on the election and nomination process which prevented young activists from 
contesting. Whereas in previous decades, student unions had played a central role in leading 
student activism, such a role was declining during the last wave of youth activism. The 
student unions “which had been dominated by pro-regime activists for most of the 1990s had 
become largely ineffective and de-linked from student activism” (Shehata; 2008, p. 7). The 
activists and experts were keen to confirm that the “student unions came under the control and 
censorship of professors and senior administrators who support the NDP or have hidden ties 
with security services. And their activities became under the observation and guardianship of 
the older generation” (El Mekawy, Interview, 20/10/2010 & Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008).  
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On the other hand, the regime attempted to create its own loyal networks of young people 
through preparation courses and education in the Leadership Development Institute or the 
National Council of Youth. These students would compose later the leaderships of the official 
student unions which came under the regime’s guardianship.  
Lutfi and Al Gaaly argued that “NDP’s students, backed by the administration and security 
service, dominated the student unions since 1995 after defeating the Muslim Brothers students 
wing in rigged elections” (Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008 & Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008). This 
could be seen as part of the deliberalization process which began in the mid-1990s as stated in 
Chapter three. It is worth noting that the students who dominated the unions belonged to the 
NDP directly or indirectly but what united them was the abandonment of political and social 
protest as a strategy to get youth rights. In an official course for young leaders of student 
unions at the Institute of Leadership Development, most of the attendants were members of 
the NDP with just one representing an opposition party (Fatima Ahmed, Interview, 
5/10/2010) 
It could be argued that there was a strategy adopted by the NDP based on the hidden 
politicization as a way to reject other political groups’ existence in the universities. 
Nevertheless various indicators pointed to the overlap between the NDP and universities; a 
luxury building for the “Future Generation Foundation” headed by Gamal Mubarak, Assistant 
Secretary-General of the NDP and secretary of the Policy Committee was located in Cairo 
University(Ikhwanonline, 15/10/2006). Gamal Mubarak formed the FGF in November 1998 
as an NGO focusing on executive leadership training and human resource development 
(Crisis Group, 2003, p. 11). In this regard, most of the deans of faculties and presidents of 
universities were members of the NDP, they took advantage of their informal networks to 
expand the base of loyal students to the party (Ikhwanonline, 15/10/2006). In addition to this, 
the leaders of student unions were attending the activities and courses organized by the NCY 
as many of the lecturers belonged to the NDP (Fatima Ahmed, Interview, 5/10/2010). It is 
striking that the NDP was inspired by the pioneering or Avant-garde Organization (Altanzeem 
Alta’aly) and Youth Organizations in the 1960s as a number of their prominent members such 
as Muffled Shehab and Ali Eddin Hilal were part of these organizations. However, there was 
a remarkable concern over repeating the experience of another student group called "Horus" 
created by the government in the 1990s to compete with opposition because it raised 
controversy around acts of violation of the moral code during the cross-gender flights 
(Ghannam, 12/12/2006). 
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The dysfunction of the government-sponsored student unions: 
The statistics and polls since 2000 illustrated that there were aspirations and desires among 
large sectors of young people to participate and engage in political activities, but they were 
faced by the lack of mechanisms to accommodate these desires, in addition to the lack of trust 
in the formal institutions. On the other hand, the political culture among the older generation 
was keen to avoid politics and rejected the participation of youth in the political process. A 
survey showed that 61% of the students of Cairo University believed that the best way to help 
young people to take an active role in society is the opportunity for effective participation in 
student clubs and unions, followed by political and cultural groups with 16%, and political 
parties with 14%. They were also interested in public affairs and roles in the government and 
parliaments (Tohami, Youth and Politics, 2002, p. 96). This means that there was a high level 
of aspiration to participate but the lack of trust in participation channels led to apathy and 
alienation.  
There were various indicators that the regime considered students as a threat and a source of 
problems, also showing the failure of official student unions as representatives of students and 
young people: 
The actual forms of participation in the student activities and associations critically dropped 
as there were only 10% of students engaged in student union activities in spite of the previous 
poll that showed a high desire for participation.  According to the Al-Ahram survey (2004) 
conducted on a national sample of youth (ages 15-24), 56% of the sample had never 
participated in student union elections, 67% had never participated in any student activities 
and 84% had never participated in a public protest or demonstration.  Older study found that 
80% of students did not participate in the 1990 and 1995 parliamentary elections (Tohami, 
2002). Ordinary students mentioned many reasons for non-participation in the student unions’ 
elections and activities such as the lack of time due to the term system and the load of study, 
but also that the unions did not reflect their demands and interests and they felt they were 
useless 
 
(Abu Yousef, 2001, pp. 84,85).  
From the activists view, the student unions did not perform their basic functions with the 
exception of some leisure activities and trips. They did not play a real role in the field of 
providing services and protection of the rights of students, thus opening the door for 
alternative student activism to emerge.  It is also worth noting the absence of the role of 
student unions in national and public issues like promoting democratic, developmental and 
economic reform. This absence extended to student issues as they no longer had a voice in the 
reform of the educational process or the Higher Education Act, or the 1979 bill which most 
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young activists were seeking to change. The student unions no longer provided political 
leaders compared with the role played by their counterparts in the 1970s, where the leaders of 
the student unions became the leaders of political movements in the following years. It is hard 
to recognize any young leader in the government or the parliament who have had the 
experience of leading student unions in the 1990s and 2000s (Tohami, 2002).  
Perhaps the most striking thing in common among those students, who control most of the 
student unions, was their distancing themselves from political action and protest. The author’s 
interviews with the activists showed that they had negative feelings toward the role of the 
student unions. One activist pointed out that, “students joined the student union because of 
their relationship with professors to take the advantage of the benefits and services associated 
with the union” (Al Sawy, Interview, 1/10/2010). “The unions became affiliated to the 
government and under the full control of the NDP and opportunists students” (Al Gaaly, 
Interview
, 
8/1/2008). “The unions were just applauding formal decisions and decorative 
bodies” (Hameed, Interview, 4/1/2008). 
Authoritarian election and violence 
The universities which were the main venue for youth activism in the 1970s and 1980s 
suffered from intense formal and informal restrictions. Since the mid-1990s, the regimes had 
imposed heavy restrictions on activism inside university campuses. There were various 
indicators that most of the student representatives in official student unions were not elected 
in a real competitive election, but that they were appointed by the government after the 
expulsion of rival candidates from election lists. Preventing free competition in elections 
began by disqualifying the students of the Muslim Brothers, then expanded later to include all 
other candidates and activists with the exception of the NDP. The Administrative Court 
approved the student's right to take an action against the university administration even if they 
have not reached the legal age to sue due to expulsion (Al Ahram 12/9/2002). 
The tension became severe as a result of the escalation of polarization between the leaders of 
the formal student unions backed by universities administrations on one side and political 
activists and opposition on the other side. The tension and violence between the two sides 
reached a critical stage after the use of violence and thugs from within the Ain-Shams, Al 
Azhar and other universities between 2006-2010 in an attempt from NDP student unions to 
prevent the formation of free association and the political activism. The Muslim Brothers 
students at Al Azhar university received severe criticism in 2006 after introducing a “combat 
show” and dressing in black like Hamas fighters which the media called a military and 
militias show while MB’s activists argued that, “it was a symbolic act of protest to express 
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their suffering from the repression they have faced for several years” (Lutfi and Al Gaaly, 
2008).  
In an investigation report about the tension in the university, conducted by Al Ahram 
(19/12/2006, p. 3), it concluded that students indicated that, “everything that happens is the 
result of the absence of the role of the university and the mistakes of the management and 
mistreatment of students".  Al Azhar university chairman publicly condemned the students 
participating in these events and stated that the university was banning them from nomination 
and removing their names from the election list, as he added that, “the university 
administration did not allow these students to the hijack the student unions, and did not allow 
them to enter the elections, and to speak on behalf of Al-Azhar (Al-Ahram, 19/12/2006, p. 9). 
This declaration reflects the strategy used by the government and chairmen of universities and 
the security services to exclude the activists.  
In this regard the last wave of young activism which included activists from groups such as 
Kefaya, Al Ghad and April 6 extended their networks inside the universities campuses but 
they faced similar constraints and repression. It is worth noting that this wave of youth 
activism (2000-2011) occurred largely outside university campuses and then attempted to 
penetrate the campuses. However as a result of the strict constraints imposed by the regime on 
political activism inside university campuses, youth activism within university campuses was 
limited and fluctuated over time. And even though students continued to stage some 
demonstrations inside university campuses, the most significant protest events staged by 
youth since 2000 occurred outside university campuses (Shehata; 2008, p. 7). 
The deficit of the budget: 
The budget of the student unions permitted for activities was modest compared with the 
number of students. It was only 8 million Egyptian pounds during the academic year 
2005/2006, and increased to 32 million during 2006/2007 as a result of increasing tension and 
violence in the universities (Al-Ahram, 24/12/2006, p. 3). There is no doubt that the amount 
of 8 million pounds means that the amount allocated to activities decreased by a third 
compared to what it was three years before. For example, in the academic year 2002/2003 the 
Ministry of Higher Education had allocated 12 million Egyptian pounds for the activities of 
students in universities and institutes affiliated to it; the Ministry indicated that the money had 
been distributed to universities on the basis of the number of students enrolled in each 
university (Habib, Al-Ahram, 17/11/2002). 
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Table (12): The student unions budgets in the universities (2002/2003) (Habib, Al Ahram, 
17/11/2002).  
University  Budget (Thousand Egyptian pounds) 
 
Cairo 1169 
Alexandria 663 
Ain Shams 975 
Assiut 371 
Tanta 623 
Mansoura 600 
Zagazig 911 
Helwan 547 
Minya 220 
Menoufiya 395 
Suez Canal 264 
South Valley 260 
 
Due to such a small budget, it was impossible to cover the whole number of students who 
desire to participate and benefit from the students unions. This led to a decrease in the 
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numbers of students who participated in student union activities to only 10% of the total 
number of students in the universities. It is worth noting that the rate of 10% of students 
involved in such activities did not reflect the student activism or express the numbers of 
students interested in public activities. The goals of this 10% of participants differed as some 
of them might be obliged to attend some lectures or activities to get free meals or T-shirts 
(Fatima Ahmed, Interview, 2008). 
It is also worth noting that the budget of both the NCY and the NCS in the year 2007/2008 
reached 442 and 392 million Egyptian pounds respectively. This means that the total budget 
for youth and sport is 814 million, about 35 Egyptian Pounds per young person per year 
(equivalent to 4 euro) (Tohami, 2009, p. 22). 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the development of the different waves of student and youth 
activism which could be dated back to 2000 until 2010 as both student movements in the 
universities and youth activism outside universities sparked one of the longest waves of 
mobilization in modern Egyptian history.  
This chapter showed that the outbreak of the intifada in Sep/Oct. 2000 was a turning point in 
the Egyptian youth movement. The Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the implication of the 
Intifada on youth mobilization turned youth activists against the regime, criticizing it for its 
failure and its ineffectiveness. Activism began to shift towards internal issues and various 
initiatives and platforms were launched to push this wave of protest. By 2004 the opportune 
context stimulated veteran activists who developed their mobilizing structures during the 
previous cycle of protestation and initiated the new pro-democracy protest movement. The 
high levels of grievances became visible and intense since 2007 and the structural strains 
triggered a new wave of social protest. The regime’s positive response to social and labour 
protests and their relative success tempted youth activism to create links between social and 
political  agendas through a call for a general strike on the sixth of April 2008, which was the 
real beginning and foundation of the April 6 youth movement. There were plenty of 
prominent events that enabled activists to gain momentum in 2010; the most important were 
the return of ElBaradei and the launching of the Khalid Saeed Facebook page in addition to 
the rigged parliamentary election. 
On the other hand, this chapter also discussed the role of the formal and official youth 
structures during the period of intensive protest and analyzed the reasons behind their failure 
to capture and express the grievances of youth.  It illustrated the inefficiency of the formal 
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student organizations, legally established during the Nasser era, and their failure to meet the 
demands of young people. It has become obvious that the corporatist structures were not able 
to include or integrate students into the political regime. They ended up unable to carry out 
their functions, became decorative structures, and ceased to be expressive and clear about the 
needs of students and their aspirations. The autonomy of the official student unions was very 
weak because of the nature of elections and the nomination process which prevented young 
activists from contesting according to the 1979 bill.  
In such a context, the youth activists began to establish their own organizations and networks 
outside the pre-existing political structures either of the ruling party (NPD) or formal 
opposition parties. This opened the door for alternative student activism and networks to 
emerge and develop. Activists responded by establishing parallel institutions and new student 
movements replaced the student unions and traditional political parties which had come under 
the full control of the regime.  The dilemma of student representation deepened because of the 
competition between the student unions officially recognized by the state and the student 
activism networks such as the Free Student Union and other student clubs that did not enjoy 
any legal recognition.  
The following two chapters focus on two case studies of youth and student activism in Egypt; 
one from the student movements and the other from youth activism outside campuses. 
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Chapter Six:  
Strategic Choices, Organization, Framing and Mobilizations: Case 
Study Of The Student Activism 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The formal structures and official corporatist arrangements which the regime tightly 
controlled were unable to capture or express mobilisation and new formats for activism 
outside of organised structures began to emerge. As stated in the previous chapters, the 
political opportunities structure 2000-2010 associated with different waves of youth activism 
in response to external and internal factors which motivated ordinary students to engage in 
large numbers with contentious politics, albeit beyond traditional student unions and political 
parties. This chapter addresses the student movements’ strategies in dealing with these new 
political opportunities and the internal mechanisms of the youth activism as well as the 
framing process adopted to construct their collective identities focusing on their orientation, 
values and ideologies. 
Chapter six highlights the development and profiles of student movements and networks in 
Egyptian universities in the first decade of the twenty-first century. As stated before, the 
thesis adopts a wide definition of youth activism to include various categories of youth and 
student activism particularly “student movements” and “youth chapters” of political parties 
and social forces. Apart from the National Democratic Party (NDP) students, all other 
students’ movements became active in spite of the governmental procedures to formally 
prevent them and the exposure of many to the prosecutions and harassment.  This chapter 
identifies the types of politically-oriented student movements as follows:   at the top of the list 
come the movements associated with the Muslim Brothers student wing. Second, are 
movements associated with protest-oriented parties and networks that were active within the 
student context such as Al-Ghad, the Revolutionary Socialists, and the Labour Party (Al-
Amal party). The third category constitutes those student activists associated with opposition 
parties which could be described as less active within the student environment, particularly 
the Tajamu and Wafd parties. The Nasserist student activism stands in between those two 
categories to be distributed between the Nasserist Party and Karamah Party. Before 
addressing these student networks and movements, this chapter explores the main strategies 
and characteristics of student activism in the Egyptian universities (2000-2010). 
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It is worth noting that this chapter is based on fieldwork research to collect data about youth 
activism in the Egyptian universities. The evidence has been collected from the activists 
themselves during the data collection period through semi-structured interviews, as described 
in chapter two. 
6.2   The Strategies of Student Movements 
Although it has resulted in the case of the political movement in Egypt in 2004-2006 and 
possibly since the October 2000, the youth activism regained their vitality and relative 
recovery.  They developed and responded to the political opportunity structure by developing 
strategies that focused on protest-based activities, cooperation across ideological lines and 
connecting with outside campus movements.  
Between election and protest 
The new youth activism abandoned the strategy of participation in the formal façade 
corporatist arrangements of the student unions and focused on protest activities. They gave up 
their efforts to be represented through election in the formal student unions and have been 
more concerned with and involve in contentious politics through the prism of social and 
protest movements. 
The interviews with, and active observation, large segments of activists demonstrated that a 
considerable percentage of political activists have never voted in any elections, parliamentary 
or otherwise, including the last presidential elections after the revolution. In fact the Nasserist 
and Socialist activists used to deliberately boycott all sorts of elections including the student 
union elections. However, the attitudes toward the student elections varied depending upon 
the circumstances of the relevant movement. In this respect the Muslim Brothers’ student 
wing used to have a clear-cut strategy that they have to take part in any elections unless they 
have been formally excluded from nomination, in which case they declared a boycott of the 
elections. On the other hand, the Nasserists and Socialists always boycotted the elections. As 
for other formal parties such as Al-Wafd, Al-Ghad, Al-Amal (Labour), and the Independent 
groups, they usually took part as long as they had qualified members or supporting loyal 
candidates.  One striking development was the participation of the Socialists in the voting 
process to form the informal Free Student Union in 2006/2007. 
From the foregoing it could be argued that elections were not the only political concern for 
political activists.  Yet, whether or not a specific organization would take part in the elections 
depended upon the circumstances surrounding the elections; such as fairness of the elections 
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and the availability of a suitable candidate to be supported.  But for the majority of political 
activists nonetheless, organizing demonstrations and protests remain the most important 
activities.  In this regard all the interviewees except one female student, who was an ex-
member of the formal student union, took part in protests of varying intensity. 
Cooperation across ideological divides (The Free Student Union) 
The activists who formed these groups tried to cooperate with each other and developed 
common positions. Consequently they announced the formation of what is known as the “Free 
Student Union” (Etihad E-Talaba Elhor) in 2006/2007, which was elected on an informal 
basis as a parallel body to represent the students and as an alternative to the formal student 
union. The FSU engaged in student services and some students became official spokespeople 
on its behalf such as Al Gaaly and Kholoud Barakat. 
In other words while the student unions were under the pressure of official restrictions, the 
activists exerted tireless efforts to establish themselves through parallel institutions such as 
the FSU and other informal groups. The dilemma of student representation emerged as there 
were student unions formally recognized by the state, but there was also the Free Student 
Union which did not have legal legitimacy.  
The FSU represented a kind of youth-led initiative. One activist on the MB’s young wing 
argued that “while the idea emerged in 1996, it was not implemented until 2005 due to the 
political openings climate in 2004-2005” (Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008).  The initiative 
represented a symbolic response and reaction from the students prevented from being 
nominated to student elections. The formation of the Free Union came after conducting non-
formal elections in 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 under the supervision of an independent 
Professors’ Club and human rights organization. Although the educational administration 
sharply rejected these elections and considered them illegal, thousands of youths participated 
in the election in 7 universities in 2005/2006 and 14 universities in 2006/2007. According to a 
Leftist activist young woman, “the main goals of the FSU were to declare a protesting 
message against the authorities and to present good services to the students” (Kholoud Saber, 
Interview, 10/2/2008). There were two kinds of activities: firstly, student activities that serve 
students in cultural, sports and social fields and secondly, those supporting political reform 
inside universities and society. 
When political movements come together for a common cause such as the FSU they become 
increasingly powerful to attract students for voting, and they did an effective job, as thousands 
of students were nominated in the FSU elections and tens of thousands took part in the voting 
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process. Problems start when the student movements suffer from self-degeneration and 
infighting breaks out, and the movements lose the sense of unity with regard to the student 
causes in favour of political interests and ideologies.  The fact that the Muslim Brothers were 
the main players in the student movement was a point of weakness.  The government took 
advantage of that point to portray the students as being controlled by the Muslim Brothers. 
Lutfi pointed out that, “at the announcement of the FSU they had to face harsh responses from 
the student union and the security forces”( Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008).   
Under such circumstances cooperation between political forces becomes inevitable to 
overcome the state of weakness (Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008).  So when these student 
networks, with the exception of the Muslim Brothers, came together in a demonstration 
featuring the student international day in 2005 they succeeded in rallying 200 students 
according to an activist from Al Ghad. He also stated that Al Ghad youth, on the other hand, 
had succeeded in rallying more than hundreds students in the student international day 
demonstrations in 2006 (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). 
Multiplicity and diversity 
The diversity of experiments associated with student activism that dealt with youth affairs 
since 2000 could be an indication of the excessive vitality and activity that characterise the 
“Millennium Generation”.  Some of those experiments could be described as brand new, 
while others could be described as old and new at the same time.  In other words the old 
movement could be rejuvenated with a new spirit in terms of either fashion or theme or 
probably the two together. However, the most famous student movements and organizations 
that emerged included the “Future Generation Foundation”, which had been linked to the 
NDP. This movement more or less became active among government-sponsored student 
unions, something which has been discussed previously.   Yet, in this current study the author 
will focus on student movements, which are most likely opposition-oriented such as Al Ghad 
movement, Kefaya movement, the Nasserist movement, the Socialist movement, the Labour 
Party and the Muslim Brothers.  But, nonetheless, other movements exist which did not have 
direct links with political activities before the January 25
th
 revolution such as the Amr Khalid 
and Salafi networks and the Coptic activists who performed their activities either under the 
auspices and care of the youth episcopate of the Coptic Church or independently.     
It could be argued that while the Muslim Brother movement has been stable and sustainable 
in the last three decades, other student movements, particularly the leftist and the Nasserist 
movements suffered serious setbacks in the 1990s. However, the political opportunities linked 
to the Intifada in Palestine and the invasion of Iraq, and the political demonstrations by the 
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masses that followed have reactivated the leftist networks such as the Socialists and Nasserist 
students. New movements and political forces emerged including Al Ghad, Kefaya youth, 
Youth for Change and the FSU.  
The assessment of student movement greatly varies in terms of popularity irrespective of the 
nature of activities to be performed by those movements. The MB student wing is the main 
player in the student movements. So, there was an almost general consensus among 
interviewees that the Muslim Brothers should come in first place followed by the other 
factions particularly the Revolutionary Socialists, Al Amal (Labour party), the Nasserist and 
Al Ghad. In this respect a strong rivalry existed between the MB and the NDP who controlled 
the student unions, then far behind them comes the Salafi student movement and probably the 
Coptic students (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008). Abdel Hamied, a Socialist activist believed 
that the MB could be in command of around 10% of the whole students including the 
sympathizers (Hameed, Interview 4/1/2008). Nabil argued that, “despite the fact that those 
who take part in student activities could not exceed 3% of the total figures of students but 
nonetheless the MB could be around 60% of the total participants” (Nabil, Interview, 
9/10/201). However, the new activism was so inconsistent that they could suddenly go up at 
one time and then suddenly plunge at other times. In this regard Al Ghad went up to second 
place in this balance of power during the academic year 2005/2006, but suddenly went down 
in the following academic years. With regard to the influence of youth activism according to 
different universities and faculties, it is worth noting the fact that Cairo University is at the 
top followed by Ain Shams and Al-Azhar universities respectively. Most political networks 
have representation in Cairo University with very few members which could be, at best, 
estimated in tens at some of the university faculties.  Al Gaaly assessed the activism networks 
in the Cairo University faculties as follows: the Revolutionary Socialists were active at the 
faculties of Arts, Dar Al-Uloum and Engineering, while the Al-Amal party was active at Dar-
Al Uloum and Engineering (Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008). On the other hand, the Nasserist 
and Al Ghad were active at the faculty of Commerce. Othman, a Nasserist activist noted that, 
“in the early nineties the leftist groups in general and the Nasserist movement in particular 
had been the dominant forces at the University of Ain Shams before their obvious retreat later 
on” (Othman, Interview, 7/1/2008). But as for the Al Tajamu and Al Wafd they could hardly 
be spotted in terms of activities among students apart from some individuals who neither 
directly showed their support to those parties nor do they take part in student activities. But 
even if there were students who belonged to those two parties, they remained inactive and 
unseen so that most student activists were absolutely unaware of their existence. 
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It is most likely that Kefaya, April 6, then the ElBaradei Campaign movements turned out to 
represent large segments of students and reflected their dreams better than the traditional 
political parties. The different waves of protest led to the emergence of new leaders and the 
establishment of new networks while the old political parties and forces attempted to take 
credit for the students' sudden activism as well as leading their own protests, but, for the most 
part, these have been small affairs and Egypt's small opposition parties remain cut off from 
the activism. Most Socialist students expressed scorn for Al Tajamu, Egypt's legal left-wing 
party. In this regard, the Lawyers' and Journalist’s Syndicates re-emerged as the new 
incubator and as a centre of political activism
 
(Schemm, 2002). 
Recruitment and Mobilization: 
It is obvious that the movements endeavoured to win the support of as many students as 
possible through protests and exhibitions. The recruitment and the building of movements 
start after the end of the demonstrations and exhibitions benefiting from the new contact with 
young people who participate for the first time. The process of winning supporters is usually 
the work of an active leadership who manage to attract them to increase the numbers. That 
also has something to do with the course of events, so that a riotous atmosphere usually 
provides a good opportunity for enthusiastic activists in order to attract supporters in an easier 
manner than when the atmosphere is quiet. MB activists said they benefit from the services 
and activities to recruit new members (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008).  
It is important to take into account the fact that student activism needs the support of the older 
graduates outside the campuses as some of them continue their university activities even after 
graduation. Moreover, some activists who are still undergraduates could resort to having bad 
academic performance in order to prolong their stay at university. This is for the simple 
reason that graduation of activists could result in a clear decline of partisan activities, and the 
subsequent loss of supporters, which means the new activists will start from scratch. 
6.3 The Muslim Brothers Students Wing 
For almost two decades the MB has been on the ascent. They have been active at the Egyptian 
universities under the label of the Islamic Current, or “Altyaar Al-Islamy”. They managed to 
get support from such a large segment of the students that they enabled to win elections and 
take over the formal student unions from the beginning of the 1980s until the mid-1990s when 
the regime decided to tighten its control over the student unions. Subsequently, the 
government succeeded in forcing the MB to withdraw from the student elections by using 
every possible means to disrupt their activities.  This was a great success for the government 
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and NDP as the MB finally lost their ground in the formal student unions, while their 
activities continued without the provision of those unions.  Lutfi, who was a prominent 
activist from the MB student wing, said that, “the last time the MB managed to win a 
university union election was in 1994, while the loss of leadership of Dar Al-Ulum College 
union in the year 2000 marked the end of their reign” ( Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008).  
The MB activists were also active through student clubs (Ossar) at universities such as the 
Salahudin Club in the Faculty of Medicine, Cairo University, which has been their traditional 
stronghold since the 1970s.   
Al-Aryan confirmed that, “the academic year 1999/2000 marked end of their reign to the 
formal student union after years of continuous control of the organization because of the 
expulsion” (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008).  However, the MB student wing revived after 
the Palestine Intifada and continued to be the most prominent group among activists in the 
universities but without legal cover. After practicing their activities for some time under the 
name of the Islamic movement “Altayar Al-Islamy”, a decision was made to reinstate the 
name of “Muslim Brothers” from the academic year 2005/2006. That decision could be 
justified, according to Al Gaaly, by the fact that the “Islamic movement could feature a wide 
spectrum of organizations, while the MB would indicate a unique group of students” (Al 
Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008).  On the other hand the “MB is considered popular among 
students in terms of legitimacy and credibility with regard to the historic role it has been 
playing within the Egyptian society”. Indeed, this decision came during the rising of the 
political reform movement in Egypt which provided an opportune context and was an attempt 
from the MB to assure their existence and names to challenge the regime. 
From the interviews involving the student leadership of the MB student wing, it became 
evident that the objectives of the movement featured three dimensions i.e. the religious 
dimension, the political dimension and the student dimension.  But Al Gaaly confined the 
objectives “to promoting the Islamic faith as well as helping students” (Al Gaaly, Interview, 
8/1/2008).  Al-Aryan on the other hand focused on the religious and the national dimensions, 
by defining the objectives as “to produce a generation that favours the country and the 
religion based on proper understanding away from extremism and violence” (Al-Aryan, 
Interview, 12/1/2008). However, according to Islam Lutfi the objectives could be identified as 
follows: 
- Promoting the ‘moderate’ doctrine featuring the Muslim Brothers among students. 
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- Taking advantage of the university as the only environment available for freedom of 
expression in the country. 
- Reactivating positive images among students after years of repression (Lutfi, 
Interview, 8/1/2008). 
They argued that the rejuvenation of student activities would be to the benefit of the country 
and the MB so that the latter would be viable afterwards in terms of sustainability and 
strength. In this respect, “the consolidation of the opposition was a main concern of the 
Muslim Brothers in this period” according to Lutfi. 
Sustainability and consistency for many years has been the main feature that distinguishes the 
activities involving the Muslim Brothers compared with other young activists’ networks. In 
terms of the services they provided they were highly competitive with a wider base of 
beneficiaries compared to other organizations. Generally speaking, the activities provided by 
the Muslim Brother Students included sports, arts, cultural, social, educational and charity 
activities. Al-Aryan argued that, “from the 1980s onwards there had been significant activities 
associated with the Islamic Movement including reception ceremonies for the new students at 
the beginning of the new academic year” (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008).  Also, they 
managed to initiate dialogues inside the lecture rooms, reciting the Qua’ran, and helping 
students with reviewing their lectures. Communication always creates an atmosphere of 
confidence and trust between the different parties. In such an atmosphere recruitment of new 
members for the organization begins. The role of the students extends beyond the above-
mentioned activities to include other educational aspects such as providing lectures recorded 
on CDs on the different areas of scientific knowledge. Those services also include mock 
exams, exhibitions, and providing medical instruments. It is noteworthy as Al-Aryan 
confirmed, “MB extended their services to around 60% of the students who make use of the 
educational and scientific services” (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008). For example, at the 
faculty of Law around 3,000 copies of the informal faculty guidebook (exam questions) used 
to be printed out to be distributed among 5,000-7,000 students, so that all the copies were 
taken i.e. this means that around 50% of the students would benefit from this activity. 
The activities also included many musical concerts. Al Gaaly mentioned that, for example, a 
musical concert organized at the Medical Syndicate was attended by almost 2,000 students, 
and another at the faculty of Commerce within the university premises was attended by 3,000 
students. In relation to the sporting activities, the MB organized a sporting session whereby 
32 six-member teams took part. Interestingly, Lutfi stressed that, “some of the activities such 
as the musical concerts feature the Muslim Brother membership only and other students 
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attend as audience, while other activities remain open for everyone to take part” (Lutfi, 
Interview, 8/1/2008). 
It is worth noting that the MB Students’ activities reflected their collective desire to spread 
religious principle via new techniques. Al Gaaly confirmed that they always focused on 
campaigns such as “the real love” campaign in 2005/2006, which targeted the relationship 
between boys and girls, and the “resistance for survival” campaign in 2006/2007 aimed at 
reforming individuals, the university and the society(Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008).  
Strategies and disruptive tactics: 
As stated in previous chapters, external Arab and Islamic issues provided a political 
opportunity and were the main motivation for MB student demonstrations until 2003 with 
some exceptions. For example, MB students launched big demonstrations about Iraq in 1991, 
on El-Haram El-Ibrahiemy Massacre in 1994, the Gabal Abu Gunaim settlement in 1997, the 
threat to bomb Iraq in 1998, the Intifada protests in 2000/2002, on Kosovo war in 1999, and 
the Iraqi war in March 2003. after 2005 they turned to focus on internal issues as they led for 
the demonstrations calling for political reforms either independently or in coordination with 
other groups like the Socialists and April 6 youth movement. However they did not give up 
provoking over external causes such as their demonstrations for Gaza in 2009. 
After 2005, MB students focused on the reform and political activities because they were 
under pressure from the regime. In this respect the most important campaign featuring the 
Muslim Brothers was “together for reform, a free university and a free country”, on October 
2th, 2005. That campaign was marked by huge protests at all Egyptian universities including 
Ein Shams, Azhar, Hilwan, Kafar Al-Sheikh, Manofia, Banha, Zagazeeg, Bani Swaif, Assiut 
and Ganoub Al-Wadi. In some of those demonstrations the protesters used new methods to 
express their grievances. For example, they just stood still with their hands cuffed and their 
mouths gagged to express the state of oppression suffered.  
As stated before, the repression does not prevent the mobilization in specific periods and 
cases, but can also fuel it. This particular case shows that the literature which says that 
repression limits movement mobilisation is wrong in this particular instance.  The student 
activism benefited from the regulations that prevented the police forces from invading the 
university campuses. Compromises and negotiations took place to emphasise the limits and 
red lines imposed by the police on demonstrations such as preventing demonstrations from 
crossing the campuses to streets.   It is worth noting that the student protests used to erupt 
when the regime pressure on the MB organization and its leadership was at its fiercest as it 
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had been in the mid-1990s, Most significantly the protests that took place at Cairo University 
where tens of thousands of students were involved in demonstrations and gatherings featuring 
the freedom day on November 15th 1995, according to Lutfi. Those demonstrations led to 
massive arrests followed by military courts for the Muslim Brother leadership in 1995. 
Since the 1990s the MB had shown their ability to rally students in big numbers to 
demonstrate against the regime, yet they had no intention to become involved in 
confrontations with the police.  A case in point was the massive demonstration held at the 
University of Alexandria led by the MB in support of the Palestinian Intifada. On April 9th 
around 9,000 students took to the streets, but, unfortunately, that event ended dramatically as 
one student called Mohammed Al-Saka was killed and 260 students were seriously injured 
when the police used plastic bullets, and water hoses to disband the demonstrators. 
Afterwards the two sides exchanged accusations. On the one hand the police allegedly 
claimed that the demonstrators attacked them with stones causing damage to cars, but the 
students denied all the allegations, confirming that their demonstrations had been peaceful 
and that they were heading for a conference on petroleum probably held at Alexandria Library 
or otherwise at the American Cultural Centre.  According to some police sources some of the 
communist elements could have initiated the violence following failure of the Muslim Brother 
activists to control the crowd, and knowing that there were limits for police tolerance 
(Schemm, 2002). 
Those who were well-informed among the activists agreed with that viewpoint, as they would 
stress the fact that the MB would always try to avoid confrontations with the police as clearly 
instructed by their leadership. Moreover, it was most likely that advance arrangements were 
made with the police before any demonstrations would take place so that they could try and 
avoid such clashes. In fact, what happened in Alexandria was originally an organized protest 
involving the MB, and yet later on the Socialists and the Independent students took control of 
the crowd. The latter managed to do so in response to the mood of the crowd which included 
ordinary activists and young MB members and led them to the streets.  Furthermore, it was 
not possible for the security forces to control 9,000 demonstrators through traditional means 
such as tear gas and security cordons. Eventually, they used live ammunition, as the police 
would not allow any disruption to the opening ceremony of Alexandria Library which was 
scheduled for April 23
rd
 (Schemm, 2002). 
However, some interviewees argued that the activities of the MB students considerably 
declined quantitatively and quantitatively. Their activities dwindled in specific years to reach 
its nadir falling short of its heyday during the decades of the eighties and the nineties. Tamam 
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(2006) argued that, “their activities failed to mimic the events featuring the student 
demonstrations in protest of the international alliance against Iraq following its invasion of 
Kuwait in 1991”. So, the Muslim Brother Student movement “was not up to the standard in 
response to major events which should have implied strong student reactions such as the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003”. The situation remained the same until the reform protests 
broke out in the spring of 2005, which was known as the “Cairo Spring”. During those events 
a protest featuring Alexandria University students organized with banners condemning what 
they considered “naked video clips” and western culture. Their counterparts at Cairo 
University managed to organize a day of the love of Islam or what they called “Mohamed 
Day” in contrast to “Valentine Day”. So, after directly joining the protests for one reason or 
another, the Muslim Brothers had no option but to consider adopting the agenda for reform. 
Tamam (2006) argued that, “the main reason was that the Muslim Brother Student movement 
could be more or less concerned with the constitutional reforms, and yet those reforms had 
never been the main concern of the movement". 
It could be maintained that the movement has had its successes and failures, though the 
activists of the Muslim Brother Students such as Al-Aryan think that “the movement had 
made great achievements, and won the hearts and minds of the students through focusing on 
their problems”.  They were highly organized with a clear-cut doctrine and a satisfactory 
message to deliver.  According to Lutfi, “the methods of work were continuously kept under 
review”, such as approving campaigns as a system of work, a professional approach that 
would take place through marketing and publicity that started in 2004. The traditional system 
of work involved schemes such as the prayer week, the reception week etc, but the new 
system would involve a general campaign featuring a specific issue. An information body 
would be organized for this purpose whereby values such as seeking love and excellence 
would be the main focus. The female role also increased according to Al Gaaly who said that, 
“Walaa Hashim from the Muslim Brother Student female membership became the deputy 
president of the FSU at Cairo University in 2005”.  Moreover, “a group of female students 
managed to organize a symposium at the anti-imperialism conference in Cairo in relation to 
the alternative media” (Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008).  
By contrast the interviewees admitted that “shortcomings and imperfections existed, which 
the movement tried to rectify”. Al Gaaly illustrated that, “those shortcomings include 
seclusion instead of openness”. But finally, positive developments were taking place and 
campaigns such as “together with reform” and “free university and free country” campaigns 
were paying off. Also, he stressed that there was a need to pay attention to the political media 
aspects as the media focused on their negative rather than the positive aspects. He added that, 
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“the activities should concentrate on symposiums, conferences, political newsletters, and 
political sessions”. 
However, the security forces and the administration used to constitute major obstacles for the 
MB activism. The former tended to make frequent arrests among the active members and 
issued threats for others. In fact the MB activists were targets for the security forces even 
though the number of arrests may have varied from one time to another. Al-Aryan denied the 
allegations made by activists from other groups that the security forces turned a blind eye to 
the MB activities while preventing other activities. The administration on the other hand used 
to carry out investigations and dismiss students. For example, Al-Aryan referred to the 
numerous disciplinary boards he has attended accused of taking part in a concert(Al-Aryan, 
Interview, 12/1/2008). 
Organizational capacities and internal mechanisms: 
As part of the Muslim Brothers, the students’ wing get support from the organization but Lutfi 
confirmed that, “self-funding is the norm usually through contributions from members, and 
yet in some cases individuals provide funding for some activities upon request” (Lutfi, 
Interview, 8/1/2008). Al-Aryan also said that, “some activities generated income to cover the 
costs as in the case with exam print-outs, and the CDs featuring musical concerts” (Al-Aryan, 
Interview, 12/1/2008). But in the end, according to Al Gaaly their “budget was limited 
compared to that of official student union budgets for example, the amounts allocated from 
Helwan student union was fifty thousand Egyptian pounds despite the insignificant activities 
of the union” (Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008). 
According to Lutfi, the Muslim Brother Student membership could be in the thousands, while 
Al-Aryan puts the number in the hundreds at Cairo University alone. Despite the threats made 
by the security forces and administration to the students, the MB activists confirmed that they 
had “succeeded to win the hearts and minds of the majority of students through personal 
conviction” (Al-Aryan, Interview, 12/1/2008). The membership existed in almost every 
university in Egypt, but the organization was more influential at Cairo, Azhar and Alexandria 
universities. Indeed, the MB exists in great numbers at regional universities, while they 
remain influential at Azhar University. In this regard, Ain Shams University was a special 
case given the tough administration and the harsh security measures. But despite all that the 
MB remain strong compared to other student movements.   
In discussing the selection of leadership, Al Gaaly said that, “for some time this process used 
to be by direct appointment” as they represent a part of the central organization (MB) which 
163 
 
they must obey whose orders they should implement. However, “changes have been made to 
reflect a kind of democratic elections and autonomy, whereby the student membership at the 
different faculties or classes votes for the faculty or class representative” (Al Gaaly, 
Interview, 8/1/2008). It is worth mentioning that only the members of the student council 
have the right to vote, and every faculty has its own student council made up of 6-10 students. 
The selection process takes place in accordance with a number of criteria including 
activeness, administrative skills, relationships with colleagues and religious commitment. 
Lutfi pointed out that “the faculty council will be responsible for the selection of the faculty 
representative and his deputy”. Al-Aryan confirmed that “all MB students were eligible for 
voting, and they got the right to choose their representatives” (Al-Aryan, Interview, 
12/1/2008).  Yet, other non-elected technical committees exist whereby some individuals are 
designated to undertake specific jobs without being elected.  
However, with regard to the decision-making process MB activists pointed out that “all 
matters were subject for open discussion and the dominant principle was team work and the 
division of labour”.  Lutfi said that, “given the fact that decisions were taken on a democratic 
basis every member of the group has a moral obligation to stick to those decisions, which 
necessarily means commitment to the party”.  According to Al Aryan a “good level of 
democracy existed within the movement and things were continuously improving, and in 
effect promising student leadership was produced through elections”. 
With regard to the relationships between the students and Muslim Brothers leadership, the Al 
Gaaly confirmed the latter “granted them to act in accordance with their own decisions and 
perspective, and yet that should not prevent them from seeking the advice of the matured and 
skilful members, as long as they abide by the same policies and rules as other members do”. 
Al Gaaly suggested that “a major conflict is very unlikely as no direct intervention takes 
place”, but admitted that a minor conflict might take place in which case student opinion will 
dominate. Al-Aryan confirmed that the decision-making process worked within a general 
policy and accordingly decisions were to be made.  In this respect Al Gaaly said that some 
campaigns including “Love” and “Resist being” were inspired by student ideas and did not 
need permission from top levels. 
It became obvious that Muslim Brother students were about to become more independent 
from the leadership, had it not been for the Al-Azhar crisis. Following what activists 
considered as “a sporting event” organized by MB students while government and regime 
said it was “military show”, the MB leadership strongly criticized the show as being an 
invitation for a fight which would definitely disfavour student activities. So, the Al Azhar 
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crisis gave an excuse for the leadership to restrict that independence, as the regime took 
advantage of the student behaviour which came as a strong security blow to the MB 
leadership particularly the military trial for a number of its prominent leaders in 2007-2008. 
Some activists argued that students should not be accountable for what happened but rather 
the tense relationship between the MB and the regime should be blamed for all that had 
happened. 
It should be noted that the MB mobilizing structure in the universities is more intricate and 
complex than other student networks. It includes different levels such as the student 
membership, the elected faculty leadership, intermediate level supervisors, the top leadership 
of the organization, the FSU union leadership, not to mention the bodies responsible for 
coordination with other forces. In this regard Lutfi argued that there was a problem 
connecting with the medium link in the movement between students and leadership. He 
confirmed that “the Muslim Brother leadership did not require anything from the students”, 
yet, “the intermediate leadership featuring university supervisors remain the main problem”, 
as it tended to communicate and interpret the ideas and regulations in a “conservative way”. 
He added that “these intermediate supervisors are in command of wide powers without 
actually intervention from the top leadership” (Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008). 
On the other hand, Tamam (2006) argued that “some from outside the student movement or 
even from outside the university became in control of the movement”. In other words the 
movement was controlled by people who were not students. Consequently, every university or 
even every faculty had its own supervisors and educators who most likely had already 
finished their courses and graduated from university. Also, some sort of central committees 
for students had been established only to be controlled by the regional administrations, where 
a supervisor for the student sector would represent the highest authority in terms of group 
organization with a main duty of outlining and planning the strategies of the activities in 
relation to the university sector. Tamam (2006) confirmed that “the relationship between MB 
leadership and the students became more organized or could possibly be described as more 
bureaucratic as well”.   
It could be argued that there had been more room for autonomy through the internal elections 
for the selection movement leadership, besides the emergence of a new generation of activists 
who had more freedom to take action, but that should remain within the general strategy of 
the Muslim Brothers who avoided confrontations with the regime until 25 January 2011 when 
the Muslim Brothers youth wing pressured for the movement to become involved in the 
revolution to topple the Mubarak regime (El Barqy, Interview, 5/2/2012). 
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Concerning the transformation and mobility of generations of the Islamist movement at the 
universities in recent decades, it should be noted that a basic difference exists between the 
activities during the seventies as compared to the eighties and the nineties, as every period has 
its own unique characteristics. For example, during the period of the seventies, the activities 
were motivated by the students’ feelings and affections in the complete absence of the 
traditional hierarchical leadership who would influence the university students. Thus that 
period has been characterized by the diversified Islamic thinking, and the freedom of 
movement away from partisan restrictions, in addition to invigorating the personal work 
experience of student activists. In the eighties, on the other hand, the Islamic activism was 
characterized by university activities taking shape on a specific partisan course, as the MB 
managed to win more than 80% of the student vote, while the Jihadist and Salafi 
organizations won 20% of the vote (Tamam, 2006). The period of the eighties was also 
unique for tight security measures which made the MB the only organization capable of 
confrontation, by taking full control of the Egyptian universities, except for sporadic clashes 
with Hours organizations which was the NDP student wing in early 1990s.  
During the period of the nineties the Islamists became more focused on trade unions and 
syndicates than student unions, whereas most of the student leadership in the eighties and the 
seventies engaged with these activities. This, therefore, rendered work among students less 
significant. In this regard Al-Mulaiji (2003) argued that “the Islamist work among students 
was not as significant as before in terms of performance, availability, spirit and influencing 
university students”.  
The organizational framework in which the Islamist movements operated during the seventies 
was also different from that in the 2000-2010. The seventies decade represented what some 
called the second establishment of the MB (after the first one in the 1920s and the 1930s).  
The Islamist student movement had been known as Al-Jamaa Al-Islamia in the Egyptian 
universities during the seventies. The bulk of the group moved spontaneously with no 
advisors or leadership from outside the group. However, the idea of spontaneity and 
networking became a source of strength for the movement, even though on some occasions 
this might have led some groups to become involved in violence. Yet, following the 
graduation of the founders of the movement who gradually became distanced from the student 
environment, the movement started to lose its spontaneity and independence as a new 
generation took over the leadership of the student movement. The new MB students found 
themselves belonging to an Islamic organization operating within the universities rather than 
belonging to a student movement with an Islamic orientation.  
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The online presence of the Muslim Brothers younger generation: 
The Muslim Brotherhood has an active online presence. Blogs and Facebook have enabled 
individuals in the MB to partake in opposition media activism (Exum, 2007, p. 1). This is 
evident in how younger MB members are trying to adopt this technology to generate the kind 
of solidarity, support and attention needed (Lynch, 2007). The pages, profiles and groups of 
MB members have gradually expanded on Facebook and Twitter. However, the virtual 
numbers do not match the actual number of members who are focusing on the real activities 
more than the virtual. This was one of the main things that helped them to win in the elections 
compared with the other new activism that focusing on the use of social media and was still 
seeking to build social and political bases in the real world. However, Facebook became a 
public avenue to display internal disputes and controversial issues among MB activists as it 
appears on the profiles and pages belonging to the younger and middle age activists like 
Haythem Abou-Khaliel
42
. It is obvious that, while new media technologies have provided 
some new-found benefits to opposition groups, they can bring potential challenges as 
well. The disputes emerged on online media in many occasions and in different movements. 
6.4 The Protest Movements and Networks 
The Students Union of Al Ghad:  
The Students Union of Al Ghad was formed under the leadership of two activists, Mohamed 
Qutub and Ahmed Maher, just before the elections of Parliament in November 2005. More 
than a hundred students and youth gathered at the university, making it a strong movement 
within the university and within the Youth for Change Movement in 2005 and 2006.  In fact 
the idea of the Union of Al Ghad students started some time before the presidential elections 
to support Ayman Nour in this election featuring a huge number of activists together with 
other sympathizers who were not organized. Maher confirmed that the actual establishment 
was just before the elections of the parliament, where it continued its strong activities in 2006 
(Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). Following the election of the parliament, disappointment 
increased among the party activists leading them to quit. The newcomers then focused on 
student activities. Consequently, informal clubs (Ossar) were established within the university 
under the name “Al Ghad Youth Clubs” using the slogan of the orange flag.  Those clubs 
were based at the universities of Azhar, Cairo, Ein Shams, Hilwan and Alexandria. 
                                                     
42 http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100000262669968 
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After this wave of activism there was a setback as many problems appeared during the 
academic year 2006/2007, during which the work featured individual random activities. The 
same could be said about other movements such as the Youth for Change which became 
exceptionally active during the presidential elections, and after the elections all students 
returned to their original parties. In this regard Maher, one of the leaders of Al Ghad Youth 
pointed out that the “Al Ghad students constituted a main component of the Al Ghad Youth, 
as almost half of the Al Ghad Youth were students, while another quarter of them were 
concerned with student causes, and only one- quarter have no concerns with student matters” 
(Maher, interview, 20/1/2012).  
Al Ghad Student Union attempted to undertake numerous activities as well as providing 
services in a way almost similar to the Muslim Brothers students. They distributed curricula, 
and held training sessions for the preparation of future student leadership including those who 
were not members of the party. Maher confirmed that the union “had done a good job within 
the university during the academic year 2005-2006, as it came second to the MB, as could be 
clearly seen during the protests of the International Student Day in 2006” (Maher, interview, 
20/1/2012). Qutub said that “on that day more than a hundred students came to the university 
carrying the orange flags”. They shouted anti-regime slogans calling for the downfall of 
President Mubarak, as well as condemning the plan of “Mubarak’s Ruling Family”, whereby 
a big exhibition was associated with the demonstrations (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). Maher 
confirmed that the masses were impressed by the activities organized by Al Ghad and the MB 
who demonstrated for a short time before they left, “But nonetheless the protesters were 
estimated at five thousand after the Muslim Brothers and others joined the rallies” (Maher, 
interview, 20/1/2012).  
According to Qutub, “it was in the interest of security to have activities performed by liberal 
students instead of limiting those activities to MBs” (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). In fact 
following the failure of the leftist groups those activities would be performed under a liberal 
cover, which constituted a good opportunity for Al Ghad to start. In this regard Qutub pointed 
out that “the general liberal doctrine tended to reject the idea of public protests” (Qutub, 
interview, 7/10/2010).  Yet, Al Ghad encouraged its youth to join the protests, as well as the 
use of labelled banners to challenge the government. Al Ghad Student Union had also 
managed to form sub-committees at the universities of Hilwan, Alexandria, Cairo, Eien 
Shams, Faioum, Bani Suaif and Asyout. 
Regarding the ideology and collective identity, it could be argued that two viewpoints have 
emerged, one in support of general student objectives, while the other viewpoint favoured 
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specific ideological objectives. In this respect Maher pointed out that Al Ghad Students Union 
in essence featured the following objectives: “establishment of a free and strong student union 
away from the domination of the security forces, which means the establishment of a new 
energetic political life as it had been before 1952 including the existence of a free multi-party 
system within the university” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). Given the fact that the above are 
general objectives, Qutub was keen to highlight the ideological objectives. Among those 
objectives was “introducing new moderate principles with positive thinking other than the 
Muslim Brothers, in addition to encouraging students to become involved in non-Islamic 
activities”. That would necessarily mean “trying to persuade the Muslim Brothers to get out 
of their isolation to join the community at large” (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010).  It is worth 
noting that opinions differed when it came to the evaluation of the doctrine and ideology of 
the Al Ghad party. For example, Maher was not considered to be “a liberal in the real sense of 
the word, and so the party could be described as moderate belonging to the “third way” ideas 
in terms of social and political doctrine” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). However, the 
common thought was that “liberalism and secularism were synonymous and so both are anti-
religious”, and yet formally in its programmes admit that “Islamic Sharia should be 
considered a major source for any legislation” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012).   
Regarding the organizational leadership, it is worth noting that Qutub was chosen by Ayman 
Nour to lead the Al Ghad students. Maher and Basim Sayed were also chosen as deputies. The 
latter was a secular Christian and a member of “Andalusia Centre” (Qutub, interview, 
7/10/2010). The Union included other activists such as Mustafa Mahmoud, Mohamed Maher 
and Ahmed Badawi besides a communication sub-committee led by Islam Hanafi.  Ahmed 
Maher pointed out that the most prominent leadership was Mohamed Qutub, Ahmed Maher 
and Muram, who had been chosen by direct elections. Following the elections of the Free 
Union of Ghad Students Mohamed Qutub became the secretary of the union and Ahmed 
Maher assistant to the secretary (Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). 
As part from the youth activism in Egypt, Al Ghad used to experience internal conflicts, 
organizational problems occurred over the legal status of the youth and student union.  Qutub 
would argue that he agreed with Ayman Nour and Wael Nuarah on the formation of a youth 
committee, but it was postponed until the end of the presidential elections. Yet, Qutub was 
appointed as secretary of the previous youth committee led by Hassabullah who was 40 years 
old and came back to the leadership after the departure of Qutub in the aftermath of a 
crisis(Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). A problem occurred involving the party leadership which 
considered the Union an illegitimate entity. They were confronted by Hassabullah, who was 
then the secretary of Ghad Youth. His critics from the activists accused him of being a former 
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member of the ruling National Party. They argued that the party regulations stated that the 
youth secretary should be a member of the supreme board, and so his age should be in the 
range of 25-30 years old. Moreover, Hassabullah had already been appointed by the 
leadership as a youth secretary rather than being elected(Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). That 
conflict led to failure of the movement according to Maher. Then some students joined the 
original youth secretariat as individuals, where elections were being held for sub-committees 
within the youth secretariat, and eventually Maher was elected as the secretary of the masses 
sub-committee. The most famous activists at the height of the activities of the Ghad students 
were Bilal Diab, Mustafa Mahmoud, Basim Samir and Muram (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). 
There were between 50 and 80 formal members on average in each of the various 
governorates of the republic, not to mention the party sympathizers. For example, in Cairo 
there were around 200 active members, but the total number of Al Ghad youth appeared to 
have been controversial. Maher, for instance, put the number at around 15 thousand members 
all over the country, while Mohamed Qutub would confirm that, as from February 2006, the 
youth committee of Al Ghad was in command of two thousand members in the entire country. 
He further confirmed that 60% of them were really active members, including 300 activists in 
Alexandria(Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). 
The financial resources which used to come from the businessmen constituted the main 
source of funding for the party. Some of these businessmen included Omar Seed Al-Ahal, 
engineer Basil Adil, Wail Nuara, and Majdi Al-Adassi. However deficits in funding appeared 
as the number of funders dwindled. On the other hand, 80 to 120 members focused on a self-
funding scheme where members had to pay weekly contributions from 2 to 5 Egyptian pounds 
(Qutub, interview, 7/10/2010). In this respect Maher would admit that he gave almost 25% of 
his monthly salary, not to mention his time and the other expenses. He would further confirm 
that the only time they received major funding from the party was during the leadership 
training sessions, when the activities would increase proportionally with the increase of 
funding. 
The Socialist Movement: 
The Socialist Movement is the most fragmented among the student movements. It featured a 
number of groups and networks including the Independent Left, the Revolutionary Socialist 
students, the students of the Democratic Left (Sharif Musa, Samar Suleiman, Majallat Al-
Busala) and the Social Democratic Party (Tanta University Group). Many questions have 
been raised about the nature and size of the socialist movement at the university. In this 
regard, according to Abdul Hamied, a prominent leftist activist, “the socialist movement is 
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unstable and always fluctuating up and down”. For example, the movement was on the rise 
during the period 1996/97, and declined during the period 2002/2003 before it went up during 
the period 2004-2006. Abdul Hamied stressed that, “the decline has always been a function of 
internal organizations’ disputes” (Hameed, Interview 4/1/2008). The most active movements 
within the socialist movement were the March 20
th
 Movement, and the Revolutionary 
Socialists as they constituted a distinct and clear brand for all socialist students. The March 
20
th
 movement used to provide such a vessel for some time before transformation to the 
socialist movement took place. The main reason for that transformation was due to the March 
20
th
, which was then active outside the university, becoming inactive, and that people no 
longer understood what was meant by March 20
th
, the one day when dominated the Tahrir 
protests in 2003 after the Iraqi war. So after transformation the left became more active under 
the new name of Socialist Students according to Abdul Hamied. 
March 20
th
 movement: 
The movement was established outside the university by members of university staff, namely 
Aida Saif Aldawla, and Manar Hussein, with a number of students such as Bassam Murtada, 
Manar Kamil and Kholoud Sabir. It started its activities during the protest wave of 2003 
following the Iraqi demonstrations and featured cooperation between a small group of 
university staff members and a group of students, the majority of which came from leftist 
families. The movement used to make some clinics as bases for its activities including 
particularly those of Saif Al-Naser and Adil Al-Mushid with the support of Farid Zahran, 
Majdi Abdul Hamid, Sabir Barakat, Ahmed Saif Al-Islam and Fatima Adli. In the university 
they started their activities with exhibitions featuring paintings at the beginning of the new 
curriculum year in 2003, but the preparations went back as early as the summer time 
(Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008).   
The activities took place at the university campuses and their starting point was the general 
student grievances and problems and what could be described as, more or less, a leftist agenda 
based on Marxist ideology (Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008). Then, by and large, other 
students who were not politically oriented started to join. Then the movement began to take 
shape through those activities.  Eventually, the movement took its place among other student 
movements, and was present in conferences and able to coordinate with other political 
forces(Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008). 
The number of students benefiting from the movement’s activities varied depending on the 
activity.  For example, Kholoud said, “it could be seen that during any exhibition there used 
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to be about 40 students in attendance and about ten students would leave their telephone 
numbers to become involved in the debates. In the meantime there were five to ten students 
involved in organizing the exhibition” (Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008). According to 
Kholoud, in terms of popularity the Socialist movement came second to the Muslim Brothers 
followed by the Nasserists and Al Ghad besides a limited presence of Wafd. She also stressed 
that the activists at the Cairo University were no more than fifteen members. It was true that 
the extent of those activities was not that big, but still it produced the idea of a leftist 
movement which was considered a positive development, with the subsequent establishment 
of relationships with other movements within the university, so that the Socialist force was 
taken into account.   
Yet, Kholoud Saber said, “the movement had to cope with some setbacks particularly with 
regard to student training and funding, not to mention its failure to link itself with a true leftist 
agenda within the university” (Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008).   Besides the financial 
problem there was the problem of the general atmosphere within the university, which would 
tend to cause barriers to the progress of the movement. The students were indifferent, and at 
times there were clashes with other movements, not to mention the power 
differences(Kholoud Saber, Interview, 10/2/2008). 
The Revolutionary Socialists 
It could be said that the March 20
th
 movement provided a broad framework that brought 
together all leftist activists irrespective of their ideologies, and yet the Revolutionary 
Socialists remained the main power in the group  (Al Gaaly, Interview, 8/1/2008). Their most 
important aim was to recruit members for the movement to achieve the political objectives 
featuring the creation of a revolutionary socialist movement. In this respect the movement had 
succeeded in communicating with a big number of students, so as to make them join its 
activities including protests. The socialist activist Abdul Hamid stated that, “the movement 
had been labelled by both the MB and the security forces as saboteurs following the violent 
events associated with some of the protests during the Intifada” (Hameed, Interview 
4/1/2008). Actually, although there were tens of members besides the sympathizers, given its 
inadequate resources the movement would not focus on providing services for students and 
the same could be said about the Nasserist movement.   
Focusing on the exhibitions, which was considered to be one of their main activities, drew the 
students’ attention. In this regard one of the young activists from Al Ghad demonstrated that 
when he visited Cairo University in 2001 for the first time, he noticed that the students were 
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being involved in exhibitions, particularly the leftists and socialists (Maher, interview, 
20/1/2012). Those exhibitions displayed photos and paintings in addition to the political 
debates. He took part in the debate “featuring the socialist students led by Khalid Abdul 
Hamied and the main issue of the debate was the importance of a political force to stand 
against the malpractices of the corrupt regime” (Hameed, Interview 4/1/2008). However, 
some interviewees understood that some of the Socialist students would work under the 
umbrella of external communist organizations, while the Socialist activists would insist that 
they had no links with any of the international movements. They would believe that it was 
necessary to take a more extreme position in terms of fighting and struggling. For this reason, 
their slogans during demonstrations in support of the Palestinian cause directly condemned 
the policies of the then President Mubarak. “They were of the opinion that political reform 
should be the first step that would lead to the liberation of Palestine, and that Cairo would be 
the start point of the road to Jerusalem”, according to an activist from the RS. That attitude 
was contrary to that of the Muslim Brothers who were of the opinion that opposition should 
favour the formation of a united front against Israel by being less critical of the regime 
(Schemm, 2002). 
RS activists cooperated with the MB through a cross ideological network called “Jam'etna 
(Our University) as well as through the FSU. Abdul Hameid confirmed that, “FSU provided a 
useful experiment by being involved in real activities, and by exposing the false nature of the 
official union and its malpractices” (Hameed, Interview 4/1/2008). 
One of the activists appreciated the activities associated with the Socialist movement as he 
confirmed that “its agenda featured new ideas”. Yet, Othman drew attention to the issue that 
the average age of the Marxist students was relatively high as he thought that “some of the 
activists have become professional politicians, which has prolonged their stay at the 
university through poor academic performance” (Othman, Interview, 7/1/2008). Another 
Islamist activist highlighted some of cultural dilemmas that faced the Socialist activism such 
as “the disagreements between the members regarding the role of religion in the public 
sphere, the relationship with other movements, whereby the tendency for accusing others of 
disloyalty is very common among members” (Lutfi, Interview, 8/1/2008). 
Islamic Al-Amal League 
The influence of the Al-Shaab newspaper on large numbers of students and the youth in 
general was undeniable during the 1990s. Moreover, the Headquarters of Al-Amal (Labour) 
Party became the focus of attention due to the demonstrations and protests. Eventually the 
party activities were suspended following the party crisis in 2000. Al-Sawi stated that 
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“because of the impact of the Palestine Intifada and particularly in 2002, the party resumed its 
activities at the universities of Cairo and Ain Shams, where the Islamic Student League 
emerged with an ever-increasing student support” (Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008). Al-Sawi 
also illustrated the internal organizational capacity of the network by stating that there were 
seven students in charge of the activities in seven faculties at Cairo University, while the 
Cairo office, the centre of power of the Al-Amal Party, was made up of 14 activists led by a 
president and head deputy.  The party also emerged at Azhar University. It is noteworthy that 
the party has been more popular in some faculties than in others. That was particularly so at 
Dar Al-Uluom and the Faculty of Law, although the party activities were extended to reach 
the Faculty of Engineering. A student called Mahmoud Al-Sakhawi from the Faculty of 
Engineering, a secretary of a party committee, succeeded in winning a seat in the elections 
featuring the Free Student Union. There was a focus on the FSU elections as it was hoped to 
create alternative student organizations. So, calling students for protests, in addition to the 
weekly congregations organized by the party at Azhar University, gathering the youth and the 
leadership marked the party activities. 
Regarding the ideology and collective identity, Al-Sawi summarized the League as aiming to 
“help the party in its struggle for power in order to establish a civil state with an Islamic 
dimension i.e. a blend of the Islamic and civil dimensions” (Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008).  
The activists endeavoured to communicate with all students within their reach, who would 
most likely be from an Islamic background, even though some of its membership was 
Christians such as Gamal Asaad, a member of the executive committee, and also George 
Ishag and Hani Labib. Al-Sawi considered that “the League is unique as compared to the 
Muslim Brothers and the Salafi groups in terms of thinking” (Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008).  
In other words they thought that they were connecting “between a rational thinking, which is 
unique to the MB and the emotional thinking which characterizes the Salafi movement”, 
bearing in mind the limited support and poor financial resources of the Islamic League as 
compared to the Muslim Brothers movement(Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008). 
The leadership of the party mainly belongs to the middle-age generation as the organization 
could be “more or less described as an informal movement rather than a political party where 
most of membership and leaders belong to the young generation under 35 years old” (Al 
Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008). In 2007 Osama Al-Hutaimi was secretary of the youth union, 
while Al-Sawi became assistant secretary assisted by Akram Irani, and Alla Hijari became 
president of the League and assisted Mohamed Mahmoud Al-Sakhawi. Later on, Al-Sawi 
became secretary of the youth union and participated in creating the Youth for Change and 
April 6 Movements in 2008. Al-Sawi also stated that the leadership was chosen by mutual 
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agreement, but with the increase of membership elections were approved as a means for 
choosing the League leadership. In his assessment of the Islamic Activist League, Al-Sawi 
believed that, “it could be equal to the Socialists who came second to the Muslim Brothers, 
followed by the Nasserists” (Al Sawy, Interview, 10/1/2008).   
6.5   The Political Parties and Students 
Apart from a few interim activities it could be generally concluded that the opposition parties 
seem to be isolated from the student movement. In this regard the fact of the matter is that 
democratic practice as a culture is missing from the majority of opposition parties, and that 
the public have little trust in the leadership of those parties who were possibly unknown to the 
public in the first place. The opposition parties tactically rely on using harsh language to 
address political matters in order to draw the attention of the masses so as to compensate for 
their missing chances to work among the masses in previous years. Unfortunately, by 
adopting such tactics those parties ended up as big losers among students (Abdul Majid, 2006, 
p. 10). Since political parties seemed to be indifferent about political nurturing of the youth, 
keeping those youth becomes a difficult task. The main problem is that the political parties 
make no effort to attract young activists. Given the revolutionary spirit and enthusiasm shown 
by the youth they always look forward for potential change and criticize the leadership. But 
after some time according to Salama, an activist from the Nasserist party, they realized that 
things had changed for the worse (Salama, Interview, 12/1/2008). Some political parties tend 
to prove their credibility among the youth by being involved in protest activities, but having 
said that, most parties remain distanced from young protesters, so that the majority of socialist 
students seem to be unhappy with the role played by the Tajamu Party, for example (Schemm, 
2002). Abdulla (1994, p. 10) a leading figure of the leftist student movement in the 1970s 
noted the insignificance of leftist-oriented youth activism in universities before 2000, which, 
“reduced their chances among the masses as a potential alternative, so that the situation either 
remains the same if not changes for the worse”.   
Moreover, the student regulations as stated in the previous chapter restricted political 
activities at universities, so that the traditional political parties avoided direct and open 
political activities among university students. Some opposition parties have used those 
regulations as an excuse to justify their weakness and their absence from the student 
environment, while the new activism resorted to various tricks to communicate with the 
students. 
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Al Wafd students: 
Al Wafd, as a traditional political party, avoided direct and open political activities among 
university students as a sign of respecting the official regulations. An activist from Al-Wafd 
denied “the existence of student clubs (Ossar) officially following Al-Wafd” (Nabil, 
Interview, 9/10/2010). However, it resorted to various tricks to communicate with the 
students, as far as the effective party needed to be in touch with young people and students. 
The Liberal activist Sameeh said that, “Al-Wafd used to have two student formal clubs 
(Ossar) at Tanta University which could be described as unique through the influence of 
Sayed Al-Badawi the party leader” (Sameeh, Interview, 5/10/2008). Moreover the Al-Masri 
student club used to informally represent the Al-Wafd party at the Faculty of Law of Cairo 
University for long time. It became exceptionally active during the reign of Numan Jumaa 
(ex-president of the party) who was then the head of the faculty in the late eighties until the 
mid-1990s. Lutfi confirmed that, “with the exception of a few of them, the majority of 
members were closely associated with the Al-Masri club through Numan Jumaa”.   
However, students who could be described as supporters of Al Wafd,  would stay away from 
political activism in the university (Sameeh, Interview, 5/10/2008). In many cases that 
becomes common practice indicating a mechanism used by some political forces to avoid 
open involvement in political activities and protestation. In this respect, Pieter Nabil an 
activist from Al-Wafd activists argued that, “the party can be described as sensible and legal, 
and so has no desire to make any disputes with the 1979 regulations” (Nabil, Interview, 
9/10/2010).  They stressed that their strategy was “to win new elements of the young 
generation and most importantly it is the quality rather than quantity that counts, and that 
efforts should be made to win their hearts and minds” (Sameeh, Interview, 5/10/2008).  So the 
main focus was that what should be taken seriously are the educational activities for the 
young generation.  For example, Sameeh referred to Al-Wafd parliament as a case in point 
and an experiment that “raised political awareness among the youth including knowledge of 
the main political parties” (Sameeh, Interview, 5/10/2008). 
The main problem with Wafd students is the fact that they lack a well-defined ideology, and 
those results in frequent disputes between the new liberals, and the supporters of traditional 
ideology who find nothing wrong in cooperation with other Islamic and socialist groups. In 
fact the Wafd party has often suffered from internal disputes and severe crises such as when 
one of them was linked with the youth demand to establish NGOs to seek financial support 
from abroad in 2006. Some of them even threatened to defect from the party in case that 
demand was rejected. The most significant of those organizations included Al-Nida Al-
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Gadeed Organization, Development of Democracy Organization, Andalusia Association, 
Refugee Welfare Organization, Al-Hura Organization, Al-Nageeb Organization, and others 
that have been associated with rumours that they received foreign financial support 
proportional to their registered membership. Consequently, those in charge of those 
organizations had to pay part of the support they received to the youth from the regions in the 
form of bonuses in return for joining those organizations as members. Numan Jumaa opposed 
the idea that the youth from Wafd could join those organizations to the extent that he had 
threatened to suspend their membership of the party as he considered that behaviour to be a 
deviation from the national trend of the party. His attitude triggered opposition against him 
(Osman, Almesryoon, 13/11/2006). On the other hand, the Committee for the Support of 
Democratic Development (CSDD) led by Mahmoud Ali has been mentioned among those 
who have received financial assistance from the American Embassy. Eventually Jumaa 
suspended the membership of the trustees of that committee including Mahmoud Abatha who 
was a member of the council of trustees. But, later on according to Othman, “they were 
reinstated as members including Mahmoud Abatha who became the party leader”. The most 
important of the activities undertaken by the CSDD was a training programme featuring 
elections which constituted a genuine part of the programme for the preparation of future 
leadership supervised by Mahmoud Ali. 
The Nasserist Students Union: 
In the early nineties of the last century the University of Ain Shams witnessed a strong 
Nasserist movement. The Nasserist activism was used to establish an exhibition featuring 
photography and paintings criticizing the regime and its policies. An activist from the 
Nasserists stressed that the membership of the leftist movements including the Nasserists and 
Socialists increased relatively by tens of core members from within the campus, and yet the 
Nasserists far exceeded the Socialists among the students. The Nasserist party had also got a 
branch at the Faculty of Law featuring a club (Ossra) known as the Nadeem Committee 
headed by Dr. Husam Issa one of the party’s leadership. His influence was similar to that of 
Numan Jumaa at the Faculty of Law at Cairo University.  The Nadeem Committee was 
established in the late eighties and continued as an official entity in the nineties. It should be 
noted that students used to join the committee and the Nasserist movement via Nadeem, but 
without joining the party. The Arab Nasserist Student Council headed by the famous political 
activist Alaa Shalabi, was officially operating through Nadeem.   
The second branch in the Nasserist movement was “Nadi Al-Fikr Al-Nasseri” or the Nasserist 
Intellectual Club which was an expression of the movement of the Karamah party led by 
177 
 
Hamadein Sabahi. In addition there was a third group called the Nasserist Student Office. It is 
noticeable that the three networks were theoretically in harmony, but in reality they reflected 
organizational disagreement within the Nasserist movement.    
Othman
 
said that one of the most important activities that linked the youth to the Nasserist 
party during that time was the “Shaqshuga” camp in Faioum where the youth from the 
universities used to gather. Another activity was the Arab Youth camping activity which 
constituted one of the instruments of the National Arab Congress. However, Othman argued 
that “those activities were self-funded by students, while the contribution of the Nasserist 
party was limited to issuing statements, as those statements could only be reviewed by the 
party” (Othman, Interview, 7/1/2008). 
 It is worth noting that, despite the existence of these clubs and organizations that belonged to 
the Nasserist Party, the group did not take part in any student elections since the nineties to 
say the least.  The main reason, according to Othman, “was a decision to boycott student 
elections as a party but there was no real chance to win the elections, while the MB used to go 
for elections but excluded from the list of nominees” (Othman, Interview, 7/1/2008). 
Since 2000, while every youth was more or less affected by the Intifada and Iraq invasion, 
large numbers of ordinary young people took to the streets by joining the Nasserist 
Movement. Some were keen to join Karamah while others were keen to join the Nasserist 
Party. Salama argued “the agenda associated with the Karamah Party adopted broad national 
principles, whereby traditional Nasserist members would deem it as non-Nasserist” (Salama, 
Interview, 12/1/2008). Subsequently, one of the Nasserist party clubs became active in Cairo 
University after the Intifada under the label of the Nasserist Arab Student Council. Salama 
said that, “there were eight members in the student council, while there were between 30 and 
35 members in the Cairo youth secretariat” (Salama, Interview, 12/1/2008).  Regarding the 
official membership of the Cairo youth secretariat, there were 40 reliable active members in 
Cairo. But disagreement existed as to the level of commitment to the organization and 
Othman referred to those party sympathizers who were not officially considered as members. 
By the end of the first decade of the 21
st
 century, the Nasserist movement was in decline 
compared to the situation in the nineties which had witnessed its strong position in the 
University of Ain Shams as a result of preventing Israel from taking part in the industrial 
exhibition in 1996. The decline could be estimated at 80% according to Othman. The 
Nasserist student representatives in the interviews were of the opinion that they were second 
to the MB in terms of popular support in Cairo University, as the Karamah movement was 
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popular at Ain Shams University but non-existent at Cairo University. So the Socialists were 
second to the Nasserists at Cairo University.   
Regarding the ideological differences between Nasserists and Socialists, one of the Nasserist 
activists believed that the “Nasserists were more open and straight forward and have nothing 
to hide compared to the Communists who would never admit their real ideology and instead 
they would rather say they were Socialists”.  Yet, they were very similar in rhetoric to the 
Nasserists such as their love for Gamal Abdul Nasser and his pan-Arabs ideology. Another 
activist stressed that “the Communists always resort to illegal ways to recruit students through 
lying emotional means”.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how the regime-control of campus-based student union activism, 
and the reluctance of traditional political party student wings to challenge this directly, led 
students to mobilise outside the structures of established youth activism. Since 2000, while 
every student was more or less affected by the Intifada and Iraq invasion, large numbers of 
ordinary young people took to the streets. Apart from a few interim activities it could be 
generally concluded that the opposition parties seem to be isolated from the student 
movement. Given the revolutionary spirit and enthusiasm shown by the youth they always 
look forward for potential change and criticize the leadership. Moreover, the student 
regulations as stated in the previous chapter restricted political activities at universities, so 
that the traditional political parties avoided direct and open political activities among 
university students. Some opposition parties have used those regulations as an excuse to 
justify their weakness and their absence from the student environment, while the new activism 
resorted to various strategies and tricks to communicate and mobilize. They developed 
strategies that focused on protest-based activities, cooperation across ideological lines and 
connecting with outside campus movements. 
The structure of student activism featured high levels of multiplicity and diversity. Some of 
those networks and movements could be described as brand new such as Al Ghad, while 
others could be described as old and new at the same time such as the Muslim Brothers 
Student wing which rejuvenated with new spirit in terms of either fashion or theme or 
probably the two together.  The assessment of the student movements greatly varies in terms 
of popularity irrespective of the nature of activities performed by those movements. The MB 
student wing is the main player in the student movements and comes in first place followed 
by the other factions particularly the Revolutionary Socialists, Al Amal (Labour party), the 
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Nasserist and Al Ghad. In this respect a strong rivalry existed between the MB and the NDP 
who controlled the formal student unions. Kefaya, April 6, then the ElBaradei Campaign 
movements turned out to represent large segments of students and reflected their dreams 
better than the traditional political parties. The traditional political parties in universities were 
fading while the MB youth wing continued to combine between protest strategy and 
providing services for the students, focusing on the real activities more than the virtual world, 
compared with other young activists who were focusing on the use of social media for 
mobilization. 
This wave of student activism was less ideologically divided, creating new forms of 
cooperation like the Free Student Union. The diversity and variety of networks and collective 
identities among student activism did not prevent the cooperation and coordination against the 
regime when political opportunities emerged. The new wave of activism was ready to 
recognize the political opportunities and sought to maximize the gains by developing 
sufficient mobilizing structures and vehicles to achieve their goals in terms of change. The 
new activism abandoned the strategy of participation in the formal façade of corporatist 
arrangements of the student unions and focused on protest activities. They gave up their 
efforts to be represented through election in the formal structures and engaged with 
contentious politics through the prism of social and protest movements. 
With regard the ideological dimension, it is worth noting that student activism suffered from 
intensive division across ideological lines since 1970s. However, they regained vitality and 
relative recovery by developing strategies that focused on protest-based activities, cooperation 
across ideological lines and connecting with outside campus movements. The activists who 
formed these networks cooperated with each other and developed a common understanding. 
They realized that since 1980, the student movements lost the sense of unity with regard to 
the student causes in favour of political interests and ideologies. The new activism launched 
across ideological platforms to cooperate and coordinate their action. When political 
movements come together for a common cause such as the FSU they become increasingly 
powerful. 
In this regard the demands of youth activism were marked by an uncompromisingly militant 
stand which encouraged the longest wave of protest and activism for decades. This was the 
fruit both of years of disappointment and efforts to construct solidarity among new networks 
and revive old movements with a high tone of militant mode. The university campuses turned 
into one of the main incubators of professional and new activism. These movements and 
networks became one of the major challenges that faced the regime and steadily generated a 
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degree of pressure from below which, within a decade, had rendered the established regime 
vulnerable to change. 
It is worth noting, however, that the evolution of student movements cannot be entirely 
separated from that of youth activism more generally because the constraints on the former 
have forced much student activity into broader youth activism and away from the campuses 
including new movements such as Youth for Change and April 6 Youth Movement which 
played important role in the preparation for the 25
th
 Jan Revolution and afterward. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 Strategic Choices, Organization, Framing And Mobilizations of The 
New Activism: Case Study of April 6  
7.1 Introduction 
April 6 is one of the most prominent Egyptian movements with a clear “youth identity” in 
terms of composition, leadership and structure. The movement played an important role in the 
events which preceded the Egyptian revolution on January 25th 2011 and afterwards. Its roles 
put the movement under the focus and attention of the media and political observers. 
However the lack of academic research in this area has created a lot of misunderstanding and 
stereotypes about the movement both, in academia and the media of both internal and 
international levels.  
Chapter six argues that the April 6 youth movement did not emerge from scratch but it came 
from the womb of the previous waves of continuous politics which had marked the political 
arena in the first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly Al Ghad Youth Union and 
“Youth for Change” (the youth wing of Kefaya). The political opportunities forced the regime 
to co-exist with the formation of clusters of youth activism which benefited from intercalation 
between foreign pressure and internal mechanisms. However the development of the 
movements depended on the building of collective identify as a protest movement which 
would adopt a radical framing process and political strategy to change the regime. In this 
regard the experiences and skills gained from the former waves of protestation since 2000 
helped to develop the internal capacities and influence to challenge the regime. The last 
section of this chapter addresses the main propositions offered by the SMT to explain and 
evaluate the mobilizing structure and frames of the movements.   
It could be argued that April 6 managed to construct its own collective identity as a youth 
protest movement engaged with contentious politics seeking to change the regime through the 
non-violence strategies. The flexible and loose structure enabled the movement to seize the 
available opportunities in terms of taking advantage of the growing interest in local and global 
issues of youth in Egypt and the Arab world, in addition to the use of modern communication 
of information technology which empowered activists of the Millennium generation and 
compensated for the existing weak mobilizing structures. Indeed, the movement paid a great 
cost before the revolution and contributed to the culture of protest among young people but 
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also it continued to suffer from splits, an inability to compete in the electoral arena, and 
strategic mistakes. 
7.2 The Roots of the Movement and Pre-Established Organizational 
Aspects 
The study distinguishes between two stages in the new social movement in terms of the 
different types of mobilization. The first stage consists of convergence around a joint aim and 
protest strategy without any kind of organizational structure while the second stage features 
the intended efforts to build organizational capacities and construct a collective identity for 
the movement. The first stage represents what Bayat (2009) called a “social non-movement” 
or what the political process model describes as movement without organization while the 
second stage represents the rational efforts and process to a gradually transform the 
movements into an organization. In the first stage the activists gathered around the political 
goal to challenge the regime benefiting from the political opportunities without the presence 
of a unified organization. All the efforts and different groups in the first stage were 
spontaneous, based on loose networks and Facebook or Twitter mobilization.  
The first stage took place between March 2008 and June 2008. Social media and personal 
connection played important roles in this stage which represented the pre-established 
organization where discussions and debates began to develop a kind of joint understanding, 
agreements and acquaintance. The activists supported the call for the El-Mahalla strike which 
itself would help to them perceive the political opportunity and to move toward further action. 
It could be argued that the April 6 strike preceded the official formation of the April 6 youth 
movement and not the opposite. The activists understood the need to invest in the event and to 
come together to benefit from the consequences of collective action.  
This stage was marked by a growing recognition among activists for the need to exploit the 
new opportunities after the success of the strike particularly public and media attention which 
was searching for speakers and leaders to produce their demands and express the collective 
action. As a result the question of organization became critical as the new generation of young 
activists were searching for leadership and organizational frameworks to set up an organized 
movement. 
Social movement theorists confirm the reciprocal relationship between culture and 
organization as well as the need for formal or informal networks to help to create a new 
pattern of counter discourse. In this regard the remaining networks from a previous wave of 
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continuous politics in addition to the new social media impact helped to create a new 
awareness among the ordinary young people.   
Before June 2008, from the perspective of social movements, we are talking about a low level 
of networks and organization which was just sufficient to raise awareness and disseminate 
counter-hegemonic discourse. April 6 did not form in April 2008 but it had grown out of other 
movements, like Kefaya and Al-Ghad. Through these loose frameworks the new awareness 
and framing process emerged but without transforming into an organized movement yet. The 
second stage would be marked by the attempts to construct a tight organized hierarchical 
movement.  
The first stage: The impact of Youth for Change and the Millennium generation: 
April 6 came out from the womb of the political and youth activism that have emerged in 
Egypt since 2000 and which benefited from the cooperation between seventies and nineties 
political generations, however April 6 itself represents the Millennium generation which 
sought to lead after the retreat of the other two generations. These young activists benefited 
from the experience and heritage of the older generation as well as from the political 
environment associated with the emergence of political and social protest movement in this 
period. For example, plenty of activists were associated with the Al Ghad party and Kefaya 
youth wing, Youth for Change such as Maher, ElSawy and others (see chap 5; also Shehata; 
2008, p. 6). 
Some of the April 6 documents and manifesto associated the roots of the movement “with the 
Palestinian Intifada and the convergence of youth political movements from the nineties 
generation” (Maher, Discussions before the Revolution, 2008). The “Discussions before the 
Revolution” document referred  to the crystallization of a new approach which emphasized 
that, “supporting Palestine begins from liberating the interior, which developed through the 
emergence of chants against Mubarak during the invasion of Iraq, then the formation of 
Kefaya movement and its youth wing, Youth for Change Movement” of which Maher was 
one of its coordinators. The document also confirmed that the membership and the leadership 
of the Youth for Change movement came from new “generational units” from the nineties and 
Millennium generations who began their political experience in the demonstrations in 2000-
2003 and which was then followed by the recruitment of hundreds of ordinary young 
members. The period of growth and virility was associated with the Kefaya and Al Ghad 
movements during 2004 to 2005. The interviewees confirmed that that “hundreds of members 
attended meetings and thousands were taking part in the demonstrations where at least the 
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attendance in the vigils was about 500 political activists” (Salama, Interview, 12/1/2008 & Al 
Sawy, Interview, 1/10/2010).  
The “Youth for Change” movement gradually began to lose momentum after the presidential 
election in 2005 and the regime crackdown on the political mobility without sufficient support 
from the external context. In addition to internal cultural and political divisions in the 
movement, as Maher illustrated, every group and network in “Youth for Change” began to 
shrink and work for their own group not for the general interest of the movement. The 
“Discussions before the Revolution” document explains the decline of Youth for Change as 
being due to “the orders coming from the older generation who led the traditional parties in 
addition to bigotry and misunderstanding among the young activists themselves which made 
the movement an arena for conflicts partisans”. In this regard the main concern for young 
people belonging to the political parties inside “Youth for Change” was “how to win the 
largest share of the cake of the movement”. In other words the old parties’ members in 
“Youth for Change” were attempting to recruit the new young activists to their parties and 
this created an isolation and conflict between the independent members and the partisans who 
attempted to mobilize the activists to vote for a particular decision which others were against. 
As a result, the disputes over the election emerged and every group or party was keen to elect 
the most possible number of members and supporters to the “Coordinating Committee” of the 
movement. With the continued involvement of older generations and conflicts the movement 
became paralyzed and collapsed. The cut-off point was the failure of the sit-in in supporting 
of the judges demands in 2006, which made activists convinced that “the route of the national 
movement and the struggle in the street was no longer useful, especially after the arrest of 
hundreds of political activists from Kefaya, Youth for Change, Al Ghad and the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the return the security repression” (Maher, Discussions before the 
Revolution, 2008).  
These clashes resulted in the yielding of the large sector of the nineties generation who went 
on to their personal concerns and careers while some of them continued through civil society 
organizations,  whether via human rights or media work, to be far from the direct involvement 
in the protest movement. This withdrawal paved the way for the emergence of the Millennium 
generation in creating the April 6 movement. 
In this regard a number of political parties played roles as incubators for the young activists of 
April 6, Al Ghad and later, in the next stages, the “Democratic Front Party” became vehicle or 
network which young activists benefited. Adel for example emphasized that “plenty of 
activists of April 6 were members of DFP which opened its doors and headquarters to support 
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the new activism” (Adel, Interview, 3/2/2012). Indeed this produced a kind of overlapping 
and entanglements between the youth and social movements in Egypt. The traditional parties 
need the presence of young people in their organizations but without allowing them to reach 
positions of leadership and control while young activists need to use to political party 
resources and benefit from the membership as formal cover to protect them from police 
investigations. This could not happen without a kind of flexibility and pragmatism which 
distinguished the new political generations and which broke through the ideological and 
intellectual barriers drawn by older generations. Adel also distinguished between generations; 
he, for example was DFP party secretary in El-Mansoura attending meetings of youth and 
adults. He noted that, “the meetings focused on the intellectual and theoretical discussions 
while young generation meetings tended to have action-oriented minds” that focused on 
protest and street politics (Adel, Interview, 3/2/2012). 
It could be argued that three elements governed the birth of the April 6 from the perspective 
of political generations. Firstly, the impact of the generational gap, although it arose from the 
networks and movements affiliated to the older generation, the Millennium generation found 
a chance to independently begin their own experience. Secondly, the regime’s repression of 
the middle-age generation (the Seventies generation) convinced the younger generation that 
they could do better in challenging the regime. Thirdly, the young activists used to have a 
critical approach toward the practices and frames of the old generation and sought to mix 
between the new ideas coming from abroad to improve the performance of the new 
organizations such as non-violence methods and the use of social media.  
The April 6 formation reflected the efforts to link between the social and labour wave of 
protest and youth movement in the April 6 strike of 2008. The call for a strike featured a 
parallel mobilization by both textile workers in El-Mahalla and young activists in urban 
centres especially Cairo (Shehata, 2008, p. 2). 
The appearance of the wave of labour protests after 2007 was a great surprise to the activists 
and politicians. Maher (Discussions, 2008, pp. 2, 3) said that, "all politicians were watching 
from afar and wonder... as labour strikes and successive sit-ins took place every day” which 
raised questions about how and who were leading and organizing them. Even parties and 
leftist organizations reached the stage of weakness where they were not able to rally for a 
seminar or meeting. The social movements did not project any political goals or involvement 
in the power struggle but they just focused on their own demands of Mubarak as the head of 
the regime itself in order to implement the demands and raise their concerns about injustice. 
The young activists were convinced that they could help in developing the political awareness 
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of the labour movement; “the social protests demands were factional, simple and sometimes 
appealing to the president despite he who was the cause of their problems” (Ibid, pp. 2.3). 
However the political activists welcomed such social mobility and considered that the social 
mobility played a big role in breaking the fears among ordinary people from repression and 
revived the dream of change (Ibid, p. 3). 
The April 6 Strike 2008: 
The April 6 Strike 2008 highlight the resurgent role of the new activism in the public sphere 
after a short period of abeyance. In March 2008, there were ongoing riots over the bread 
prices, lack of clean water and workers’ wages with an increasing number of labour strikes 
happening every day. The most notable one was planned in the textile town of El-Mahalla el-
Kubra
43
, in a government-owned textile factory, the largest in Egypt with about twenty 
thousand workers 
 
(akhbarak.net). They announced that they were going on strike on the first 
Sunday in April to protest at high food prices and low wages (Rosenberg, 2011). They caught 
the attention of a group of tech-savvy young people who were astonished by the action and 
decided to create a Facebook page in support of the workers which unexpectedly started 
attracting thousands of members in a few days. The Facebook administrators were 27-year-
old Esraa Abdel Fattah and 27-year-old Ahmed Maher at this time (PBS, 2011); both were the 
main co-founders of the Facebook page. The Facebook group called for a public strike on 
April 6 in solidarity with the workers in El-Mahalla. To their shock, the page quickly acquired 
some 70,000 followers. The administrators of the group invited about 300 people to join it; 
within a day it had 3,000 members and within a few weeks, 70,000 had joined the call for 
strikes across Egypt. They got further support from the growing network of bloggers 
(Fleishman, 2011). 
Egypt hadn't seen such events before as it was the first time there had been a call for a public 
strike through social media without sufficient preparations and an organizing body. It was a 
little bit unclear in terms of what they meant by it and what action they would take. Some 
ideas came up like asking people to stay home while others were calling for people to protest 
wearing black. In fact there wasn't a really coordinated body to determine what the solidarity 
strike was supposed to look like. The Facebook members did support it, at least by clicking 
"Follow" or "Like" on Facebook; this is “negative action”. It is worth noting that page 
members did not necessarily believe that they should be involved in street protests, but they 
simply joined the group which later created the main basis for the April 6 movement. The 
                                                     
43An industrial city located in Delta about one hour's drive to the north of the capital city of Cairo. 
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Facebook organizers had never agreed on tactics, whether Egyptians should stay at home or 
fill the streets in protest. People knew they wanted to do something, but no one had a clear 
idea of what that something was (Rosenberg, 2011). Nonetheless, the call for the April 6 
strike was picked up by bloggers and then by the mainstream media and thus received 
widespread attention. It seemed that everyone had heard about the proposed strike. 
A couple days before April 6, the state-owned media came out very strongly against a strike. 
The Rose el-Youssef newspaper warned people not to demonstrate and not to go into the 
streets. There were severe warnings from the government about the potential risks if people 
did protest (Radsch, 2011).  Security forces occupied the factory and forcefully prevented the 
strike in El-Mahalla but later on thousands of workers demonstrated and were joined by other 
citizens from different walks of life and affiliations, leading to a significant confrontation with 
the police force. Three people were shot dead and several were injured (EHDR, 2010, p. 128). 
The strike tapped into the labour unrest in the city where a small scale uprising continued for 
many days and left many people killed or injured by the police (Fleishman, 2011). Some 
estimates raised the number to four killed and 400 arrested (PBS, 2011). Protesters set fire to 
governmental buildings, particularly the NDP building and police station. The solidarity 
protests around Egypt, meanwhile, fizzled out, in most places blocked by police (Rosenberg, 
2011).  
The regime reacted harshly to both the workers’ strike and Facebook group members who 
were attempting to demonstrate in parallel action. In Cairo, several young activists were 
arrested while attempting to demonstrate without great success and were detained for several 
weeks; among them was Esraa Abdel-Fattah who became a public figure in a few days 
because the Facebook page seemed to be at the root of the popular strike and the protests. The 
police initially assumed that she was the organizer and since they were searching for someone 
to bear the responsibility for the events, the picked on her. The Muslim Brothers did not 
officially endorse the strike, although many of the MB bloggers and students did informally. 
It could be argued that the government did not really understand what Facebook was all about 
at that point, so that is why they targeted the administrator. Al-Sheshtawy confirmed that, “the 
situation was really vague for the police as Esraa herself was a new face in the activism field 
compared with other activists particularly Maher who was well known in Al Ghad and Youth 
for Change but Esraa had not been involved before in protest movements” (Al Sheshtawy, 
Interview, 29/1/2012).   
The activists were very proud of the success of the strike and the April 6 documents 
celebrated with some exaggeration in the evaluation of its success. The “Discussions before 
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the Revolution” document (2008) mentioned that, "The response was great for the calls as 
most of the students across the republic declined from going to schools and universities, also 
governmental bodies to a large extent were empty of their employees on this day because of 
the response to the strike”. However, the indicators showed only relative success as many 
people did stay home for many reasons either supporting the strike or fearful from the risks 
after the police statements. In addition to this, many people whose numbers were not known 
stayed home as it was a particularly windy day (Shehata; 2008, p. 6). However the call for a 
May 4 2008 demonstration, on Mubarak’s birthday, which the Muslim Brothers ended up 
endorsing, completely failed because it was not linked to any labour protestation (Al 
Sheshtawy, Interview, 29/1/2012). It was just a Facebook strike, whereas April 6, 2008, was a 
Facebook strike in solidarity with real strikers in the field.  
7.3 The Second Stage: The Official Formation of April 6 
There is a false impression among some observers that there was a movement or organization 
before April 6, 2008 called “April 6 Youth” movement. This reflects the lack of knowledge 
and empirical research which led to for misunderstandings and artificial interpretations about 
the political movement in Egypt. This quotation illustrates this problem in the analysis; “On 
March 23, 2008, a small group of young Egyptian activists calling themselves the April 6 
Youth Movement launched a Facebook page” (PBS, Inside April 6). Another 
misunderstanding was to consider Esraa Abdel Fattah as a co-founder of the April 6 Youth 
Movement (Anarchitext, 2011). Actually she was just a co-founder of the Facebook group. 
The empirical research confirmed that there was not any national organized structure call for 
the April 6 strike but the formation came after the success of the strike. SMT stresses the 
political opportunity and context of the emergence of a movement which was in this case 
connected with the call for strike. Indeed the strike created a new political opportunity 
enabling young activists to benefit from the existing formal
44
 and informal networks in 
addition to the influence of the new social media in order to develop their own organization. It 
could be argued that in such specific context, the failure of the security forces to strike a 
balance between repression and cooptation created a new opportunity. This failure has 
become one of the reasons behind the emergence of the April 6 youth movement after the 
strike
45
. In this regard the security response against the April 6 strike helped it to succeed as it 
frightened large segments of ordinary people from going out and many preferred to stay at 
                                                     
44 Such as opposition parties and syndicates particularly Journalists and Lowers 
45 Similar pattern took place in January 25th revolution. 
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home. An important lesson that can be drawn from the April 6 Youth is that, although the 
movement was repressed by the government, it caught the attention of the local and 
international media and drew attention to how social networking technology can be used, 
especially by youth activism, in organizing political opposition movements and exposing 
autocratic governments’ ‘unsatisfactory’ performance (EHDR; 2010, p. 129). To some extent 
the regime was relatively shocked by what the state media thought was the activists’ ability to 
get all of these people to buy into something just via social media (Radsch, 2011). 
In addition to this, the police suppression and tactics such as arresting and crackdown had a 
similar impact on creating the movement as the arrested activists became public figures and 
new symbols which inspired young generations. Indeed, Esraa and Maher did not launch a 
movement before the April 6 strike; they just established a Facebook page. People create 
pages every day but not a movement. There was no concerted effort to create a movement 
before the strike, but afterwards, they began to form it when they saw the success in 
mobilizing thousands of people to stay home and 70,000 Facebook fans
46
.  
The historical event itself created the appropriate opportunity for young activists of the 
Millennium generation to seek to form their own political action. They began to think how to 
turn it into a political and social organization. The repression began to relax as the police 
recognized that there was no specific organization behind the bloody strike particularly after 
arresting and investigating both Esraa and Maher who had been tortured to give the police the 
Facebook group password. The public opinion was sympathetic to the young girl who just 
showed interest in other people’s problems. Esraa was jailed for more than two weeks. After 
her televised release, she renounced her activism. Al-Sheshtawy confirmed that Esraa and 
Maher split over who should control and direct the Facebook page (Al Sheshtawy, Interview, 
29/1/2012). 
Maher took the initiative to launch a movement in a similar pattern to “Youth for Change” 
with various coordinators from different networks and youth groups. Asmaa Mahfouz (April 
6, 2011) pointed out that the real date for the announcement of the forming of the movement 
was June 28, 2008, in the Journalists Syndicate conference in the presence of young people 
                                                     
46 This is a very compelling case of repression triggering movement formation (cf. also della Porta on 
the effect of police killings on the RAF in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy; or the effect of the 
lynching of Emmett Till on the Civil Rights Movement in the US (Harris, Fredrick (2006), ‘It takes a 
tragedy to arouse them’, Social Movement Studies 5(1): 19-43). See also the general literature 
overview in Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004. 
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from different ideological trends and independent members. The regime responded by trying 
to contain the movement turning harshly afterward. The police exerted pressure on the 
activists sending threats to their families and their employs and some of them began to lose 
their jobs because of the political activities (Ibid). The Alexandria Incident on July 23, 2008 
witnessed the police crackdown on the activists within a month of its establishment. A group 
of April 6 activists went from Cairo to Alexandria to attend a seminar at the Al Ghad party to 
commemorate the 23 July Revolution on the beach (Fahmy Ibrahim, April 6, 2011). The 
security services attacked the tiny gathering while some of the activists constructed a giant 
kite out of bamboo poles and a sheet of plastic painted to look like the Egyptian flag. The 
police assault exploded into a frenzy of punches and shoves. Sixteen activists were arrested, 
most of them were in their twenties or younger. The other activists dispersed from the beach, 
feeling hot and frustrated; they didn’t even get a chance to fly their kite (Bayat, 2009, p. 10). 
The challenge and response: 
Following the establishment of April 6 as Social movement organization (SMO), it began a 
new stage which was marked by severe challenges; some of which were internal relating to 
the possibilities and methods of building and developing the organizational capacity and 
resources. The movement also sought to construct a collective identity and joint solidarity 
within the movement through cultural and ideological tools and frameworks. However, other 
challenges emerged in the surrounding environment relating to the methods and techniques of 
protesting against the authoritarian regime in international and regional contexts.  
The problem facing the April 6 strike after the establishment was the dilemma between social 
media mobilization based on Facebook and Twitter for protest and the balance of power in the 
real world between the regime and a nascent youth movement. The coordination committee 
decided to continue in the confrontation but attempted to join hands with other opposition 
groups, be they either secular or religious, like the ElBaradei Campaign for Presidency and 
the Muslim Brothers in arranging protests. For example, April 6 cooperated with the MB to 
organize the May 4 strike in 2009 and announced the group would coordinate online support 
for ElBaradei nomination (Wikileaks, 2009). The movement tried to work under the umbrella 
of the ElBaradei Campaign or at least to be one of the main groups that supported his 
activities (Mahfouz, April 6 and the foreign finance, 2011). But as Al-Nagar showed, “the 
campaign created its own organization” and he became the formal coordinator of the 
campaign (Mostafa Elngar, interview, 22/9/2010). This created competition with other groups 
and networks in the ElBaradei Campaign which had different ideas.   
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It is worth noting that the subsequent calls for strikes failed to achieve the same impact as 
April 6 2008.  The movement called for another strike on April 6, 2009 but it did not succeed 
because it was not connected with labour strikes on the ground in addition to being targeted 
by the security forces which had learned from their mistakes in 2008. The main sites of the 
strike took place in universities, particularly in regional universities without sufficient media 
coverage. Adel, who was Secretary of the DFP in El-Mansoura at this time, mentioned that 
“around fifteen thousand students took part in the strike in El-Mansoura University in the east 
Delta area but the demonstration was under a security siege and many activists were arrested” 
(Moataz Adel, Interview, 3/2/ 2012). However, most observers saw the national ‘Anger Day’ 
as a big failure that led to the emergence of disputes among different factions which increased 
after the rumours that some members had got some American funds and training. Al-
Sheshtawy pointed out that “the Nasserist and Islamists Al Amal youth groups dissented and 
attempted to compose a different group using the name of April 6 and declared that the 
membership of coordinator of the movement Ahmed Maher was frozen” (Al Sheshtawy, 
Interview, 29/1/2012). They composed a new group on Facebook but the total number of its 
membership was very low and eventually they gave up. On the other hand the main group on 
Facebook continued using the same name and attempted to increase its activities and 
membership. The failure of the 2009 strike and the internal divisions motivated its leadership 
to abandon the big dreams and to focus on small activities. In contrast to what had happened 
in 2008, the April 6 activities in the second half of 2009 were limited and restricted to only 
gatherings or conferences in a number of syndicates and public universities. For example, the 
activists distributed flyers in universities, asking the students to “engage in the political and 
social reform of their community"
47
. 
The movement responded to these challenges by cooperating with other political movements 
like the MB and sought to gain experience and learn new techniques by learning from other 
experiences worldwide. The movement was preparing itself to call for the April 6, 2009 
strike, but the activists became aware of the limitations and constraints. Ahmed Salah, one of 
the controversial members of the movement, told the American ambassador in Cairo on 
December 6, 2008 that “this would be ‘impossible’ due to SSIS48 interference”. He “conceded 
that April 6 has no feasible plans for future activities”. The police repression had driven the 
group's leadership underground, and many of its leaders were in hiding for weeks (Scobey, 
Wikileaks, 2008). However the activists’ goal was to “replace the current regime with a 
parliamentary democracy prior to the 2011 presidential elections”. The American embassy 
                                                     
47 http://ja-jp.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=38588398289&topic=15612&post=83109 
48 State Security of Investigation Service ( Mabaheth Aman Eldwala) 
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analysts’ assessment was that the activism “offered no road map of concrete steps toward 
April 6's highly unrealistic goal”. They also mentioned that, “most opposition parties and 
independent NGOs work toward achieving tangible, incremental reform within the current 
political context” (Ibid). It is worth noting that Salah, in this interview, either just representing 
himself or the movement, was reflecting the April 6 aims which were unrealistic from the 
American diplomats’ perspective. Actually, these were the idealistic goals of April 6 because 
of the revolutionary mood among the young activists and their ability to dream and use the 
political imagination which attracted many ordinary young people, while traditional political 
parties and the Americans themselves considered them not to be viable. 
The Serbian training: 
April 6 effectively continued to use social media in organizing protests but the regime’s harsh 
repression in the real world shrank its ability to extend and grow. Rosenberg (2011) argued 
that, “what worked so smoothly online proved much more difficult on the street”. It was easy 
for the police to block the protests and prevent activists from interacting with ordinary people. 
In this respect the April 6 leadership began to realize the deadlock and the “limits of social 
networking as a tool of democratic revolution. Facebook could bring together tens of 
thousands of sympathizers online, but it couldn't organize them once they logged off. It was a 
useful communication tool to call people to; well, to what?” (Ibid). Rosenberg’s argument 
assumed that Facebook was the main reason behind the success of the first April 6 strike, 
notwithstanding there were many factors that worked together to bring such success as has 
been discussed previously. However, the activists realized that they faced great challenges 
and dilemmas that needed a new more complicated approach. Adel confirmed “it was not a 
matter of calling for demonstrations or strikes on Facebook, but what was extremely 
important was how to implement on the ground through the cadres and activists who think 
and plan for it”. Adel also distinguished between “the social media used by well-educated 
middle and upper classes activists to spread democratic values and the street activism from 
middle and lower classes who did not regularly log on to Facebook or Twitter” (Moataz Adel, 
Interview, 3/2/ 2012).  
The activists continued to protest in the streets and organize conferences and gatherings but it 
was very difficult to turn them into a real challenge to the regime particularly after the failure 
of the May 4 strike and the internal split in 2009. Asmara Mahfouz (April 6, 2011)
 
 said that, 
“the failure shocked everyone and accusation about the responsibility appeared between the 
coordinators” and ideological factions particularly liberals and Nasserist and Al Amal 
(labour) activists. They began to search for new methods to organize effective protests in the 
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street to enable them to face the police repression. Al-Sheshtawy said that, “Mohammed Adel, 
a 20-year-old blogger and April 6 spokesman, travelled with others to Serbia in the summer of 
2009 to attend a training course while other members like Basem Fathy went to the USA to 
attend another training course organized by Freedom House” (Al Sheshtawy, Interview, 
29/1/2012). The activists studied the non-violent tactics of Serbian and Ukrainian youth 
activism and were taught by people who had organized the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević 
in the 1990s (PBS, 2011). Another report mentioned that Maher studied the Solidarity Union 
in Poland that brought had down communism there in the 1980s (Fleishman, 2011). In this 
regard the young activists began to see the young Serbs as heroes who had revolted against 
one of the worst dictatorships in the world. In Belgrade, April 6 activists “took a week-long 
course in the strategies of non-violent revolution” and “learned how to organize people” in 
addition to “how to train others” in Egypt (Rosenberg, 2011). The tactics were straight out of 
CANVAS's training curriculum. Adel Said, an activist from April 6, talked about his 
experience with the Serbs and said, “I got trained in how to conduct peaceful demonstrations, 
how to avoid violence, and how to face violence from the security forces… and also how to 
organize to get people on the streets”. The April 6 movement knew about Otpor and adopted 
the fist as its logo even before Mohamed Adel went to Belgrade. Though the activists did not 
visit Serbia again, they “kept emailing, occasionally pointing out mistakes in Arabic 
translations of CANVAS materials”. Adel had gone home with copies of “Bringing down a 
Dictator” subtitled in Arabic and continued to download books. He “conducted miniature 
versions of the CANVAS workshop in Egypt, stressing unity, non-violent discipline, the 
importance of clear goals, and keeping members engaged” (Rosenberg, 2011). Many of the 
analysts considered this journey not only a turning point that helped April 6 strategy to 
overcome the shortcomings and setbacks, but also played an important role in the January 25
th
 
revolution. Rosenberg (2011) pointed out that “their trainers in Serbia were happy with the 
young activist roles in 25
th
 January as Srdja Popovic, one of CANVAS's leaders said, ‘We 
were quite amazed they did so much with so little’".  
These training courses helped the movement but also created many internal disputes and 
provoked accusations that the activists were traitors. Though these courses added to the 
accumulation of experience, the exact benefits and achievements of these programmes were 
difficult to measure and weigh. It is also difficult to measure their contribution to the 
preparation for the revolution since summer 2009 as other networks and movements emerged 
either in the real or virtual world such as ElBaradei Campaign and the Khalid Saeed Facebook 
group in addition to new websites such as “Academia for change” which focus on learning 
Arab activists the non-violence strategies.   
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It is worth noting that some reductionist views produced by the media were spread about the 
movement and the role of social media, For example, a report from the geopolitical analysis 
group Stratfor mentioned that April 6 “became the most important organizers of the 18-day 
peaceful uprising” (Rosenberg, 2011). April 6 was “at the forefront of a surge that would 
energize millions, unite secularists and Islamists and force Mubarak to flee his palace” 
(Fleishman, 2011). This vision tended to look at April 6 as a hierarchical organization that 
had tens of thousands of organized members. It also considered April 6 was the most 
prominent movement in the 25
th
 uprising while its role as a part of the new activism 
represented a small tip of the iceberg of activism which included tens of networks and 
factions. The difficulties which faced April 6 were more complicated and could not easily be 
resolved by training courses or the usage of social media. These challenges arose from the 
political culture and the internal mechanisms of the new types of social movements.   
The preparation for the revolution:  
There were plenty of prominent events that enabled activists to gain momentum in 2010, the 
most important being the return of Mohammed ElBaradei and the launching of the Khalid 
Saeed Facebook page in addition to the rigged parliamentary election. They provoked a new 
wave of protest by increasing the political awareness of hundreds of thousands of Millennium 
generation activists engaged with continuous politics for the first time seeking for change. In 
this regard, Adel confirmed that, “the old and new networks began to join hands to coordinate 
their activities in the real world. This new type of coordination and leadership began to 
emerge through Facebook, particularly Khalid Saeed’s page” (Moataz Adel, Interview, 3/2/ 
2012). 
The return of ElBaradei to Egypt on  20
th 
February 2010, after launching his campaign for the 
presidency and the National Association for Change, revived the wave of political-oriented 
protest. Al-Nagar confirmed that “ElBaradei Campaign aimed to penetrate and reach the 
ordinary young people and not only the professional activists and create a new independent 
movement”(Mostafa Elngar, interview, 22/9/2010). ElBaradei’s arrival encouraged large 
segments of young people either to join the new movement or the existing networks such as 
April 6 which supported the campaign. However it was keen to keep its independent 
organizational structure and original identity.  
April 6, in cooperation with other networks, spent the period before 25
th
 January blending 
internet activism with the more important strategy of drawing scared and complacent people 
into the streets. April 6 set up branches and staged quick-hit acts of street protest, such as 
spray-painting "The regime is over" on city walls. Copycat movements began and in the early 
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weeks of 2011, the rebellion was born. April 6 with other groups were in the forefront of the 
uprising (Fleishman, 2011). It resorted to the tactics successfully employed a year ago; social 
media campaigns, demonstrations, graffiti art, online statements and flyers recounting the 
regime abuses (Fadel, 2012). 
By the end of 2010 and January 2011, April 6 held the conference called the “small minority”, 
encouraged the boycotting of the 2010 election and participated in the formation of the 
“parallel parliament” after the fraud in the parliamentary elections in November 2010. 
Mohamed Shawky, who was in charge of the mass action in Elmaady district said that, “he 
and many young activists were arrested while attempting to uncover and expose the regime's 
atrocities that happened in the massacre of Saints Church in Alexandria during Christmas 
night 2011” (Shawky , interview, 15/2/2012). The movement, with other groups picked 
January 25
th, 2011, the “Police Day” to be their date for protest. The Tunisian revolution had 
created a different feeling and new hope for younger activists and ordinary young people.  
“Beside the public calls and activities, there were secret meetings for the preparation to avoid 
the security pressure” (Shawky , interview, 15/2/2012). He pointed out that, “in one of these 
meetings they decided to begin a sudden march in new tactics instead of announcing the 
demonstration on Facebook and its place”. The activist realized “the importance of keeping 
the place of demonstration secret till the last minute and on the 25
th
 all groups gathered in a 
specific place then moved to the secret site of the demonstration to take the police security by 
surprise” (Shawky , interview, 15/2/2012).  
Fifteen days before the date, April 6 set up an “operation room” which Maher identified as 
having as its purpose “to discuss routine details including assessing the reach of our calls to 
protest with regards to internet websites, looking at the data and information that was being 
provided to citizens, and studying innovative mechanisms of protesting which aimed to 
overcome the methods that the state security services always use to pre-empt demonstrations 
and protests” (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2011). Two days before the planned protest, they organized 
themselves in cells of 30-50 activists; each cell was to regroup in a pre-selected spot in Cairo, 
but only one person in each cell would direct the cell to the main secret point. The Asmaa 
Mahfouz video called “Don't be afraid of the government” went viral and encouraged 
thousands of activists to join the protest movement. Shawky confirmed that, “the movement 
announced to demonstrate in El-Mohandseen, a well-off district on the 25
th
 January but they 
decided later to come down in Nahiya, a popular poor district which enabled them to collect 
thousands of demonstrators”. The preparation stage featured plenty of meetings between April 
6 and other youth activism that supported the calling for the demonstration and all activists 
responsible for the mass action or coordinators on April 6 in specific areas met with their 
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counterparts in other movements to arrange for the preparation of the demonstrations 
(Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012).  
During the days of the revolution the demands rose to focus on the slogan that, “people want 
to topple the regime”. As the Tahrir Square protests gained momentum through late 
January/early February 2011, the April 6 group issued specific demands on February 6
th
 2011: 
 Mubarak must immediately resign. 
 The national assembly and senate must be dissolved. 
 A "national salvation group" must be established.  
 To form a transitional presidential council until the next presidential elections. 
 A new constitution must be written to guarantee the principles of freedom and social 
justice. 
 Those responsible for killing of hundreds of "martyrs" in Tahrir Square must be 
prosecuted. 
 Detainees must be released immediately (PBS, Inside April6, 2011). 
7.4 April 6 Role after the 25
th
 January Revolution: The Main Phases  
The study divides the trajectory of April 6 after 11 February 2011 until the presidential 
election into four phases. April 6 activists initially sought to maximize their power in 
cooperation with the new government and through reaching out to people who were not 
previously politicized. However the relationship reversed in July 2011 after the confrontation 
with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces that ruled the state after Mubarak. From July 
onwards, the SCAF successfully constructed a narrative to delegitimize April 6 and to make 
associating with them dangerous (Fadel, 2012). The situation became complicated because of 
the internal splits and lack of ability to compete in the election with the traditional parties.  
First phase: the Romantic Phase:  
The prominent features which distinguished this phase were the romantic revolutionary 
feelings, high expectations and desire for cooperation with the new government. However a 
tragic split began to emerge. The great success of the revolution to overthrow Mubarak and 
the worldwide appreciation of the young people’s role was a motivation and huge boost to the 
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revolutionary spirit among the youth activists who began enjoyed the moments of victory and 
glory. The youth activism was very proud of their role in provoking the protests that forced 
Mubarak from power.   
The popularity of April 6 soared to a peak after helping to orchestrate the protests and poll 
results released in April by the Pew Research Centre found that 38% of Egyptians regarded 
the movement as a favourable agent of change, ahead of the Muslim Brothers and trailing 
only behind Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, the head of the SCAF, and Amr Moussa, the 
former foreign minister who became popular figure (Fadel, 2012). 
In the aftermath of the January uprising, April 6 strategy was to maximize their power 
benefiting from their role in the revolution (Fadel, 2012). One of the most strategic options 
was the cooperation with Essam Sharaf’s government and attempts to calm the streets, in 
addition to playing the role of monitoring the government and ministers to judge on their 
actions. Both the government and the SCAF positively responded to the requests of activists. 
On February 14
th
, Maher referred to the new role of the April 6 movement in calming the 
protest, “Those who are demonstrating have their own issues. We made the decision not to 
demonstrate while we wait for a response to our demands. We can always go back to the 
street” (PBS, 2011). Others rejected this approach, such as the Socialist activist Hossam el-
Hamalawy who thought that the fight as far from over, “Activists can take some rest from the 
protest and go back to their well-paying jobs for six months, waiting for the military to give 
us salvation. But the worker can't go back to his factory and still get paid 250 pounds. The 
mission is not accomplished” (Ibid). 
This phase was marked by many aspects of both cooperating and monitoring the government 
such as formal meetings and discussions. For example, a delegation from April 6 led by 
Maher met with the minister of interior, Mansour Al’Esawy, on 11th June 201149. The minster 
invited them to attend the National Security conference. They also met with Deputy Prime 
Minister Ali Selmi and a Japanese delegation to discuss pro-democracy movements 
(Fleishman, 2011). In this stage, April 6 also organized a conference in collaboration with the 
                                                     
49https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=121342731284733&set=a.119279621491044.29804.119276198158
053&type=1&permPage=1 
198 
 
Cairo Centre for the Culture of Democracy
50
 entitled "Youth: From Revolution to Rise of 
Egypt" in July in the Pyramisa Hotel at Dokki
 
(April 6 Youth Conference, 2011)
51
. 
The April 6 leadership attempted to devise new approaches that connected politics to the 
needs of the people. For example, the movement’s branch in the Menya governorate helped in 
solving the gas cylinder crisis (Ahram Weekly, 22/6/2011). However this approach could not 
become the main priority of the movement because its main strategic option was exerting 
pressure for reform through demonstrations. The movement’s main strategy was to focus on 
street activism as long as the complicated problems existed. 
 In fact the April 6 strategy to connect politics to the people’ needs did not last long because 
of its involvement in daily confrontations with the SCAF and police in the following stages. It 
is worth noting that the language used by April 6 members and other activists focused on 
giving orders to the officials for example, ”the governor must decree a law that gives the 
cylinders to licensed distributors only” (Ibid). This language reflected the idealism and 
romantic feeling of the revolution heroes who felt entitled to give orders which the SCAF and 
government must implement. 
The Second phase: exerting pressure through demonstrations  
This stage was marked by demonstrations and Friday gatherings to exert pressure on the 
SCAF to achieve the revolution goals in addition to critical assessment of the SCAF 
decisions. By now, it had become clear that the military junta was in control while the 
government of Sharaf, appointed from Tahrir, was extremely weak due to a lack of real power 
and authority. April 6 confirmed “the need to pressure constantly, and stated that instability 
was a main characteristic of any revolution and that it is slowly improving” (BBC, 
22/6/2011). It should be noted that April 6 was discriminating between the position of the 
SCAF and that of the government, trying to maintain the ties with the government (which, 
was considered a revolutionary one, and appointed by Tahrir’s influence to replace the 
government of Shafik appointed by Mubarak). Until June the demonstrations were peaceful 
and communications with the government existed. The communication and meetings were 
held to propose a reshuffle of ministers of the government. April 6 met with the Prime 
Minister Sharaf to give him a recommended list of new ministers to take the posts of those 
resigning in a wave of changes (Ahram Weekly, 13/7/2011). The group rejected the 
                                                     
50 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cairo_Center_for_the_Culture_of_Democracy 
51 This event was criticized by other groups because of tension over Tahrir at this time and well off a which might 
refer to external financial support 
199 
 
appointment of pro-SCAF Faiza Abo-Elnagah for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as she was 
thought to be working against Egyptian activists in the U.S. (April 6 statement, 22/6/2011). 
Several ambiguous confrontations took place in the street between the SCAF military police 
and some activists after Friday gatherings aimed at prosecuting Mubarak, particularly on 8th 
March where some dissident officers were arrested and detained. Polarized feelings were 
evident in demonstrations, where supporters of the April 6 group chanted slogans against 
military rule while onlookers watched warily (Fadel, 2012). Consequently, the doubts 
deepened when the SCAF held an official meeting with hundreds of youth factions which 
April 6 considered as an attempt to break up youth coalitions and support groups loyal to it.  
The Third phase: The Confrontation   
The sense among youth activists was growing that they were gradually losing the momentum 
and the revolution. Maher wrote on his Facebook account in early July 2011 that, “the 
revolution is stolen”. The activists thought the SCAF intended to replace the revolutionary 
groups that had a role in the preparation for January 25 with other new groups linked to the 
SCAF. Maher confirmed that, “there were revolutionary youth associations and youth 
activism led by security and intelligence informants and their mission was to distort the 
groups that played key roles in the revolution”. He sharply criticized the SCAF whom he said 
“considered our revolution a foreign plot to destabilize and overthrow the regime”. The 
activists tried to recapture the public’s support but became involved in a bitter dispute with 
the military council, which retained strong public backing at this time (Fleishman, 2011). On 
the other hand, in July 2011, the military issued a statement accusing April 6 of “driving a 
wedge between the army and the people”. A member of the SCAF accused the group of 
getting illicit training in Serbia, and several members were arrested (Fadel, 2012). The 
generals accused April 6 of "igniting strife" between the army and the people (Fleishman, 
2011).  
The movement responded by suing the SCAF and organizing a march to the ministry of 
defence in order to condemn and reject the accusations made in the SCAF’s statement no. 69. 
The demonstrators were attacked by alleged thugs while the military police and army stood by 
watching. The attacks brought to the activists’ minds similar scenes of violence from the 
security forces and thugs from the 25
th
 January revolution. April 6 issued a statement against 
the SCAF and army stating that it was not “our Egyptian army” that sacrificed its blood, but 
the SCAF’s army (Ahram Weekly, 24/7/ 2011). The movement defended itself against the 
SCAF’s allegations that it was funded by the U.S. and has secret links with Israel. The 
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movement’s demands were that “the military council either present all evidences and 
documents against the youth movement in its possession to the general prosecutor or 
officially apologize”. The April 6 statement issued on 23 July about clashes at Abbasiya 
Square claimed that the “SCAF's mask has fallen down to reveal the face of Mubarak once 
again” (Ibid). 
This confrontation provoked angry feelings in the streets because of the backdrop of 
economic and political instability after months of clashes between security forces and 
demonstrators that had disrupted daily life. Although April 6 once had near-heroic status, the 
SCAF and state-owned media succeeded in portraying the group as agents of a foreign-
backed insurrection (Fadel, 2012). The SCAF got remarkable support from some Islamists 
especially among the Salafi trend in this confrontation. In this regard, April 6 became very 
close to the liberal camp while the Islamic-secular polarization was increasing. Maher pointed 
out that, “Islamists were pressing for power and election while April 6 must protect the 
country from religious extremists” (Fleishman, 2011). 
Most of the Salafi leaders were clearly against April 6 and youth activism. Mohamed Yousry, 
the Secretary-General of the Commission Legitimacy of the Rights and Reform stated that 
“what April 6 were doing has been applied and implemented in non-Islamic countries” and 
accused it of having connection “with, Freemasonry and crusade to dismantle the Egyptian 
state”. Yasser Borhamy, Vice President of the Salafi movement, also criticized the activists 
accusing them that “want to drive a wedge between the people and the army” and that, “the 
witnesses in Alexandria proved that the protesters are the ones who started throwing stones at 
the citizens and the military police” (Ahram, 25/7/2011). In later stages, some of the Islamists 
apologized for these accusations they made without any evidence.  
The confrontations and mutual accusations continued for months. Political activists continued 
to accuse the SCAF of “botching their transitional rule, working against democracy and 
conducting deadly crackdowns on unarmed protesters” (Fadel, 2012). In November, April 6 
was also accused of being involved in the bloody confrontation of Muhammad Mahmoud 
street and the burning of the scientific historical building (Engy Hamdy, 29/2/2012). The 
movement denied all these accusations and confirmed they were still strong and that six 
thousand new members had joined the movement in the three months since the July 
confrontation, as these events prompted the citizens to sympathize with them rather than stay 
away from them (Maher, youm7, 25/9/2011).. However, later, Maher admitted that the 
movement suffered from the attack that “destroyed our reputations. This is more dangerous 
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than detention or arrest” as “they have the most powerful weapon of all: the media”  (Fadel, 
2012). 
 
The Fourth phase: The controversy over the election strategy: 
April 6 decided to boycott the election despite the participation of other liberal and secular 
parties in addition to an April 6 faction known as the Democratic Front. There were no 
published polls to gauge the youth activists’ popularity after these confrontations, but the 
multi-phase parliamentary elections suggested that the youth movement’s support had faded 
badly with only 2% of seats projected to go to the ‘Revolution Continues’ coalition which 
included the Democratic Front and which Maher’s faction decided to boycott. Altogether, 
liberal parties were projected to take only 20%  of parliamentary seats, compared with 62% 
projected to go to Islamist candidates, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
ultra-conservative Salafi (Fadel, 2012). The results made Maher’s supporters claim that his 
strategy was better than those who had participated and failed to get the majority. The 
movement refused to participate or to support any candidates of electoral blocs (including 
liberal blocs). The activities of the movement during the election process were determined by 
two tasks; first, exposing the former NDP candidates known as “Foloul” to citizens, and 
secondly monitoring any election violations (Maher, 25/9/2011). In the presidential election, 
April 6 decided to observe and monitor without supporting any candidate in the first round 
but in the second run-off they supported the MB candidate Mohamed Morsi, against Ahmed 
Shafiq who was considered to have been very close to Mubarak’s regime and near to the 
SCAF. 
7.5 The Internal Organizational Capacities and Collective Identity  
The process of developing the mobilizing structure and cultural frames featured intense 
debate about the continuity and change in the movement. One of the main characteristics of 
April 6 and other youth activism was their fluidity and liquidity. These kinds of new social 
movements in the Egyptian context were always experiencing long stages of reshaping the 
organization and constructing their collective identity which is still in progress and not stable 
or strict. However, this led to various splits and instability in the structure. Indeed, April 6 
developed a more stable structure and collective identity and strategic choices compared to 
other youth networks such as Youth for Change, but still needed to be articulate this in more 
complex and specific terms and concepts.  
In this regard the internal organizational structure of April 6 featured multiple phases and 
changes in response to the external conditions and political challenges on the one hand, and 
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internal splits on the other hand. Its leadership confirmed that, “the movement is open for any 
proposal for changing and developing its internal regulations such as the suggestion for 
holding the election” (Maher, Interview, 20/1/2012). As Maher pointed out in the interview, 
“the restructuring and holding the election are still ongoing processes” (Ibid).   
It is important to explore and evaluate the main elements featured in the mobilizing structures 
as have been introduced by the SMT theorist which include; leadership, membership and 
recruitment, internal cohesion and internal democracy, financial resources, and ability to 
connect between formal and informal networks.  
The Political Bureau of the Movement: 
The main structure of the movement consists of the general coordinator, and administrative 
bureau which includes the founders, coordinators, provincial and official committees. As 
stated before, the leadership of April 6 in the virtual world during the April 6 strike in 2008 
consisted of both Esraa Abdel Fattah and Ahmed Maher as the co-founders of the Facebook 
group. Esraa did not have a formal position in the movement after formally launching it in 
June 2008; she became one of the civil society activists who ran the Egyptian Democratic 
Institute. On the other hand Maher was considered the main leader of April 6 and founder of 
the movement.  
However, according to the principle of “Trial and Error”, the structure was not constant but 
changed over time on a number of occasions. Maher pointed out that, “the structure in the 
beginning and during the stage of formation since 2008 was simple and similar to Kefaya and 
its “Youth for Change” wing (Maher, Interview, 20/1/2012). The movement divided its goals 
and activities according to different tasks; assigning coordinators for a particular file or task. 
When there was a consensus or agreement about something, they allocated members to carry 
out the necessary tasks and jobs and to be responsible for it. However, at the beginning of 
2009 they resorted to committees and the most prominent among which were the following 
three; Media, Mass, Educational Committees (Maher, Interview, 20/1/2012). Some of the 
coordinators in charge of these committees split after a clash in May 2009 and new 
coordinators had been appointed. Maher pointed out that in 2010 a fourth committee was 
created called ‘Organizational and Internal Communications’. In 2011, due to the complexity 
of the political situation and the flow of membership in the thousands per month, a fifth 
committee called the ‘Membership and Provincial Affairs Committee’ was created (Maher, 
Interview, 20/1/2012). 
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Thus the structure consisted of five official committees according to Maher and these were: 
Media Committee, Mass and Public Action Committee, Educational and Cultural Committee, 
Organizational and Internal Communications Committee and Membership and Provincial 
Affairs Committee. These general committees began to have within them sub-committees 
such as the media committee which formed a research committee to support the theoretical 
side, educational process and decision support. Maher pointed out also that “various 
suggestions emerged about the separation between planning and implementation and conduct 
of elections” (Maher, Interview, 20/1/2012). 
It is worth noting that April 6 refused to announce the names of members who were in charge 
of the organizational structure, but in the light of the internal disputes after the revolution, one 
of its Facebook pages published some information about the names and members of the 
Political Bureau on 12th June 2011 with notification about what the Facebook and the Internet 
websites said to represent the group officially, but later on, the page deleted the portion of the 
statement that mentioned the coordinators
52
. The members of the bureau, according to what 
had been published, were: Ahmed Maher. Mohamed Mahmoud, Ingy Hamdi, Mohamed Adel, 
Ahmed Nadeem, Ahmed Abdul Aziz, Amal Sharaf, Mustafa Beheiri, Mahmoud Afifi, Nada 
To'eima, Amr Ali, Mohammad Sami, Islam Saeed,  Mohammed Mustafa, Walid Rashid. 
According to Shawky, “the movement has known a constant central structure from 2009-2012 
after the separation of the leaders of the group called ‘Will not Pass’ in 2009”. He claimed 
that, “the core leadership that exchanged positions and responsibilities in the Central Bureau 
includes: Ahmed Maher, Amal Sharaf, Ingy Hamdi, Amr Ezz, Mohamed Adel” (Shawky, 
interview, 15/2/2012). He added that, “the coordinators in charge of Mass and Public Action 
committee were Amr Ali and Amr Ezz before the revolution until the split in mid-2011 then 
Amr Ali again”. Moreover, “the coordinators in charge of Media Committee were Asmaa 
Mahfouz then Ingi Hamdi, assisted by Tariq Al-Kholi before separation, then Mohamed Adel 
who was in charge of the internet website, then Mahmoud Afifi” (Shawky, interview, 
15/2/2012). 
                                                     
52 The researcher saved this page on his computer as soon as it appeared, then could find it again on Facebook. 
But still considered to be relevant and draws the general picture of April 6 structure at this time. 
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=121199887965684&set=a.119279621491044.29804.1192761
98158053&type=1&ref=nf 
June 12, 2011 
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The membership and Election:  
April 6 leaders stated that the number of members was twenty thousand in mid-2011 and they 
distinguished between two types of membership: organized and affiliated members. The 
members who worked as engineers or doctors, etc., were paying a monthly subscription value 
of about 20 Egyptian pounds (Maher, Interview in El-Mehour channel, 2011). Maher’s 
figures about the twenty thousand who were regular members of the movement could be true, 
in general, but the actual number of members who were attending as activists could be less. 
Shawky suggested that, “the actual number of membership was ranging between 2,000-3,000” 
(Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012). This is because the twenty thousand were the registered 
members though many of them were not active while others were just taking part in a one-
time event. In this regard, Shawky confirmed that, “the majority of the new members faced 
the problem of lack of experience and limited preparation” (Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012). 
Another remarkable problem relating to the numbers is the high level of members who 
dropped out and new comers. 
It is worth noting that the number of activists who used to attend the April 6 gatherings and 
protests before the revolution, according to Shawky, “went down in 2009 and 2010 to just 50 
activists and 300 in the best cases” (Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012). If that is true then we 
could assume that only 0.5% of the recorded members of the Facebook page (around seventy 
thousand at this time) joined the activities and could be considered as active membership 
during the repressive regime in the period of decline while the 3,000-5,000 represented the 
active membership during the political opening after the revolution.  
The dissident group that split after the revolution accused Maher of “dictatorship and 
rejecting to hold the election” but Maher confirmed that, “the issue of elections has been 
manipulated by those who sought to dismantle the movement” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). 
Maher argued that, “The delay was intended to avoid police penetration and to complete the 
regulations and the theoretical part, but now we can organize it"(Ibid). The internal election 
began to take place in 2012 to replace the appointed members by elected ones. Early in 2012 
April 6 decided to hold elections on the governorate and provinces. This election raised the 
membership issue again as one could assume the number of members who had the right to 
vote and elect was less than the registered membership (twenty thousand). The movement did 
not announce the exact figures for the number of voters at the provincial level. It could be 
assumed that the presence of voters was not that large compared with the total number of the 
membership.  
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It was expected that the elected coordinators in the provinces would elect the General 
Coordinator and members of the Political Bureau. Actually this strategy of election, when 
completed, reflects that April 6 was still keen to keep its internal organization far from the 
public and security intervention. It also raised the issue of different levels and layers of 
membership and activism. There was a good lesson the movement learnt from the mistake 
that the split faction, ‘Democratic Front’, faced and showed its weakness. In mid-September 
2011, the Democratic Front led by Amr Ezz and Tariq Al-Kholi held an open election to 
choose the coordinators for the Political Bureau. However, the number of members who had 
the right to vote in this election was limited to those who had joined the movement at a certain 
time and they were only 200-300 members (Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012). The organizers 
said that, “this is the real bulk of members of April 6 who represent the movement and 
preferred to be active in this faction while rejecting Maher’s April 6 branch”. 
It should be noted that these low figures reflect the problem of new social movements in 
Egypt such as Kefaya or April 6 when activists attempted to transform the movement and 
stream of ideas and activism into a hierarchical organization. When they attempted to create 
an organizational structure which was composed of members and leaders, the movement 
began to experience the loss of momentum and vitality as the conflicts over leadership and 
resources erupted. During the non-organization phase, thousands or tens of thousands of 
professional and new activists as well as young ordinary people attended the public activities. 
They believed that these activities aimed to serve and support public goals and national 
interests. Soon, these high numbers dramatically shrunk and became limited only to the few 
members who were keen to attend the organizational activities and elections. This could be 
explained by different reasons whether it is the lack of interest among large numbers of 
members or the will of the dominant administrative group according to the “Iron Law of 
Oligarchy” developed by Robert Michels53. This is in addition to the fear of the police and 
security penetration which the leadership attempted to block.  
In the absence of official records of membership, it became unclear who were the real and 
original members and who claimed to be members for various goals. Indeed, the new youth 
activism are not formal movements or organizations that have official records for membership 
and this is one of the main differences between civil society organizations, political parties 
and the new social movements. 
                                                     
53 Michels, Robert. 1915. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy. Translated into English by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul. New York: The Free Press. From the 1911 
German source. 
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Some activists pointed out that there is a membership form that new members sign when they 
join the movement. The provincial coordinator collects these forms to be sent to Cairo to the 
Political Central Bureau. However as there are no any identity cards, only the leadership can 
decide whether that person is a member of April 6 or not and can isolate the dissident. This 
enabled the leadership to claim that the members accused of an undesirable behaviour were 
not members of the movement (Wesam Abdel Razek, 2012). This tactic took place on many 
occasions and for different purposes such as Basem Fatehi who took training in Freedom 
House in the U.S. in 2009, Ahmed Salah who claimed to represent April 6 and met the 
American diplomats and Alia Al-Mahdy who published her naked photos on Facebook. April 
6 stated that all of them neither represent the movement nor were real members. This tactic 
was also used against the split in 2009 ‘You Will Not Pass’ and ‘The Democratic Front’ in 
2011. The leadership said it is important to protect the movement and prevent people from 
claiming to be members just to distort its image or to protect the members from the security 
interventions.  
The organizational characteristics: 
In response to the internal and external challenges in 2009 the movement transformed to a 
"closed organization", and imposed more difficult conditions on the membership because of 
what Maher described as a "huge security breach” in 2009(Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). 
Maher confirmed that the internal structure of the movement must be secret and unpublished 
because of security conditions (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). The movement emphasized that 
the security services sought to know the internal structure of the movement in order to 
dismantle it especially after the clash with the military junta. Apart from the announcements 
and events published in the media and on Facebook, April 6 attempted to strike a balance 
between the publicity and security. For example, the time and date of invitation for a specific 
event might be published but the organizational arrangements would be kept secret (Free 
Youth, April 6 Youth).  
There are different and contradictory interpretations about the ambiguity associated with the 
structure of the movement and its leadership. From Maher’s point of view the secrecy was 
necessary in light of the ongoing security attempts to penetrate the movement and in order to 
prevent anyone from claiming to represent the movement to abuse it. On the other hand, his 
opponents saw this as a kind of dictatorship and personification of the movement. The truth 
might be in the middle, as Maher and his close circle represent the main founders and keen to 
keep its continuity and success. They fear for the consequences of dissident actions and the 
security breach which forced them to get rid of suspicious members or rivalries to keep it 
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alive. Indeed, surveillance and secrecy disrupt free communication and open debate within a 
movement, leading either to fragmentation of aims and expectations - a recipe for discord and 
sedition - or to outright authoritarian tendencies and a cult of leadership (Bayat, 2009, p. 11). 
The absence of a clear published structure and membership is linking the movement to Maher 
and his inner circle. It would be easy to deny the relationship with any suspicious events or 
acts carried out by members or by state agencies to impute some of negative actions to the 
movement such as the attack on a number of activists who were against its leadership, 
especially Ahmed Doma and Khalid al-Sayed, on April 20th 2012.  
It is worth noting that Ahmed Salah was one of the controversial figures in the movement. 
Salah
54
 was the activist whom Wikileaks cable suggested had discussed a plan with U.S. 
officials in 2008 to overthrow Hosni Mubarak. He claimed that the unwritten plan was agreed 
upon by all opposition groups. He said, “When I discussed the plan, I was with the April 6 
Youth Movement…the plan was [masterminded] for the movement”. “But April 6 never 
implemented this plan and it never took place” (Fahmy, 2011). These positions triggered a 
severe campaign against April 6 in the Egyptian media. Maher denied that Salah was ever an 
activist with the movement, saying that, “He took advantage of its proximity to the movement 
during the translation work for foreign journalists and foreign researchers and claimed to be 
of the group” (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). Maher also emphasized that Salah, “misused our 
trust and claimed that he represented us when in fact he did not”. He focused on the fact that, 
“the age limit for members in the April 6 Youth Movement is 35, and Salah was 45”. On the 
other hand, and after the fallout, Salah accused April 6 of tarnishing his reputation and denies 
Maher’s accusations (Fahmy, 2011).   
 April 6 is considered to be a decentralized movement which can be seen on different levels: 
“On the geographical and provincial level, each branch has different activities depending on 
the circumstances and connections”. However there is a general framework and a uniform 
plan which help to centrally coordinate the activities. “The Political Bureau does not impose 
decisions, but its task is evaluating, following-up, framing suggestions and assisting efforts, 
material and human resources
 
(April 6 Youth document, the construction project). The 
decentralization appears in the freedom of action of the provincial branches and the 
networking with other groups and other parties. 
In this regard Shawky confirmed that, “every governorate has its own structures and leaders 
that decide its independent activities” (Shawky, interview, 15/2/2012). The Alexandria branch 
                                                     
54 https://www.facebook.com/asea1009 
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is the most independent one among the other branches in governorates as it decides its 
activities without clear orders from Cairo (Wesam Abdel Razek, 2012). On the other hand, 
ex-members argued that there is a degree of centralization in the movement where the 
branches receive instructions from the capital, and follow the “plan to decide everything”.  
Funding and networking 
The availability of financial resources is a critical element in the success of any social 
movement. In this regard, April 6 stressed in its written documents and formal declaration 
that, "the group does not receive any external or internal funding but is only self-funded" 
(April 6, the construction project, p. 4). On the other hand, due to its novelty and the young 
age of most of its members, it suffered from the lack of financial resources. The members are 
either students or young professionals who are paying monthly subscriptions. Indeed, they can 
contribute a small amount and this is not sufficient to fund the activities. The movement's 
leaders insisted that their funding depends mostly on such contributions, which range between 
10-20 pounds per month (2-4 dollars).  
However, there is a multiplicity of references to various kinds of support from political 
figures or human rights networks which support the arrested activists. Asmaa Mahfouz (2011) 
pointed out that, “There is a pattern of big donations when the movement launches a 
campaign or important activity such as April 6, 2009 and 2010 most came from senior 
politicians”. The political activist Mamdouh Hamza provided the headquarters for the 
movement in one of his estates beside the headquarters for many other youth activism. In 
contrast, opponents, dissidents and officials insisted that the movement be financed from the 
outside. 
In the crisis of confrontation with the SCAF in 2011, the government began to investigate the 
external funding for some organizations and human rights movements. But Maher denied that 
they “accepted international contributions” (Fleishman, 2011). Inge Hamdi (Facts You Do 
Not Know, 2012) confirmed that April 6 refused even donations and support from Egyptian 
businessmen in order to preserve the independence of its decisions. She added that, “The 
government did not refer any of its members on trial for access to foreign funding”. One of 
the striking issues was the accusation that Maher participated in establishing a human rights 
training centre in 2010 which was called the ‘Future Centre’ (Dar Al-Moustaqbal) to get 
external funding
55
. Maher denied this accusation and confirmed that, “it was just a law firm 
                                                     
55 Photo of the Firm contract as a Non-profitable Firm 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=275362312534892&set=a.275361305868326.62414.26065620733883
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set up by the lawyers to defend the detainees but closed after a month and the office did not 
have a bank account or receive any funding”. He added that the firm was closed after a month 
when he knew they hired Ahmed Salah (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). 
In spite of the lack of any evidence on the financing of April 6 from the outside, several issues 
still need further discussion such as the relationship with the Freedom House and their 
training abroad, and indirect funding. 
From the perspective of social movements, these movements are connected with many formal 
and informal networks and organizations. Among the most prominent of these networks 
linked to April 6 are the Democratic Institute, Al Ghad, and the Democratic Front Party. April 
6 has associated with close ties with the activists working in these organizations such as Esraa 
Abdel Fattah, Ahmed Badawi and Basem Fathi who cooperated previously to establish the 
movements. It could be argued that there are intersections in joint activities, especially in 
training and educational activities particularly for the new members helping in developing 
their intellectual and cultural capacities and visions.  
It could be argued that April 6 took the advantage of the resources and staff of formal and 
informal networks and organizational resources available for the movement. It benefitted 
from the headquarters of syndicates especially the Press where its first establishing meeting 
was held in the hall, free of charge at the Freedoms Committee of the Journalists Syndicate. In 
addition to this, the movement uses the appropriate available elements of the environment and 
locations to hold its meetings in public places such as International Park, Freedom Park and 
El Azhar Park or the headquarters of the political parties and human rights organizations 
(Mahfouz, 2011). 
Inge Hamdi (2012) indicated that even months after the revolution, April 6 did not have a 
headquarters, they just benefitted from the headquarters of the Al Ghad and Democratic Front 
in addition and the Muslim Brotherhood when there was a positive cooperation with the 
Muslim Brothers parliamentarians. The usage of these resources and headquarters of political 
parties and revolutionary movements in the governorates reflected the complexity and the 
large overlap between the categories of membership and activists at the local level. It is worth 
noting that the overlap at the central level and the state of liquidity certainly extended to the 
local levels. On the local and regional levels, an activist could be a member of more than one 
movement and political party at the same time as they attend educational or regulatory 
activities, and perhaps vote in their elections. For example, Shawky was a member of the 
Brothers and 6 April at the same time. Other cases included the joint activities and 
demonstrations that were arranged by different groups at the same time. 
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Constructing a collective identity:  
The movement’s collective identity is associated with the April 6 strike in 2008. The 
movement took this event as a day to celebrate its historical birth, and the title of which is 
associated with its identity. Many new groups in Egypt attempted to choose their name from 
the date of prominent events like 20 March and April 6. This makes the movement neutral in 
relating to ideologies and political disputes with the exception of the opposition to the regime. 
The movement stressed this identity in its activities, for example, they launched a campaign 
called I am Aprilism (Ana Abrily) to defend the movement on the Internet
56
.  
April 6 sought to construct a collective identity and solidarity among the members through 
presenting   itself as a protest movement and not as a political party or civil society 
organization. It confirmed that it is an independent youth movement which is not part of any 
other political party or group (A document called who are we?). April 6 official documents 
emphasized that, “membership is open and the main elements constituting the group are 
young people of both sexes either independent or affiliating to any ideology without 
consideration of the intellectual affiliations of the various members as long as they are 
seeking to one goal” (The intellectual construction project document). It is a youth movement 
not only with the standard of membership and leadership, but also the target group which is 
“the youth and young people who interested in the change” (who are we, formal document). 
No specific age has been set in these documents which also said that it seeks to form a “youth 
block or youth organization”. But Maher mentioned that, “The age limit for members in the 
April 6 Youth Movement is 35”   (Fahmy, 2011). 
April 6 sought to strike a balance between the priorities at internal and external levels. For 
example, it focused on facing the Mubarak regime without neglecting the existence of inner 
feelings toward the regional symbolic issues such as the siege on Gaza and January 2009 
Israeli attack. They emphasized the change of priorities that took place since 2005 arguing 
that that the support of Palestine can only be effective after changes at home. 
7.6  Conclusion 
April 6 emerged in a context where a wide range of grievances and discontent took place. But 
according to SMT, this psychological discontent was not enough to form a movement without 
constructing a collective identity and solidarity among the members and developing a framing 
process and cultural meanings. Resentment and grievances were there for a long time but the 
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movement arose from the interaction between political opportunities, cultural and educational 
frames in addition to mobilizing structures that linked these grievances to the corruption of 
the regime and the need for change. 
The thesis distinguished between two stages in the formation of April 6 in terms of the 
different types of mobilization. The first stage consists of convergence around a joint aim and 
protest strategy without a clear organizational structure while the second stage features the 
intended efforts to build organizational capacities and construct a collective identity for the 
movement. 
A number of elements governed the birth and structure of April 6. Firstly, the impact of the 
generational gap and the retreat of the middle-age generation. Secondly, the efforts to link 
between the social and labour wave of protest and youth activism in the April 6 strike of 
2008.  Thirdly: The failure of the security forces to strike a balance between repression and 
cooptation created a new opportunity. The success of the strike created a new political 
opportunity enabling young activists to benefit from the existing formal
57
 and informal 
networks in addition to the influence of new social media in order to develop their own 
organization.  
One of the main characteristics of April 6 and other youth activism was their fluidity and 
liquidity. These kinds of new social movements were always experiencing long stages of 
reshaping the organization and constructing their collective identity which is still in progress 
and not stable or strict. However, this led to various splits and instability in structure. 
April 6 has a clear “youth identity” in terms of composition, leadership and structure. The 
movement constructed its collective identify as a protest movement which adopted a radical 
framing process and political strategy to change the regime. Indeed, April 6 developed a more 
stable structure and collective identity and strategic choices compared to other youth networks 
such as Youth for Change, but still needed to be articulate this in more complex and specific 
terms and concepts.  
April 6 can be regarded as a pattern of the new social movements in terms of the absence of 
hierarchy and central organization with a lack of ideology which could be seen as result of 
universal and global trends and hybrid culture. However, these features represent a great 
challenge to the movement due to the absence of intellectual and organizational unity because 
of the internal multiplicity of ideologies. It is worth noting that there are other factors that do 
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not fit neatly into a NSMT framework.  April 6 is not just about identity issues, but also about 
bread-and-butter issues, it is not just about personal lifestyles, etc. 
The dilemma for the movement in terms of organizational and networking aspects can be 
summarized as follows; that it positively benefitted from the loose organizational framework 
as it helped to integrate different and many efforts of networks at a given moment, as 
happened on April 6, 2008 or in the 25th  January revolution. This helped to the movement 
evade repression. However, this framework quickly leads to negative effects when conflicts 
and splits emerge between groups and members, or when a famous individual member or 
group commit or carry out any mistakes which can be easily attributed to the movement as a 
whole. The internal institutional structures and organizational capacities were not effective 
and led to splits and divisions. The collective identity was not constructed in a way that 
guaranteed sustainability and solidarity among members and activists who flocked to the new 
movements. 
It could be argued that April 6 managed to construct its own collective identity as a youth 
protest movement engaged with contentious politics seeking to change the regime through the 
non-violence strategies. The flexible and loose structure enabled the movement to seize the 
available opportunities in terms of taking advantage of the growing interest in local and global 
issues of youth in Egypt and the Arab world, in addition to the use of modern communication 
of information technology which empowered activists of the Millennium generation and 
compensated for the existing weak mobilizing structures. 
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Chapter Eight : 
 Using Social Movement Theory to Assess Egyptian Youth activism: 
Opportunity, Mobilization, Strategies and Cultural Frames 
8.1 Introduction 
The dramatic increase in the political opportunities since 2000 provided an appropriate 
context for plenty of movements and networks to develop their mobilizing structures, 
strategies and framing process. However opportunities are not static; they can exist for brief 
periods of time, and then close again, or alternatively the political changes caused by 
mobilization can themselves lead to demobilization. In a similar way the youth activism and 
networks also featured long or short cycles of prominence and decline, coalitions and 
disintegration which should be considered when explaining the trajectory of social and 
political movements in Egypt during the period in question.  
It is not only change in political opportunities that triggered activism, but most important also  
the responses of the agents of change themselves and their strategic actions and perceptions 
that shape the different cycles of political activism when they struggle to develop their 
mobilizing structures and framing processes. In other words the changes in political 
opportunities and constraints created important incentives which triggered new phases of 
contention for people with collective claims, but their actions in turn create new opportunities. 
chapter eight is seeking to construct a synthesis to assess field work data through the prism  
SMT. The discussion focuses on how the youth activism identified political opportunities, and 
the role of external and transnational factors such as Palestine/Iraq, US democracy drive etc., 
which came to light and is not explained by SMT.  
This chapter also explains the methods and the dynamics of interaction between political 
opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing processes in the Egyptian context that 
triggered the longest wave of youth activism since the 1970s. It also seeks to identify the main 
features and characteristics of youth activism in addition to their strategic choices in dealing 
with the challenges created by internal and external factors prior to the 25 January revolution.  
8.2 The Political Opportunity 
The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by significant social and historical 
changes in Egypt which led to a change in the political opportunities; the shrinking role of the 
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state, the erosion of regime legitimacy, the collapse of the social pact and globalization and its 
effect on social media. This was further exposed through the regional political developments 
in the Middle East that started in 2000 and which created the political opportunity structure 
which triggered different waves of social and political protestation and new kinds of youth 
mobilization. 
The regime’s adaptive capacity (Heydemann 2007, p. 26) to accommodate external and 
internal pressure and to respond to the grievances and the counter-hegemonic forces 
dramatically deteriorated. The corporatist arrangements and statist order created during the 
Nasser era could not survive because of economic restructuring, integration into the global 
economy and vigorous implementation of neoliberal policies since 2004, which weakened key 
institutions of state control, particularly the public sector and the subsidy system and created 
economic crises.  
The failure of the corporatist structures and the collapse of the social pact associated with the 
socio-economic crisis raised the level grievances and the sense of relative deprivation to 
unprecedented levels. The ineffective state apparatus did not succeed in delivering sufficient 
and appropriate services to the citizens and lost the capability to achieve its functions. Thus, 
the society and social forces began to create and develop their own agencies and institutions 
to fill the gap through establishing various kinds of organizations which could be called 
“parallel structures”, either for lobbying and political purposes such as the Free Student 
Unions and other independent trade unions or for delivering health and educational services 
such as private tutoring or for the informal economy. The student movements were under 
pressure and official restrictions, but they exerted tireless efforts to establish themselves 
through the parallel institutions such as Free Student Unions and other informal groups. In 
later stages these parallel structures established alliances among other social forces that had 
high levels of grievances, through coordination and networking. In such a context the younger 
generations did not see any reason why political participation should be further postponed and 
social protest became one of their main responses to such exclusion.   
In response to the external and internal pressure, Mubarak opened the political sphere a little 
bit in 2004-2005, such that 88 members of the Muslim Brothers had been elected in the 
parliament. Ayman Nour, the head of the Al Ghad party, was running for the presidency 
election against Mubarak in 2005 in the first presidential election in Egyptian history. It is 
worth noting that the hope for political reform in 2005 was reinforced by the emergence of 
Kefaya, Al Ghad and the achievement of the opposition in the election (102 seats).  
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Following the 2005 elections and the decline of this wave of political mobilization, the regime 
began to tighten its grip on power and resorted to the methods of coercion and repression. The 
protest movements lost momentum, which coincided with the decline in the United States 
policy of democracy promotion in Egypt and the Middle East after the victory of Hamas in 
the Palestinian election in 2006 and the achievement of the MBs in the 2005 Egyptian 
elections.  
The splits inside the regime began to increase around the issue of the political succession and 
the deterioration in the social and economic conditions in addition to the political coercion 
and atrocities against ordinary people, all paved the way for triggering another wave of 
protests and new types of youth initiatives. 
It could be argued that the political opportunities expanded in the last years of Mubarak’s 
reign which was marked by fraction and interest conflicts among the ruling elite, and which 
lost its coherence and harmony. These divisions and clashes among the ruling elite could be 
linked to the transformation of power and political succession. The military, bureaucracy and 
“Policies Committee” led by Gamal Mubarak and his loyal network of political and 
businessmen leaders were divided over the issues of economic policies, privatization and 
corruption, as well as the failure to resolve internal factionalism and impose party discipline. 
These remarkable divisions within the regime between the old guard and the new guard, the 
military and bureaucracy apparatus and the NDP’s Policy Committee had been recognized by 
the political activists who were seeking for change. According to the political process model, 
which has been discussed in previous chapters, the political activists perceived these divisions 
and splits among the ruling elite as a potential political opportunity to maximize their role in 
the contentious politics. 
These gaps and splits within the institutions exposed the vulnerability of the regime while the 
political activists attempted to employ them for their interests. In this respect there was an 
assumption among some activists that the change would come from inside the state itself, 
particularly after the failure of the Islamic militants’ violence strategy to topple the regime in 
the 1990s. On the other hand, the regime used to manoeuvre between political forces as 
shown by Lust Aukar (2007, p. 39) who focused on “The distinction that lies in the extent to 
which opposition groups are given equal opportunity to participate in the political sphere or 
structure of contestation”.  A pragmatic wing in the regime recognized the benefits of turning 
a blind eye on some aspects of the new political activism in a manoeuvre to strike a balance 
between accommodation and repression strategies and to create a balance of power inside the 
regime and in the opposition camp in order to marginalize the Muslim Brothers after 2005. It 
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could be argued that the regime was forced to accept the existence of the social and political 
movements and attempted to develop a strategy similar to the Sadat's strategy that boosted a 
cultural and political context conducive to the hegemony of Islamist groups (Tohami, 2009, p. 
149). 
As the Islamists had became the stark enemy of Mubarak’s regime, it was forced to accept the 
existence of new opposition movements as long as they came under the control and the 
scrutiny of the security services to strike a new balance in the opposition. This strategy could 
also ease the external pressure and improve the regime’s negative image in international 
society.   
It is worth noting that the regime accommodated the political and ideological polarization by 
introducing itself as a centre among extreme groups. As the tone of the conservative Salafi 
discourse spread in the public sphere, with support from some wings in the regime, the liberal 
networks within the regime supported liberal discourse in the media and civil society. The 
regime realized that such networks and discourse could help in challenging the strong 
religious discourse and serve the regime for certain positions in certain situations. For 
example, the state-owned media encouraged the protest in specific times and for different 
reasons such as the first wave of protest against Israel during Intifada in 2000 and the 
confrontation between the SCAF and the American non-profit organization that erupted in 
2011-2012.  
The liberal wing and pragmatic strategists of the regime were concerned about the political 
expansion and dominance of religious discourse and encouraged the liberal discourse to strike 
a new balance in the society and political sphere. In this regard, the regime issued a formal 
licence for the Al Ghad party led by Ayman Nour and the Democratic Front Party led by 
Osama Ghazali Harb in 2004 and 2007 although they represented a new formal liberal 
opposition and rejected the Nasserist party Al Karamah and the new Islamist party Al Wasat . 
However, in later stages Al Ghad and DFP became prominent incubators for the young 
movements before January 25
th
 revolution. 
The regime accepted the formation of clusters of Salafi, liberal and left-wing groups as long 
as they kept within the framework of controlled speech and did not had real access to the 
stage of organization and protest
58
. The emergence of Kefaya and April 6 came in such a 
political environment and as a result of interact between foreign pressure and internal 
mechanisms. However the interaction between the regime and the movements led to a hostile 
                                                     
58 For more details see table (2) The democratic façade and controlling the opposition parties 1981-2010. 
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relationship as these movements began to construct their collective identify as protest 
movements, adopting a radical framing process and political strategy for change which totally 
different from the traditional political parties. In this regard the experiences and skills gained 
from the former waves of protestation since 2000 helped to develop the internal capacities and 
influence the challenge to the regime. Kefaya, for example, introduced the possibility of, and 
the right to demonstrate in Cairo’s city centre which was considered a red line from the 
security services’ perspective. This civil right, established by such initiatives, continued in the 
street despite the regime's attempts to suppress and threaten those who made it by using the 
“stick-and-carrot” policy.   
Structural theory could help in explaining the emergence of April 6 and other labour 
movements at this stage because of the high level of grievances and relative deprivation. The 
socio-economic crises which deepened in 2007-2008 triggered a new wave of social unrest. 
This wave did not focus on political reform compared to 2004/2005 wave but raised the 
demands of workers, employees, peasants and students. The various forms of social, 
economic and political exclusion rendered youth, particularly urban educated youth, a 
marginalized social group, but one that had a high level of expectations due to its urban 
exposure and education (Shehata, 2008, p. 3). The crisis of social mobility motivated the 
different layers of social categories to cooperate to remove the grievances. The young people, 
particularly from the middle-class, found in the means of communication technology, such as 
Facebook and Twitter, fertile ground to show their rejection and protest not only at the 
deterioration of their own positions, but on the overall economic and social deterioration on 
the national level. Indicators about the nature of the forces that took part in the social protests 
suggest that they largely included categories from the middle-class including different 
categories such as entrepreneurs, employees, professional, student activists and politicians 
(Siam, 2010, p. 59). 
Some of what could be called non-political protests managed to achieve important 
concessions from the regime for the tax collectors and El-Mahala labour protest movement in 
addition to the protest against the establishment of the Agrium petrochemical project in 2008 
(Shehata, 2010). The regime showed a flexible and tolerant policy in dealing with such 
protests and struck deals through negotiation and compromise fearing a wide public explosion 
which would be difficult to control or oppress without paying a high cost. This positive 
response of the regime to these protest actions and its relative success encouraged many of the 
young activists to call for a public strike on the 6
th
  of April 2008, which was the real 
beginning and foundation of April 6 youth activism. 
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Among the most influential elements of the political opportunity in this context was the 
availability of new media and modern communication technologies such as blogs, Facebook 
and Twitter along with multiple news websites which allowed the young ordinary people to 
engage with continuous politics and express their views in the public sphere. The activists 
began to use the social media to create a framing process that delegitimizing the regime and to 
mobilize young people to demonstrate and protest. 
8.3 The External and Transnational Factors 
In the Middle East context, the case studies show that the intensive interaction between 
internal and external politics has a great impact on shaping the political opportunities. The 
external and transitional factors played more major roles in creating new opportunities than 
the social movements theory proposed.  
The outbreak of the Intifada in 2000 was a turning point in the Egyptian youth movement. It 
was the spark that announced the beginning of a new round of youth activism after long 
period of calm and apathy. This mobilization represented a qualitatively and quantitatively 
different stage from other waves of protest since the 1970s. The student sector, in various 
stages of education, interacted with events which were manifested in daily demonstrations 
and marches in universities and the streets of cities and villages over several weeks in October 
2000 and March 2002 (Schemm, 2002). This wave of mobilization was associated with the 
return of large numbers of left-wing activists to the political arena (Abdalla, 2003, p. 5). 
The regime strategy was always concerned about any kind of popular gathering and strongly 
repressed any kind of the youth mobilization in the 1990s. However, the regime’s strategic 
calculations during these events were more complicated as it sought to use the internal 
protests for external purposes and to enhance its regional role to renew its internal legitimacy. 
The regime turned a blind eye to the ongoing mobilization until it reached a level that the 
regime could not tolerate any more, after which it began to repress them in 2002 and 2003. 
However, this change in the political opportunity structure agitated Egyptians against the 
regime and provided a suitable environment for youth activism to emerge and develop.  The 
engagement of hundreds of thousands of ordinary young people of universities and schools in 
such protestations created a new awareness and new mobilizing structures that young activists 
joined and where they learned the rules of the new political game. It also enhanced the 
militant mood among young people. This engagement of the youth in politics was against the 
traditional strategy of the regime to exclude the majority of young people from politics.  
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Despite the significant decline in the events and demonstrations relating to the Palestine 
Uprising, opposition to the invasion of Iraq mobilized had the vitality and spirit once again of 
the youth movement. The spontaneous demonstrations that started against the war confirmed 
the entry of new players on the scene: young ordinary people who did not belong to any 
political organization but were thirsting for an effective political voice. Tens of thousands of 
young people occupied Tahrir Square on 20
th
 March 2003 for the first time since the student 
movement had done so in 1971-1972. The security forces nonetheless succeeded in ending the 
demonstration on the same day after 12 hours of occupation. It was an inspiring event that the 
25
th
 January activists repeated in a more organized way, controlling the square for two weeks 
until the toppling of Mubarak in 11 February 2011. 
The Palestine Intifada and Iraqi war did not only pave the way for street protests and 
mobilization but also for challenging the regime’s legitimacy. It could be argued that the 
legitimacy of the Egyptian regime used to be tested through the regional and Arab policy as 
well as protecting the national security. In this regard the regime policies promoted the 
counter-hegemonic movements and their efforts to delegitimize the regime where a 
significant aspect of legitimacy was contingent on a nationalist foreign policy. The counter-
hegemonic movements were involved in stark cultural and ideological campaigns to 
delegitimize the regime and its policies and the security apparatus which had grown 
increasingly demoralized. The regime came under growing pressure and criticism of young 
activists because of what was seen as “a weak or compliance role in the region during the 
second Intifada and during the American invasion of Iraq” (El-Mahdi, 2009, p. 1022). 
The impacts of the Palestinian Intifada and Iraqi war mobilizations resulted in turning against 
the regime criticizing its failure and the absence of effectiveness. Activism began to shift 
towards internal issues and launched various initiatives and platforms to push this wave of 
protest. By 2004 the opportune context stimulated veteran activists who had developed their 
mobilizing structures during the previous cycle of protestation and initiated the new pro-
democracy protest movement. The American support for democracy policies decreased the 
regime’s repressive capacity to oppress the political mobility in 2004-2006 and paved the way 
for the emergence of new movements and networks such as Kefaya, Al Ghad and Youth for 
Change which attracted large groups of ordinary young people. The American pressure for 
democratization and the relaxation of the regime repression before the 2005 presidential and 
parliamentary elections encompassed the growth of political movement. The demonstrations 
calling for the political reform continued 2005-2006 and emphasized the new shift in both 
issues and mobilizing structure. The new agenda of the young people’s movement witnessed a 
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shift from this phase of focusing on external and regional issues to the stage to focus on 
domestic and internal issues. 
The decline of this cycle of protest coincided with the retreat of the US democracy promotion 
in Egypt and the Middle East after the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian election in 2006 
and the achievement of the MBs in the 2005 Egyptian elections. The regime launched a 
backlash against Kefaya and the MBs and Al Ghad’s leader Ayman Nour. As stated 
previously, the US policy witnessed a shift to focus on the formal and informal support to the 
civil society association rather than directly putting pressure on the regime. The U.S. 
administration's policy tended to focus on the spread of liberal principles and encouraging 
young civil associations and NGOs. It is worth noting that young activists joined the 
ElBaradei Presidential Campaign in 2010 realizing the available opportunities which were 
linked to the international reputation of the Nobel Prize-winning prominent figure 
diminishing the repression capacities of the regime. Moreover, the transnational factors 
empowered a number of youth networks and groups by providing them with training, ideas 
and experience and funding.  It is noteworthy that the Tunisian revolution spread to Egypt and 
then to other Arab countries and triggered the new wave of the Arab Spring. 
The external and transnational factors created political opportunities and shaped the 
mobilization process. When internal opportunities were closed, youth activism sought to 
benefit from international alliances and institutions to create opportunities and generate new 
resources. Some NGOs and youth networks used to get financial support through NGOs or 
training activities from external actors. On the other hand, Islamist youth networks used 
received financial support from Gulf States and benefited directly or indirectly from available 
training provided by NGOs such as the project of “Academic for Change”. 
It could be argued that external actors played a role in sowing the seeds for a democratic 
struggle and through pressures on the ruling elite. Moreover, the transnational factors created 
an environment that changed the political opportunity structure agitating many Egyptians 
against the regime. In this regard, the external factors were not related to just to US policy but 
also to regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iraqi wars in addition to 
transitional ideologies and movements like pan-Arab and Islamist.   
8.4 Mobilization Dynamics and Networks 
The initial engagement of ordinary young people with contentious politics, unlike 
professional activists, came as a result of the available opportunity leading to a huge impact 
and rupture in the conventional politics practised by political parties and advocacy NGOs. 
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Contentious politics entered a new phase when ordinary people, borrowing Tarrow’s concept 
(2011, p. 8), particularly youth and teenagers, became involved in the contestation with elites 
and authorities. They either joined old forces or created their own networks through a long or 
short process of recruitment and membership that allowed the newcomers themselves to 
become professional activists. As soon as the ordinary young activists engaged with 
contentious politics, segments from among them gradually turned into activists or 
professional activists and leaders. In this regard, the transforming of ordinary young activism 
from non-collective action to be part of networks and broad social movements was a complex 
process. Indeed, what used to be called movements in the Egyptian context were types and 
coalitions of networks that coordinated their action based on growing mutual trust and 
cooperation across ideological lines. These alliances of networks had a remarkable impact 
when gathered behind a goal and managed to build a consensus about a particular strategy for 
a short time. However these coalitions and movement often disintegrated to begin a new 
course of re-organizing and seeking alliances again such as Youth for Change and April 6. 
The protest and social movements are inclined to work through the networks and not through 
hierarchical organization as a result of regime repression and internal disputes. This tendency, 
among large segments of new activism in the protest movements, became more effective in 
exerting pressure on the regime than other formal and older organizations and parties. This 
broad sense of networks and movements among young activists facilitated the mobilization 
and released the pressure of the regime that was focusing on central organizations like the 
Muslim Brothers and traditional political parties. When the political opportunity occurred, 
these limited networks converged to form new coalitions to increase their influence.  
This process produced a distinguishing between two types of youth activism and two stages of 
the development of social movement; social non-movement and new social movement that 
have been tested on the April 6 youth movement. Bayat (2009, p. 5) in his contribution on 
social movements in the Middle East tended to focus on the first stage and neglected the 
second stage. He argued that the vehicles through which ordinary people in the Middle East 
change their societies are not simply audible mass protests or revolutions; rather people resort 
more widely to what he called “non-movements” which means “the collective endeavours of 
millions of non-collective actors, carried out in the main squares, back streets, court houses, 
or communities” (Bayat, 2009, p. 13). These collective actions of non-collective actors used 
to be practised by large numbers of ordinary people. These activities triggered much social 
change even though they fragmented and were rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable 
leaderships and organizations. In this respect these “social non-movements enjoy significant, 
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consequential elements of social movements; yet they constitute distinct entities” (Bayat, 
2009, p. 13).  
It could be argued that Bayat’s model only represents a specific phase of mobilization and 
movement -for example the pre-established phase of April 6- which soon would enter another 
phase of networking and loose structures. What he called the non-collective actors developed 
into further complicated networks and movements through the cycle of protestation and 
mobilizations. Bayat’s concept applied when new political opportunities occurred and the 
public mood of protest and change emerged. 
Indeed the youth activism and social protest that emerged in Egypt could not be perceived as 
fully-fledged movements or organizations yet but, on the other hand, they were more 
complicated and growing differently than social non-movement as Bayat assumed. Some of 
these networks were less than a movement but others gradually developed their organizational 
capacities to be similar to the new social movements. Some of these networks and movements 
tended to focus on politics such as April 6 and Youth for Change, while others avoided 
practicing politics, such as the new preacher Amr Khalid network.  
However at a certain time, at the moment of revolution most of these networks, converged 
and formed an alliance against the regime. They effectively worked together to topple the 
regime launching a framing process to delegitimize and demoralize its actions and building 
counter-hegemony blocks and alliances. They followed a peaceful mobilization, non-violent 
resistance and possibly negative or silent protest against the repression of the Mubarak 
regime.  
The Common characteristics and Features of Youth activism 
Youth activism as in Egypt a kind of social movement has demonstrated some distinguished 
characteristics that set it apart from earlier waves of youth activism in Egypt.  
Flexibility and horizontally organized mini-networks 
The type of a particular social movement has a profound effect on the success of the 
movement. According to (Tarrow, 2011), a formal hierarchical organization such as the 
Muslim Brothers can more easily sustain interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters, 
but lose much of their capacity for disruption (i.e. contention), an output better suited to 
autonomous, horizontally organized mini-groups such as April 6 and Youth for Change.   
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The youth networks and movements are characterized by a high degree of elasticity and 
fluidity, a lack of centrality and the free movement of activists among groups and networks 
due to the absence of clear-cut ideology or charismatic leadership. Whereas the regime used 
to have a high capacity to weaken and abort nascent organizations, new forms of political 
mobilization were networked and digitally active. Activists were involved in many 
organizations and networks as well as political parties; sometimes they preferred to participate 
under a wider umbrella such as Kefaya, and another time they established Youth for Change 
and April 6. They worked together launching a joint initiative such as Free Student Union and 
another time they worked separately and returned back to their original parties. Many of the 
activists were very active in many groups at the same time, and nowadays almost anyone can 
be an activist; establishing or joining a Facebook group, posting to a blog, or setting up a 
Twitter account. 
However, this flexibility decreased the sustainability of these networks and created a short life 
span. The sequences of events, resultant from the political opportunity, helped the formation 
of new youth activism with high levels of membership and thousands of supporters but they 
would began to shrink and crumbled as soon as the PO fade away in favour of another new 
movement. Most of the activists freely gave up their original membership and joined other 
organizations or political parties without restrictions as they worked across groups and youth 
activism. For example, in 2005 most of the activists preferred to join the Al Ghad party and 
Kefaya and its wing “Youth for Change” during the political mobility in 2005-2006. Then 
other networks emerged between 2008 and 2010 which most activists joined such as April 6 
and the ElBaradei Campaign. After the revolution new revolutionary coalitions emerged and 
attracted large segments of both old and new activists. In some cases, young people chose to 
give up the banner of political parties to which they belonged, and quickly joined the new 
movements, but they might subsequently return back again to their original parties. This 
showed a lack of commitment to political parties, protest networks and youth activism with a 
few exceptions such as April 6.   
It is worth noting that the central dimension was required in organizing and coordinating 
between networks and movements. The role of social networking technologies and a few 
satellite channels such as Al Jazeera relatively compensated for the communication gap and 
lack of centrality particularly in addition to coordination roles played by youth activist 
movements and traditional forces such as the Muslim Brothers. In other words, the youth 
activism was not hierarchical, but rather horizontally network-based which used social 
networking technology as a mobilizing tool. For example, Facebook used to invite people to 
events or organize demonstrations such as the April 6 2008 strike and the 25 January 
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revolution. Tarrow suggested “a delicate balance between formal organization and autonomy, 
one that can only be bridged by strong, informal, non-hierarchical connective structures". As 
such, the most successful movements will have this "informal connective tissue operating 
within and between formal movement organizations" (Tarrow, 2011, p. 137). 
From working through traditional parties to working independently:  
The relationship between youth activism and the traditional political parties and forces could 
be described as unstable and changeable. Shehata (2008, p. 1) has argued “the current wave of 
youth mobilization has occurred largely outside existing parties and movements, and has 
tended to be less ideological and more inclusive compared to earlier waves”. In fact the 
relationship was more complicated and featured irregularities and fluctuations between 
affiliation and autonomy. The traditional political parties and forces played different roles in 
the emergence of the new waves of youth activism. While some forces such as the MBs 
benefited from these waves, other opposition parties became less attractive (as stated in 
chapter six which showed that the presence of the traditional political parties among students 
was too weak).  As theorists argue that the new movement depends on the existing formal or 
informal networks to emerge and develop, it is important to confirm that many of the activists 
began as members of the traditional parties and middle-age generations movements. In later 
stages, they moved outside to establish their own independent groups although some groups 
were still using their venues and facilities and gained experience from the older generation 
while rejecting their political positions on many occasions. The relationship became more 
complicated and the new activists began to represent a serious challenge to the traditional 
leadership of the political organizations. For example, some activists from the MB student 
wing were active in the movement for a long time until they managed to construct a new 
collective identity and coordinate with other youth activism to declare their separation from 
the MB after 25
th
 January 2011.  
It is worth noting that the young people played an important role in the movements 
established to support Palestine and Iraq, and in others calling for political and constitutional 
reforms but they did not build their independent movements just yet. They began to mobilize 
and practice politics through the existing organizations and networks that were established by 
older generations. During that period hundreds of young activists joined new movements such 
as the Egyptian Political Committee for Supporting the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) which 
were mostly led by seventies or middle-age generation activists, many of whom had split 
from older parties and movements during the 1990s then they established their own parties 
and groups. However, resisting establishing their own organizations for a while, youth 
225 
 
activists engaged in the creation of newer parties and movements such as Kefaya and the Al 
Ghad party then they separated to establish their own networks such as Youth for Change and 
April 6.  
From universities and official arrangements to informal networks that developed 
outside campuses: 
The political process model illustrates that the mobilizing vehicles include the micro-level 
groups, organizations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of 
social movements (McAdam et al, 1996, p. 3). The current youth activism emerged in the 
universities which were the main venue for recruiting and mobilization then developed 
outside the campuses. For most of the twentieth century, university campuses were the 
primary site of youth activism. The collected data and interviews illustrated that most of the 
activists began to engage in continuous politics in the universities through demonstrations and 
protests, and then they moved out to establish and develop their own networks. The 
universities which were the main venue for youth activism suffered from heavy restrictions on 
the political activities so that the young activists abandoned the official corporatist 
arrangements and preferred to form their own networks and initiatives to practice polities 
without permission from the administration (such as the Free Student Unions). They gave up 
the strategy of being represented in the formal student unions or clubs and replaced it with a 
strategy depending on informal or parallel unions and networks that practice politics without 
formal approval in order to mobilize students to protest and provide them with services and 
help when needed. Consequently their efforts and the bulk of the work among students took 
place through the prism of social protest and new social movements without the need for 
official representation in the student unions. Youth activism took place outside the partisan 
and corporatist institutional frameworks as a result of depriving young ordinary people from 
electoral power to change things. Consequently, they were likely to “resort to their own 
networks to bring collective pressure to bear on the authorities to undertake change” (Bayat, 
2009, p. 11). 
Moreover, the professional syndicates played an important role in the mobilization of the 
youth activism that benefited from the available resources and support. The declaration of the 
Free Student Union and April 6 took place in the Journalists Syndicate. With the onset of the 
crisis in Palestine and the invasion of Iraq, the syndicates’ particular lawyers and journalists 
began holding rallies and seminars on current events. “As the universities are riddled with 
informers and encircled by vigilant security, the syndicate grounds have become a kind of 
"liberated territory" for student activists”. The activists from different universities used to 
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meet and discuss the current events and they began to know each other as well as activists 
from older generations (Schemm, 2002). “The real politics start after the demonstrations end” 
said one activist referring to the recruitment process and the construction of the organizational 
capacities (Maher, interview, 20/1/2012). 
The cycles of contention  
The legacy of the protest began in 2000 and reached its peak in 2011. The demonstrations in 
October 2000, April 2002 and March 2003 sparked the first cycle of youth activism as the 
mood of young people became more militant. The second wave took place in 2004-2006 and 
focused on internal reform. Then a wave of labour and social protestation continued from 
2006-2008. The last phase consisted of social protest and political activism until the 25 
January revolution. These four waves of youth activism reflected the accumulation of 
protesting experiences over a decade. They comprised together the longest cycle of political 
activism since the 1970s. Every cycle or wave of protest matches what Tarrow (1988, pp. 38-
39 & 2011, p. 12) described as the magnitude of conflict, its social and geographical 
diffusion, the forms of action employed, and the number and types of SMOs involved vary in 
concert over time. When these increase above the mean for the preceding period, we are in the 
presence of a cycle of protest. It is worth noting that new networks and movements took 
momentum in every cycle of protest. When a common purpose and opportune political 
context existed, the old and new networks of activism unified and cooperated across 
ideological divides to work under one broad umbrella. Then they began to gradually decline 
and lose the momentum to pave way for the emergence of new across-ideological movements. 
These umbrella movements connected with each period and cycle of protest such as the 
EPCSPI (2000-2003), Kefaya and Al Ghad (2004-2005), April 6 (2008), the ElBaradei 
Campaign for Presidency (2010) and the Revolutionary Youth Coalition (2011).  
The EPCSPI emerged in response to the Palestinian Uprising and declined in accordance with 
the decline of the uprising which meant that its task and mission did not exist. A short time 
later Kefaya emerged as the new umbrella for movements seeking to stop the election of 
Mubarak or his son in the 2005 election. The youth activism began to emerge inside Kefaya 
as an independent network under its umbrella. After the decline of Kefaya, April 6 emerged 
and developed until the return of ElBaradei.  
It is difficult for scattered networks of youth activism to have an impact on politics without 
coordinating and acting together in specific events such as March 2003, April 6 strike and 25 
January and through specific organizations such as Kefaya and Youth for Change. They 
created a consensus among activists on the unified aim as a result of specific opportunities 
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and the existence of common feelings which motivate coordination, activities and 
protestation. The consensus, which included these different networks, continued for a specific 
period among the networks while they got support from the majority of activists. Then they 
began to break down and return to their original networks because of the lack of a coherent 
collective identity and sustainability and the intervention of the state or organized movements 
to penetrate these movements which led to internal disputes in the movements such as Youth 
for Change. On the other hand, the high expectations began to turn into disappointments and 
activists began to return their personal lives and careers.  
The end of any specific cycle of contentious politics depends on the unified goal which either 
achieved or failed. Then the movements began to lose their claims which provided the 
temporary basis for solidarity among protest movements. For example, the Kefaya role began 
to decline and lose momentum after 2006 as a result of its failure to achieve its main goal in 
preventing Mubarak from winning the presidential election in 2005. 
At every stage of this period, the activists were able to realize the existing political 
opportunities as information spread about the vulnerability and challenges facing the regime. 
The activists used to test the limitations of the regime repression in order to launch a new 
wave of protest. When one movement succeeded in exploiting such an opportunity, other 
joined it; old networks would recover and new networks formed. When the resulting "cycles 
of contention" spread to an extreme, revolution may occur. Tarrow (2011) argued that, "The 
difference between movement cycles and revolutions is that, in the latter, multiple centres of 
sovereignty are created, turning the conflict between challengers and members of the polity 
into a struggle for power". These waves of mobilizations since 2000 helped in developing 
new and old centres which were necessary to launch the January 2011 revolution.  
8.5 The Strategies and Tactics of Social Movements: Integrating Social 
And Political Waves of Activism 
The “objective” political opportunities do not automatically trigger episodes of contentious 
politics or social movements, regardless of perceptions, frames and strategic choices of the 
leaderships. The movement entrepreneurs decide the best time to take actions and the kind of 
such strategic actions. The interaction and outcomes of these decisions generate other 
reactions and could end up creating a new opportunity or deepening the constraints for the 
original insurgents and for latecomers (Tarrow, 2011, p. 12). The outcomes of such waves of 
contention depend not on the justice of the cause or the persuasive power of any single 
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movement, but on their breadth and on the reactions of elites and other groups (Tarrow, 2011, 
p. 12). 
The collective response and their strategies could recall in four types of activism; passive, 
survivalist struggles, collective protest and social movements (Bayat, 2000, p. 4). Focusing on 
the last two responses, the collective protest could be described as spontaneous, ad hoc, and 
consequently uncommon; they often involve violence and a risk of repression (Bayat, 2000, p. 
6). However, when these social protests “gain national support by embracing diverse issues 
and actors” - such as students and the middle-class making economic as well as political 
claims - they often follow significant changes including political reform (Bayat, 2000, p. 6).  
In this regard, the cycle of social protest erupted in 2007-2008 aimed at achieving factional, 
social and economic demands. The protest was gradual and quiet in general alongside 
avoiding highlighting the political or partisan identities. This kind of social protest tended to 
coordinate with the political forces, when necessary, to take advantage of them and put 
pressure on the regime, without allowing the political forces the opportunity to exploit the 
protest to directly achieve political goals (Fawzy, 2010, p. 32). This wave of social protest 
was not interested in power struggles, democratization or external issues such as the previous 
waves but they focused on service interests and avoided politics as long as this strategy 
serviced their aims. A survey (Siam, 2010, p. 59) about the social protest in Egypt in 2009 
concluded that, except for protest activities initiated by political activists, the remaining part 
of the protestation activities, about 80%, was far from the struggle over top politics. Siam 
(2010, p. 59) argued that this wave of protests was against the state policies and institutions 
and the failure of corporatist institutions and the civil society associated with it. This wave 
developed its tactics and forms of protests which reflected the progress made by social 
activism. They were no longer limited to strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, but new 
mechanisms of negotiation and diversity in practice and styles of protest emerged as well as 
the use of media which reflected the evolution of consciousness (Siam, 2010, p. 71). It is 
worth noting that this wave of social protest combined with the new wave of youth activism 
began with the formation of April 6 and was ended by the Facebook groups and ElBaradei 
campaign. Both the youth and labour activism linked to each other but while the first focused 
on political change, the latter focused on social reform. 
Bringing together social protest and youth activism:   
The political activists sought to build a strategy of integrating social and local protests such as 
labour strikes into the contentious politics. However, they were cautious of the risk of 
triggering police repression. In this regard, the ordinary young people who began to 
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participate in this wave of social protest forced the regime not to use the severe repression 
against them by following some rules. Firstly, they insisted that they were coming from 
outside the context of traditional political parties. Secondly, they avoided any link with 
Muslim Brothers or Islamic militants. Thirdly, they attempted to distance themselves from the 
power struggle. This strategy showed awareness of the constraints and enhanced the political 
opportunity through the relaxation of repression and the tolerant approach toward them. This 
separation was necessary to distract the regime’s attention until the emergence of a new 
political opportunity. 
The movements which have society-oriented strategies such as the youth networks connected 
with Amr Khaled, Salafi and beneficiary associations associated with the Muslim Brothers 
also avoided involvement in traditional politics and power struggles as they were focusing on 
their strategy to reform society and religious activities. It is worth noting that plenty of state 
corporatist bodies engaged in the peaceful protest such as a number of local councils, which 
were subject to the control of the ruling party (Siam, 2010, p. 71). The NDP itself participated 
in the protests, Agrium and façade opposition parties were forced to play a role and engage in 
protest activities (Tohami, 2010, p. 160). 
Some contradictions faced the strategy of bringing together society-oriented networks, social 
protest and political collective actions and transformed them into political action when the 
political opportunity arose. These strategic choices of these non-political networks created a 
tension in the relationship with the strategies of professional activists. The professional 
activists and political and ideological networks faced the regime repression campaigns in the 
former wave of protest and they thought they qualified to lead the new wave. Some of them 
accused the newcomers of a lack of political awareness and experience, while new ordinary 
young people who had just begun to participate were skeptical about the professional activists 
and their strategies and had concerns about their political interests. For example, Mostafa Al-
Nagar, who was the coordinator of ElBaradei campaign in 2010 expressed “a negative 
evaluation of April 6 strategy and tactics that focused on direct political protest while the 
well-regarded Agrium social protest focused on local levels and including ordinary people” or 
what could be called “politics from bottom” (Mostafa Elngar, interview, 22/9/2010). Another 
activist, El Gebba showed his concern over some professional activists who considered 
activism as their career that earned them money (El Gebba, interview, 29/9/2010).    
There were negative impressions among professional activists and politicians that these social 
protests were only about limited demands such as salary increases, and would not lead to a 
big change. However others argued that these networks and movements were gradually 
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transforming their limited social demands into comprehensive political demands for change 
when they realized that the regime was the only party to be blamed for their grievances. The 
most important change these networks and social protests achieved was in providing a 
suitable environment and incubator for young ordinary people to engage in continuous 
politics without too much fear. Over time and with the accumulation of experiences and 
networks they were able make the January 25
th
 revolution happen.  
In this regard, social and protest movements like Agrium (Tohami, 2010), April 6 strike and 
the tax collectors (Shehata, 2010), represented a tiny revolution in a limited but specific way. 
It could be argued that the 25
th
 January Revolution replicated the main strategies and tactics 
of these movements but in a larger context. The accumulation of experiences developed and 
learnt from protest and social movements on the local and provincial levels had proven to be 
effective and succeeded in challenging the incumbent regime and its policies. Indeed, the 
accumulation of these new waves of participations led to a gradual shift and transition in large 
segments of these networks’ strategies and views to become revolutionary in their strategies 
and thoughts and to engage directly in contentious politics. These social protests accumulated 
over the years and new activism, using social media, linked these components with each 
other. The increasing capacities of youth activism which have a kind of sustainability helped 
to take advantage of the available opportunities. 
The strategic actions and repertoire of contention: 
The literature of social movements focuses on three forms of strategic action used by social 
movements: Violence, Disruption, or Convention. These contentious acts could be considered 
the strategic actions in pursuit of rational goals. Tarrow (2011, p 89) argued that, “contention 
can be considered as "public performance" to air disputes with the government and the status 
quo”.  
In the Egyptian context, the conventional actions, which included regularized and accepted 
strikes and demonstrations for instance, were not formally allowed to take place in such 
competitive authoritarian regime. However, the political opportunity forced the regime to deal 
with the new activism initiatives to use these conventional forms as part of the protest 
strategy. Thus strikes and demonstrations could be included under the disruptive strategic 
action. In general, most of the tactics and forms of action utilized by the Egyptian youth 
activism could be classified under non-violence and disruption strategies.  
In the absence of free activities and conventional actions before 2000, the political class was 
forced either to temporarily exit the political scene, or to go underground (Bayat, 2009, p. 10) 
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and use violence such as the Militant Islamists who resorted to subversive rebellion in the 
1990s because open and legal political work was limited (Bayat, 2009, p. 11). However, their 
failure convinced the new young activists to abandon the violence as strategy for change. 
They recognized that while violence can be impressive and clearly shows discontent, it has 
shortcomings of scaring off possible sympathizers to a cause. 
In this regard disruption, as a form of contentious action, is merely the threat of violence, but 
it need not actually threaten public order. This can be done through non-violent direct action, 
such as sit-ins, marches, rallies, constructing barricades, blocking traffic, etc. In general, 
“disruption loses its power as the movement progresses as formal organization moves away 
from it, police and elite counteract it, and individuals within the movement lose interest in 
collective action” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 95). The activists exert pressure on the regime to 
undertake sustained social and political reforms. Such a non-violent strategy required 
powerful social forces such social movements or genuine political parties to challenge 
political authorities (Bayat, 2009, p. 2). The disruption was the main strategy among the 
radical new activism who “adapted non-violence ideas to favour a type of indigenous political 
reform marked by a blend of democratic ideals and, possibly, religious sensibilities” (Bayat, 
2009, p. 13).  
Nonviolent movements are considered the dictators’ worst nightmare. Thus the social 
movements in the Egyptian context presented themselves as non-violent peaceful movements 
that did not resort to vandalism. They took advantage of global experiences and avoided the 
risk of a clash with the security forces as happened with other Islamist groups previously. The 
anti-terrorist ideology became effective among the young generations of activists as a result 
of the militant Islamist’s failure in the 1990s, who themselves began pursuing nonviolence 
strategies thereafter. It should be taken into account that the violence that occurred in specific 
events was in response to police violence (Siam, 2010, p. 71) such as that happened in the El-
Mahalla city on April 6 and during the 25
th
 revolution. 
The youth activism’ activists were aware of the limits of change through ‘authoritarian 
elections’ as the regime designed the election process in ways that ensured its own durability. 
In this regard, the rise of the pro-democracy movement cannot be viewed in the light of the 
nuanced idea of elections in authoritarian contexts as a catalyst for the rise of contestation 
(Brownlee, 2007). Most of the youth activism, as protest movements, distinguished itself from 
political parties and Muslim Brothers by rejecting the election as a strategy for change and 
instead they chose the disruptive tactics and nonviolence strategy to be their main strategic 
actions for change. It is worth noting that other militant Islamists were also rejecting the 
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election but on a different basis because of their interpretation of Islamic principles which 
consider democracy is against Islam. After toppling Mubarak, some activists refused to 
abandon their protest strategy, such as April 6, while others formed their own political party 
to contest the election. April 6 sought to define itself as a lobby group and not a political 
party. There was a continued discussion about this strategy and if it can work or not after the 
change in the political sphere in Egypt in 2011-2012.  
8.6 Framing Processes and Strategies of Cultural Change 
The cultural factor deals with the moral visions, cognitive understandings, and emotions that 
exist prior to a movement but which are also transformed by the formal leaderships through a 
framing process and strategic efforts in order to create shared understandings that legitimize 
and motivate collective action.  
The “objective” political opportunities do not automatically trigger episodes of contentious 
politics or social movements, regardless of perceptions, frames and strategic choices of the 
leaderships. The leaderships decide the best time to take actions and the kind of such strategic 
actions. The interaction and outcomes of these decisions generate other reactions and could 
end up by creating a new opportunity or deepening the constraints.  
The leaders of the youth activism were aware of the political conditions and had their own 
interpretations and knowledge about the environmental political opportunities and constraints. 
As soon as they defined a situation as an opportunity, they began to mobilize and act. For 
example, there were perceptions that the Palestinian Uprising could trigger a new wave of 
collective action in the streets. The activists understood that the regime repression would 
diminish and people’s support for the cause provided an appropriate opportunity to 
demonstrate and form their mobilizing structure. A similar realization and perceptions could 
be seen on other occasions such as the political mobility in 2005, social protestation in 2007-
2008 and the January 25
th
 revolution. The leading activists and entrepreneurs did not only 
recognize the available opportunities when they emerged but they also sought to create new 
opportunities. In this respect the young activists benefited from the new social media which 
provided them with a new genre for mobilization and frames. They also were aware of the 
difficulties facing the arrangement for the political succession and its impacts on the regime 
coherence.   
The leaderships and theorists of the movements sought to construct frames which spread 
through the new social media. The new media used to transmit these symbols and frames, in a 
move towards constructing a consensus among young ordinary people and those taking part in 
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the action and who were meant to be mobilized. The ideas and ideologies spread in the public 
sphere, in addition to grievances, enabling the youth activists to present new claims and to 
behave in ways that fundamentally challenged the regime. 
The youth activism, in cooperation with other social movements, managed to replace the 
dominant belief system that legitimizes the status quo with an alternative mobilizing belief 
system that supported collective action for change. The culture of protest could be seen in the 
music and arts such as Rap and Cairo’s murals and graffiti which represented memorial 
spaces and sardonic resistance. Jokes about Mubarak and his family were indicators of social 
and political change.  
The Agrium protest movement against the petrochemical project in Damietta governorate in 
2008 illustrated an appropriate example of the framing process that was launched by activists 
to demoralize the regime policy. The leadership and activists used cultural and historical 
heritage to generate symbols to inspire the ordinary people and integrated particular ideas and 
meaning in their counter- hegemonic discourse (Tohami, 2010). The movement consciously 
utilized these symbols and cultural meaning to recruit members and get support from society.  
It is important to take into account that both radical and reform Islamists continued “to serve 
as a crucial mobilizing ideology and social movement frame” (Bayat, 2009, p. 7). They 
launched a counter-hegemonic discourse in order to delegitimize the regime considering it far 
from Islamic principles and Sharia. Apart from exclusive or inclusive characteristics of 
Islamist movements, some interpretation of the Islamic principles was used as conservative 
readings of Islam to serve the regime while a different growing trend developed a 
revolutionary reading to challenge the regime. For example, Fares, a liberal activist and a 
former member of MB used to write on his Facebook page an Islamic metaphor in modern 
ways to mobilize young ordinary people. 
Social solidarity and collective identity: 
The young activists attempted to be those types of leaders and entrepreneurs who create a 
social movement by trapping into and expanding deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. 
They launched activities and presented ideas to purposefully “construct” collective identities 
through constant negotiation. In the trajectory of social and youth activism, the solidarity and 
collective identity needs to be addressed by the leadership and entrepreneurs. The solidarity 
means that isolated incidents of contention, for instance, participation in a demonstration to 
support Palestine or Iraq or social protest to improve the public services or increase salaries 
did not create social movements, because the participants in these forms of contention 
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typically have no more than temporary solidarity and cannot sustain their challenges against 
opponents (Tarrow, 2011, p. 11). However such actions and protestation and spontaneous 
assemblies were more an indication that a movement was in the process of formation than 
movements themselves.  
There were common purposes pursued by Kefaya, April 6 in 2008 and the Revolutionary 
Youth Coalition during the January 25
th
 revolution. Each of them called for change and 
toppling the regime but to transform such networks and social protests into social movements, 
it was necessary to create a collective identity and identifiable challenges that helped the 
movement to be a sustaining collective action. But unless they can maintain their challenges, 
movements will evaporate into a kind of individualistic resentment. In this regard, the 
remaining networks from a previous wave of continuous politics, in addition to the new social 
media impact, helped to create solidarity and raise the awareness among the ordinary young 
people. Before June 2008, from the perspective of social movements, there was a low level of 
networks and organization, just sufficient to keep the counter-hegemonic movements alive 
until new opportunities emerged. The second stage would be marked by the attempts to 
construct a collective identity of April 6 as a protest and youth movement which would adopt 
certain ways for change. With a few exceptions, particularly April 6, the collective identity of 
most of the youth activism was not constructed in a way that guaranteed sustainability and 
solidarity among members who easily flocked to the new movements. The movements 
benefited from the loose organizational framework as it help to integrate different networks at 
a given moment, however, this type of organization led to negative effects when conflicts and 
splits erupted between groups and members, or when a famous individual member or group 
committed any mistakes which could easily be attributed to the movements. 
Cooperation and division: 
Social movements emerge out of what is culturally given, finding their position in the 
political landscape by utilizing pre-existent rhetoric and symbols. Constructing a new identify 
for the movements needs a framing processes and ways of defining of the historical and 
cultural heritage. This process had a remarkable impact on the relationship between different 
movements particularly that between the youth activism and Islamism which was complicated 
and characterized by irregularities as it transformed from cooperation to competition and the 
opposite. Bayat (2009, p. 9) argued that that the increasing roles of youth and women 
movements marginalized the role of Islamists. However the fieldwork showed various aspects 
of cooperation across ideological divides between Muslim Brothers, political parties and 
youth activism between 2000-2011. 
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The youth activists followed the examples of Kefaya and the EPCSPI which could be 
described as “non-ideological” in nature. Many of the youth that joined movements like 
Kefaya, and Youth for Change or who blogged on the internet, did not clearly subscribe to a 
well-defined ideological orientation. Most seemed to share a general commitment to the 
values of human rights, pluralism, democracy, and social justice and some displayed watered-
down leftist, and Islamist orientations (Shehata; 2008, p. 6). 
Isherwood (2008) and Etling et al, (2009) concluded that young bloggers connected with 
Kefaya were typically secular, and many bloggers have Socialist, and some, even Marxist, 
sympathies. However Kefaya itself was a loose-knit political movement that was composed of 
different ideological trends that cooperated across divide lines such as Liberals, Labour 
Islamic and the Communist as well as the fact that some of them were Independents (Tohami, 
2009, p. 190). The movements that have gained momentum since 2000 tended to be inclusive 
and internally diverse. 
 It could be argued that the presence of Islamic opposition was hampering activism at certain 
times and strengthening it at other times. They cooperated on many occasions such as the Free 
Student Unions and organized joint protests such as the “Anger Day” on 4 May 2008 and 6 
April 2009, in addition to the National Association for Change. On the other hand, they 
competed and contested with each other on other occasions such as the youth activism 
rejection of the MB strategy to participate in the parliamentary election in 2010.  
It is notable that Sometimes, the MB cooperated and worked with other networks under these 
broad umbrellas and by exchanging ideas but a number of MB members split to join the new 
networks such as Mostafa Al-Nagar who became the coordinator of the ElBaradei Campaign 
and Mohamed Adel who joined April 6 and became the spokesman of the movement. 
The political opportunities did not resolve the problems of "ideology" and "identity" in 
Egyptian youth culture. For example, the cultural polarization prevailed between religious 
trends on one side and the Westernized trend on the other hand. Another trend was the debate 
about the Coptic issues among activists from both Muslim and Coptic youth groups. Lastly, 
there was a debate among Islamist groups themselves. 
The split between the religious and the secular elements appeared to intensify the divisions. 
The pioneer study about the Arabic blogosphere (Etling et al, 2009, p. 9) which focused on 
the political activists discriminated between Islamists, secularists, and avowed atheists. 
Among the Islamists, it showed different groups such as Salafi Sunnis, Twelve Shi’as, and 
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moderate modernizers. Among secularists, it showed Western-leaning democrats, anti-
Western Socialists and Communists, and a healthy dose of Feminists. 
These give us insight about the cultural diversity in the society especially the growth of 
religious groups in both the Coptic, who were thought to be between 6-12% of total 
population, and Muslims. Using religious symbols from Islam and Christianity as a way of 
mobilizing and recruiting, this sometimes led to clashes between movements themselves and 
with the state. When there was a spread of Islamist groups and their symbols, the Coptic 
activists began to express their grievances and mobilize. A scholar argued that, “Over the past 
few years, the Copts have realized that the government has actually violated its long-standing 
agreement with them. It no longer protects them, supports their causes or speaks to their 
interests. Hence, they have now taken the grave risk”. It is easy and common to see the 
enraged Christian youth on the streets. They express dissent which may be uncomfortable for 
many Muslims (Iskandar, 2011). Most Coptic internet websites speak about what they 
described as the isolation and marginalization of Coptic youth and discrimination (EHDR, 
2010, p. 118). Many Coptic activists express their growing concern about the victories of the 
MB and Salafi in the election. 
Internal diversity and interaction: 
The internal diversity in the movements and generational mobility provoked debates and 
discussion about the strategic choices and polices. While some wings in the movements 
tended to be more conservative, others have more open-minded views and good relations with 
other groups. This created intense debate and pressure for reform policies, strategies and 
frames. The airing of this internal debate in cyberspace foretold coming challenges to the 
movements. In this regard the social media helped to empower the voices of younger 
generations who tended to criticize many aspects and practices in some movements, such as 
the Muslim brotherhood and its leaders.  
Blogs and Facebook have enabled individuals in the MBs to partake in opposition media 
activism (Exum, 2007, p. 1). This is evident in “how younger MB members attempt to adopt 
this technology to generate the kinds of solidarity, support and attention” they wish to see 
(Lynch, 2007). The pages, profiles and groups of MB members gradually expanded on 
Facebook which became a public avenue to display internal disputes and controversial issues 
among MB activists as it appeared on the profiles and pages belonging to the younger and 
middle-age activists like Haythem Abou-Khaliel
59
. The movement leaders thought they were 
                                                     
59 http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100000262669968 
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able to contain the different wings while activists argued that this “may further threaten the 
authority of more conservative leaders”. Different approaches emerged among MB leaders 
about how to tackle the issues; while some of them were concerned that the diversity may 
lead to fractions and splits, others did not agree saying, “youth should be encouraged to use 
this technology and not be criticized for doing so” (Ajemian, 2008). The splits took place 
around many issues relating to policies, organization and culture. For example, the ex-Muslim 
Brother activist Abdel-Monem Mahmoud levelled a series of critiques of the conservative 
aspects of the published draft of the MB’s programme as a political party in 2007 before 
splitting (Ajemian, 2008). At the same time, Facebook and Twitter became a public avenue to 
display internal disputes and controversial issues among the MB’s younger generation. 
Facebook pages also illustrated the escalation of the dispute among the young activists of the 
Muslim Brotherhood themselves. They debated about the decision to participate in the 2010 
election and how it has been taken, as some former members raised charges on the incidence 
of counterfeiting in the decision of the Shura Council, whose members agreed to participate 
by 98%. The debate had shifted between the activists, from participating in the election 
decision itself, to a broader discussion about the process of decision-making in the 
Brotherhood and the role of youth. These disputes escalated and led to significant splits in 
2011 when hundreds of activists formed the Egyptian Current (Eltayyar) party whose leaders 
were prominent figures in the MB student wing in the universities. 
8.7 Conclusion: Challenges after the Revolution 
There were high expectations from the youth activism and revolutionary groups after toppling 
Mubarak in 11
st
 February 2011.  
 The youth activism expressed the sweeping feelings and ambitions to participate among 
young people who were keen to practice in the political and public arena during that romantic 
period where youth activists were considered to be the heroes of the revolution.  
The institutional opening after the revolution was supposedly intended to reduce the level of 
domestic protest as social movement organizations shifted their resources towards lobbying 
(Maney, 2001, p. 29). This entailed a transition of youth activism roles and strategies to 
political parties’ policies or NGOs and civil society organizations. However, there was a 
concern that this shift could mean that youth activism would lose large segments of its 
membership as networks were turned into NGOs or political parties, characterized by the 
centrality and bureaucratic rules of the Egyptian experience since the 1970s. Most youth 
activists refused to abandon their protest strategy (such as April 6 and the Revolutionary 
Youth Coalition) while others accepted to form their own political party to contest in the 
election such the dissident group of MBs youth wing (Al Tayyar) without great achievements. 
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There was, for example, a controversial initiative among April 6 activists to identify the 
movement as a lobby group and not a political party but this was one of the reasons behind 
the split in April 6 in 2011. The discussions continued about this strategy and whether it could 
succeed in making April 6 or other networks of youth activism function as lobbies or not.  
However, the main reason for the failure of this shift was that the large segments of youth 
activists believed that the revolution had been stolen and that the old regime still existed and 
that their role consequently is to keep the spirit of revolution through protest activates and 
nonviolent strategy. They sought to achieve the idealistic goals of revolution which required 
tremendous efforts and resources. The dilemma of the Egyptian revolution is that “nothing 
guarantees that a just social order will result from a revolutionary change” (Bayat, 2009, p. 2). 
After 25
th
 January, youth activists sought to demolish the SCAF rule which they considered a 
continuation of the old regime. On the other hand, the election strategy which was part of the 
façade corporatist arrangements during Mubarak era began to work in favour of MB and 
Salafi parties.  Moreover, MB benefited from the confrontation between youth activists and 
the SCAF that have weakened both of them and helped MB to win the presidential election 
and overthrow SCAF in July 2012. 
 
There was a state of revolutionary idealism among the youth activism after the revolution. 
However, they were not fully prepared yet to deal with the requirements of the moment and 
committed numerous of strategic mistakes that led to the decline of their influence in addition 
to division and disintegration. One of their mistakes was focusing on the protest activities and 
social media instead of connecting with ordinary people to solve their problems and build 
electoral bases. It is noteworthy that the internal structures and organizational capacities as 
kind of new social movements were not qualified for effective participation in elections and 
led to more splits and divisions. The collective identity also has not been constructed in a way 
that guarantees the sustainability and solidarity among members who easily flocked to new 
movements. 
The dilemma of the youth activists in terms of organizational and networking aspect can be 
summarized as follows: that they positively benefited from the loose organizational 
framework which integrated different elements and networks at a given moment such as April 
6, 2008 strike or 25 January 2011 Revolution. However, this kind of horizontal organization 
has negative impacts when conflicts and splits erupted between groups and members, or when 
some individual members or network commit mistakes which easily attributed to the 
movement.  
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The level of social and political trust deteriorated between activists and SCAF, between the 
political movements, and within the movements and parties themselves. The ideological 
polarization between Islamists and seculars weakened the cross ideological cooperation and 
youth activism got lost in the middle of such polarization. 
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Conclusion   
Social Movements Theory has been conceptually developed and empirically applied in 
various chapters of the thesis. It has been  applied to two specific case studies from among 
student activist formats; the student unions and the April 6 youth movement.  
It was suggested in the previous chapter that SMT and empirical analysis addressed the main 
questions about the prominence of youth activism in Egypt. The thesis began by asking what 
conditions shaped the mobilization of youth activism in Egypt since 2000 and what SMT 
could tell us about these movements. The empirical study has set out the cycles of contentious 
politics which have been led by new activism and youth activism in Egypt by using the 
conceptual tools of SMT; political opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing processes 
as well as external and transnational factors. Political opportunities expanded significantly 
after 2000, as shown by discussion of the rising levels of grievance, the internal contradictions 
of competitive authoritarian, division among ruling elites and the impact of transnational and 
external factors. Youth activists responded with strategies, mobilization, organisations and 
framing process which characterise the youth activism.  
The thesis has answered the second question by suggesting that Egyptian youth activism 
could be considered as New Social Movements and not only an old style of Social 
Movements or Social Movements Organizations. The new activism could be identified as; 
firstly, adopting a kind of mobilizing structure that is horizontal and networked, secondly, 
being less ideologically partisan enabled them to form across ideological networks and 
movements, and, thirdly, value-oriented movements that focus on freedom, dignity and social 
justice. The youth activism was not hierarchical, but rather network-based which used social 
networking technology as a mobilizing tool. They are not vertically organized such as the MB 
that could be considered to be of the old style social movements. However, large segments of 
the youth activism are not typical NSM by Western criteria and terms because they are not 
post-material nor post-industrial movements and still focus on power struggles, political 
issues and radical change of  an authoritarian regime. Moreover, variables have started to 
occur that emphasize the importance of both the generational effect and social media roles. 
They need to be integrated in the analysis to offer a new synthesis about the youth activism 
and to fill the gaps in the literature and theory. Youth activism as part of contentious 
politics would not have prevailed without the new social media which played a major role in 
the mobilization and framing processes. The most important thing about these movements 
was that they were part of a wider generation of young people. The generational peculiarity 
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and gaps should be taken into account when exploring the common features and collective 
identity of these youth activism.  
 
The Generational Effect 
The analysis of youth activism showed that the youth activism were part of the same political 
generation that could be called the “Digital Native” or “Millennium” generation. Mannheim 
(1974, pp. 7-8) identified a political generation as the same age group members who were 
involved in the two key elements; that all grow in the same historical and cultural context, and 
feel together in the same social and historical determination. In the Egyptian context, the 
Millennium generation is composed of the young people who grew up and experienced the 
historical developments in the period 2000-2011 when their age was between 18-35 years. 
They represent a political generation by Mannheim concepts which emphasized that the 
biological generation has no sense of great political importance without having collective 
identity. The generation that becomes a political and social phenomenon worthy of study is 
the generation that consists of individuals in the same age groups who have lived through the 
same historical experience and share the same hopes and disappointments, and have 
experienced freedom and opposition to the older generation (Mannheim, p. 8; Willis, 1977; 
Pilcher, 1993). Feuer (1969, p. 25) argued that the generational collective identity is formed 
due to the founder events that consolidate the similar generational awareness and way of life. 
It is worth noting that Bayat’s thesis about youth activism and non-collective actors (Bayat, 
2009, p. 5) is similar to Mannheim’s theory about the political generation. Bayat’s 
contribution tended to focus on culture, norms, uniforms and way of life. The claims of 
youthfulness remain at the core of youth movement. But the intensity of youth activism 
depends, first, on the degree of social control imposed on them by the moral and political 
authorities and, second, on the degree of social cohesion among the young (Bayat, 2009, p. 
18). 
 The political generation features different groups of young people who may be conservative 
on the one hand or liberal on the other, for example. But both belong to the same generation, 
because both of them constitute different intellectual and social responses to the same exciting 
historical factors. Each of these two groups represents a specific "generation unit" within the 
same generation (Mannheim, Karl, p. 9-10(. In the Egyptian context the generation features 
different groups such as Nationalists, Islamists, Marxists, Liberals and Independents. 
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Generational gaps: cooperation and rapture: 
Much of the new energy in the Egyptian society and politics came from the younger 
generation which became the main social agent for change. The generations that controlled 
and led Egyptian politics for decades, both in government and opposition during Mubarak’s 
reign, became very old and isolated from the social and cultural transformations in the 
society. There was a chance for a new  generation to replace the old elite  by being attached to 
Gamal Mubarak in  the Policies Committee but its  neoliberal agenda was a major stimulus 
for the 25
th
 January revolution. On the other hand, the official opposition parties came under 
the full control of the regime security services. The activists from the Seventies generation, 
which emerged in the universities in 1970 (see chap. 3), launched various political initiatives 
particularly political parties since the nineties such as Al-Wast, Al Ghad and Al Karamah 
after an internal generational and organizational split in the MB, Al-Wafd and Al Tajamu 
respectively, as well as wide umbrella movements that consisted of independent and cross 
ideological activists such as the EPCSPI, and Kefaya (Tohami, Generational Mobility, 2009).  
The “Millennium” or “Digital Native” generation engaged in contentious politics joining 
these movements and networks in large numbers because of the historical events and political 
opportunities that occurred in Egypt and the region since 2000. They interacted with the large 
number of left-wing activists from the Seventies generation who returned to the political 
arena after nearly a decade of political apathy (Abdalla, 2003).  However, a relative decline 
took place after the end of the wave of political mobility in 2005. The Millennium generation 
began to form their own organizations benefiting from the experience and tactics learned from 
the seventies generation.  
Numbers of leading figures sought to establish their own initiatives and networks after 
developing critical positions toward the older generations, accusing them of apathy and 
inefficacy and compliance with the regime. They launched movements such as Youth for 
Change, April 6 and the Current (El-Tayyar) party which could be considered a rupture with 
the older generation. Other movements featured better relationships between internal 
generations such as the MB and the ElBaradei campaign. However the April 6 movement is 
the most independent group among the younger generation initiatives. These young activists 
called for the 25 January revolution and were the basic backbone of the demonstrations, 
although the subsequent stages witnessed the participation of other generations. 
The new activism was characterized by a set of features that ranged from consuming products 
of globalization and adopting a kind of hybrid culture and values balancing between 
particularity and universality, in addition to the lack of centrality and hierarchy that shaped 
243 
 
their new networks and mobilizing structures. The young activists were driven by unlimited 
aspirations and ambitions so that they went to the extreme demands during the revolution 
while the older generations were hesitating and sought a compromise with the regime. They 
followed radical strategies and became less conciliatory in their approach to the regime, 
favouring comprehensive political change (Tohami, 2011).  
The cultural and collective identity of the Millennium generation is a hybrid culture; a 
combination of global and local components, modern and traditional values. Large segments 
of the young activists moved beyond the divided ideologies to adopt and construct an open 
political value system which could be described as the “postmodernism generation”. Perhaps 
the model of the young man, Wael Ghoneim, the founder of the page “Kolna Khalid Saeed”, 
who works at Google, is an indication of this case. He graduated from Cairo University, and 
received his MBA from the American University in Cairo. Although he is not a partisan, he 
engaged in the protestation against the regime through social networking technologies.  
The Role of Social Media  
 The arrival of the internet-based technologies has made the work of professional activists 
much more effective and has attracted the attention of society and observers, if only because 
their internal and external communications became much cheaper and harder to be monitored. 
The new social networking technologies have provided the youth with new channels for 
participation and empowerment. This became true in a part of the world where the older 
generations, in either government or opposition, controlled the traditional political and 
cultural arena and dominated the public sphere. However, the younger generations gradually 
launched creative initiatives using online media in recent years until the 25 January 
revolution. The younger generations have engaged in public affairs by peaceful means to 
bring about a change and to influence the decision-making processes and policies.  
In this regard, the new social media played a facilitating role in the long wave of continuous 
politics in Egypt since 2003, although it is not a causal role. It basically helped in the 
mobilization and framing process aiming to delegitimize the regime and demoralize its 
policies. The ideas and ideologies spread in the public sphere, and, in addition to grievances, 
enabled the young activists to present new claims and to behave in ways that fundamentally 
challenged the authorities. Indeed the social media impact could not lead to real change 
without physical offline action in society. In this respect the most notable actions, such as the 
April 6 Strike in El Mahala 2008 and January 25 revolution, were triggered by the marriage 
between online and offline activism, particularly when activists moved smartly between 
244 
 
online and offline activities to create real challenges to the regime and to escape from police 
repression.  
The social media empowered ordinary young people and impacted on the policy agenda as 
well. The activists launched social media campaigns to support or halt policies and actions 
both in internal and external issues and which resulted in increasing the role of the public 
space and public opinion in foreign policy. The Egyptian youth activists succeeded in 
attracting international attention and the building of a positive image which shaped the 
international community’s policies toward the Egyptian revolution.  
However, the impact of social media on youth activism became a controversial issue that led 
to debates about how networks both online and offline, contributed to the ousting of former 
president Mubarak. The role of youth activists and their strategy that for a long time was 
considered irrelevant or far from a strong influence on the political structure, proved to be 
effective in stirring the crowd and making a change through non-central virtual and practical 
frameworks and networks with a  determination to pay the cost of change.  
The activists have made extensive use of information technology as a mobilizing instrument. 
Through their websites, blogs and social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, 
youth has been able to coordinate various protest activities, even in the absence of organized 
political structures. The April 6
th
 Strike and January 25 both uprising were wholly a product 
of the marriage of virtual and real activism. Taking into account that the regime had a high 
capacity to weaken and abort the forming of central hierarchical organizations, the new 
activism began using the social media to organize the demonstrations and launch digital 
campaigns calling for reform or change. The social media served as mobilizing vehicles and 
channels that connected and coordinated the activities of youth networks and groups which 
were not hierarchical, but rather network-based.   
Expanding counter-hegemonic discourse 
The value of internet-based communications and new media is not only because they can 
easily communicate and mobilize widely with one another, but also because it allows and 
facilitates the creation of a counter-public sphere of discourse that has the potential to 
penetrate the society (Ajeman, 2008). They facilitated the creation of a counter-hegemonic 
narrative that challenged the regime. The human rights issues and the abuse of power were 
always a remarkable issue in the process of demoralizing the regime policies. This 
represented a major challenge to the regime which was considered a classic hierarchy, 
attempting to maintain control of a large public sphere.  
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In this regard youth activism’s influence was growing in its online presence. They were far 
more prominent and active than the National Democratic Party (NDP). Howard argued that, 
“If the election were held online, Egypt's ruling elites would be tossed out of power. The tide 
of opinion among Egyptians online has become a flood of support for opposition movements” 
(O’Donnell, 2010).  
Constructing alternative awareness and incubator of democratic:  
The new social media presented the possibility of a much richer public sphere than existed 
before.  The internet has become the primary incubator of democratic political conversation. 
The social movements have moved online, using the information infrastructure of digital 
media as the place for difficult political conversations. The main opponent to the regime was 
a complex, fractured umbrella group. They composed of tech-savvy activists and wired civic 
groups which may not be enough to hold it together much longer (
 
Howard, 2010). The slogan 
‘People Want the Fall of the Regime’, which insurgents raised, was not only a rebel sign 
against the control of the older generation which had been in power for decades, but also it 
could be understood as a guide for this generation to build a new world - freedom, justice, 
dignity- fit perceptions for this generation formed in the light of the era of globalization.  
It is important to consider the remarkable competition between activists and regimes, where 
each part pushed to come up with new tools: the authorities - with new tools to censor, and 
the activists - with new tools to unblock the censored materials. The regime realized the risks 
of leaving the arena of public sphere and developed new tactics to halt the strategy of new 
activism and then the social media turned out to be a battlefield. This also included the more 
the established organized groups which have sought to take part in the internet arena after 
recognizing the benefits and risks of ignoring such an arena but without having much 
influence. 
In sum, the Egyptian Youth activism could be seen as the cohering of a generation. They 
transformed the youth activism from activism in the old-style social movements to activism 
via a specifically Egyptian form of New Social Movements which were ultimately horizontal 
networks using social media as a tool for mobilization and challenging the regime hegemony. 
They adopted a nonviolent strategy to bring change but subsequently were unable to translate 
this revolution into post-revolutionary structural power. 
In answer to our third question then, what does the study of contemporary youth activism in 
Egypt tell us about the wider realm of Egyptian state-society relations, we can say that the 
revolution has only just begun. The January 25
th
 Revolution saw a change of leadership but 
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the necessary change in the deeper socio-political fabric of the country needed for a transition 
to more democratic politics  is still to come. 
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Appendix  
Appendix (1): List of Interviewees  
      Name Position-status Affiliation  Date Format of 
interview  
1- Dr. Norhan  
ElSheikh 
Professor and 
Expert 
 
Director of Youth Studies 
Unit in FEPS and 
consultant  at NCY  
8/4/ 2008  Face-to-face 
2- Dr. Gamal Sultan Professor and 
Expert 
Al Ahram Centre for 
Political and Strategic 
Studies- former Member 
of the NDP Policies 
Committee 
10/4/2008 Face-to-face 
3- Dr. Nabieh 
Elalqamy 
Professor and 
Expert 
Chairman of Youth and 
Education Committee in 
the Shura Council (NDP) 
15/4/2008 Face-to-face 
4- Dr. Mosaad Ewies Professor and 
Expert 
Secretary of Syndicate of 
Sports Professionals- 
Former chair Youth 
Agency in the Ministry of 
Youth 
2/10/2010 Face-to-face 
5- Hani El Mekawy Activist and 
Journalist  
Specialist in student and 
education affairs 
20/10/2010 Face-to-face 
6 Ehaab Abdou  
 
Founder  Nahdet El-Mahroussa 20/4/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
 
7 Haitham Kamel Head of Board  Sustainable Development 
Association (SDA)  
25/4/2008 Face-to-face 
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8 Tamer Elfouly Member Egyptian Federation of 
Youth NGOs 
23/4/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
9 Ahmed Al Gaaly 
 
Former 
chairman 
Muslim Brothers student 
wing and FSU 
8/1/2008 Face-to-face 
10 Kholoud Saber Activist  
 
Socialist student 
movement and FSU 
10/2/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
11 Ibrahim Essam Al-
Aryan 
Activist MB Youth Wing 12/1/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
12 Ahmed Maher Coordinator  April 6 21/1/2008 
and  
20/1/2012 
Face-to-face 
Facebook 
13 Daia Al Sawy Activist Al Amal (Labour) Party 10/1/2008 Face-to-face 
14 Moataz Adel  Activist Secretary of the 
Democratic Front party in 
Al Mansoura 
3/2/ 2012 
 
Facebook 
15 Sameh El Barqy 
 
Activist Al-Tayyar party  25/2/2012 Skype  
16 Ahmed Sameeh  Activist Liberal, Andalusia Centre 
for Tolerance   
5/10/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
17 Moataz Othman Activist  Nasserist and human 7/1/2008 Face-to-face 
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rights activist 
18 Fatima Mohamed 
Said 
Independent  Chair of  a Student Union 5/10/2010 
 
Face-to-face 
19 Mahmoud Al 
Sheshtawy 
Journalist and 
activist 
Kefaya and ex April 6 
member 
29/1/2012 Facebook 
20 Khalid Abdel 
Hameed 
Activist Revolutionary Socialist 4/1/2008 
 
Face-to-face 
21 Islam Lutfi Activist Al-Tayyar  party - Ex 
MB Youth Wing  
8/1/2008 Face-to-face 
22 Mohamed Qutub Activist Al Ghad 7/10/2010 Face-to-face 
23 Peter Nabil 
Mikhaieel 
Activist Al Wafd 9/10/2010 Face-to-face 
24 Mostafa Elngar Activist  Former coordinator 
ElBaradei Campaign for 
Presidency – Al Adl 
(Justice) party 
 22/9/2010 
 
Face-to-face 
25 Mohamed El Geba Activist  Ex Muslim Brothers  29/9/2010 Face-to-face 
26 Isam Salama Activist Arab Nasserist Party 12/1/2008 Face-to-face 
27 Mona Saad Activist ElBaradei Campaign for 
Presidency  
5/2/ 2012 Facebook 
28 Mohamed Shawky Activist Coordinator of April 6 
Mass action in Elmaady 
15/2/2012 Skype 
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29 Mohamed Samir Activist Independent 12/2/2012 Facebook 
30 Shaaban Ayob Activist Salafi 11/2/2012 Facebook 
31 Anonymous Activist Facebook activists 27/1/2012 Facebook 
32 Anonymous Activist Facebook activist 16/2/2012 Facebook 
33 Ishak Ibrahim  Activist and 
researcher 
Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights 
25/2/2012 Skype 
34 Noha Khaled  Activist  Mesrna Group - Aboul 
Fotouh Campaign 
19/2/2012 Facebook 
35 Abdullah 
ElNourani  
Activist Islamist - civil society 3/2/2012 Facebook 
36 Shykh hosny 
(Mohamed Hosni) 
Activist Islamist 11/2/2012 Facebook 
37 Belal Abdallah Researcher 
and activist 
Independent  17/2/2012 Facebook 
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Appendix (2) List of Abbreviations  
CSO Civil Society Organizations 
NSMs  New Social Movements  
SMT Social Movement Theory 
PPM Political Process Model 
SMOs Social Movement Organizations  
EP Egyptian Pounds 
NGOs Non-governmental Organizations 
NYP National Youth Policy 
NDP National Democratic Party  
NCY National Council for Youth (Almjls Alqwmy llshbab) 
NCS National Council of Sport (Almjls Alqwmy llryadh) 
NCYS National Council of Youth and Sport 
SCYS Supreme Council for Youth and Sports 
MY Ministry of Youth 
LPI Leaders Preparation Institute 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
UNDP United Nation Development Programme 
USAID United State Aid Programme 
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CDAs Community Development Associations 
CAPMAS The Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics 
ESISYB Egypt State Information Service Year Book 
FEY Federation of Egyptian Youth NGOs 
YO Youth Organizations 
YENAP Youth Employment National Action Plan 
FEPS Faculty of Economic and Political Science 
FSU Free Student Union 
NCSCR National Centre for Sociological and Criminological Research 
NCMC 
EPCSPI 
National Council for Motherhood and Childhood 
Egyptian Popular  Committee for Supporting the Palestinian Intifada  
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Appendix ( 3)  List of Youth activism and Youth Wings of Political 
Parties 
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh Presidential Campaign 
Al-Karamah (Dignity) Party  
Al-Wafd party 
Al-Amal Islamic (Labour) Party Islamist 
Al Ghad Youth Union 
Al-Tayyar Al-Masry (The Egyptian Current Party)  
Amr Khalid Association 
April 6 Youth Movement   
Arab Nasserist Party 
Democratic Front party  
Egyptian Federation of Youth NGOs 
ElBaradei Presidential Campaign  
Justice Party (Hizb ElAdl) 
Formal student unions (federations): (Etihad E-Talaba):  
Free Student Union ((Etihad E-Talaba Elhor) 
Future Generation Foundation (FGF): NDP and Gamal Mubarak youth wing 
Jam'etna (Our University) 
Youth for Change (Kefaya youth wing) 
March the 20th movement 
Meserna Group 
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Muslim Brothers Student Wing (al-ʾiḫwān al-muslimūn)  
Nasserist Party (alhzb alnasry) 
National Democratic Party (NDP) (alhzb alwtna aldymwqraty) 
Ossar: The student clubs or societies in universities  
Revolutionary Socialists 
Salafi movement 
Socialist movement 
Tajamu party  
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